

LOEB CLASSICAL LIBRARY
FOUNDED BY JAMES LOEB 1911

EDITED BY
JEFFREY HENDERSON

SALLUST
II

LCL 522

59 66M, 66Mc, 57D, 16K

qui¹ praegrediebantur equites catafracti ferrea
omni² specie

Non. p. 556M = 893L.14–15: to illustrate the adj. *catafractus*.

¹ cui (quoi) Müller ² omnes Coler: omnis Müller

60 69M, 67Mc, 61D, 19K

Epistula Mithridatis¹

- 1 "Rex Mithridates regi Arsaci salutem. Omnes qui secundis
rebus suis ad belli societatem orantur considerare debent
liceatne tum pacem agere, dein quod quaesitur satisne
2 pium, tutum, gloriosum an indecorum sit. Tibi si perpetua

¹ The title and text of this letter are transmitted by V (*Vat. lat.* 3864, ff. 126r–27r). Citations from §§15, 16, and 19, as noted below, are assigned to Book 4 by Charisius and Arusianus.

59 66M, 66Mc, 57D, 16K

In the battle between Lucullus and Tigranes, the cataphracts were posted in front of the right wing of the Armenian army (Plut. Luc. 27.7).

mail-clad cavalrymen who went in the vanguard,
having a uniform appearance of iron

60 69M, 67Mc, 61D, 19K

Letter of Mithridates

In the winter of 69/68, after Lucullus crushed the vast forces of King Tigranes of Armenia in the battle near Tigranocerta (cf. §15), Mithridates writes to Phraates III, king of Parthia (whose dynastic name was Arsaces [XII]). His aim is to convince Arsaces that it is in the Parthians' self interest to join in the fight to drive the Romans out of Asia, since the Parthians are bound to be the next victim of Roman aggression. The picture that Mithridates paints grossly distorts the ultimate aims of Rome's foreign policy in that region. Like Pompey's dispatch (fr. 2.86), this letter serves as a substitute for a speech to provide variation, and once again, Thucydides may have provided a model: viz., the letter of appeal for succor written by the ostracized Athenian hero Themistocles to King Artaxerxes of Persia (Thuc. 1.137.4).

"King Mithridates sends greeting to King Arsaces. All persons who in time of prosperity are entreated to enter into an alliance for making war ought to consider whether they are in a position to maintain peace at that time; next, whether what is being asked of them is sufficiently righteous, safe, and honorable or, on the contrary, disgraceful.

pace frui licet,² nisi hostes opportuni et scelestissimi, egregia³ fama, si Romanos oppresseris, futura est, neque petere audeam societatem et frustra mala mea cum bonis
 3 tuis misceri sperem. Atque ea quae te morari posse videntur, ira in Tigranem recentis belli et meae res parum⁴ prosperae, si vera existumare voles, maxume hortabuntur. Ille enim obnoxius qualem tu voles societatem accipiet, mihi fortuna multis rebus ereptis usum dedit bene suadendi et, quod florentibus optabile est, ego non validissimus praebeo exemplum, quo rectius tua conponas.

5 "Namque Romanis cum nationibus, populis, regibus cunctis una et ea vetus causa bellandi est, cupido profunda imperi et divitiarum; qua primo cum rege Macedonum Philippo bellum sumpsere, dum a Carthaginensibus premebantur amicitiam simulantes. Ei subvenientem Antiochum concessione Asiae per dolum avortere, ac mox fracto Philippo Antiochus omni cis Taurum agro et decem milibus talentorum spoliatus est. Persen deinde, Philippi filium, post multa et varia certamina apud Samothracas

² liceret *Manutius* (ed. Ald. 1509) ³ <ni> ante egregia
 ins. *Madvig* ⁴ *Manutius* (ed. Ald. 1509): rarum V

¹ Tigranes had been placed on the Armenian throne by the Parthians shortly after 100 but subsequently grew strong and invaded Parthian territory, inflicting serious losses (Plut. *Luc.* 21.4).

² A euphemism for the loss of Mithridates' kingdom.

³ The Second Macedonian War (200–196), against Philip V.

⁴ Protracted diplomatic exchanges postponed an open clash between the Romans and Antiochus III, the Great, king of the Seleucid Empire in the Middle East, until after the conclusion of the war against Philip. By the Peace of Apamea in 188, Antiochus gave up claim to territories in Asia Minor north of the Taurus Mountains.

