

PARADOXES OF SEGREGATION

Housing **S**ystems, **W**elfare **R**egimes
and **E**thnic **R**esidential **C**hange
in **S**outhern **E**uropean **C**ities

Sonia Arbaci



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HOUSING **S**YSTEMS, **W**ELFARE **R**EGIMES
AND **E**THNIC **R**ESIDENTIAL **C**HANGE IN
SOUTHERN **E**UROPEAN **C**CITIES

Sonia Arbaci

WILEY

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Series Editors' Preface

The Wiley *Studies in Urban and Social Change* series is published in association with the *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*. It aims to advance theoretical debates and empirical analyses stimulated by changes in the fortunes of cities and regions across the world. Among topics taken up in past volumes and welcomed for future submissions are:

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The series is explicitly interdisciplinary; the editors judge books by their contribution to intellectual solutions rather than according to disciplinary origin. Proposals may be submitted to members of the series Editorial Committee, and further information about the series can be found at www.ijurr.org:

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Preface

Interwoven in every page of this book is the unwritten story of the cities where I have lived, those I still dream about and, above all, the people I have been fortunate to encounter. I am an architect from Milan and I am a migrant. Perhaps ‘il luogo ideale per me é quello in cui é piu naturale vivere da straniero’ (‘The ideal place for me is the one in which it is most natural to live as a foreigner’, Calvino 1994, vii).

The journey of this book started almost three decades ago, in 1990, when I moved to Madrid to work and study. The Madrid of the early 1990s was an exhilarating place; a constant Almodovarian *movida* sparked by the democratisation process and the pursuit of a renewed society where, ultimately, ‘el sol sale para todos’ (‘the sun shines for everyone’). The shared feeling of possibility, of being able to steer urban and social change, was even stronger in Barcelona, a city I have often returned to and where I lived for a spell (2012–2014) while writing this book.

I re-encountered that idea of reconstruction in Porto, a city I moved to in 1993. Society was changing in ways I could not yet understand. But urban transformations were unfolding in slow motion revealing the processes beneath; not only in Porto but also in Lisbon (which is now my second home). Portugal was, and I believe it still is, one of the most welcoming places for immigrants. There is a special Lusophone kindness exhibited towards strangers and an appreciation of other cultures that I have yet to encounter elsewhere. As in Spain, elective affinities among Southern Europeans permeated daily life and yet these were somehow contradicted by the unfamiliar distinctiveness of the city: its people, its colours and its history.

The diversity of the Southern European context was striking. Every time I visited Italian cities, their differences seemed more pronounced and their paths diverging from the rest of the region. Busy with the Second Republic, following the Milanese urban affair (Tangentopoly),

they were not experiencing a second ‘*miracolo Italiano*’ (the ‘Italian miracle’ of the 1950s and 1960s) but the beginning of a home-made neoliberalisation (the Berlusconi phenomenon).

In 1997 I left for New York, a multi-ethnic city that I love and that had a profound impact on me and, indirectly, shaped the direction of this book. Living and working in a society without a welfare state – which until that moment I had taken for granted – made me feel utterly vulnerable. Not having access to public health, the heightened sense of precarity at work, the commodification of many aspects of everyday life and the absence of an institutional safety net was hard to bear. I suddenly saw myself for what I had become: an alien stranded at the margins of an unequal and divided society.

While the Anglo-American neoliberal discourse resonated loudly in Europe and elsewhere, this type of society encapsulated everything I did not wish the future to be. There were and there are alternatives, plenty of them. It became clear to me that even those European welfare regimes – so distinctive and much criticised because allegedly expensive and unfit to embrace the ‘future’ regimes of accumulation – were alternatives worth fighting for. These experiences changed my perspective and interests.

Another defining moment was my move to London in 1998, where I still live and work. It was here that I stopped practising as an architect and ventured into the academic world, which gave me the opportunity to meet and work with some extraordinary people. This book would not exist without the intellectual generosity of the many academics and friends, in London and overseas, who have helped shape many of the ideas presented in the pages that follow.

Michael Edwards, a beautiful soul and an incredible inspiration to myself and others inside and outside the Bartlett School of Planning, University College London (my alma mater and current intellectual home). His contagious enthusiasm encouraged me to embark on this massive comparative pursuit, seeking explanations in uncharted territories across disciplines and regions of Europe. Michael has a special talent to take one's concerns and intuitions to another level. His support has been critical and enduring and has helped me develop the original body of work present in this book. To him, I would like to extend my dearest thanks.

My relationship with London and the British academic scene is one of ‘*odi et amo*’ (‘I hate and I love’, Catullus 65 BCE, 85), whose intrinsic contradictions I have grown fond of. Ironically, it was a frustration with the Anglo-Saxon ethnocentrism rooted in certain disciplines, its contempt towards peripheral countries and secondary centres of scholarship, that spurred me to look (and travel) for sources of inspiration

elsewhere. This opened up unexpected encounters with wonderful scholars in the United Kingdom and abroad, many of whom have since become close friends.

I would like to extend my warmest thanks to Judith Allen, Frank Moulaert and Thomas Maloutas, who have been pursuing common denominators and shared lexicons between the different corners of Europe and the Anglo-Saxon world. To Judith, for her marvellous conceptual brilliance in understanding how societies work and for being the only scholar in the United Kingdom who was really interested in Southern Europe while dealing with the welfare-housing puzzle. To Frank, for his elegant mind that brings light in the darkest moments with his prism of elective affinities. To Thomas, for his wonderful intellectual wisdom that recentres any debate where it matters the most.

On one of my trips to Lisbon, I met Jorge Malheiros, shortly after he published the first comparison of ethnic segregation in Southern and Northern European cities (2002). Expecting a venerable 'catedrático' (full professor), I encountered a young scholar with a venerable wit. A heartfelt thank you to him for all of the joyful collaborations and discoveries; for showing me the fun part of migration studies (paradoxically, one of the most insular of disciplines); and for introducing me to a network of great scholars. Among them, Lucinda Fonseca and her research group and Paul White whose brilliant work and theoretical approach influenced the framework of this book.

Everyone has secret sources of inspiration. Though an unorthodox practice, I would like to disclose the names of a few people who have been crucial to this research. I would like to extend my appreciation to Sako Musterd, Ronald van Kempen, Stuart Lowe, Jim Kemeny and Gøsta Esping-Andersen among other comparative thinkers; Antonio Tosi, Enzo Mingione and a particular stream of (young) scholars from Italy and from the much-admired Franco-German and Scandinavian region who I met through the RC21 and ENHR conference circles.

But the one I cherish the most is Jesús Leal Maldonado, a reference for many in housing, segregation and urban studies in Southern Europe and the Spanish-speaking world of the Americas. I deeply appreciate that he transformed what was a brief encounter at a conference at Cambridge into opportunities to continue the conversation. I am thankful to him for sharing ideas and questions while wandering together through new and familiar cities; for opening the hermetic doors of Spanish academia and introducing me to some wonderful scholars, particularly those of his research group in Madrid. Many passages of this book are a legacy of his intellectual kindness and beautiful friendship.

Despite my periodic escapes, I have always returned to London because of the generous colleagues and close friends I have had the

fortune to meet at the Bartlett School of Planning, my intellectual family. My infinite gratitude goes to Claire Colomb, an unending source of inspiration and incredible support throughout every step of my academic journey. She made me believe this book was possible and lent her critical eye to the introduction and conclusion. To my sisters-in-arms, Elisabete Cidre, Elena Besussi and Alexandra Gomes, who helped me join the dots on sunny and rainy days; to Penny Koutrolikou and Nikos Karadimitriou who showed me the complex beauty of Athens and Greek society. A kind thank you to Nick Gallent and Matthew Carmona for providing moral and financial support (and lots of patience). To my closest colleagues and those I met at University College London (Laura Vaughan, Pablo Mateus, Ben Campkin, Ger Duijzings and Paul Watt from our neighbourly Birkbeck) for their collaborative and intellectual spirit.

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To my mum and my brother; you are always in my thoughts.

Sonia Arbaci
London, UK

1

Introduction

1st of January 2018. New Year's Day speech. Addressing the nation, Denmark's Prime Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen announced: 'We must set a new target of phasing out ghettos altogether. In some places by breaking up the concrete. By demolishing buildings. By spreading the inhabitants and rehousing them in different areas. In other places by taking full control over who moves in. We must close the cracks in the map of Denmark and restore the mixed neighbourhoods where we meet people from every walk of life' (Statsministeriet 2018).

In spite of a consensus that residential segregation is a multidimensional and complex phenomenon, an oversimplified assumption that spatial segregation¹ mirrors social inequality² persists. This is especially the case concerning forms of segregation referring to ethnicity, nationality or race.³ In other words, *spatial* concentration is considered a proxy indicator of *social* division attached to poverty, marginalisation or exclusion. Metaphors such as ghetto and neighbourhood effects have helped to reinforce this belief since they carry pejorative connotations that have resonated within the media, with policy makers and even in academic circles outside the (North American) context from where they originated. Likewise, *spatial* desegregation and mixing are equated with *social* integration, inclusion or upward mobility; a more optimistic version of the same assumption that echoes in debates about processes (dispersal) as well as policies (anti-concentration).

Paradoxes of Segregation?

Yet, this is not the case in many parts of the world, in particular in Southern Europe, the focus of this book. At least since the 1990s, cities such as Milan, Rome, Madrid and Lisbon have presented an apparently paradoxical phenomenon that challenges these assumptions: while urban inequalities and residential marginalisation are traditionally high, spatial segregation among both native and foreign groups has been low and moderate. And this has declined even further during the 2000s. This phenomenon has intrigued me since my migratory journey across this region started in the early 1990s. Ethnic concentration patterns and urban processes seemed very different from those depicted in North American and Northern European cities; are these patterns an exception, or a transitory phenomenon about to change with increasing migration? Are processes of ethnic and class-based segregation distinct across places? If so, what drives these? After a century of research in segregation, dominant theories could not fully explain this phenomenon, and this part of the continent was overlooked in the European debates on segregation burgeoning in that period. Indeed, it was surprising to realise how little was known about Southern European multi-ethnic cities.

Similar paradoxical phenomena have been happening in other parts around the world, but have only recently drawn considerable attention. Despite the worsening of social inequality, several cities are not becoming more spatially segregated. Even with the surge of new mass migrations or the escalation of the housing affordability crisis, the forecast process of 'ghettoisation' has not materialised in a systematic way across cities. In several places residential segregation has even decreased among immigrants and native groups across the city and its metropolitan area, and some neighbourhoods are becoming more ethnically diverse and socially mixed.

This is particularly striking in the United States, where the latest census revealed an unparalleled decline in spatial division between White and Black in 53 metropolitan areas, especially 'in cities long divided by race, including Detroit and Chicago', with San Francisco becoming one of the least racially segregated cities in the United States (Lee 2015, p. 1). Is this mainly because of changing demographics, due to the unprecedented variety of immigrant inflows and ethno-racial mobility associated with globalisation? The dispersal of households from Hispanic origin, in particular, is claimed to be reducing segregation in US cities (Frey 2014), driving the 'global neighborhoods' phenomenon, 'where Hispanics and Asians are the pioneer integrators of previously all-White zones, later followed by Blacks' (Logan and Zhang 2010, p. 1069). Importantly, some scholars may see this decline in segregation as a sign of assimilation into

US society (Pais, South and Crowder 2012), even though poverty and divisions are escalating, and racial unrests returning. For many, it is just a temporary phenomenon because neighbourhoods are expected to resegregate 'organically', mirroring individuals' racial preferences (Clark 2009); only a few consider that this phenomenon contradicts established North American segregation theories (see discussion in Lumley-Sapanski and Fowler 2017).

On the other side of the Pacific, the role played by local and national institutions seems to matter more in studies of spatial segregation. Yip (2012, p. 89) stresses that local housing policies and the planning system in Hong Kong have been indispensable to ensure social mixing in such a divided city. For Fujita and Hill (2012, p. 37) the Japanese national political economy and its legacy is crucial to understand why residential income inequality 'does not translate into class-based segregation in Tokyo'.

Is this phenomenon the by-product of distinctive historic conditions? This seems to be the case in most post-Socialist Eastern European cities that saw the upsurge of class inequalities after the late 1970s combined with a decrease in spatial segregation (which then stabilised throughout the 1990s). This has been unsurprisingly termed the 'paradox of post-Socialist transition' (Sýkora 2009) or 'post-Socialist segregation' (Marcinićzak, Gentile and Stępniać 2013). A key argument, as suggested for Tallinn, is that it was state Socialism that engineered cities around low levels of socio-spatial differentiation; and this remained so thereafter because of the residential immobility of the lower classes combined with the slow mobility of the upper classes (Ruoppila and Kährik 2003). Yet moderate segregation levels should not be 'ascribed solely to the period of post-Socialist development' but to ongoing gentrification and middle-class suburbanisation, as claimed for Prague (Ouředníček et al. 2016, p. 26).

Also here the paradox is considered by some as a transitory phase. Residential segregation is 'inevitably' expected to rise when the neoliberal 'reform' of the labour and housing markets is completed: central areas will then be colonised by wealthier groups, suburbs by the middle classes, and the rest squeezed in between (see discussion in Sýkora and Bouzarovski 2012). Conversely, others predict increasingly finer patterns of segregation due to a 'variety of processes, sometimes apparently contradictory, at work' (Haase et al. 2011, p. xvi), unclear regulation on tenure rights and property restitution, and a 'complex intermix of investment-disinvestment' (Kovács and Szabó 2016, p. 256; see also Lowe and Tsenkova 2003).

The simultaneous escalation in class inequalities and fall in segregation indices seems, instead, a recent occurrence in various Northern and Central European cities. The explanation regarding changing

demographics posited in the United States reverberates in the United Kingdom with Catney (2015, 2016) suggesting that the growing ‘super-diversity’ of the population, in particular due to the complex composition of recent waves of migration (Vertovec 2007), is driving the (ethnic) desegregation of London and other British cities. In Vienna, Hatz, Kohlbacher and Reeger (2016) associate these processes with the desegregation of the wealthiest groups, while in Dutch cities these are linked to neoliberal housing policies and tenure-mixing regeneration programmes (Bolt, Özüekren and Phillips 2010). Critically, none of these explanations consider low segregation levels or desegregation processes as unequivocal indicators of social upward mobility and improved life chances.

Equally intriguing is the ‘reverse of the paradox’ encountered in Scandinavian cities. Copenhagen, Stockholm, Oslo and Helsinki are among the least socially unequal cities of the world (Barr 2017), but their levels of spatial segregation are considerable; part of the reason seems to lie beyond the city boundaries, within the action of Scandinavian welfare states (Arbaci 2007; Andersson et al. 2010; Andersen et al. 2016).

This mosaic of cases does not necessarily portray a trend or a universal phenomenon (oscillations and rises in segregation indices can be simultaneously traced in many multi-ethnic cities; Tammaru et al. 2016). But it suggests that correlations between the spatial and social dimensions of inequality are not as straightforward as often implied by mainstream metaphors of segregation. Simply put, these patterns do not reveal a paradox, but rather indicate that the relationship between segregation and inequality is far from linear. How can we make sense of these patterns? How can we unpack this complex relationship to better understand (and address) the possible social problems or issues sometimes associated with segregation? Perhaps the concept of segregation should be abandoned altogether since, as van Kempen (2002) mentioned, it cannot be explained by one single theory.

Certainly, the variety of explanations put forward, while limited, expose radically different approaches to segregation (a discussion furthered in Chapter 2). They differ greatly in how segregation is perceived: is it an organic and inevitable outcome resulting from individual preferences and/or global forces or, conversely, is it a structural, systemic process? Should it be seen as an issue attributed to individuals, the neighbourhood, the city or society as a whole? Ultimately, is it a problem and for whom, and what are the solutions? At the heart of this contested debate is the way segregation is conceptualised (theory formation) and addressed (policy formulation).

This book embraces this debate through an international investigation of patterns of ethnic residential segregation across eight Southern

European cities – Lisbon (Portugal), Madrid, Barcelona (Spain), Rome, Milan, Turin, Genoa (Italy) and Athens (Greece) – from the early 1990s to the global financial crisis of the late 2000s. The study is embedded within broader debates and analyses on segregation patterns in Western European⁴ societies. It is the outcome of two decades of comparative research exploring a region that offers a rich ground for advancing our understanding of segregation processes (Arbaci 2002, 2007, 2008; Arbaci and Malheiros 2010; Arbaci and Tapada-Berteli 2012).

