Rickley & Karim (2011). "Examining How Firm-Specific Advantages Impact Foreign Subsidiary CEO Staffing", *Journal of World Business*, 53(5), 740-751.

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Questions

- What is all about in this article?
- What is the major contribution of this article to the literature?
- What about liabilities of foreignness? Where are they originated from?
- Which industry do the authors focus on? Why?
- According to the institutional considerations, why should MNC subsidiaries appoint local CEOs rather than expatriate CEOs?
- Discuss the underlying rationale why the positive relationship between the appointment of local CEOs & institutional distance decreases when (1) <u>MNC multinationality</u>, (2) <u>regional agglomeration</u>, & (3) <u>host</u> <u>country experience</u> increase.
- Draw practical insights from the study's empirical results?

Discuss the drawbacks inherent in this research.



CEO Staffing Strategy: Institutions & Resources



Research Questions

- Whether are CEO staffing strategies influenced by institutional distance?
- How do firm-specific advantages moderate the relationship between institutional distance & CEO staffing strategies? => Whether does (in more institutionally distant host countries) possession of firmspecific advantages shift subsidiary CEO staffing strategies?

Theory

*A mix of institutional theory & the resource-based considerations.


Analytical Strategy

- ✤A quantitative approach.
- 75 subsidiaries of 33 U.S. & European MNC banks in 12 CEE host countries (between 2005–2010).
- Multi-level regressions.






Liabilities of Foreignness



Source: Peng & Meyer (2011: 14).

(1) A lack of familiarity &/or legitimacy in the host environment, (2) lack of relational embeddedness in host-country knowledge networks & structures, costs of coordinating across spatial distances (Eden & Miller, 2001; Zaheer, 1995).



Liability of Outsidership


- Liabilities of foreignness are measured by *differences in country-specific attributes* along *(in)formal institutional dimensions* (North, 1991).
- Cross-national differences in regulations & norms represent salient attributes, & together, these are referred to as 'institutional distance' (North, 1991).





Conceptual Framework

Resource-Based View of the Firm






CEO Staffing Strategy: Institutions & Resources



Hypotheses

KEY POINTS

- An institutional theory-based solution for alleviating liabilities of foreignness is the adoption of local isomorphism strategies (Rosenzweig & Singh, 1991; Zaheer, 1995).
- Using domestic firms' strategic behavior as a template, foreign subsidiaries (1) reduce *risk of losses* due to **misalignment** between internal strategic choices & external market conditions & (2) enhances their legitimacy in the host-country market.
- * MNC subsidiaries are likely to *utilize the local knowledge & network embeddedness* of local CEOs to a greater extent in more institutionally distant environments.








Hypotheses

Resource-Based View of the Firm







Hypotheses **Resource-Based View of the Firm KEY POINTS *** Expatriates as agents of **MNC Regional** informal coordination Facilitates intra-firm Agglomeration within the subsidiary communication & network (Edstrom & knowledge transfer Galbraith, 1977; Harzing, 2002). (Buckley & Ghauri, 2004). **Institutional Theory Subsidiary CEO** Institutional Staffing (1=Local, Distance **0=Expatriate**)

Subsidiaries leverage *related experiences the MNC has earned in proximate locations*.



CEO Staffing Strategy: Institutions & Resources

Hypotheses

Institutional Theory

Institutional

Distance

KEY POINTS

The longer a firm operates in a foreign country, the more opportunity it has to learn about its environment (Barkema et al., 1996), accurately evaluate consumers', competitors', & regulators' actions, & develop relational ties with local actors (Johnson, Lenartowicz, & Apud, 2006).

As MNCs accumulate experience in a host-country environment, the need to rely on the local knowledge of local executives wanes (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1988).



MNC Host-Country

Experience

Subsidiary CEO

Staffing (1=Local,

0=Expatriate)

Resource-Based View of the Firm







Managerial Relevance

- As MNCs seek to configure their subsidiary TMTs to fit the demands of multiple host-country environments, they are constrained by the availability of qualified talent (Tung, 2016), particularly in high-growth emerging markets such as Brazil, China, India, & Eastern Europe (Collings et al., 2007).
- How to allocate a limited recruitment pool across different institutional contexts? => Allocation patterns of expatriate versus local CEOs across subsidiaries are 'not one-size-fits-all'.
- Instead, they depend on interaction between (i) institutional distance & (ii) organizational characteristics of the MNC. While higher levels of institutional distance alone do not indicate a greater use of expatriates, expatriates are used more often by MNCs with firm-specific advantages in more institutionally distant environments.





Limitations & Suggestions for Future Research

- *Focusing on a single region & industry limits the generalizability of our findings. Since this study was performed in the transitioning CEE host markets, it would be particularly valuable to have comparison with Asian communist/transitioning economies.
- The study covered **the period between 2005 & 2010**, which is approximately 15 years following the fall of Communism in CEE.
- The sample consisted of MNCs from more developed countries **operating in comparatively less developed countries**. => How about emerging-market MNCs operating in developed markets?
- ◆ Future research can extend our understanding of subsidiary staffing by also examining the interaction between institutions & culture.







ご清聴有難う御座いました。 Thank you so much! Merci beaucoup ! Vielen Dank für Ihre Aufmerksamkeit! Grazie mille !

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