If you are in a position to enjoy uninterrupted peace, if [fr. 60] you are not threatened by strategically placed and utterly treacherous foes, not destined to have outstanding renown if you crush the Romans, I would not venture to seek an alliance with you, and I would hope in vain to unite my own unfavorable circumstances with your favorable ones. But those considerations which seem able to give you pause, such as your anger against Tigranes in connection with the recent war,¹ and my not very favorable circumstances²—if you are willing to make a true appraisal—will be major incentives. For Tigranes, since he is at your mercy, will accept an alliance on any terms you desire, while so far as I am concerned, although Fortune has deprived me of much, she has bestowed upon me the means of giving good advice; and being no longer at the height of my power, I furnish a model for you to arrange your own affairs more correctly, something that those enjoying prosperity should welcome.

"In fact, the Romans have one inveterate motive for making war upon all peoples, nations, and kings: namely, a deep-seated desire for dominion and for riches. For this reason, they first undertook war with Philip, king of the Macedonians,³ though they put up a pretense of friendship as long as they were being hard pressed by the Carthaginians. When Antiochus came to Philip's aid, they craftily diverted him from his purpose by the surrender of Asia, and then, after Philip's power had been broken, Antiochus was robbed of all territory this side of the Taurus, and of ten thousand talents.⁴ Next Perseus, the son of Philip, after many contests of varying results—after he

- 11 deos acceptum in fidem, callidi et repertoires perfidiae,
 8 quia pacto vitam dederant, insomniis occidere. Eumenes,
 quouis amicitiam gloriose ostentant, initio prodidere An-
 tiocho, pacis mercedem: post, habitum custodiae agri capti-
 tivi, sumptibus et contumeliis ex rege miserrumum servorum
 effecere, simulatoque impio testamento filium eius
 9 Aristonicum, quia patrium regnum petiverat, hostium
 more per triumphum duxere. Asia ab ipsis obsessa est,
 postremo Bithyniam Nicomede mortuo diripuerunt, quom
 filius Nysa, quam reginam adpellaverat, genitus haud du-
 bie esset.
- 10 "Nam quid ego me adpellem? Quem diiunctum un-
 dique regnis et tetrarchiis ab imperio eorum, quia fama
 erat divitem neque servitutum esse, per Nicomedem bello
 laccessiverunt, sceleris eorum haud ignarum et ea quae
 accidere testatum antea Cretensis, solos omnium liberos
 11 ea tempestate, et regem Ptolemaeum. Atque ego ultus

⁵ The island to which Perseus had fled after his defeat at Pydna in 168.

⁶ In 162, Perseus died in captivity at Alba Fucens in Italy, after having been exhibited in the triumph of Aemilius Paulus. His death is said to have resulted either from self-starvation or at the hands of jailors who prevented him from sleeping (Plut. *Aem.* 37.2-3).

⁷ Eumenes II of Pergamum was given a share of Seleucid territory taken from Antiochus in 188 (see n. above).

⁸ So called because in it Attalus III (d. 133), son of Eumenes II (d. 158), bequeathed his kingdom to the Romans. Aristonicus, an illegitimate(?) son of Eumenes II, led an unsuccessful revolt aimed at preventing the Romans from taking control of the kingdom of Pergamum under the terms of Attalus' will and turning it into the Roman province of Asia.

had surrendered on good faith, as witnessed by the gods [fr. 60] of Samothrace⁵—was killed by those crafty inventors of faithlessness from want of sleep, since they had granted him his life according to a compact.⁶ Eumenes, whose friendship they boastfully exhibit, they at first betrayed to Antiochus as the price of peace; later, having treated him as serving the function of a custodian of captured territory,⁷ they transformed him by means of imposts and insults from a king into the most wretched of slaves. Then, having concocted an unholy will,⁸ they led his son Aristonicus in triumph like an enemy, because he had tried to recover his father's kingdom. Asia was taken possession of by them; lastly, on the death of Nicomedes,⁹ they snatched away Bithynia, although a son had unquestionably been born of Nysa, whom Nicomedes had addressed as queen.

"Why should I name myself as an example? Although I was separated from their dominion on every side by kingdoms and petty monarchies, yet because word had spread that I was rich and would not be a slave, they provoked me to war through Nicomedes,¹⁰ though I was by no means unaware of their wickedness and had previously called, as my witnesses to what happened, the Cretans—the only ones truly free at that time—and king Ptolemy.¹¹ But I took vengeance for the wrongs inflicted upon me;

⁹ In 75 (see fr. 2.57); like Attalus, Nicomedes IV left his kingdom by will to the Roman people.