Recentring the Debate on the Production of Urban Inequality

The way of conceiving and perceiving social reality is moulded by the concepts themselves, making the use of vague and ill-defined terms an obstacle to the eventual solution of social problems that are outwardly specified or implied by them. At the same time, however, vague concepts can be politically attractive if they can successfully accommodate different meanings appealing to different audiences. Clarifying the theoretical background and the preconceptions inherited in a concept is thus essential for putting up clearer, but not necessarily more appealing, political projects. (Maloutas and Pantelidou-Malouta 2004, p. 450)

This book outlines an understanding of segregation in relation to the broader organisation of society and calls for a recentring of the debate on the role of the state–market(–family) nexus⁵ in the production of urban inequality. Segregation is a multiscale process driven by a variety of systemic mechanisms and contextual factors, their legacies and transformation, and not by inevitable global forces, individual behaviour or pure market logics. I argue that the way societies are organised and produce, transform and distribute resources, plays a key role in the social division of space; segregation is thus an embedded product of – and should be understood in relation to – the wider society. Central to these processes is how social institutions⁶ – state, market, family and non-profit sector underpinning civil society – intertwine in the deployment of resources and (welfare) services.

The focus of this research is not solely on patterns of ethnic residential segregation (describing outcomes); it is mainly concerned with the mechanisms, processes and changes (identifying causes) that drive these patterns and forms of socio-ethnic differentiation. Critically, there is an effort here to distinguish and unpack the spatial and social dimensions of segregation. The attention is thus placed on social inequality and residential marginalisation⁷ and the spatial forms they take (segregation). Contrary to the traditional notion of ‘poverty’, these are all concepts

that reveal the *relational positioning* (stratification, differentiation and segmentation) of a group within a society and/or a city. This book aims to steer the segregation debate where it matters: the production of urban inequality.

This is a radical departure from the reductive notions of segregation that permeate – and dominate – mainstream theory and policy formation. Ethnocentrism(s) is arguably an issue in segregation studies. As Robinson (2002, 2011, 2016) and Maloutas (2013) put it, ethnocentrism is a hegemonic narrative constructed by core centres of scholarship that tends to universalise theories and findings from their own contexts, and steer interpretations in other geographic contexts, neglecting the value of the ‘ordinary’ and the ‘periphery’ in theory formation. Despite the wealth and diversity of scholarship on segregation around the world (Sabatini 2003; Njoh 2008; Colombijn and Barwegen 2009; Fujita 2012), US-based theories have been clearly dominant in exporting influential metaphors that became worldwide normative references: the ‘underclass’ and the ‘ghetto’ in the 1980s, ‘polarisation’ and the ‘hyper-ghetto’ in the 1990s, and the ‘dispersal consensus’ and the ‘neighbourhood effects’ since the 2000s. Grounded on a century of North American scholarship, these notions have funnelled the focus primarily on race – ethno-racial divisions (especially between Black and White) – and poverty (the urban poor). Ethno-racial segregation per se is often perceived as negative and primarily ascribed to racial preferences and behaviours, or market discrimination; it is not seen as a societal process but as an issue of individuals and neighbourhoods.

Approaches from urban, housing, welfare and immigration studies, previously explored in isolation from one another, are brought together in this book to examine *how* (ethnic) residential segregation is produced in society across dimensions and scales. Through *contextual divergence perspectives*, a comparative approach that bridges context-bound perspectives (drawn from urban studies) and comparative divergence perspectives (drawn from housing studies), I propose to explore the variety of ethnic residential patterns encountered in the cities examined in relation to welfare regimes, housing systems, immigration waves and division of labour, and the socio-spatial structure of the city and their changes. This is an attempt to advance multiscale approaches and systemic thinking in segregation studies by exploring how macro-scale principles of stratification and mechanisms of differentiation translate at the city level and differentiate social and ethnic groups across cities. This approach is operationalised through a new interpretative framework drawing on White’s (1999) ‘contextual structural model’ (see Chapter 2).

Contextual divergence perspectives are crucial in this research. Rather than seeking convergences in paths and universalised explanations, this comparative approach interrogates differences among patterns and systems, seeking to reveal and comprehend the distinctiveness and contextual diversity of each case. Why are Lisbon and Athens more ethnically segregated than Milan, Rome and Madrid? Why are some foreign groups more spatially concentrated than others, especially the wealthiest such as North Americans and Japanese? Why are Moroccans highly segregated in Brussels, slightly less so in Amsterdam, dispersed in the periphery of Turin and Madrid and moderately predominant in the centre of Genoa? This approach helps to identify the role of certain key features – mechanisms and changes – that would not be revealed using a single case study, but also establish wider comparative frameworks by contextualising Southern Europe in relation to other regions of Europe (Northern, Central and Scandinavian).

The approach taken here relies, in part, on quantitative analyses which adopt simple statistical methods (e.g. Indices of Segregation, Location Quotients), and data has been processed to ensure comparability (as databases differ significantly between countries and cities; more details in Chapters 2, 3 and 5) and accessibility to the reader. However, because I regard quantitative data as limited in capturing the underlying mechanisms of social and spatial differentiation analysed here, I use this segregation data mainly to reveal differences in geographies and degrees. This is to prompt questions on the diverse spatial forms that social processes take, in particular those driven by residential marginalisation, housing segmentation and socio-ethnic differentiation. This is not a book that will entirely satisfy a reader eager to delve into sophisticated statistical methods to understand how segregation works. Moreover, despite the effort to overcome data constraints (especially on immigrants and housing) and the technical limitations of cross-comparative analyses (e.g. in terms of statistical regularity and classification, scale and unit of analysis), these persist and were complemented when possible with secondary data and a degree of caution in data interpretation.

A key point of departure here is that the broader vision of society that each country holds – whether based on principles of social equity, economic liberalism or conservative familism – informs its welfare regime⁸ and patterns of stratification. But how do mechanisms of differentiation embedded in the welfare pillars (education, labour, housing, etc.) influence the social and spatial division of cities and neighbourhoods? Studying Western Europe is particularly revealing given the variety of welfare regimes (social-democratic, corporatist, liberal and familistic)⁹ which are representative of different positions of the role of the state along the universalism/residualism spectrum.

Starting with an analysis of these four welfare archetypes (Chapter 3), we will see throughout the chapters that the degree of redistribution¹⁰ is central not only in preventing or reducing social inequality, but also in shaping patterns of (ethnic) spatial segregation. There is thus a far-reaching relationship between segregation and redistribution than needs to be explored but that is almost absent in mainstream segregation studies.

To this end, a view across European housing systems takes central stage in this book. Housing is a major engine for the production of wealth but also of inequality (Edward 2002); its potential redistributive value is tremendous. But its extent depends on the fundamental question of whether housing should be considered a right, a good or an asset (see the contentious debate on the ‘wobbly pillar’ in Chapter 2). The way housing is conceived and organised ‘in a sense can come also to shape, if not actually define, different types of welfare systems’ (Lowe 2011, p. 140; see also Kemeny 1980, 2005). Sadly, despite its fundamental role *within* society (Allen et al. 2004), housing is a field nearly systematically neglected in welfare studies. Furthermore, because of this oversight, welfare studies have been at odds with understanding welfare regimes in Southern European countries, and have disregarded the distinctiveness of a ‘familistic’ welfare capitalism (considered at best a conservative variation of the corporatist one). But it is, in fact, ‘a model of national political economy prevalent in many regions in the world (Southern Europe, Latin America and Asia), where the family plays a double role as the key provider of welfare and a key agent in the model’s socio-economic and political reproduction’ (Papadopoulos and Roumpakis 2013, p. 204).

Housing is certainly a major feature that differentiates Southern European societies from European counterparts given, for instance, the traditional dominance of homeownership, the role of family and patrimony¹¹ within the supply system, and how these influence urban development and urban policies (Leal 2004a). This distinctiveness, however, has been overlooked in previous interpretative frameworks on segregation that were developed from specific contexts (mainly Northern European) and thus slightly biased to the relevant aspects of those cases. I sought to overcome this limitation by shifting the conventional emphasis on housing market and social housing towards the broader concept of housing system, which includes the tenure policy system and the supply system (as presented in Chapter 3). Throughout the chapters it will emerge that in particular the housing supply system, since it encompasses provision, production and especially the land system, is fundamental for understanding how urban inequality is produced, filtered or prevented (as discussed in Chapters 2, 3, 7 and 8).

We will see how each sphere of the housing system (tenure policy and supply) distinctively influences how groups are stratified socially and spatially across the cities examined. The degree of (de)commodification¹² emerges as a key determinant. As housing operates across scales, we will also discover in our investigation across the eight cities, the ways in which (changes in) the national housing system influences local strategies of urban growth and renewal programmes (local urban political agendas), underpins profound societal transformations (e.g. ‘monetary revolution’, Emmanuel 2004), and triggers particular socio-urban processes of marginalisation (e.g. gentrification, embourgeoisement or peripheralisation; Chapters 8 and 9). Moreover, a comparative focus that triangulates between the geographic distribution of housing tenures, the segregation patterns of a large variety of foreign groups and those of native groups (thus reflecting the socio-spatial structure of the city) is key to further reveal important mechanisms at play in forms of socio-ethnic differentiation (e.g. religious affiliations, spatially entrapped social mobility, the so-called ‘belt effect’; Chapters 6 and 7).

Although it may be surprising, migration studies have had little bearing on segregation studies, with these two fields developing mostly in isolation. I consider migration of critical importance to understand ethnic segregation processes. Migration flows, immigrants’ characteristics and migratory projects play a crucial role in the settlement patterns and residential mobility of ethnic groups (White 1999). At the same time, migration systems inform, and are greatly influenced by, the broader transformations of societies (King 2000; Ribas-Mateos 2005; Castles 2010; see debates on the ‘Mediterranean caravanserai’ and ‘social transformation perspectives’ in Chapter 4). I will thus identify distinct migration waves across Southern Europe (since the mid-1960s) and scrutinise how these, by intersecting urban processes, have led to diverse patterns in the settlement, housing trajectory and geographic distribution of immigrants, while being instrumental in the socio-economic reproduction of the receiving society (e.g. through the provision of social care and dependency on low productivity sectors).

Longitudinal thinking is key to capture these transformations and their effects on segregation. We will discover that during the 1990s, complex processes of spatial, social and ethnic differentiation working at different scales were at play, with divergences in patterns and paces of change, linked for instance to self-production, intergenerational mobility *in situ* and contrasting socio-spatial structures visible between port and continental cities (Chapters 6 and 7). However, since the late 1990s, the relationship between segregation and inequalities has become increasingly difficult to interpret. Incrementally, ethnic desegregation and metropolitanisation, and the blossoming of homeowning

societies has perniciously disguised new forms of residential marginalisation and more complex mechanisms of social and ethnic division in the cities studied (Chapter 8). For instance, the expansion of homeownership among immigrants is paradigmatic: in many cases, it does not necessarily indicate residential upward mobility but entrapment in marginalised conditions and over-indebtedness, and masks a stark and widening divide along social and ethnic lines. In different forms and to different extents, these patterns are a product of the neoliberalisation of the state–market nexus filtered by Southern European familistic welfare regimes and channelled through national policies and local programmes (Chapter 9).

Throughout this comparative journey across cities, I put forward an alternative metaphor of segregation – the ‘urban diaspora’ – to capture the macroscale dimension of processes of (forced) centrifugal expulsion from the central municipal areas into the successive rings of the metropolitan area. In most cases, the resulting patterns of ethnic desegregation, dispersal and metropolitanisation reflect processes of exclusion, segmentation and urban marginality rather than dynamics of upward social mobility and housing career. This underlies the ‘paradox’ seemingly witnessed in the cities concerned whereby the increase in social inequality entails processes of dispersal, and thus a decrease in spatial segregation. I aim to move away from traditional metaphors of the ethnic ghetto and neighbourhood effects, and conceptualise this new geography of inequalities outlining a more systemic understanding of segregation.

Some of my arguments are not entirely new. An (alternative) notion of segregation as a context-dependent and societal process has been burgeoning in the European literature at least since the late 1990s, triggered by the worldwide transformations of the 1980s, and the critique of the polarisation thesis and convergence theories (further discussed in Chapter 2) in urban and housing studies thereafter (Kemeny and Lowe 1998; Musterd and Ostendorf 1998; White 1999; Maloutas 2004a). Since then, a growing group of European scholars joined forces in developing comparative studies that offered new interpretative frameworks to explain the diversity of (ethnic) segregation patterns across Western European multi-ethnic cities and laid the ground for (what I would like to consider) a European school of thought on segregation (Musterd, Ostendorf and Breebaart 1998; Maloutas and Fujita 2012; Tammaru et al. 2016). This book builds and expands on the contributions of this body of scholarship.

While this European literature presented a paradigm shift in the conceptualisation and theorisation of segregation, its contributions hardly resonate in the core of the discipline, led by the long-established North

American scholarship, and is often seen as peripheral in international debates. There is a rift between North American and European approaches – presenting contrasting lexicons, foci, interpretative lenses and solutions – which have been consolidating in antithetical directions with little dialogue and uneven footings in the international scholarly and policy debate, often influenced by a US-rooted ethnocentrism, as already mentioned.

How segregation is conceptualised is not just an academic debate; it has an immense impact on policy and ultimately on the life chances of urban residents. Policy makers and the media have been regularly seduced by dominant metaphors which, by inferring that the spatial and social dimensions of segregation are interchangeable, may carry a simplistic assumption that social problems can be solved by spatially reordering those ethnic or social groups concentrated in allegedly problematic neighbourhoods (Darcy 2010). This assumption has provided the theoretical justifications for the revival of ‘area-based urban programmes’ designed to de-concentrate certain groups and foster forms of social mixing, as well as residualist housing policies to increase owner-occupation – often both effective back doors of neoliberalisation and recommodification of welfare pillars (Lupton and Tunstall 2008; van Gent, Musterd and Ostendorf 2009; Pinson and Journal 2016). Despite growing opposition from academics and grass-roots organisations, this assumption continues to dominate the urban policy discourse across Western Europe and the Global South (Porter and Shaw 2009), including in contexts where indices of ethnic segregation are low or decreasing, as in Southern and Eastern Europe. Sadly, this discourse is also pervading Scandinavian and Central European countries where long-established practices of universalism and ‘people-based programmes’ effectively kept urban inequalities at bay and built less divisive societies during the Keynesian Fordist era.

The implicit point I would like to steer with the metaphor of the ‘urban diaspora’ is that the policy response to segregation needs to be reframed through systemic thinking (the exploration of the multidimensional link between segregation and redistribution is an attempt in this direction), rather than assuming spatial interventions will solve social problems by desegregating and mixing people, as implied in many traditional metaphors. This is not to entirely disregard the focus on issues such as racial prejudice and market discrimination as entangled with segregation processes, but to stress the need for a more sophisticated understanding that recognises (the production of) urban inequality as the essential issue to tackle. It entails reconsidering which principles and policies within the universalism/residualism spectrum can effectively attain a less unequal society. Those who still believe that

social equity, universalism and decommodification of welfare services – once beacons of post-War, Fordist equalitarian societies – were and still are part of the solution, are left with a main challenge: how can universalism be rethought today within a post-Fordist regime of accumulation? This is a crucial question, more so given the new challenges posed by massive immigration waves and the increasing financialisation of the state and everyday life, and with austerity and rising populism based on post-evidence rhetoric and anti-immigration discourses, both pledging simplistic solutions to complex problems.

The Value of the (European) Periphery

European scholarship has contributed to counteract ethnocentrism in segregation studies by expanding its empirical basis and challenging dominant US-based theories. However, this scholarship, particularly Northern European research dealing with housing and immigration, has also revealed some tendency to apply accounts and theorisations from some parts (e.g. the Netherlands, the United Kingdom) to other regions of Europe such as Southern and Eastern Europe. The latter are often considered ‘variations of’ or ‘in transition to’, respectively, and expected to converge with Anglo-Saxon or Central European models. These convergence assumptions obscure the distinctiveness and diversity of national, regional and urban contexts, making these peripheral to the debate and neglected in the theorisation process. This book brings to the fore one of these peripheral regions.

There are reasons that explain the marginality of Southern Europe in the international debate on segregation. On one hand, the European debate on segregation was anchored in the experience of fully industrialised Fordist economies, post-War mass migration and Keynesian welfare legacies that shaped Northern European countries. Except in a few regions, none of these aspects were present in Southern Europe. On the other hand, the key societal transformations that triggered an interest in ethnic segregation were different. In Northern Europe it was the transition from a Fordist to a post-Fordist regime of accumulation and the deindustrialisation process, while in Southern Europe it was the new wave of mass immigration (that started in the mid-1980s with the so-called ‘international migration turnaround’, King, Fielding and Black 1997) and its impacts on cities.

In spite of the limited attention to Southern Europe in international debates, a rich literature examined this region and its cities especially after the 1990s, but its influence on broader debates has been curtailed by the lack of publications in English. In this book, I combine two main research streams developed by this strand of scholarship: comparative

studies in welfare, housing, urban and immigration studies (which, however, did not focus much on ethnic segregation), and a body of single-city case studies on patterns of ethnic residential segregation.

