**The study found a negative relationship between "championing alternatives" and initiative realization. What could be the possible explanations for this?**

1. When subsidiary managers champion initiatives too soon, HQ may:
	1. Reject them due to perceived risk;
	2. Impose bureaucratic constrictions (budget reviews, compliance checks) that slow experimentation.
2. Lack of communication or political skills
	1. Subsidiary managers may lack the ability to persuade headquarters
	2. Championing requires navigating politics.
3. Culture and power distance
	1. Countries with high PDI (China: 80) have hierarchical structures; championing feels like "insubordination."
	2. Countries with low PDI (Sweden: 31) have flat structures; employees are expected to challenge authority, and the HQ boosts bottom-up initiatives

**The authors introduce "enabling embeddedness" as a key subsidiary manager activity. How does this concept extend our understanding of the role of middle managers in general, and why is it particularly critical in the context of MNCs?**

1. Extending Middle Management Theory

Traditional frameworks (Floyd & Wooldridge, 1992) focus on middle managers’ vertical roles (Upward, Downward).

"Enabling embeddedness" adds a horizontal dimension, recognizing that middle managers must also build external ties (with local suppliers, governments, universities) and access localized knowledge (market trends, regulations).

2. Overcoming the "Liability of Foreignness"

MNCs face disadvantages abroad (mistrust, unfamiliar regulations). Subsidiary managers mitigate this by leveraging local relationships and partnering with local elites.

HQ wants standardization; local markets need customization. Embedded managers need to negotiate compromises and shield local experiments from HQ scrutiny until proven.