¹⁰ In 89, Nicomedes IV was pressured by Rome's legate M. Aquilius (cos. 101), who had restored him to the Bithynian throne, to raid Mithridates' neighboring kingdom, and this invasion precipitated the First Mithridatic War (89-85).

¹¹ Ptolemy IX, ruler of Egypt from 88 until his death, in 80.

- iniurias Nicomedem Bithynia expuli Asiamque spoliū regis Antiochi recepi et Graeciae dempsi grave servitium.
- 12 Incepta mea postremus servorum Archelaus exercitu pro-
dito inpedivit, illique, quos ignavia aut prava calliditas, ut
meis laboribus tuti essent, armis abstinuit, acerbissimas
poenas solvunt, Ptolemaeus pretio in dies bellum prola-
tans, Cretenses impugnati semel iam neque finem nisi
13 excidio habituri.⁵ Equidem quom mihi ob ipsorum interna
mala dilata proelia magis quam pacem datam intellege-
rem, abnuente Tigraue, qui mea dicta sero probat, te re-
moto procul, omnibus aliis obnoxiiis, rursus tamen bellum
coepi Marcumque Cottam, Romanum ducem, apud Cal-
chedona terra fudi, mari exui classe pulcherrima. Apud
14 Cyzicum magno cum exercitu in obsidio moranti frumen-
tum defuit, nullo circum adnitente; simul hiems mari pro-
hibebat. Ita, sine vi hostium regredi conatus in patrium

⁵ *Manutius (ed. Ald. 1509): habitur V*

¹² In 88, Mithridates overran the province of Asia and ordered a general massacre of all Romans and Italians living in the territory.

¹³ Cf. §6.

¹⁴ In 88–87, Mithridates' army under the Greek general Archelaus (see next n.) overran most of central Greece.

¹⁵ In 86, Archelaus was defeated by Sulla in two separate battles in Greece and was authorized by Mithridates to work out the peace agreement ending the First Mithridatic War in 85. Later, in 83, Archelaus went over to the Roman side when he fell out with Mithridates.

¹⁶ Ptolemy XII Auletes, who came to power in 80 and relied heavily on support from the Romans, which he purchased with bribes, to maintain his position.

I drove Nicomedes from Bithynia, recovered Asia,¹² the [fr. 60]
spoil taken from king Antiochus,¹³ and lifted oppressive
servitude from Greece.¹⁴ My undertakings were frus-
trated by Archelaus, basest of slaves, who betrayed my
army;¹⁵ and those whom cowardice or perverse cunning
kept from taking up arms in order to remain safe while I
did all the work, are paying most grievous penalties: Ptol-
emy is averting hostilities from day to day by the payment
of money,¹⁶ while the Cretans, now that they have already
been attacked once, will have no end of war except by their
annihilation.¹⁷ As for myself, when I realized that it was
more a postponement of the struggle than a genuine peace
that had been offered to me on account of the Romans'
own domestic troubles¹⁸—though Tigranes refused to join
with me (he belatedly endorses what I said at the time),
though you were far removed from me, and all the rest
had submitted—I nevertheless commenced war anew¹⁹
and routed Marcus Cotta, the Roman general, on land at
Chalcedon; on the sea, I stripped him of a fine fleet. While
at Cyzicus with a large army, mired in a siege, I ran short
of grain; no one in the neighborhood gave support; at the
same time, winter cut me off the sea. When I, therefore,

¹⁷ First attacked by M. Antonius (pr. 74) in his campaign against the pirates, Crete was reduced to a Roman province in 66 and attached to Cyrene at the conclusion of further campaigns against the pirates carried out by Q. Metellus (cos. 69) in 68–67.

¹⁸ The Peace of Dardanus, which ended the First Mithridatic War in 85, was negotiated at a time when Sulla was preparing to invade Italy and drive out his political enemies, who, led by L. Cinna (cos., 87, 86, 85, 84), had seized power in his absence and declared him an outlaw.

¹⁹ In 74.

15 regnum, naufragiis apud Parium et Heracleam militum
optumos cum classibus amisi. Restituto deinde apud Ca-
beram⁶ exercitu et variis inter me atque Lucillum proeliis,
inopia rursus ambos incessit;⁷ illi suberat regnum Ariobar-
zanis bello intactum, ego vastis circum omnibus locis, in
Armeniam concessi; secutique Romani non me, sed mo-
rem suum omnia regna subvortundi, quia multitudinem
artis locis pugna prohibuere, imprudentiam Tigranis pro
victoria ostentant.