An in-depth comparative account of ethnic urban segregation across Southern Europe is long overdue. This region has distinctive features that provide an opportunity to advance our conceptualisation of segregation processes. How does segregation work in cities with a very large proportion of owner-occupation and highly diverse neighbourhoods, exhibiting patterns that theories and frameworks drawn from other contexts cannot fully explain? The cases explored here offer rich and varied examples of how segregation operates in residualist and familistic societies and the (paradoxical) spatial-social forms it takes revealing some well-known but also new mechanisms of differentiation by interrogating their ‘contextual diversity’ (Maloutas and Fujita 2012).

The findings of this research are not limited to Southern Europe and can also shed light on transformations taking place elsewhere. Particularly across Europe, some of these features are emerging in societies traditionally based on universalism and people-based policies (e.g. the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Denmark, Poland) that are moving towards residualist welfare arrangements with the recommodification of housing and use of area-based programmes, whose cities are witnessing new patterns and processes that have long existed in Southern European cities: starting with the paradoxical patterns presented earlier or, more broadly, with the increasing centrality of ‘parental wealth’ in processes of residential segregation since ‘the intergenerational transmission of inequalities has become more pronounced with regard to housing’ (Hochstenbach 2018, p. 1). Beyond Europe, as mentioned earlier, ‘familistic’ forms of welfare capitalism are also prevalent in Latin America and Asian societies where family and patrimony are key social institutions in the reproduction of national political economies and in the provision of welfare (Allen 2000, 2004; Saraceno 2016; Aspalter 2017).

It is important to stress that theorising from Southern European cases is not about generalising from the periphery, or – yet again – exporting new universalised findings; it is about expanding and refining our understanding of segregation as a complex systemic process, which is multidimensional and, above all, context-dependent. It is timely to give the periphery a more central role in the process of theory formation.

Structure of the Book

As segregation is multiscalar and multidimensional, the book is organised along and develops through a series of comparative analytical chapters that examine patterns, processes and causes of ethnic urban

segregation in Southern Europe from the macro- to mesoscale, while intertwining the welfare, housing, urban and immigration dimensions. First, macroscale perspectives provide the basis for a wider comparative dialogue across Western European societies contrasting Northern, Central, Scandinavian and Southern regions and understanding each context in relation to the others (Chapters 2–5). This sets the key conceptual and contextual references for the in-depth mesoscale analyses across the eight Southern European cities which follow (Chapters 6–9). This multiscale structure also aims to trace how mechanisms identified at the national level play out at city level and contribute to differentiate social and ethnic groups differently across cities.

Chapter 2 provides the theoretical and methodological foundations for the book. It traces how the (European) reconceptualisation of segregation, which took place in the 2000s, did not emerge from segregation studies but from the ‘transatlantic debate’ on ‘polarisation’ theory and the ‘dual city’ order posited from the US context, and from key contentious debates in urban, housing, welfare, and (partly) immigration studies framed in Europe in the 1990s within the broader critique of convergence theories. It discusses the emergence of a paradigm shift in segregation studies driven by what I describe as a scholarly movement that laid the ground for a burgeoning European school of thought on segregation. Its fundamental premises, contributions and gaps are reviewed to build the contextual divergence perspectives and the interpretative framework for this book. A review of the relevant literature on Southern Europe further exposes the value of, and need for, expanding research on segregation patterns in this region.

Macroscale comparative analyses begin in Chapter 3, which examines the relationship between welfare regimes and segregation by focusing on the diverse housing systems found in Western Europe up to the mid-1990s. Drawing on a taxonomy of four welfare clusters (social-democratic, corporatist, liberal and familistic), patterns of ethnic residential segregation in more than 30 cities across 16 countries are compared to explore whether and how each welfare type differently affects social inequality and spatial segregation among low-income and vulnerable groups. The value of this chapter is twofold: it demonstrates how degrees of (de)commodification and principles of stratification embedded in each housing system (tenure policy and supply), and the respective planning and land systems, make a difference in processes of social and spatial differentiation; and it devises a broad conceptual framework that explores the link between segregation and redistribution along the universalism/residualism spectrum. Both outlooks inform the narrative that unfolds throughout the book.

Chapter 4 moves into migration studies, whose theoretical and empirical advancements have developed in isolation from, but are of significant importance for, segregation studies. In the context of worldwide global changes and the (Southern) European ‘international migration turnaround’, a review of contentious theoretical debates (e.g. about the post-Fordist model of immigration, or Europe’s ‘Rio Grande’) that spurred the reconceptualisation of immigration in the 1990s reveals ground-breaking approaches to analyse migration in relation to wider societal processes (e.g. through the notion of a ‘Mediterranean caravan-serai’ and through social transformation perspectives). Drawing on these perspectives, historical and taxonomic analyses are developed through two sections: (1) (pre)conditions, drivers and changes in Southern Europe migration flows are explored in relation to wider societal transformations and welfare restructuring, revealing the vital role of (im)migration in Southern European societies in reproducing familistic welfare path-dependencies while permitting the modernisation of societies; (2) comparative analyses of immigration in Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece from the mid-1960s until the late 2000s identify three types of migratory flows and three waves. The findings question a set of convergence arguments stemming from the globalisation debate(s) in migration studies and the theory of a uniform Southern European migratory system. The diversity of waves, flows and roles will prove crucial for understanding divergences in segregation patterns examined later in the eight cities.

Chapter 5 complements the analyses developed in previous chapters by interweaving the urban sphere. Features of ethnic segregation are explored in relation to those national and urban systems that distinguish the Southern European region from its Western European counterparts. Accounts on North versus South models of ethnic segregation are critically reviewed to place the segregation analysis within wider societal and urban contexts, drawing on the contextual structural dimensions of White’s model (1999). These reveal the roles of the dominant ideology in the host society, labour market segmentation, socio-urban processes and local urban political agendas as key mechanisms of differentiation as well as structural drivers of ethnic marginalisation. The deductive analysis suggests two main arguments which are further tested in the subsequent chapters: across Southern Europe, the layering of these (and other) mechanisms of differentiation have led to processes of marginalisation associated with ethnic dispersal, rather than ghettoisation and polarisation; and the housing affordability crisis and residential marginalisation are systemic and chronic wherever welfare regimes, housing systems and local urban political agendas are residualist.

Moving to mesoscale comparative analyses of the eight Southern European cities, Chapters 6 and 7 look at patterns and mechanisms until the mid-1990s, and Chapters 8 and 9 examine their changes until the late 2000s.

Chapter 6 provides a comprehensive overview of ethnic segregation patterns in the mid-1990s revealing a complex and diverse mosaic across the Southern European region regarding geographic distribution and degrees of ethnic residential segregation, among cities, among foreign groups (by continent and country of origin) and vis-à-vis native groups (by occupational categories). While there are no signs of polarisation, it shows a stark difference between port cities (Lisbon, Barcelona, Genoa and Athens) and continental cities (Madrid, Rome, Milan and Turin), and significant cases of correlations and mismatches between ethnic and social lines. The socio-spatial structure of the cities, the geography of upper strata, ethnic affiliations, labour segmentation and the welfare regime's social care arrangements broadly account for these divergences. However, these mechanisms did not fully explain some of the differences found, suggesting instead housing arrangements and mechanisms as potential explanatory factors.

Chapter 7 furthers the analysis of the patterns identified in the previous chapter by looking at mechanisms of differentiation embedded in the local housing systems, and the way in which the segregation–redistribution nexus plays out at metropolitan and municipal level. Dissimilarities among cities in the form of housing production, patterns of urban development and land development control (formal/informal), weight of rent control and the (un)even geography of tenures play a fundamental role in differentiating along social and ethnic lines. Historical and georeferenced analyses explore the distribution of the social groups across the owner-occupation and rental sectors to look at (1) how both components of the housing system – tenure and supply – affect respectively the socio-tenurial differentiation and the socio-spatial divisions found in each city, and (2) why these differ significantly among the eight cities, despite sharing familistic welfare arrangements. The paradoxical and exclusionary process of what I termed the 'belt effect' is captured here, offering insights into how successive waves of internal and international migration have negotiated their residential insertion in the city differently because of changing housing contexts.

After the mid-1990s, changes in housing systems, local urban political agendas and socio-spatial structure of the city have altered or consolidated some of the conditions, processes and mechanisms of differentiation. Chapters 8 and 9 look at how these transformations interplay with patterns of ethnic residential segregation.

Chapter 8 gives an account of the major transformations brought by the liberalisation of the credit and housing systems (e.g. the ‘monetary revolution’ and changing means of access to owner-occupation; new forms of housing supply and commodified access to land; rental recommodification). These had multiplying effects at municipal and metropolitan level, which the chapter explores in relation to (1) policy-led strategies of urban renewal and metropolitan growth, (2) socio-urban processes (e.g. gentrification, intergenerational social mobility *in situ*, etc.) and (3) socio-urban legacies (e.g. ‘belt effect’, low residential mobility, patrimonial values, etc.). These reveal how housing and socio-urban changes have generated new structural mechanisms of differentiation and exacerbated residential marginalisation, hindered immigrants more specifically, amplified forms of socio-ethnic differentiation, and created new geographies of diffuse segregation. The changes have also intensified the housing affordability crisis, persisting as a structural problem and spreading across middle-income strata too.

This narrative continues in Chapter 9 with more detailed analyses of emblematic examples to further explore the impact of current mechanisms of differentiation on patterns of ethnic residential segregation. First, it examines changes in the socio-residential conditions of the diverse ethnic groups since the mid-1990s to reveal how residential marginalisation and socio-tenurial differentiation has intensified across the ethnic groups and widened between natives and immigrants. Housing hardship grew, residual segments of the rental sector and owner-occupation markets became more ‘ethnicised’ and the expansion of homeownership among immigrants disguised new mechanisms of marginalisation. Second, it explores the spatial dimension of these processes, in particular: how the increase in socio-residential marginalisation is associated with processes of microsegregation, desegregation, peripheral dispersal and diffuse segregation; how the geographic distribution of successive waves of immigrants followed centrifugal paths; and how these new patterns of segregation stemmed from structural mechanisms of differentiation (and stratification) driven by the housing systems and urban renewal strategies. This diversity of patterns and transcalar processes is captured in the metaphor of the ‘urban diaspora’ – a fresh attempt to conceptualise this new geography of urban inequality.

Chapter 10 brings together the main arguments developed throughout the book and discusses their implications for wider debates in housing, planning and urban studies. It concludes with some reflections on emerging challenges for segregation studies.

A paradigm shift that focuses on role of the (welfare) state in the production of urban inequality has long been advocated by a European scholarship on segregation burgeoning since the 1990s, as explored in Chapter 2; this is the starting point for recentring the segregation debate on redistribution, which is the core aim of this book.

Notes

- 1 Segregation is both a process and a concept. It is a *relational concept*, since by definition segregation refers to ‘the residential separation of groups *within* a broader population’ (van Kempen and Özüekren 1998, p. 1632; italic added), whereby residential separation expresses solely the spatial dimension of this process, representing spatial differentiation, separation or distance between groups. ‘By definition, spatial segregation implies *spatial concentration*. If an area (neighbourhood) displays an overrepresentation of a certain group (compared to, for example, the share of the group in the city as a whole), we speak of a concentration area for that group’ (van Kempen and Özüekren 1998, p. 1633). Thus, segregation, residential segregation and spatial concentration are synonymous terms, which are interchangeably used also in this book.
- 2 Generally, social inequality refers to the differentiated positioning of socially defined categories of persons or groups (based on income, wealth, class, race/ethnicity, age or gender, among other categories) *within* the larger society with regard to access to social goods, such as labour market and other sources of income, education and health systems and forms of political representation and participation (Walker 2009). In this book, social inequality refers broadly to the social stratification of socio-economic groups (native groups), associated with income, class or occupational categories according to the sources used.
- 3 These are socially constructed concepts that vary across countries, and are often used to refer to immigrants or foreigners. See debate in Bhopal (2004) and explanation of the terms used in this book in Chapter 2.
- 4 Western Europe refers to the Western part of Europe and does not include Eastern European countries of the former Soviet/Comecon bloc. It comprises the Northern, Scandinavian, Central and Southern regions of the European Union; regional subdivisions are at times adapted to reflect historical settings or welfare models, to encompass geographical and political meanings. In this book, Central Europe often denotes the Franco-German speaking countries (or Bismarck’s social market model), while Southern Europe includes only Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece. When a Northern/Southern divide is mentioned, Northern refers also to countries of Central Europe and Scandinavia to account for their shared history of Fordist industrial economies, post-War mass migration and Keynesian legacies, which distinguish them from the Southern counterpart.

- 5 The term ‘state–market(–family) nexus’ adapts Abrahamson’s metaphor of the ‘welfare triangle’ (1992, 2002; which comprises state, market and household) to encompass also family (and/or non-profit sector) as key welfare providers, as originally stated by Esping-Andersen (1990) even though only the relationship between state and market was then subject of analysis (Minas et al. 2014). The triangle, or nexus, is a framing device introduced for conceptualising welfare regimes, later becoming of great relevance for defining housing systems in Europe (see Kemeny 2001; Allen et al. 2004), based on the role and relationships of these key social institutions in the provision of housing and land (supply side of the system) and (re)distribution of benefits/taxes (tenure policy side of the system).
- 6 Social institutions are the significant social structures and practices that organise societies, through a complex, integrated set of social norms, formal or informal rules, and standards that structure interactions between groups and individuals. Social institutions are densely interwoven and enduring.
- 7 Residential marginalisation refers to the marginalisation of a group *within* the larger society in terms of housing accessibility, affordability, security of tenure, quality and conditions. ‘Generally in urban studies “marginality” has arguably become one of the most used concepts in the last decade. (...) It has also become a central point of reference for studies which use “marginality” as a relational approach for the analysis of urban inequalities’ (Bernt and Colini 2013, pp. 15–16) and, in housing studies, for the analysis of housing differentiation/segmentation.
- 8 For simplicity in this book, I privilege the term ‘welfare regime’, since it is broader than welfare system and welfare state, and thus may encompass both principles of stratification and redistribution. ‘A [welfare] regime is understood as a particular constellation of social, political and economic arrangements which tend to nurture a particular welfare system, which in turn supports a particular pattern of stratification, and thus feeds back into its own stability’ (Taylor-Gooby 1996, p. 200). A welfare regime is organised upon a variety of systems of service provisions for the reproduction of society, often referred to as welfare pillars (e.g. education system, health system, housing system, etc....).
- 9 I make use of the classification introduced by Esping-Andersen (1990) regarding ‘ideal-types of worlds of welfare capitalism, [which] referred to particular types of welfare systems – universal, conservative and residual – embedded in their respective welfare regimes – Social Democratic, Corporatist and Liberal’ (Papadopoulos and Roumpakis 2013, p. 205). Welfare regimes are classified according to their degree of decommodification – see note 12. ‘The greatest level of decommodification is in the social democratic (universalist system), the least in the liberal welfare (residualist system). The corporatist is somewhere in between (conservative system)’ (Minas et al. 2014, p. 136; parenthesis added).

However, I adopt the term ‘familistic’ to refer to the type of welfare regime and advanced capitalism that distinguishes Southern European countries. This is the terminology currently used by Southern European

scholars in welfare and urban studies, who refute earlier classifications developed in the Northern European literature that described the Southern Europe welfare model as underdeveloped, rudimentary or late-comer (see discussion in Moreno 2006; see also Andreotti et al. 2001; Naldini 2003; Ferrera 2007; León and Migliavacca 2013; Mari-Klose and Moreno-Fuentes 2016). ‘The term *familistic* describe[s] the centrality of family in the totality of the welfare capitalist regime in Southern Europe and not only its welfare and care aspects, which often in the literature are described as *familialistic*. (...) It adds one important dimension in the role of family as a key institution for the reproduction of the familistic political economy’ (Papadopoulos and Roumpakis 2013, pp. 204 and 208).

- 10 Welfare regimes ‘embrace distinct redistributive principles, some of which may promote more equality of outcomes or of opportunities, while others may actually work in the opposite direction’ (Esping-Andersen and Myles 2011, pp. 640–641). The relationship between welfare and redistribution is complex and multidimensional (Esping-Andersen 2016a). Here the degree of redistribution of a welfare regime is seen through the (de)commodification programme and stratification principles of its welfare pillars. More about this in Chapter 3.
- 11 As explained by Allen et al. (2004, pp. 5–6), patrimony ‘refers directly to the specific stock of housing and land owned by a family. (...) It is something which is not exchanged or traded on markets. Rather, patrimony is something that the family conserves and keeps. (...) Patrimony, as a social institution associated with the family, is seen as being eternal, lasting, continuing much longer in time than the life of any individual within the family’.
- 12 Esping-Andersen (1990, p. 21) conceived the decommodification (e.g. allocation of a good and a service is guaranteed as a social right)/commodification (e.g. transformation of goods, services and people into commodities, or objects of trade) paradigm and classified welfare regimes accordingly, whereby ‘[d]ecommodification occurs when a service is rendered as a matter of right, and when a person can maintain a livelihood without reliance on the market’. Within the same welfare regime, the extent of decommodification of each welfare pillar may vary and change over time. The decommodification/commodification paradigm is reflected in the universalism/residualism spectrum.

Theorising Segregation from Europe

Segregation has always existed as an urban phenomenon. ‘Cities have always been divided, (...) whether called divided, dual, polarised, quartered, or fragmented’, this process of residential separation is intrinsic to cities (Marcuse 2002, p. 7). However, the concept of segregation as a theoretical subject was only conceived about a century ago in the United States during a period of massive immigration flows and intense ethno-racial divisions. The term, borrowed from genetics and referring to the residential separation of groups within a broader population, was first adopted by the Chicago School’s *human ecology perspective* ‘as a metaphor for socio-spatial separation, which became subsequently its dominant meaning’ (Maloutas 2004a, p. 8). Since then, segregation has oscillated between neglected and golden ages; it returned to the academic and political agenda periodically after significant geopolitical and economic transformations (and urban unrest), advancing new theorisations of the concept and its premises for policies.

The Chicago School’s pioneering work was extremely influential, particularly in the 1960s and 1970s when the *factorial ecology perspective* theorised racial segregation as an ‘organic’ phenomenon and a ‘transitory’ path towards integration (see Figure 2.1 bottom line). Derived from biological models, this idea of segregation became prominent with the invasion-succession model (or *equilibrium approach*), which assumed ‘the city developed through a competition for space to produce concentric zones (...) or multiple nuclei’ that house groups




Figure 2.1 Historic evolution of theoretical approaches on ethnic segregation and spatial concentration, 1920s–2010s. *Source:* compiled by the author.

with different resources and characteristics. 'Processes of invasion and succession involved a chain reaction, with each preceding immigrant wave moving outwards and being succeeded by more recent, poorer immigrants (Park, Burgess and Mckenzie 1925/1974). The final pattern of segregation, the "mosaic of social worlds" (or a residential mosaic; see Timms 1971) was seen as a "natural" equilibrium. It was a consequence of various processes: invasion, dominance and succession. Behind it was the idea of immigrant enclaves as transitional stages on the road to eventual acceptance and integration in the larger (American) society' (van Kempen and Özüekren 1998, pp. 1636–1637).

Although this organic notion of segregation was widely criticised in the following decades, succeeding interpretations remained 'tightly related to a binomial reality of clearly separated Black and White populations' (Maloutas 2012b, p. 40), captured in the image of the ghetto that, by entangling spatial concentration with social problems, ascribed a negative and ambiguous connotation to segregation despite the term being neutral by definition. Until recently, this was 'the general theoretical canvas against which [scholars from US and elsewhere] weaved their own explanatory attempts' (Maloutas 2012b, p.40).

After the 1980s, the leading North American interpretative frameworks were based on the debate about 'choice and constraints' of households and individuals (Figure 2.1 central line). The notion of segregation changed; it was no longer regarded as an organic phenomenon, but the result of households' conditions that respond to individual and racial behaviours (choice), and housing markets and households' resources (constraints). Its novelty, however, stemmed from established thinking. It drew on the legacy of *Neo Weberian*, *Neo Marxist* and *behavioural approaches* by encompassing their complementary perspectives, and formalised conventional North American beliefs by associating the concept of segregation with individualism and economic liberalism. Spatial concentration was seen as a problem, whose solution should be ultimately sought through the action of the individual and the market by introducing role models in the neighbourhood and changing individual behaviour, or de-concentrating and dispersing the segregated groups. Although the *choice and constraints perspective* was challenged – especially by *institutionalist* and *managerialist approaches* given the little attention paid to the role of government, institutions and the structure of society in driving segregation patterns – it endures today as a familiar reference point in academic and policy circles (see review in van Kempen 2002; Tammaru et al. 2016). Despite the diversity and richness of the research on ethno-racial segregation developed in the past century, mainstream scholarship has been influenced by what can be considered a North American school of thought (van Kempen and Özüekren 1998; Ruiz-Tagle 2013).

From the late 1990s, an alternative conceptualisation of segregation was developed in Europe. It moved away from the dominance of organic notions, individualism and economic determinism in framing interpretative lenses, problems and solutions. Segregation was rarely associated with the ghetto and the urban poor, but considered as the product of broader societal structures and mechanisms that (re)produce social inequalities and (un)equal production of space. It prompted a fundamental paradigm shift in segregation studies that, for the first time, focused on the role of the ‘welfare state’ in the production of inequality and stressed the importance of *contextual divergence perspectives* (Figure 2.1 – grey band at the top). As we will see, these offered a context-dependent understanding of segregation in relation to wider society and new interpretative frameworks drawn from comparative thinking designed to understand the diversity of cases and identify structural mechanisms, processes and societal changes underpinning segregation patterns.

However, as argued in this chapter, this reconceptualisation did not blossom from traditional schools of segregation but by virtue of contentious debates in other disciplines, in particular the critique of convergence theories in urban studies, housing studies and (some) immigration studies, and the fertile ‘transatlantic debate’ stirred by a group of European scholars that questioned the universal validity of the social polarisation theory and dual city order posited from the US context.

This chapter unpacks these debates, limiting the focus within the US–Western Europe region, and traces how they led to a paradigm shift in segregation studies and policy formation. It reviews the extraordinary body of European work that has not yet received recognition in mainstream segregation literature and which has had limited impact on policy. The aim is to bring to light the contribution of this burgeoning literature that laid the ground for (what I would like to consider) a ‘European school of thought on segregation’ and that provided the theoretical and methodological basis for this research. The review also highlights the conceptual and empirical limitations of this scholarship, particularly for Southern Europe. The chapter concludes with an explanation of the framework devised for this study.

Reconceptualising Segregation: Societal Transformations and the Transatlantic Debate

The most recent reconceptualisation of segregation was not triggered by the current international financial crisis and austerity era or by the post-Arab spring immigration crisis, but by the worldwide

transformations of the 1980s and 1990s. Neglected during the 1970s and the crisis of positivism,

segregation started to attract considerable attention again in the 1980s not only through the intense ethno-racial discrimination that led to urban riots in the US (a recurring phenomenon anyway), but also through the neighbourhood crisis in European public housing estates and in deprived (mainly de-industrialised) areas. (Maloutas 2004a, p. 3)

These were the initial symptoms of wider geopolitical and economic transformations that changed Western urban societies in the following decades. Globalisation and economic restructuring, the transition from Fordist to post-Fordist regimes of accumulation, deindustrialisation, the restructuring of labour–capital relations, the fall of the Iron Curtain and the ‘international migration turnaround’ (King, Fielding and Black 1997) were seen as universal, inevitable processes leading to a new societal and spatial order. From this viewpoint, the assumption that most countries across the world will eventually follow paths ‘converging’ towards this new world order became a mainstream narrative, albeit unsupported initially by evidence and theories.

Radical worldwide transformations required new theorisations. Traditional notions of spatial division of labour, social division of space or immigration based on industrial capitalist societies appeared inadequate. This was also the case with segregation. Several disciplines turned to higher levels of abstraction to develop new models, concepts and frameworks seeking convergent trends and universal explanations.

The Onset: Convergence and the Death of the State

Political economy took a leading role in the process of theorisation in the 1980s. Its macroscale foci laid the groundwork for new convergence theories based on the globalisation discourse, which replaced the old view of convergence attached to the theory of industrialism and the Western model of the Fordist city. Convergence perspectives depicting a new world order dominated the theoretical arguments in urban, housing and immigration studies throughout the 1980s.

In urban studies, *macro-development perspectives* led new comprehensive theorisations and a set of ground-breaking North American studies exposed ‘how’ globalisation and macro- and global-level processes impacted local developments and household conditions, and drove changes in the city. The concept of the underclass and the mismatch hypothesis of Wilson (1987), the metaphor of hyper-segregation of Massey and Denton (1989, 1993), and particularly Sassen’s social

polarisation thesis (1991) became worldwide references in the initial theorisation of changing post-Fordist societies. A new spatial order was inferred, grounded on the analysis of 'divided cities' (Fainstein, Gordon and Harloe 1992; Massey and Denton 1993) and the 'dual city' (Mollenkopf and Castells 1991).

The theories on social polarisation and dual city order were avant-garde as they crossed disciplinary boundaries and contributed to the interpretation of changing segregation patterns 'in response to the complex interaction of a variety of structures and developments on different spatial levels' (van Kempen and Özüekren 1998, p. 1644). In North American cities, relative and absolute poverty was increasing. It was argued that the middle class was shrinking (e.g. 'mismatch hypothesis' by Wilson 1987), and that cities were becoming spatially hyper-segregated (Massey and Denton 1989, 1993) and socially polarised (Sassen 1991) whereby there was an increase at both the top and the bottom ends of the occupational and income structure. In part, the impact of economic restructuring could 'be perceived as polarising and segregating under this broad view: loss of employment and redundancy in the labour market; proliferation of professional and managerial jobs fuelled by the increasingly educated cohorts; increased gentrification within inner cities; increasing flows of migration giving more visibility to the lower occupational categories; increasingly visible ethnic segregation' (Maloutas 2004a, p. 7; see debate in Marcuse and van Kempen 2000).

However, generalised findings extracted from these theorisations, inspired mainly by the US context, promoted a simplified idea of post-Fordist societies assumed to be applicable to other Western advanced industrial economies and asserting a convergence of societal and urban trends. 'Polarisation and its causes were formulated as universal phenomena' (Andersen 2004, p. 146). As envisioned by Lipietz (1996, 1998, pp. 177–178), the shift in the economic regime would entail a shift in the regulation of social relations and income distribution: the 'montgolfier society' of the Fordist development model – 'a hot-air balloon ascending harmoniously: few poor people, few rich people, a huge waged middle class, all of them enriching progressively' – was expected to transform into an 'hour-glass society' of the post-Fordist era, 'where grains of sand represent households, desperately falling to the bottom, (...) the huge "middle" shrinks, (...) and air is like money accumulating in the upper part'.

Most convergence narratives argued globalisation and economic restructuring brought greater social and spatial divisions in most cities and were a universal 'key factor promoting both the retrenchment of welfare states and their convergence' towards a (neo)liberal model (Kleinman 2002, p. 343). At stake were the Keynesian redistributive

paradigms, which guaranteed the expansion of universal welfare provisions during the Fordist regime but were considered inadequate to cope with growing deindustrialisation, the restructuring of labour-capital relations and the changes in the international division of labour. Thus, the weakening of the role of the state and welfare provisions were claimed to be necessary and inevitable.

Also in the 1980s, on the other side of the Atlantic, one of the earliest and strongest arguments in support of convergence theories came from British housing studies following Harloe's (1985) influential work on 'tenure modernisation'. Changes in housing policies witnessed in many Northern European countries were regarded as part of analogous trends converging towards the pursuit of 'free market efficiency' and recommodification driven by the 'inevitable' politico-economic restructuring of welfare states. These trends included the withdrawal of the state and other non-profit housing agencies (e.g. co-operatives) from the promotion of social housing, the abolition of rent control, privatisation of social housing and a shift from supply-side subsidies to person-orientated subsidies. Universal housing and social sector subsidies were no longer considered necessary in policy programmes; these shifts were seen as a move away from Keynesian universal principles towards more residualist and (re)commodified housing systems. 'Torgersen (1987) called housing a "wobbly" welfare state pillar because capital programmes are much easier to cut in periods of austerity than salaries' (Lowe 2011, p. 139). Several scholars regarded these changes as an irreversible historical process, implying that social rented housing was a 'transitional tenure' (Harloe 1985, 1995), whose role was confined to the post-War housing crisis, and was therefore obsolete (Ball, Harloe and Martens 1988). This idea, strongly supported by one stream of housing studies, led to calls for 'tenure modernisation' and justified the creation of a homeownership society.

Over the next decades the convergence theories that steered housing studies had serious political and societal implications. Academia provided the theoretical legitimisation for Western governments' efforts to deregulate the housing and credit system. It was inferred that housing as a pillar of welfare provision was inefficient, outmoded and expensive and that the market would do better without state interference. In particular, the tenure modernisation theory justified the recommodification of the housing system and delegitimised the principles of social equity (which formed the basis of Northern European Keynesian states' interventions aiming at the equal redistribution of resources and opportunities across all social groups through universalist or comprehensive programmes, and thus considering the access to housing, education, health and other welfare services a right). The tenure modernisation

theory aligned with principles of economic liberalism, whereby housing was never considered a right but a commodity; therefore universalist redistributive programmes designed to prevent or reduce inequalities, such as the decommodified and highly regulated housing systems provided during the post-War period, should be lessened or even abandoned, and state intervention should be residual, restricted to ensure only the safety net for the poorest groups (see discussion in Lowe 2011). The United Kingdom set the precedent in the 1980s with the dismantling of social housing provision, the Right to Buy initiative and the financial markets' 'Big Bang', and set off a neoliberalisation narrative that echoed across the European continent (Harvey 2005; Cole 2006). The resonance of this convergence discourse about recommodification and deregulation went beyond housing: it postulated a new post-Fordist order based on the 'commodity versus right' argument and a shift in the role of the state from universalist to residualist interventions, first in housing then gradually across all welfare services.

Convergence theories were also embedded in migration studies throughout the 1980s and 1990s. These looked for new models and a single theory to explain the so-called 'international immigration turn-around' (King, Fielding and Black 1997; Bonifazi 2008), referring to the fact that the global immigration system was changing in volume and type of migration with countries that were once sources of emigration becoming major destinations of immigration and vice versa. As discussed later in Chapter 4, explanations for this new global immigration system were built upon economic and geopolitical accounts that related the liberalisation of trade and capital investment to changes in regimes of accumulation and in labour–capital relations. These macro-developments resulted in new forms of international division of labour (e.g. push–pull argument) that triggered changes in the global migration system. New concepts emerged around this reasoning – the idea of a global industry of immigration, the post-Fordist model of immigration and the metaphor of Europe's Rio Grande – all feeding into the convergence argument of a new world order. However, the search for a single theory in migration studies developed in isolation from those sought in urban studies, with only a few points of contact regarding macroscale processes, and little bearing in segregation studies. Hence the evolution of theories and convergence versus divergence debates in migration studies are reviewed separately in Chapter 4.

Overall, the emergence of macro-development perspectives in urban studies pushed segregation studies into a new golden age. The influential urban theories and metaphors – developed by Wilson, Sassen, Massey, Denton, Fainstein, Mollenkopf and Castells among others – connected segregation to the international debate on globalisation and post-Fordist

cities and advanced the view that macroscale factors influence individuals (see review in van Kempen and Özüekren 1998, pp. 1632–1649). By the early 1990s segregation studies started to incorporate macroscale interpretative frameworks, widening the traditional focus on choice and constraints. However, as suggested in the following sections, it was the convergence versus divergence discussions embedded in housing studies and the transatlantic debate in urban studies that led to a revolutionary reconceptualisation of segregation.

The Shift: Divergence and the Role of the State–Market Nexus

The mid-1990s marked the blossoming of important theoretical breakthroughs in European academic circles, which offered more diversified interpretations of changing urban societies and advanced the theorisation process. Convergence theories of a new world order were being critiqued in most disciplinary terrains.

In urban studies, although European scholars engaged with macro-development perspectives, adding value to the multiscale foci, they began to challenge the universal validity of the generalised findings drawn from theories on social polarisation and the dual city order and called for different theoretical interpretations. This antithetic position triggered a fertile ‘transatlantic debate’ on the impact of globalisation on Western cities, initially focused on global cities and later expanded to other cities and wider urban issues.

For the first time, Hamnett (1994), Eva van Kempen (1994), Burgers (1996) and Kloosterman (1996) tested the theoretical and empirical validity of the social polarisation thesis, the dual city order and the convergence argument in contexts outside the United States, namely in British and Dutch cases. They found that ‘social polarisation is not a single, homogeneous process which operates in the same way in different places ... [The] forces driving polarisation in different cities differ or are mediated in various ways’ (Hamnett 1996, p. 1408). Critically, ‘problems are even greater when the translation from the social to the spatial has to be made. This translation of social polarisation into spatial patterns is often made too easy. It is by no means always the case that polarisation leads to segregation. This has clearly to do with the spatial structure of the city’ and the institutional, national, regional and local mechanisms that mediate or modify the social division of space (van Kempen 2002, p. 49; see discussion in Burgers and Musterd 2002; Maloutas 2004a; Musterd 2005). Western European cities and welfare state regimes contained such a variety of cases that deeper empirical analyses were needed to understand contemporary urban and societal transformations. The work of Hamnett (1994, 1996, 2001) on

London – an ascending global city – was pioneer and studies of other European cities followed suit.¹

Unlike in the North American context, ‘it soon appeared to be difficult to find examples of income polarisation in Europe; in most cases income became more unequally distributed’ (Andersen 2004, p. 146) but middle-income groups did not shrink as posited in the mismatch hypothesis (see early critiques in Waldinger 1996). Social polarisation was not increasing in most European cities because the dominant process driving change in the occupational structure was professionalisation, which accounted for a significant trend in upward mobility throughout classes and generations and led to the expansion of the middle classes (Leal 1994, 2002, 2004b; Préteceille 1995, 2004, 2006; Kloosterman 1996; Hamnett and Cross 1998; Petsimeris 1998; Hamnett 2003). This was the legacy of the Bismarck social market model and three decades of Keynesian social pacts in Northern Europe (based on full employment and industrialisation, and promoting the decommodification of labour, education, health and housing), and a history of Christian social policies in Southern Europe (based on the familistic model, but with universal access to education and health).² To different degrees, both models aimed to create a middle-class society.