16 “Nunc, quaeso, considera nobis oppressis utrum fir-
miorum te ad resistendum, an finem belli futurum putes.
Scio equidem tibi magnas opes virorum armorum et auri
esse; et ea re a nobis ad societatem, ab illis ad praedam
peteris. Ceterum consilium est, Tigranis regno integro,
meis militibus <belli prudentibus>,⁸ procul ab domo, parvo
labore⁹ per nostra corpora bellum conficere,¹⁰ quom¹¹

⁶ Cabera *Cortius*: Cabira *ed. Ven.* 1560 [τὰ Κάβειρα]
⁷ inter . . . incessit] *Charis. GL 1.119.11 = p. 152B.27–28*
⁸ *Charis.: om. V* ⁹ parvo labore] *om. Charis.* ¹⁰ scio
equidem . . . conficere] *Charis. GL 1.196.18–22 = p. 255B.21–25*
¹¹ quō V: quo[m] *Gerlach ed. min.: quoniam Reynolds (sed alibi*
in V, semper quoniam, numquam abbrev. quoniā: Hauler 1895,
p. 141)

²⁰ Actually, M. Cotta's consular colleague L. Lucullus forced Mithridates to lift the siege of Cyzicus in the winter of 73/72.

²¹ Towns on the south shore of the Propontis (Sea of Marmora) and Black Sea, respectively.

²² Near Cabira, an inland stronghold in Pontus, Lucullus defeated Mithridates in late 71, causing him to flee for safety to Armenia.

without compulsion from the enemy,²⁰ attempted to re- [fr. 60]
turn into my ancestral kingdom, I lost, by shipwrecks at
Parium and at Heraclea, my best soldiers together with
the fleets.²¹ Then when I had reconstituted my army at
Cabira and done battle with Lucullus with varying success,
scarcity once more befell us both.²² He had at his disposal
the kingdom of Ariobarzanes,²³ unravaged by war, while I,
since all the country round about had been devastated,
withdrew into Armenia. And the Romans, pursuing not
me but rather their custom of overthrowing all monar-
chies, hold up Tigranes' lack of judgment as if it were a
victory because they kept Tigranes' massive forces out of
the fight by means of the narrowness of the terrain.²⁴

“Do consider now, please, whether you think that when
we have been crushed you will be in a stronger position to
put up resistance, or that there will be an end of war. In-
deed I know that you have great stocks of men, of arms
and of gold; and it is for that reason that you are being
targeted by us with a view to an alliance, by the Romans
with a view to spoils. Yet my advice is, while the kingdom
of Tigranes is intact, and while I still have soldiers skilled
in war, to finish the war far from your homes and with
little labor, using our bodies, since we cannot conquer or

²³ Cappadocia, a client kingdom, where Sulla, when governor of Cilicia in the mid 90's, had reinstated Ariobarzanes to the throne.

²⁴ In 69, near the major city of Tigranocerta. Despite a warning from Mithridates (*App. Mith.* 85), Tigranes, relying upon his vast hordes, risked a battle with Lucullus on unfavorable terrain.

- 17 neque vincere neque vinci sine tuo periculo possumus. An ignoras Romanos, postquam ad occidentem perguntibus finem Oceanus fecit, arma huc convortisse? Neque quicquam a principio nisi raptum¹² habere, domum, coniuges, agros, imperium? Convenas olim sine patria, parentibus, pesti¹³ conditos orbis terrarum,¹⁴ quibus non humana ulla neque divina obstant quin socios amicos, procul iuxta sitos, inopes potentisque trahant excindant, omniaque non serva et maxume regna hostilia ducant.
- 18 "Namque pauci libertatem, pars magna iustos dominos volunt, nos suspecti sumus aemuli et in tempore vindices
- 19 adfuturi. Tu vero, quoi Seleucea, maxuma urbium, regnumque Persidis inclutis divitiis est, quid ab illis nisi dolum in praesens et postea bellum expectas?¹⁵ Romani arma in omnis habent, acerruma in eos, quibus victis spolia maxuma; audendo et fallundo et bella ex bellis serundo
- 20 magni facti. Per hunc morem extinguent omnia, aut occident—quod haud difficile est—si tu Mesopotamia, nos

¹² Ciacconius: partum V ¹³ Douza: peste V
¹⁴ pesti (pestem *codd.* AS *Serv.*: perte *rell.*) . . . terrarum] *Serv. ad Aen.* 7.303 ¹⁵ quid . . . expectas (*expectans codd. Arus.*)] *Arus. GL* 7.487.6 = p. 179DC

²⁵ In the former case, the Parthians will have to risk making the Romans their enemies by supporting Mithridates in order to insure his victory; in the later case (if they do nothing and Mithridates succumbs to the Romans), the Parthians will be the next victim of Roman aggression.