Nevertheless, social inequalities increased in many Western cities, ‘even if they are not related to globalisation processes’, as Kesteloot (1998, p. 126) stressed. But ‘explaining this process remains a complex task. At the empirical level, research has to cover a very broad range of topics, such as changes in participation in the labour market; changes in the distribution of incomes, education, housing, health and culture; and variations in state intervention in all these fields’.

Both sides of the Atlantic acknowledged that the concept of the polarised or dual city was still a useful construct, ‘as a hypothesis, the prelude to empirical analysis’ (Fainstein, Gordon and Harloe 1992, p. 13; van Kempen, Schutjens and van Weesep 2000, p. 509). But its generalisation oversimplified trends and, more importantly, underestimated ‘national differences resulting from the actions of nation-states’ (Kesteloot 1998, p. 126). At this point, the theorisation process turned to interpretative frameworks able to explain contextual differences, highlighting the need for international comparative analyses.

The transatlantic dispute developed into fertile comparative conversations between North American and European scholars, culminating in the ground-breaking collective works on *Urban Segregation and the Welfare State: Inequality and Exclusion in Western Cities* (Musterd and Ostendorf 1998) and *Of the State and the City* (Marcuse and van Kempen 2002). These re-established the theoretical and analytical value of institutionalist perspectives in urban studies, which highlight the

importance of the state and redistributive instruments, two of the factors that the convergence arguments had already sentenced to a slow death.

In fact, the role of the welfare state took centre stage in urban studies' critique of convergence. Welfare regimes were undergoing restructuring but it was the state – rather than the market – that played an active and crucial role in restructuring processes and driving economic, societal and urban changes. The move away from the universalist welfare model was not the inevitable outcome of external global processes and the unmediated operation of market forces but the result of crafted political decisions (Hamnett 1996; Jessop 1997; Harvey 1989, 2005; Marcuse and van Kempen 2002). As Marcuse (1996, p. 40) pointed out,

it is not, however, a reduction in the role of the state; to the contrary, it may even be an increase in that role. (...) They rather shift direction, from a social and redistributive to an economic and growth or profit-supporting purpose. At the same time, they shift from a public, in the sense of democratic or popular instrument, to an instrument of private business purpose.

The return to institutionalist perspectives replaced the idea of convergence of causes and outcomes in the new post-Fordist order by acknowledging the diversity of contexts that bring about divergences in processes and patterns. Attention turned to differences in the trajectories of political actions that, encompassing path-dependencies or path-changes, filtered or enhanced the impact of globalisation. Macro-development convergence approaches were incrementally replaced by context-bound perspectives and divergence comparative approaches (Wessel 2000; Maloutas 2004a). Context and differences recentred the focal point of the international debate.

The paradigm shift in urban studies cannot be understood in isolation from the political struggles that occurred within European housing studies after the early 1980s. This field provided the strongest critique of convergence with the establishment of divergence perspectives in international comparative studies (Kemeny and Lowe 1998). Divergence comparative analyses revolutionised housing studies and contributed to the advancement of the theorisation process in urban and segregation studies. However, they were not prompted by the transatlantic debate in urban studies; the trigger was political in nature and British by nurture.

By the 1980s, 'governments of European countries [were] under increasing pressure to reduce public expenditure' and housing was the first pillar of the welfare regime threatened by moving away from universal principles, because 'limiting general subsidies to housing

would seem to be a relatively simple way to accomplish this with little political resistance' (Priemus and Dieleman 2002, p. 197). Housing was also the most vulnerable 'to a right-wing strategy to roll back the state' and attract more voters by using the compelling argument of homeownership for all (Malpass 2008, p. 3; Lowe 2011).

However, Northern European governments adopted different restructuring strategies and at different paces. France, Germany, Austria and Switzerland did not aim to fully recommodify housing. They maintained significant levels of market regulation and kept the social market model³ (subsidies to profit and non-profit provisions to compete in the same market) but adjusted levels of state intervention and privatisation according to economic crisis or buoyancy in line with the corporatist welfare tradition (Kemeny et al. 2001; Scanlon and Whitehead 2008; Lowe 2011). Others, such as Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands, progressively lessened the social-democratic universal principles by changing the subsidy regime and increasing the role of non-profit sectors (e.g. housing co-operatives and housing corporations). Housing remained largely decommodified for a long time while the credit market was liberalised but still regulated (Kemeny, Kersloot and Thalmann 2005; Andersson et al. 2010; Lennartz 2011). The United Kingdom was the only country that pursued a truly radical path-change, with housing recommodified out of social-democratic into liberal principles (Clapham 2006; Cole 2006). Thatcher's right-wing government initiated the earliest and fastest deregulation and privatisation of the housing and credit system, using the tenure modernisation thesis to dismantle the large social rented sector to create a homeownership society (van Gent 2010).

By the mid-1980s the convergence debate in housing studies was no longer a matter of semantics – British society and households' housing behaviours were about to be drastically transformed. British housing schools of thought were split between those depicting housing as the 'wobbly pillar' (Harloe and Torgersen's stream) and those considering it an even more important 'cornerstone' of the new welfare state (Kemeny, Lowe, Malpass and Murie's stream; see review of the discussion in Cole 2006; Malpass 2008; Hoekstra 2010).

The 'cornerstone' stream disputed the empirical validity of the convergence narrative based on the tenure modernisation thesis and was concerned about its political exploitation and societal implications. 'How [housing] is organised will have far-reaching repercussions throughout society in general and the welfare system in particular. (...) The ability of housing to structure the lives of ordinary people is profound' (Kemeny 1995, p. 174). Several scholars called for evidence-based theorisations to explain the functioning of housing in relation to society. This was the first time that the all-encompassing focus on

'housing as a system' (produced by, and informing, the state–market nexus) came to the fore. It was inspired by Esping-Andersen's (1990, 1996) international comparative work on welfare regimes and prompted by the fact that knowledge of housing systems was neglected in welfare studies and still limited in housing and urban studies.

Some British scholars saw the need for international comparisons and sought evidence outside the United Kingdom and the Anglo-Saxon context where the convergence argument was posited (see the work of Balchin, Kemeny, Lowe, Malpass, Barlow and Duncan, among others). Scholars from Central Europe and Scandinavian countries soon joined the cause and a wider, collaborative movement developed during the 1990s. It focused on whether and why housing markets, policies and systems differed across Western Europe and how differently these informed the social stratification of cities and societies (Priemius, Dieleman, Andersson, Andersen, Matznetter and Wessel, among others). In the 2000s, a small community of scholars in Southern Europe advanced these initial theorisations beyond Nordic-centric framings to help explain societies and housing outside their geographic and former Keynesian remit (Allen, Leal, Maloutas, Padovani, Tosi and Arbaci, among others).

The paradigm shift that happened in housing studies was groundbreaking, leading to the first methodological theorisations on divergence versus convergence analyses (Kemeny and Lowe 1998). The shift in foci generated some of the most relevant conceptualisations in housing (e.g. the concept of 'unitary' and 'dualist' rental systems coined by Kemeny)⁴ and innovative frameworks that identified typologies of housing systems in relation to clusters of welfare regimes (Barlow and Duncan 1994; Kemeny 1995; Balchin 1996; Doling 1997; Allen et al. 2004; Hoekstra 2010; van der Heijden and Heijden 2013). Fundamental differences in markets and divergences in systems proved the convergence theory as empirically inadequate and politically deceitful, and revealed instead great differences in the redistributive value of the various housing systems in terms of affordability, security and mobility (see Chapters 3 and 7 for wider discussions). It emerged that the more redistributive the housing system, the less unequal the society, with universalist and residualist welfare regimes located at opposite ends of the spectrum (respectively social-democratic and liberal regimes). Evidence was thus used to argue against the modernisation thesis and neoliberal narrative and to, simultaneously, call for more comparative studies to help explore the relationship between welfare/housing regimes along this spectrum by looking at principles of stratification and mechanisms of differentiation (Allen et al. 2004). These theorisations are still relevant in understanding how societies work and the impact of system changes, for instance in the novel research on housing financialisation

(Aalbers 2008, 2016a; Forrest 2015; Fernandez and Aalbers 2016; Fields and Uffer 2016), or housing asset-based welfare and pension schemes (Doling and Ronald 2010; Lennartz 2011).

The new line of enquiry into European welfare/housing regimes prompted by the British experience later became a niche study in UK academic circles (Lowe 2004) while flourishing in continental Europe throughout the 1990s and 2000s. By advancing the understanding of 'how' housing systems increase, reduce or mitigate spatial and socio-economic inequalities according to their redistributive scope, divergence housing comparative studies offered tremendous contributions to urban studies and segregation studies (Wessel 2000; Kleinman 2002; Arbaci 2007; Andersson et al. 2010; Maloutas and Fujita 2012; Tammaru et al. 2016).

Meanwhile, given the insular nature of migration studies, the internal discussions on convergence versus divergence approaches developed in parallel but with little spill-over into urban, housing and segregation studies (see detailed review in Chapter 4). A more concrete engagement between migration and urban debates emerged in the late 2000s, when the social transformation perspective shook migration studies by arguing that migration is a component of social relations that should be analysed as part of – and in relation to – complex and various processes of societal change (Castles 2010, p. 1568). A tentative dialogue has recently materialised between the concept of 'super-diversity' in migration studies (Vertovec 2007) and the concept of 'hyper-diversity' in urban studies (Tasan-Kok et al. 2013), both recognising immigrants as an asset, rather than a liability.

*Segregation Studies: An Alternative Paradigm and the Emergence
of a European School of Thought*

These contentious debates played an important role in the reconceptualisation of segregation. It began with the individual and collaborative work of a group of Northern European academics in the late 1990s, which progressively consolidated into a European scholarly movement throughout the 2000s bringing together scholarship initially from the North and the Centre, then the South, and ultimately the East of Europe.

From the early 1990s, US-based metaphors drawn from the post-Fordist convergence arguments had a considerable influence on segregation studies. Metaphors of dual city, divided city, social polarisation and hour-glass society suggested a dualist conception of urban order and the social and spatial dimensions of given processes – whether polarisation, segregation or inequality – as interchangeable. Spatial

segregation was unquestioningly equated with social polarisation, accentuating the negative conception of ethnic concentration embodied in the underclass and (hyper)ghetto argument (Wilson 1987; Massey and Denton 1993).

However, as discussed earlier, most Western European cities presented a different picture. Rather than social polarisation, they were witnessing an increase in socio-economic inequalities that, more importantly, did not automatically translate into an upsurge of spatial segregation or the formation of (hyper)ghettoes as in North America. Levels of ethnic segregation remained lower than those recorded in the United States (Peach 1996a; Musterd and De Winter 1998; Musterd, Ostendorf and Breebaart 1998; Johnston, Forrest and Poulsen 2002), and spatial patterns were not displaying convergence trends across European cities but following complex trajectories entangled in the sorting and shifting of the different housing markets (Peach 1998b; Arbaci 2007; Andersson et al. 2010; Andersen et al. 2016). Furthermore, there were cases where ethnic concentration was decreasing while residential marginalisation was worsening (see Chapters 1, 8 and 9).

The transatlantic debate on social polarisation and the absence of (hyper)ghettoisation processes in European cities prompted European scholars to question the notion of a uniform spatial reconfiguration in Western urban societies (Kesteloot 1998, pp. 126–127; Peach 1998a, 2009). The transferability of theories, metaphors and policies borrowed from the US context was contested. Likewise, the traditional meaning of segregation – accumulated in the course of its long history of North American scholarship – also appeared inadequate ‘to come to term with new realities’ and was ‘often carried forward to our days in rather unproblematized ways’ (Maloutas 2004a, p. 4).

This move away from American approaches revealed a vacuum in the theorisation of segregation in Europe and the absence of interpretative frameworks capable of explaining the diversity of patterns of ethnic urban segregation found within and across European cities. This vacuum created an opportunity for a radical rethinking of segregation. The initial research agenda set an alternative lexicon, narrative and foci, and looked beyond the straightforward discussion on polarisation. As White (1999, p. 179) summarised,

we need to recognise that urban models imported from other major world regions may be unhelpful. We need to be aware of the large scale structural influences at work as back-drops to all contemporary changes in Europe, but also to accept that the translation of these influences into urban ‘events’ and patterns is mediated by a *variety of mechanisms and processes* that are changeable through time and space. Such an argument

accentuates the potential *importance of comparative studies* of the situation of the minorities in *different urban contexts*, since it is through such studies that the *broader structural forces* can be evaluated. (...) The descriptions of minority circumstances, whilst having a certain value as a snapshot at a point in time, tell us nothing about *causal processes*, nor about *the trajectories of change* of those circumstances. In order to understand the situation of particular migrant groups in particular cities, we need to *contextualise our understanding in a very broad manner*. [italics added]

The use of cross-national comparative studies in the search for interpretative frameworks able to account for differences and divergences in patterns was fundamental for the reconceptualisation of segregation and required a move from notions of segregation traditionally constructed upon a single case and a specific context. This quest for comparative approaches shared the rationale and political stance that drove the critique of convergence in housing, welfare and urban studies, and prompted European segregation scholars to join forces (Figure 2.1 – grey band and top).

The development of new conceptual frameworks for pan-European comparative analyses began with the ground-breaking collective work on *Multi-Ethnic Metropolis: Patterns and Policies* (Musterd, Ostendorf and Breebaart 1998), which for the first time examined patterns of ethnic segregation across 10 Northern European cities, and called for the much needed ‘construction of European metaphors of segregation’. Differences in patterns among the Dutch, German, French, Belgian, Swedish and British cases were interpreted in relation to varying urban development contexts and processes, types of migration and ethnic characteristics and housing differentiation, focusing on tenures rather than the orthodox supply–demand. The focus on contextual factors marked a departure from conventional notions of segregation based on economic liberal determinism and individualism, and inspired the genesis of *multi-factor approaches* in segregation studies, combining macro and meso levels of analysis.

While this study introduced some initial reflections on the importance of state–market relationships, it was another pioneering collection at the centre of the polarisation debate that first discussed the multiple relationships between *Urban Segregation and the Welfare State* (Musterd and Ostendorf 1998). This opened a crucial line of enquiry, further pursued in the following decade, on how structural factors working at different scales and in different contexts inform and/or mediate ethnic and socio-economic segregation, and how these translate differently into spatial patterns (see Arbaci 2002, 2007; Musterd 2005; van Kempen and Murie 2009; and work of Kesteloot, Maloutas, Leal, Anderson and van Gent, among others).

For the first time, the role of the welfare state was included in the explanatory lists of segregation studies in advanced industrial societies. The focus marked a departure from dominant North American schools of thought, in which the welfare state has been ignored or considered marginal (starting with the Chicago School overlooking politics and the state; see wider discussion in Wacquant 1997, 2008, 2016). In fact, it was 'the action and inaction of the state [that was] seen as an integral part of the genesis and growth of post-Fordist poverty and deprivation' and the redistributive and regulatory breadth of its welfare regime regarded crucial in the prevention or rise of advanced marginality and the 'intensification of the functional division of space' (Bernt and Colini 2013, p. 9). European scholarship acknowledged the complexity of the welfare regime and its diversification across countries linked to different types of capitalism and ideological visions of society, and with distinct redistributive mechanisms (see Chapter 3). For these scholars, the welfare regime is central in the production or mediation of urban (in)equalities, of which segregation is a symptom and not a cause (Musterd and van Gent 2016).

This research agenda was led by Northern European scholars (Dutch academics played an important catalyst role in comparative collaborations) who developed explanatory frameworks drawn from empirical analyses. Thus, initially multi-factor frameworks were context-specific, since they were organised around aspects which were distinctive of these regions and their post-industrial changes. Attention was centred on universalist welfare regimes and unitary rental systems, social housing, middle-class counter-urbanisation, colonial and migration histories, deindustrialisation and the post-Fordist division of labour. These themes stemmed from the cross-pollination of institutionalist perspectives in urban studies and the divergence perspectives in housing studies to which many of these scholars were also contributing.

Contextual divergence perspectives had already permeated segregation studies but became a fundamental *raison d'être* when Southern European scholars joined from the early 2000s. Exposing (ethnic) segregation studies to a more diversified range of urban contexts was crucial for the advancement of multi-factor approaches. Although still limited, analyses of Southern European cities and Eastern European post-Socialist cities (after the late 2000s) revealed further differences regarding the housing and welfare regimes (e.g. dominance of owner-occupation and dualist rental systems, residualist and familistic welfare regimes), capitalist developments, urbanisation and organisation of the city and immigration flows that enriched and reinforced the need for contextual and divergence accounts. One of the first attempts to develop a divergence framework encompassing the diversity of Northern

European and Southern European cases was Arbaci (2002, 2007), who analysed the relationship between welfare regimes, housing systems and patterns of ethnic urban segregation, inspired by the work of van der Wusten and Musterd (1998, p. 241). A comprehensive review of the evolution of multi-factor contextual frameworks that identifies social inequalities, global city status, welfare regimes and the housing systems as the ‘underlying universal structural factors’ is presented in Tammaru et al. (2016).

This ‘contextualised approach to segregation’ entailed a shift in foci and problematisation. As pointed out by Maloutas (2004a, p. 15), segregation needed to be understood ‘in the very broad meaning of the construction of the spatial dimension of social distance, [which] will therefore permit to investigate the real issues by going beyond the deforming lenses of social polarisation and ghettoisation’. The real issues were inequality and marginalisation and the mechanisms, processes and changes that drove them, not segregation and patterns of concentration. Thus, analyses should look for structural driving causes rather than ascribe to universalised interpretations. A number of scholars explored this approach through collective works that examined causal relationships between patterns of spatial segregation and mechanisms driving socio-economic inequality in a variety of distinctively diverse contexts; it was an evolving comparative undertaking that started in the early 2000s by bringing together several cities from Northern and Central Europe and a few from Southern Europe, to later include a variety of Eastern European cases, and more recently broadening its scope outside these regional boundaries to embrace scholarship and metropolises from Latin America and Asia (e.g. see evolution of seminal collective works edited by Maloutas or Musterd).

The socio-spatial hierarchy of the city – the history and patterns of social division of space – analysed across all social groups rather than restricting the focus on the most vulnerable groups, emerged as one of the key factors in explaining (the diversity of) spatial segregation patterns and their inclusive or exclusive nature. This focus has in fact long-established roots in the French tradition of the *nouvelle sociologie urbaine*, which in the 1980s related urban segregation to the distribution of social classes and access to collective consumption services (Pinçon-Charlot, Prêteceille and Rendu 1986), thus anticipating the transatlantic debate on polarisation. Notably, changes in the spatial distribution of the wealthiest groups, typically the most segregated among both native social groups and ethnic minorities, were found to be an important driver of change in the segregation patterns of the middle and bottom echelons (Prêteceille 2006; Andreotti, Le Galès and Moreno-Fuentes

2015; Leal and Sorando 2016). The need to examine ethnic segregation patterns in relation to the wider societal context, in particular to the distribution of native social groups, became increasingly apparent after the mid-2000s. In European urban contexts, mechanisms of class division – perhaps more than race or ethnicity – seemed to be primary determinants of ethnic segregation patterns.

Another major methodological advance was the introduction of social theories to study (ethnic) segregation across structural dimensions and scales and develop divergence comparative frameworks. In particular, the ‘contextual structural model’ of White (1999) and the reframing of ‘modes of socio-economic integration’ by Kesteloot (1998) offered innovative interpretative frameworks built on theories that conceptualise society at the highest level of abstraction (respectively by Giddens and Polanyi), in order to overcome context-specific framings (Figure 2.1 – top).

The ‘contextual structural model’ of White (1999), partly drawn from Giddens’s arguments on duality of structure and agency (1984), focused on ‘local variability within a general context’ (Figure 2.2). This model, first applied in the case of London (White 1999), analysed minority residential history and spatial segregation at a meso level (city) in relation to four structural dimensions ‘working both independently and through their inter-relationships’: the state of economic conjuncture, the ideology of the host society, the urban context, and the characteristics of the migrants or minorities. A fundamental premise was that these dimensions explored at meso level were understood in relation to structural factors operating at macro level (regional, national, global) and local practices and ethnic dynamics operating at micro level (neighbourhood). As stressed by van Kempen (2002, p. 47), ‘demographic, economic, socio-cultural, and political developments, do not operate independently but have to be seen in relation with other variables on different levels’.

The framework was both comprehensive and detailed. It incorporated a variety of structural factors and changes at different scales (thus encompassing many of those identified in empirical analyses). But it also required disaggregated analyses that contrast patterns of residential segregation across a diversity of ethnic groups and in relation to the natives’ class groups, thus considering the role of occupational categories, education, religion, time of arrival and migration project in the societal division of space (Peach 1998b; Simon 2002; Arapoglou 2006; Arbaci and Malheiros 2010; Kandylis, Maloutas and Sayas 2012). Alongside other scholars, it stressed the need to depart from the narrow, binary focus on poorest versus richest groups, as inherited from the polarisation analyses. This model offered a theoretical breakthrough,




Figure 2.2 White’s meso-level contextual structural model (1999). *Source:* compiled by the author; adapted from White (1999, p. 161).

but perhaps because it was only presented in a conference paper it did not have wide international resonance and was never employed in international comparative analyses. This book explores its potential by using it as the base for the analytical framework, as detailed later.

MODES OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC INTEGRATION:
THE THREE MECHANISMS TO ACCESS RESOURCES and THEIR SOCIO-SPATIAL AND HISTORIC CONDITIONS




Figure 2.3 Polanyi's modes of socio-economic integration (1944). *Source:* compiled by the author; adapted from Kesteloot and Meert (2000, p. 65).

Based on Polanyi's conception of society structured around three spheres – market exchange, redistribution and reciprocity – Kesteloot (1998) developed a social theoretical framework that reframed 'modes of socio-economic integration' to relate societal changes and spatial patterns (Figure 2.3). The key argument was that 'access to resources necessary for decent living and reproduction of household (...) depends on how the household is integrated in the economic system. Inequalities are inherent in market exchanges, partially compensated by state redistribution and social network reciprocity' (Kesteloot and Meert 2000, pp. 63–64). An important contribution of this model was that it allowed key mechanisms associated with reciprocity and redistribution that were initially overlooked in the mainstream analyses (e.g. informal economy, role of ethic entrepreneurship, social networks, clientelism) to be captured. This framework was presented in the collective book on welfare and segregation (Musterd and Ostendorf 1998), and first applied at neighbourhood level to compare ethnic clusters in Brussels using the concept of mixed embeddedness (Kloosterman, van der Leun and Rath 1999; Kesteloot and Meert 1999, 2000) and to explore the spatial dimension of social exclusion and integration in 11 European cities (Musterd, Murie and Kesteloot 2006). More recently, Maloutas and Fujita (2012) used this framework to develop an international comparative segregation study that also considers cases beyond Europe. Their important edited work examined the relationship between socio-economic inequalities and spatial segregation at city level by comparing the economic sphere (market exchange), the state sphere

(redistribution) and the social sphere (reciprocity) across 12 international metropolises in Asia, Latin America and Europe.

The potential of these social theoretical models for international comparative analyses is tremendous, since they offer a framework in which the distinctiveness of each context is equally important in the framing and conceptualisation. Hence, they overcome the crucial issue of uneven power relations in theory formation between scholarship at the core and in the peripheries (Connell 2007; Robinson 2011, 2016; Maloutas 2013). This remains problematic in the field of segregation, because of the tendency to employ context-specific frameworks, concepts and theories borrowed from the core centres of scholarship (e.g. North America, Northern Europe) to interpret cities and phenomena in the peripheries (e.g. Latin America, Asia, Southern Europe, Eastern Europe).

In summary, this body of work developed an alternative understanding of urban and residential segregation as a systemic process, which is context-dependent, multiscalar and multi-factor: 'it is difficult, if not impossible, to explain patterns and processes of segregation and concentration by one single theory. Numerous factors, developments, and variables have to be taken into account' (van Kempen 2002, p. 46). Rather than being an inevitable outcome or an organic phenomenon, segregation is the product of, and part of broader mechanisms and structures that (re)produce, social inequalities and (un)equal production of space in capitalist societies (Maloutas 2012a, p. 10; see evolution on this perspective from Musterd and Ostendorf 1998 to Maloutas and Fujita 2012; van Kempen 2015; Tammaru et al. 2016). A shift in lexicon accompanied these conceptual developments. Segregation was no longer associated with reductionist and residualist paradigms linked to the underclass, the poor and the ghetto (the traditional focus on residual sections of society) and became ascribed to (class) inequalities and mechanisms of differentiation across the whole society.

Critically, segregation does not carry any predetermined positive or negative connotation (Peach 1996b, 2009), as 'both segregation and concentration are defined neutrally, without reference to coercion or choice' (van Kempen and Özüekren 1998, p. 1632). Particular attention needs to be paid to scale as 'segregation at one spatial level [metropolitan, city, neighbourhood or building level] does not automatically imply segregation at another spatial level' (van Kempen and Özüekren 1998, p. 1632). More importantly, spatial segregation does not automatically equate to social inequality or function as an antonym of social integration (Dominguez, Leal and Goytre 2012; Ruiz-Tagle 2013). However, the understanding of the multiple and complex relationships between spatial and social dimensions remains limited and requires further examination.

It is important to stress the novelty of the focus on the welfare state and the use of contextual divergence perspectives in segregation studies. This innovation occurred because many of the European scholars of segregation came from urban studies and were experts in housing studies, where these approaches were developed (e.g. Hamnett, Musterd, van Kempen, Maloutas, Leal, Andersen, Andersson and Preteceilles, among many others). This helped expand enquiries on segregation within social and policy debates.⁵

Ultimately, this reconceptualisation of segregation distanced itself from the dominance of North American schools of thought in the field, and paved the way for the establishment of a distinctive European approach. Whether this scholarly movement has consolidated into a European school of thought on segregation is open to debate, but it did prompt a paradigm shift that has created schisms in academic and policy arenas.

Academia and Policy Dissonance

Dissonances in conceptualising segregation between North American and Western European scholarship have both historical and ideological roots. As discussed by Maloutas (2012a, pp. 14–19) and Ruiz-Tagle (2013), there are two fundamental differences.

First, North America and Western Europe have different histories of the division of urban space. The social hierarchy of space in US cities was more segregated as a result of the suburbanisation of the social elite and middle classes and the racist regulation of residential space that drove discrimination, white flight and the formation of ghettos, leading to socially and racially homogeneous neighbourhoods (Marcuse 2002; Maly 2005; see theory of the Burgess model). This was not the case in European cities. Suburbanisation was not as intense and divisive and it spanned social strata and ethnic groups. Social elites did not abandon the central areas, and residential mobility was traditionally low (Inverse Burgess model). Importantly, Keynesian welfare policies designed to decommodify labour–capital relations, housing, land, education and health systems attempted to reduce inequalities by mediating social divisions across society and space (see Chapter 3).

Second, North America and Western Europe employed dissimilar ideological frames to perceive and construct segregation as a social and political problem and develop policies to address it. Their *modus pensanti* and *modus operandi* were both inherently different.

‘On the American side the perception of segregation is founded on the dominance of economic liberalism, personal merit, and on a very high rate of residential mobility’ (Maloutas 2012a, p. 18). Social mobility

and acquisition of normative behaviour were regarded as the antidote to spatial segregation, since they promoted upward spatial mobility away from the enclave (spatial assimilation theory and place stratification theory; Pais, South and Crowder 2012). However, racial discrimination challenged the idea of a meritocratic system for the ‘deserving’ African Americans; segregation was thus seen as limiting equal opportunities and ‘policies devised to confront it aim at providing opportunities to escape from bad areas rather than improve them, and people may be moved to less segregated residential areas or to non-segregated schools’, as planned in the Hope VI and Moving-To-Opportunities programmes (Maloutas 2012a, p. 18). Moreover, socially and racially homogeneous neighbourhoods (e.g. ghettos or enclaves) were perceived as the result of aggregated racial preferences of individuals and tolerance points (preference theory, since Schelling 1971; Clark 1991, 2009), thus segregation and resegregation were seen as inevitable. Diversity and mixing were considered transitory conditions, a midpoint on the way to the rehomogenisation of the neighbourhood (see critique in Lumley-Sapanski and Fowler 2017).

Most US theoretical arguments employed to justify policies, starting from the assimilationist paradigms of the Chicago School to the Dispersal Consensus perspective (Alba and Nee 2005; Lindo 2005; Imbroscio 2008), constructed a discourse on the poor neighbourhood and the people living in it as both the source of and the solution to the problem (see debate in Wacquant 1997, 2008). Traditionally, the preferred policy response was area-based programmes that sought to ‘dilute’ poverty and ethno-racial concentration through spatial reordering.

Western Europe followed a different philosophy. Traditionally, social equity, rather than economic liberalism, was the dominant ideological frame as ‘in the French republican ethos or the socialist tradition and social rights in Scandinavian welfare societies. (...) Therefore, segregated areas are a problem to which organised society must provide answers’ (Maloutas 2012a, p. 19). Moreover, people had a stronger attachment to places so social mobility did not automatically entail outward spatial mobility or filtering out of the neighbourhood.

As the problem was conceived as societal and structural, the solution was envisaged as systemic and redistributive. Many Northern European governments addressed spatial segregation by trying to mitigate socio-economic inequalities with labour and housing market regulation and comprehensive, people-based policies. This also reduced the distance between native and ethnic groups, which helps to explain why ethnic segregation in European cities was correlated more with class inequalities than with ethno-racial differentiation (Musterd 2005; Préteceille 2009; Fujita 2012).

These differences show that both academic and policy approaches to segregation are path-dependent, historically and ideologically bound, making the transfer of theories and policies problematic and misleading. Nevertheless, such transfer is widely practiced, particularly in recent times.

After the geopolitical and economic transformations of the 1980s, the dichotomy between social equity and economic liberalism was diluted. The neoliberalisation (and more recent financialisation) of European political economies changed the role of the state towards more residualist forms of welfare and the recommodification and deregulation of some of its pillars (labour, housing and in some countries even education, pensions and health system). Consequently, 'structural problems [have been] individualized and spatialized' (Darcy 2010, p. 5). Solutions have also changed from systemic, comprehensive people-based policies (typical of Northern European universalist regimes) to area-based policies focusing on individual behaviour and problematisation of poor neighbourhoods (as in residualist and liberal regimes).

With the expansion of neoliberal creed, urban policy discourses in Europe began to frame the clustering of minority ethnic groups and areas of concentrations of social housing as problematic. 'Purposeful aggregation of data serve[d] to discursively construct places and communities as the source of and the solution to social and economic disadvantage, while binary narratives of community and token participation practices reinforce the perception that it is the poor tenant households who must change their behaviour or their residential location in order to secure the promised benefits' (Darcy 2010, p. 19). Theoretical premises were borrowed from North America, particularly the theory of the 'ghetto' in the 1980s, and more recently the 'neighbourhood effects' (van Ham and Manley 2012; Musterd, Galster and Andersson 2012; Sharkey and Faber 2014). These provided 'a framework in which the obvious solution is not to challenge structural inequalities, but to engage in spatial reordering' (Lupton and Tunstall 2008, p. 110) laying the ground for anti-concentration, dispersal and mixing urban programmes (e.g. Big City Policy, Urban Revitalisation Policy and housing differentiation programmes in the Netherlands; Single Regeneration Budget, Sustainable Community agenda and mixed-tenure programmes in United Kingdom; Frankfurter Vertrag in Germany; *Developpement Social des Quartiers, Loi d'Orientation pour la Ville* or *Contracts de Ville* in France; PERIs – *Plan Especial de Reforma Interior* – and the Barcelona Model in Spain).

Area-based programmes also became a new tool for local economic growth, particularly among those cities where the devolution process accompanied the recommodification and privatisation of local

welfare services (e.g. United Kingdom, Netherlands, Denmark). More recently, events such as the London bombings of 2005 (amid fears that Britain is 'sleepwalking to segregation', Phillips 2005) and urban unrest in Northern English cities (2001), Birmingham (2005), French cities (2005, 2009), Swedish cities (2009) and more recently in London (2011) and Stockholm (2013), further legitimised these approaches.

However, the growing body of work developed by European scholars and reviewed above provided an acute critique of these policies and discourses (Lupton 2003; Friedrichs, Galster and Musterd 2005; Bolt, van Kempen and van Ham 2008; Prêteceille 2012; Pugalis 2013; Bricocoli and Cucca 2016). They argued that the imported paradigms were inadequate or irrelevant for the diverse European contexts and justified policy-myths. Specifically, they found area-based programmes could not tackle structural inequalities because of their reductive redistributive role; de-concentration or mixing did not address the roots of deprivation but simply dispersed it spatially (Atkinson and Bridge 2005; Petsimeris 2005; Briata 2009, 2011; Darcy 2010; van Gent 2010; Leal and Sorando 2013). Furthermore, 'there is scant real evidence that making communities more mixed makes the life chances of the poor any better' (Cheshire 2009, p. 343) or that it 'increase[s] the social capital and social cohesion of inner city communities' (Lees 2008, p. 2450).