²⁶ The text is uncertain. If *peste*, the reading of V is retained; the meaning is "they have been formed from the scum of the earth."

be conquered without danger to you.²⁵ Or are you not aware that the Romans turned their arms in this direction only after Ocean put an end to their westward progress? That from the beginning they have possessed nothing except what they have stolen: their homes, wives, lands, and dominion? That having been once upon a time refugees without a native land or parents, they have been established to serve as a plague upon the whole world,²⁶ being men who are prevented by nothing human or divine from plundering and destroying allies and friends—those situated far away or nearby, weak and powerful too—and from considering as their enemies all powers not subservient to them and especially monarchies.

"For in fact, while few men want freedom, a great many want fair-minded masters; we have fallen under suspicion as rivals to the Romans and as, in due course, avengers to be. But you, who possess the magnificent city of Seleucea²⁷ and the kingdom of Persia with its renowned riches, what do you expect from them other than guile for the present and war in the future?²⁸ The Romans have weapons against all men, the sharpest against those from whom conquest yields the greatest spoils; they have grown mighty by audacity and deceit and by sowing wars from wars. In keeping with this custom, they will destroy everything, or they will perish in the attempt—a thing that is by no means difficult to bring about—if you from Mesopota-

²⁷ On the west bank of the Tigris, wrested from the Seleucid Empire by the Parthians in 141.

²⁸ In 54, M. Crassus embarked on a war of aggression against the Parthians, which ended in the disastrous defeat of the Romans at Carrhae in 53.

22 Armenia circumgredimur exercitum sine frumento, sine
 23 auxiliis, fortuna aut nostris vitiis adhuc incolumem. Teque
 illa fama sequetur, auxilio profectum magnis regibus la-
 trones gentium oppressisse. Quod uti facias moneo hor-
 torque, neu malis pernicie nostra tuam prolatare quam
 societate victor fieri.”

LUCULLUS' MARCH INTO ARMENIA
 (mid 69–68), FRR. 61–70

61* 71M, 68Mc, 5.9D, 5.11K

Lucullus pecuniam Quintio dedit ne sibi¹ succederetur.

Schol. Gronov. ad Cic. *De imp. Cn. Pomp.* 28 (p. 320St.17–18):
 quoting S. to explicate Cicero's comment on political figures who
 coveted (*concupiverunt*) provincial assignments.

¹ scripsi: illi cod.

62††† 70M, 69Mc, 5.6D, 4.8K

imperi prolatandi percupidus habebatur, cetera
 egregius

Arus. *GL* 7.470.19–20 = p. 122DC (mistakenly assigned to *Jug.*):
 to illustrate *egregius* + acc. [of respect].

63* 5.10M, 4.70Mc, 5.5D, 5.10K

Σαλούστιος μὲν οὖν φησι χαλιπῶς διστεθῆναι τοὺς
 στρατιώτας πρὸς αὐτὸν εὐθὺς ἐν ἀρχῇ τοῦ πολέμου

mia and we from Armenia surround their army, which is
 without grain, without reinforcements, and intact up until
 now only thanks to good luck or our own shortcomings. In
 the course of having set out to aid great kings, you will
 attain the fame of having crushed the robbers of nations.
 I warn and urge you to do this and not to prefer merely to
 postpone your own ruin at the expense of ours rather than
 to be the victor by means of an alliance.”

LUCULLUS' MARCH INTO ARMENIA
 (mid 69–68), FRR. 61–70

61* 71M, 68Mc, 5.9D, 5.11K

L. Quinctius (tribune of the plebs 74, cf. fr. 3.15.11) as praetor in
 68 played a leading role in having Lucullus' province of Cilicia
 reassigned to Q. Marcius Rex (cos. 68): *Plut. Luc.* 33.6. The brib-
 ery reported by S., if it took place, presumably occurred in 69,
 before Quinctius entered office.

Lucullus gave Quin(c)tius money so as not to be replaced
 by a successor.

62††† 70M, 69Mc, 5.6D, 4.8K

Possibly the same context as fr. 61 and included in S.'s character
 sketch of Lucullus.

he was regarded as very desirous of prolonging his
 command, but outstanding in other respects

63* 5.10M, 4.70Mc, 5.5D, 5.10K

Possibly the same context as fr. 61–62.

Sallust states that *Lucullus' soldiers were ill-disposed
 toward him right from the beginning of the war, when*