In fact, these policies may be pernicious. By using the mixed communities' narrative to market places for investment, area-based programmes have often promoted gentrification, facilitated real-estate speculation, increased housing unaffordability and displaced vulnerable groups towards peripheral areas, resulting in an increase of social and spatial inequalities across the city. Studies on state-led, regeneration-driven gentrification have highlighted these effects (Lees, Slater and Wylie 2007; Arbaci and Tapada-Berteli 2012; Arbaci and Rae 2013; see debate in Slater 2014; Lees, Shin and López-Morales 2016).

This dissonance between academics and policy makers seems to be widening in Europe. While policy makers have gradually individualised, spatialised and de-politicised urban problems (claiming neoliberal market-led actions as inevitable solutions), a growing number of academics have demonstrated that these urban problems are societal, the causes structural and contextual and solutions should contemplate (again) systemic and redistributive actions. But a multidimensional and systemic understanding of these issues is complex. This may explain why, despite the evidence, North American narratives and metaphors continue to be appealing and reverberate among European policy makers and the media.

Southern Europe ... a View from the Periphery

Initial interpretative frameworks supporting a contextual divergence approach to segregation were drawn from the specific contexts of Northern European cities. The first systematic European comparative analyses frequently referred to distinctive European patterns (van Kempen 2005), or to European metaphors (Musterd, Ostendorf and Breebaart 1998) and assumed Southern European cases were a 'variation of' (and Eastern European 'in transition to') a general European model (see debate in Allen et al. 2004; Fenger 2007; Hegedüs, Lux and Teller 2013). Implicitly, it was inferred that Southern European cases could fit in some of the identified typologies with little consideration of their distinctive features. While these studies attempted to appreciate contextual distinctiveness of the framing of the research, Southern Europe was overlooked in the process of theory formation and comparative frameworks were limited in explaining societies outside Northern regions.

There were three reasons for this. First, the reconceptualisation of segregation was influenced by housing studies, which were then dominated by ethnocentric approaches. Anglo-Saxon and Northern scholarship (the core) drove comparative conceptualisations but barely incorporated the Southern cases (the periphery) in theorisation. This is the legacy of a parochial tradition of housing schools in the United Kingdom and other social-democratic countries, established when housing became a pillar of post-War welfare states, which tended to circumscribe the European debate primarily to issues and phenomena of interest in these regions. Franco-German housing scholarship also developed its own regional core but their influence was insular because they rarely published in English. However, urban studies in Europe were less ethnocentric and attempted to incorporate the peripheries in theory formation, and this was important in wider the reconceptualisation of segregation.⁶

The second reason Southern Europe was marginal in the debate was its lack of established schools on housing studies and migration studies (the latter emerged in the 1990s), and that ethnic segregation studies were underdeveloped. Finally, the key societal transformation leading to interest in ethnic segregation in Southern Europe was related to the new phenomenon of mass immigration (part of the so-called 'international migration turnaround' of the mid-1980s) and its impact on cities, rather than the deindustrialisation process and the transition from Fordist to post-Fordist regimes that radically transformed Northern European societies.

After the late 1990s, Southern European scholars gradually joined these international debates and made important contributions to two main research streams. The first consisted of comparative analyses examining Southern European cases in welfare, housing, urban and immigration studies, but not focused on ethnic segregation. The second regarded a specific body of work on ethnic residential segregation.

The first stream revealed a diversity of urban contexts, capitalist developments, institutional regimes, change dynamics, migration histories and schools of thought that differed significantly from Northern Europe (except for some Franco-German urban scholarship). These studies showed that, rather than being a variation of a general European model (Allen et al. 2004, p. 10), Southern European societies were organised around fundamentally different systems and their path-dependency and path-change led to divergent trajectories (Kazepov 2005). This focus advanced the field of enquiry in understanding societies and their diverse principles of socio-economic and spatial stratification beyond Anglo-Saxon and Northern European parameters (see the work of Leontidou, Malheiros, Fonseca, Leal, García, Maloutas, Arapoglou, Mingione, Tosi, Padovani, Kazepov, Andreotti, Allen and Arbaci, among many others).

Some of these parameters will be explored further in this book. Southern European societies did not share the industrial histories, the post-War international mass migrations and the Keynesian welfare legacies of their Northern counterparts. Their economies were not usually anchored by a fully industrialised regime (except in a few regions) but had moved directly from agricultural to service societies. Capitalist development was still based on labour-intensive activities and dual labour markets (Mingione 1995; Allen 2004), so the post-Fordist convergence debate was less pertinent (especially in immigration studies, see debate in Chapter 4). The high degree of familialism (role ascribed to the family, rather than the state or the market, in the provision of key welfare services) and clientelism (patronage relations) that distinguished Southern European welfare regimes required an attention to family and civil society in addition to the traditional focus on the state-market nexus (inherited from Esping-Andersen's work) in order to comprehend how societies are organised and welfare regimes structured (Allen et al. 2004; Leal 2004a; Moreno-Fuentes and Mari-Klose 2016). Southern European scholars turned to Abrahamson's (1992, 2002) metaphor of the 'welfare triangle' – of state, market and household/family as components of civil society – recognised as one of the most valuable 'framing device[s] for conceptualising welfare systems' in Europe (Allen 2004, p. 69) and elsewhere (see Hwang 2011 on East Asian welfare regimes). Recently, the degree of de-familiarisation⁷ of welfare regimes has been considered as an important dimension in

understanding differences also between and within Eastern European and Northern European societies (Fenger 2007; García-Faroldi 2014).

Moreover, contrary to Northern Europe, housing systems in Southern Europe were residualist, dominated by owner-occupation (based on the concept of patrimony rather than trading assets), and dualist rental systems (with a weak social rented sector). They also had historically low residential mobility and their forms of production largely included self-construction, informal land markets and small- to medium-scale construction industry (except Spain). These systemic arrangements underpinned particular forms of urban development, which did not involve widespread counter-urbanisation of the middle classes (as in Northern European contexts) but rather peripheralisation of the working classes. Therefore, Anglo-Saxon concepts used to interpret the spatial distribution of ethnic groups as gap fillers – such as suburbs and inner city, filtering up/down, white flight – did not fully apply to Southern European cities (Malheiros 1998, 2002; Petsimeris 1998; Briata, Bricocoli and Tedesco 2009). Other concepts – such as intergenerational social mobility *in situ*, spatially entrapped social mobility (Leal 2002; Maloutas 2004b), or the metaphor of ‘urban diaspora’ later presented in this book – were used to capture the finer processes of spatial filtering (or lack of it).

Similarly, while the Northern European scholars’ attention on mechanisms of socio-tenurial differentiation (distribution of social groups within and across tenures) remained an important dimension of analysis (Andersen et al. 2016), their focus on social and non-profit housing was too narrow to be relevant in societies that were not organised upon unitary rental systems. In fact, in countries fostering dualist rental systems (e.g. United States, Australia, Spain, Greece), it is owner-occupation that plays a dominant role in the stratification of social groups across tenures, as well as in policy formation and housing provision mechanisms (Allen et al. 2004). It is necessary to reframe this concept to encompass all types of housing tenures, and the relationship between tenure system and supply system, including forms of production, land system and types of urban development (see discussion in Chapters 7 and 3). This wider focus allows the capture of structural processes of segmentation and marginalisation (among and between social and ethnic groups), especially where the residual segments of rental and owner-occupation markets are significant and play a crucial role in the social stratification of the city (see Chapters 8 and 9).

Finally, some of these Southern European studies that identified the segregation paradox also began to question the idea of ‘segregation as an expression of socio-economic inequality’ (Dominguez, Leal and Goytre 2012, p. 217). While the urban fabric of Southern European

cities was more mixed than in Northern European cities, with lesser spatial divisions among classes, socio-economic divisions were greater (Maloutas and Fujita 2012; Cucca and Ranci 2016; Tammaru et al. 2016). Recently, similar phenomena have been recognised in some Eastern European cities (Marcinićzak, Gentile and Stępniaćk 2013; Marcinićzak et al. 2016). These patterns show how complex the relationships between the spatial and social dimensions of segregation, inequality and marginalisation are, highlighting the need for a more fine-grained understanding of these relationships (Petsimeris 1998, 2010; Maloutas and Karadimitriou 2001; Leal 2004b; Maloutas 2004a; Arbaci 2007; Arapoglou and Sayas 2009). Southern European cities offer particularly interesting cases in this respect.

The second stream of work focused specifically on ethnic residential segregation. The majority of scholars, especially around the early 2000s, worked on case studies of single Portuguese, Spanish, Italian and Greek cities (Malheiros 1996, 1998; Bocco 1998; Tosi 1998, 2004; Fonseca 1999, 2008; Sargatal 2001; Baganha and Fonseca 2004; Malheiros and Vala 2004; Weber 2004; Arapoglou 2006; Maloutas 2007; Martinez and Leal 2008; Somma 2008; Bayona and López-Gay 2011). While identifying segregation patterns across a range of foreign groups, they revealed the significance of highly mixed neighbourhoods and the importance of the metropolitan dimension in explaining relatively low levels of ethnic spatial segregation, despite the high increase in immigration and high levels of residential hardship experienced by immigrants (Tosi 2010; Malheiros and Fonseca 2011; Agustoni and Alietti 2011; Orueta 2012; Kandylis 2015). More recently, studies focused on changes in patterns, furthering the understanding of macroscale processes of ethnic metropolitanisation and exploring the complex neighbourhood interplay between ethnic segregation, urban renewal programmes and gentrification (Semi 2004, 2015; Subirats and Rius 2006; Arapoglou and Sayas 2009; Cesareo and Bichi 2010; Annunziata 2011, 2014; Tapada-Berteli and Arbaci 2011; Bayona and Gil-Alonso 2012; Malheiros, Carvalho and Mendes 2012; see Chapters 8 and 9). These pioneering studies are invaluable as they managed to expose a great diversity of patterns within and between cities, despite the fact that access to suitable data is difficult in Southern Europe. However, as most of this scholarship was not published in English, its influence on international debates was limited. This book builds on this rich literature and its empirical and interpretative contribution.

Within this stream, further important contributions came from a few Southern European scholars who engaged in the transatlantic debate and the construction of a pan-European analytical corpus on ethnic residential segregation, either through comparative studies

(Malheiros 2002; Arbaci 2007, 2008; Musterd and Fullaondo 2008; Arbaci and Malheiros 2010, 2012; Briata 2010; Scarpa 2016), or edited collective books and special issues (Baganha and Fonseca 2004; Bolt, Özüekren and Phillips 2010; Arapoglou 2012). Initial comparative analyses explored the hypothesis of a Southern European model of patterns of ethnic residential segregation (Malheiros 2002), in line with studies defining Southern European models of immigration (King 2000; Ribas-Mateos 2004, 2005; Ambrosetti, Strangio and Wihtol de Wenden 2016; see Chapter 4), capitalist development and welfare regimes (Mingione 1995; Ferrera 1996; Mari-Klose and Moreno-Fuentes 2016; see Chapters 3 and 5). These interpretative frameworks shed light on the distinctiveness of Southern Europe but also showed significant differences within it, calling for a move from model construction to taxonomic analyses, an approach also used in this book.

By adapting broader interpretative frameworks these studies reinforced the need for contextual divergence perspectives, and the study of mechanisms of differentiation, processes and changes underpinning patterns of ethnic residential segregation in different contexts. Moreover, the engagement with the European effort to reconceptualise segregation as a societal process – shifting the focus from concentration of poverty to wider societal mechanisms of marginalisation – made it possible to question the reductive spatial focus and unproblematised notion of (ethnic) residential segregation that is prevalent in Southern Europe especially in the policy-making arena. This view of de-concentration or spatially dispersed reordering of immigrants as a solution to localised social problems resurfaced often during periods of social unrest or scarcity of public resources, when immigration was perceived as a threat and immigrants became political scapegoats.

However, this reductive view was rooted in the residualist role of housing systems in Southern European welfare regimes, rather than linked to economic liberalism principles as in North America. Although inequality and other social issues were addressed through comprehensive policies in health and education defending universal access, they were tangential to housing and urban strategies and dealt with residual policies (Tosi 2001, 2004). Mainstream housing policies tended to be conceived as a political-economic instrument ultimately fostering owner-occupation, and urban policies employed area-based programmes as spatial instruments to solve social issues. Both approaches were often limited to a marginal provision of social housing and de-concentration strategies aimed at dispersing residents from ‘difficult’ neighbourhoods, which were only introduced as emergency responses to a perceived crisis (PER rehousing programmes – *Programa Especial de Realojamento* – in

Portugal; PERIs renewal programmes – *Plan Especial de Reforma Interior* – in Spain; CdQ neighbourhood programmes – *Contratti di Quartiere* – in Italy, etc.). This *modus pensanti* was also mainstreamed by housing studies and consultancy work based on orthodox economics, despite emerging critical voices (Pareja Eastaway and San Martin 2002; Allen et al. 2004; García 2010; Leal and Sorando 2013; Bricocoli and Cucca 2016). The broader political and urban agenda has generally neglected the idea of comprehensive strategic policies to address housing and spatial inequalities (Leal 2002, 2011; Maloutas 2003; Padovani 2004; Briata, Bricocoli and Tedesco 2009; Agustoni and Alietti 2011).

Mind the Gap

These two burgeoning streams of scholarship on Southern Europe made important contributions to local and international debates. They showed the potential of expanding research in these areas and bridging between welfare, urban, housing and migration studies and simultaneously revealed some of the limitations of European wider theoretical framing on ethnic segregation.

First, there is a lack of regional perspective in ethnic segregation studies in Southern European scholarship. There are no systematic comparative studies of ethnic urban segregation in Southern European cities that explore differences and contextualise them in relation to the other parts of (Western) Europe. Although single cases have shown diverse and complex patterns between and within cities, initial attempts to develop comparative studies sought to identify a Southern European model of ethnic segregation focusing on a North–South division, with Southern Europe as a homogeneous block defined in opposition to Northern Europe. However, both Southern and Northern European societies are far from homogeneous regions, and devolution and decentralisation further blurs boundaries and national uniformity. In this regard, Scandinavian scholarship is exemplary; scholars of this region that questioned ‘the relevance of US and even European experiences in relation to the Nordic welfare states’ (Andersson et al. 2010, p. 7; Andersen et al. 2016) considered essential the development of divergence comparative studies on immigration, housing and segregation in their four capital cities to advance interpretative and policy assessment frameworks pertinent for the distinct ways in which Scandinavian societies and cities are organised and, at the same time, establish a dialogue in relation to other welfare clusters (e.g. liberal, corporatist).

Second, with the exceptions discussed above, both research streams have advanced in isolation from each other (and thus an undertaking similar to the Scandinavian example might take longer to develop in Southern Europe). There has been little cross-pollination between these two research streams so ethnic segregation studies have made little use of the conceptual advancement of pan-European urban studies. The contributions of Southern European cases to the international debates came mainly from comparative analyses in urban studies and a few in housing and welfare studies (the collective work of Allen et al. (2004) is ground-breaking also in this regard). These focused on social exclusion and recently on neighbourhood effects, socio-economic segregation and inequalities, rather than ethnic residential segregation (Musterd and Murie 2002; Musterd, Murie and Kesteloot 2006; Fujita 2012; van Ham and Manley 2012; Marcińczak et al. 2016). Moreover, contextual divergence perspectives that stress the role of the state and the disentanglement of segregation and inequality blossomed in Southern European urban studies but have not permeated Southern European ethnic segregation analyses. Most of the latter studies focused more on patterns (output), rather than mechanisms and changes that underpin these patterns (process), and had little engagement with the wealth of Northern European segregation scholarship. Consequently, in Southern European ethnic segregation studies, while disaggregated analyses across non-Western groups have recently emerged, comparisons between native and ethnic groups are still under-researched and the social and spatial dimensions of segregation have not been disentangled.

Third, the role of Southern Europe cases in theory formation remains limited. These cases were only recently used to devise interpretative frameworks that incorporate their systemic distinctiveness and differences (in welfare regimes, urban and housing structure, etc....) in two leading-edge international comparative works in urban studies – Maloutas and Fujita (2012) and Tammaru et al. (2016) – but these did not account for the ethnic dimension in their analyses of residential segregation and class inequalities.

There is a need to expand contextual divergence analyses in ethnic segregation studies across a number of Southern European cities to explore mechanisms and changes, and not solely patterns. This requires an interpretative framework that appreciates the wider societal contexts (macro and meso) that inform ethnic urban segregation, draws from and incorporates the distinctiveness and diversity of Southern Europe, and moves beyond a European-wide model towards diversified taxonomic analyses organised around families, clusters or types.

Framework for the Book

This study adopts a contextual divergence perspective and develops a broad framework to examine ethnic residential segregation patterns in relation to the wider society and mechanisms of social division of space in Western Europe, with a focus on Southern European cities. Building on the contributions of European scholarship, a key theoretical premise underpinning the interpretative framework is that segregation is a systemic, multi-factor and multiscale process in which relationships between social and spatial dimensions are complex. Segregation, rather than being an inevitable process, is driven by multiple mechanisms of differentiation that operate at different scales, most notably those embedded in systems and regimes, and in the social stratification of the city. The aim of this study is thus to examine patterns of ethnic residential segregation and, most importantly, isolate the systemic mechanisms of social and spatial differentiation that drive these patterns, how these operate at different scales and in distinct national and urban contexts, and how they have changed over time. A key goal is to disentangle the social and spatial dimensions of segregation.

More specifically, the conceptual and analytical framework developed for this study combines White's contextual structural model, the focus on the role of the state–market(–family) nexus in the production of inequality drawing on the wealth of pan-European scholarship, and the contextual perspectives of Southern European analyses. White's model is promising (especially for studies focusing on the periphery) because it offers a social theoretical framework that is not context-dependent, framing comparative analyses across structural dimensions and multiple scales that can capture factors that are specific to the countries and cities under examination. In other words, it is comprehensive enough not to impose predetermined foci imported from other contexts.

The framework for this book (Figure 2.4) is based on White's four structural dimensions (state of economic conjuncture, ideology of host society, urban context, and characteristics of migrants or minorities, see Figure 2.2) but adapts them to incorporate welfare regimes, housing systems, migration systems and the socio-spatial structure of the city. Widening attention to systems and regimes permits the exploration of principles of stratification and redistribution, and the broadening of the focus on the state–market nexus to include, when relevant, family as a social institution (following Abrahamson's welfare triangle). The four structural dimensions of the framework and their inter-relationships establish interpretative lenses to understand the residential patterns of immigrants and the multiple dimensions of segregation (Figure 2.4 central part).




Figure 2.4 Multi-level contextual structural model: a conceptual and operational framework. *Source:* compiled by the author.

Each dimension is multiscalar and includes macro and meso conditions and mechanisms that might drive processes of (ethnic) residential segregation in each urban context. This is particularly important regarding the housing systems; both national and city levels need to be considered in order to explore the distinctiveness and differences in Southern European tenure and supply systems. Housing is particularly revealing of how and why high and increasing levels of social inequality (e.g. residential marginalisation, housing hardship, overcrowding) can coexist with low and decreasing levels of spatial segregation.

The book is mainly organised around two scales of analyses – macro and meso – cutting across the various dimensions of the framework. The macro level (national and supra-national) examines the four Southern European countries and contextualises them in relation to Western Europe to identify specific characteristics of systems, regimes and immigration flows that drive the socio-spatial stratification of societies and cities, and set key macroscale references for the meso-level empirical analyses of particular urban contexts. The relationships between the structural dimensions are explored in turn in Chapter 3 (welfare, housing and segregation), Chapter 4 (immigration and economic system) and Chapter 5 (societal context, urban structure and segregation). The latter bridges the macro and meso scales.

The meso level (city and district) examines eight Southern European cities to identify patterns of ethnic residential segregation, further mechanisms of differentiation, and their changes over time, across the different urban contexts. Patterns and mechanisms until the mid-1990s are explored in Chapters 6 and 7, and changes in mechanisms and patterns in Chapters 8 and 9. The meso level includes metropolitan, municipal and district levels to provide more fine-grained comparative analyses across and within cities. The passage across scales allows a move from interpretative models to taxonomic perspectives that encompass complexity and divergences. Importantly, these analyses contrast the patterns of residential segregation among foreign and native groups. When possible, all foreign groups are included and disaggregated by country of origin rather than by continent or by the Western and non-Western distinction (i.e. European migration studies frequently used the term ‘Western groups’ to refer to foreign groups from advanced industrial societies – like the United States, Canada, Australia, Western Europe and Japan – assumed to have higher levels of skills, education and income than the other, non-Western immigrants from developing countries). Groups’ disaggregation permits the capturing of the diversity of patterns, the avoidance of generalisations and the setting of reference points. The analysis does not develop into micro level (neighbourhood scale).

A key aspect of this framework is the need for a historical perspective that considers an extensive length of time. This is paramount to interpret patterns in the interplay of past processes and present conditions, and examine path-dependencies and path-changes in systems and regimes. The analyses thus cover a timeframe focusing on two periods, the first up to the mid-1990s and the second up to the late-2000s.

The first period goes back to the legacy of post-War welfare construction in European societies that structured urban (ethnic) segregation until at least the mid-1990s. The second period aims to consider the impacts of major social transformations of Western societies and immigration systems that developed from the late 1970s but became visible only after the late 1990s. Moreover, the 1990s was a pivotal period in the history of Southern European ethnic segregation with a significant increase in immigration flows that impacted on urban areas. The timescale of the analysis leads up to the international economic recession of the late 2000s, a critical historical event whose potential transformative effects are complex and thus difficult to interpret at this stage.

The selection of case studies was determined by several criteria. The choice of Southern European countries – Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece – was based on similarities in the types of welfare, notably the familistic welfare regime, and was restricted to the larger EU countries with significant migration history (thus Malta, Cyprus, Monaco and the Balkans were not included). The cities chosen included the four capital cities – Lisbon, Madrid, Rome and Athens – and four industrial cores – Barcelona, Milan, Turin and Genoa; all have experienced a significant increase in immigration since the 1980s and have a long history of rural–urban migration.⁸

The main investigative method uses divergence comparative perspectives that compare and classify cases *simultaneously* in order to overcome the methodological limitations of juxtapositional and modelling analyses (Kemeny and Lowe 1998). The goal is to provide a comparative narrative throughout the book to complement existing edited works on segregation that, as Cochrane, Clarke and Gewirtz (2001, p. 9) note, often look ‘rather too much like an unconnected series of chapters (usually written by national experts), each summarising the experience of one country and expecting the reader to draw his or her own conclusions’.

This type of systematic comparative study requires a great amount of disaggregated and comparable data. However, there are substantial data constraints, particularly on housing and immigrants’ characteristics. International agencies, national bureaux of statistics and census data seldom provide such detail, and metropolitan and municipal data for the eight cities is uneven.⁹ The paucity of raw and primary data and the lack of systematisation make comparability challenging, especially at an

inter-urban level (Fonseca et al. 2010). The lack of disaggregated and longitudinal data prevents the development of regression analyses, diachronic analyses, complex indices or statistical modelling.

As a result, the study has relied on a combination of multiple data sources (including extensive secondary data from scholarly sources and official reports), simple statistical explorations, and working by proxy. It uses a large number of cities to build typological accounts with at least three cities per category, so the analyses presented here are the result of many comparative attempts negotiating significant data constraints. Simple traditional indicators to measure spatial concentration are employed, like Indices of Segregation (IS) and Location Quotients (LQs).¹⁰ Other more complex indices exist but are not used because they require more adequate data, or are considered ambiguous since based on statistical modelling that employs spatial indicators to infer the existence of social problems. Decreasing indices of spatial segregation do not necessarily imply social upward mobility or integration. For instance, multidimensional indices (such as the Index of Multiple Deprivation in the United Kingdom, see critique in Deas et al. 2003) have proved useful to map more sophisticated understandings of complex realities, but they can be misleading in terms of framing and assessment when spatial and social indicators are bundled together.

At the same time, the limitations of simple indicators such as the IS and LQs are recognised (Johnston, Forrest and Poulsen 2002; Schnell and Ostendorf 2002, p. 73; Fonseca and Malheiros 2005, p. 121; Johnston, Poulsen and Forrest 2005). In particular, significant discrepancies in the average size of the spatial units available in each city is a problem since these indicators are sensitive to scale variations and thus require complex technical procedures to improve comparability (e.g. by reducing the size of the units, there is a possibility that indices might increase substantially). Taking into account technical limitations, the results are always contextualised and corroborated through other sources. All quantitative references presented, upon which the comparative grids are built, are slightly flawed (e.g. uncounted undocumented immigrants, differences in administrative units). However, rigorous systematic comparisons and secondary sources have been introduced to lessen the margin of error. This systematic analytical framework may be explored further when more adequate data is available.

Finally, some terminological clarifications are required. In most Southern European countries, the census data on foreign population is based on residence permits, by continent or country of origin, or

by nationality (a discrepancy that makes intranational comparison difficult) and there is no official category of ethnic minority or minority group (EUMC 2005, pp. 35–36; for issues on methods and data sources, see Cangiano 2008; Cangiano and Strozza 2008; Arango et al. 2009). Similarly, ‘second generation’ immigrants are not recognised and there is no disaggregation of ethnic groups (e.g. distinction between Egyptians of Muslim and Copt origins). In most Southern European countries, the words ‘foreigner’ or ‘immigrant’ are widely used and applied to a ‘documented’ resident who does not have full citizenship (for definitions of illegal and undocumented status see Baldwin-Edwards and Arango 1999). The term ‘immigrants’ (or *extra-comunitari*, meaning non-European) refers to non-Western migrant groups, while the term ‘foreigners’ is used when European and other Western migrants are also considered. Both ethnicity and race are socially constructed concepts and quite contentious; the former is more predominant in Europe, while the latter is preferred in North America (and Anglo-Saxon world), South Africa, and Latin America. For consistency with the European literature, this book will adopt ethnicity as ‘a multifaceted quality that refers to the group to which people belong, and/or are perceived to belong, as a result of certain shared characteristics, including geographical and ancestral origins, but particularly cultural traditions and languages. The characteristics that define ethnicity are not fixed or easily measured, so ethnicity is imprecise and fluid. Ethnicity differs from race, nationality, religion, and migrant status, sometimes in subtle ways, but may include facets of these other concepts’ (Bhopal 2004, pp. 441–442). In broad terms, *immigrants*, *foreign groups* and *ethnic groups* remain interchangeable in this book. When referring specifically to migrants from developing countries ‘non-Western groups’ is used.

Finally, some conceptual terms in the book are of Latin heritage and forms of social distribution are often hyphenated. For instance, *socio-tenurial differentiation* refers to the distribution of social groups across housing tenures (see Hamnett 1987 for insights and how it relates to socio-spatial segregation and wider debate on polarisation and inequality); and *socio-urban processes* refers to processes (like gentrification, embourgeoisement, peripheralisation, etc.) that alter or consolidate the geographic distribution of social groups across the city; socio-urban is preferred to socio-spatial to draw attention to the city-wide scale/nature of the phenomenon. The concept of *patrimony* or *patrimonial* is employed because it captures one of the cardinal essence of Southern societies (see definition in Chapter 1). MA is used as an abbreviation for metropolitan area (e.g. Lisbon MA, Madrid MA, etc.).

Notes

- 1 Paris (Préteceille 1995, 2004; White 1998), Brussels (Kesteloot 1998; Kesteloot and Meert 2000), Hamburg (Friedrichs 1998) and Frankfurt (Keil and Ronneberger 2000) from the corporatist welfare world; Amsterdam and Rotterdam (Kloosterman 1996) were followed by Stockholm (Murdie and Borgegård 1998), Oslo (Wessel 2000) and Copenhagen (Andersen 2004) within the social-democratic welfare cluster; and Milan, Turin and Genoa (Petsimeris 1998), Madrid (Leal 2004b) and Athens (Maloutas 2004a, 2007) from the familistic welfares of Southern Europe (see Chapter 3 on welfare regimes).
- 2 Details on the Bismarck social market model, Keynesian social pacts, and Christian social policies are presented in Chapter 3. Although differing in terms of universal coverage of services and policy programmes, each of these models developed redistributive programmes aimed at social protection and upward mobility across society, by ensuring the access of all social groups to what were considered key welfare services (education, health and pension, but also labour, land and housing, among others). Social equity principles were to various extents rooted in these models, which influenced the expansion of diverse welfare regimes in Europe during the post-War period.
- 3 In the social market model, developed in Germany in the 1930s, ‘state and market are deliberately integrated into a “third way.” (...) Non-profit renting takes a variety of forms and is encouraged to compete with traditional profit-oriented renting for households. The role of the state is as a facilitator of such competition, acting as a referee to ensure that competition is as fair as possible’ (Kemeny et al. 2001, pp. 2 and 4).
 Conversely, the economic liberal model, developed in most Anglo-Saxon countries, ‘polarises “market” and “state” into opposing distribution mechanisms and argues that “the market” is superior to state regulation. (...) Non-profit renting is hived off into a state-regulated command economy sector so as to prevent it from competing on the open market with owner-occupation and profit renting for households’ (Kemeny et al. 2001, pp. 2 and 4). More insights are presented in Chapter 3.
- 4 Kemeny’s distinction between unitary and dualist rental systems is still the most influential explanatory framework in comparative housing research, often used as an independent variable in assessing housing programmes and outcomes. Details presented later in Chapter 3.

In *unitary rental systems* (e.g. Sweden, Netherlands, Germany, Switzerland, Austria, France), the profit and non-profit rental sectors are integrated into a single rental market and encouraged to compete (based on the social market model); the rental sector takes up most of the housing market with an extensive provision of social housing, rental control and housing allowances. It aims to ensure low rents, superior quality of housing and secure contract tenancy terms. Conversely, in *dualist rental systems* (e.g. United States, post-Thatcher United Kingdom, Australia, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Greece), profit and non-profit rental sectors operate in two separated

- markets, keeping the provision of social housing to a minimum and regulated to avoid competition with the profit-driven private rental sector. Owner-occupation takes up most of the housing market, which is profit-driven and mostly kept unregulated, thus this system does not guarantee affordability, quality and security of tenancy (see Figure 3.3; and Stephens 2017 for a recent overview).
- 5 For instance: social exclusion and mixed embeddedness in ethnic neighbourhoods (Kloosterman, van der Leun and Rath 1999; Musterd, Murie and Kesteloot 2006), deprivation, social mixing and the neighbourhood effects (Friedrichs, Galster and Musterd 2005; van Ham and Manley 2012; Musterd, Galster and Andersson 2012), gentrification, residential mobility and school segregation (Burgess, Wilson and Lupton 2005; Goux and Maurin 2007; Lees, Slater and Wylie 2007). The debate also broadened from distributional to relational issues (van Beckhoven and van Kempen 2003; Murie and Musterd 2004) and from theory formation to policy-related concerns (Atkinson and Kintrea 2001; Kazepov 2005; Lupton and Tunstall 2008; Marcuse 2009; Darcy 2010; van Gent 2013; Slater 2009, 2014).
 - 6 This is not surprising given the long-established dialogue in urban studies between the Franco-German and Anglo-Saxon regional scholarship, and elective affinities between Franco-German and the Southern scholars, or between Scandinavian and Eastern European scholars.
 - 7 In welfare studies, the term 'de-familiarisation' refers to 'the extent to which the household's welfare and caring responsibilities are relaxed by state or market provision'. Esping-Andersen (1990, 2016b) defended the importance of considering the degree of 'familialism' or 'de-familiarisation' in assessing welfare regimes 'in order to attain a better understanding of the role of the family in the welfare mix, as well as a more complete characterisation of the regimes' (Arcanjo 2006, p. 10). However, the inclusion of this dimension (familialism) and process (de-familiarisation) in international welfare studies, and the recognition of 'familistic' welfare regimes, developed only after Southern European and Eastern European scholars joined the debate and comparative studies.
 - 8 The criteria for choosing the eight cities were based on two factors. The first was the availability and quality of primary and secondary data; the second was the need for diverse geographical and contextual features, and similarities among pairs of cities and among clusters of four cities. The four municipal areas (Barcelona, Milan, Turin and Genoa) and four metropolitan areas (Lisbon, Madrid, Rome and Athens) were selected because of the scale of disaggregated data available on the distribution of immigrants and their consistency for comparative georeferenced analyses to relate processes at metropolitan and municipal level. These cities are not representative of all cities in the region.
 - 9 Official on-line data is available in Spain, but less so in Italy (with the exception of ISMU – Istituto per lo Studio della Multiethnicità). Accessibility of reliable data has improved in Portugal and in Greece but remains limited in Italy. Macro-level comparative analyses are mostly based on data from international agencies (based on national census), validated by national

and scholarly sources. Meso-level analyses mostly use data from national and municipal bodies, research centres, and reports, which are processed to a degree of comparability. Occasionally comparable data can be found for all four countries and all eight cities. When cross-comparative frameworks are incomplete, these are complemented by proxy indicators and correlations between primary and secondary data sources.

- 10 *Location Quotients* (LQs) measure the relative concentration of a social or ethnic group in urban sub-units $LQ = x_i/x_j$ where: LQ represents the relative concentration of a social group x in an area; x_i represents the percentage of the social group within the i -th area; x_j is the percentage of the same group within the wider metropolitan area. The values of LQ are all positive. $LQ < 1$ represents relative under-representation of the ethnic group in a zone; if $LQ = 1$, the representation of the ethnic group in a zone is equal to the overall average; $LQ > 1$ represents relative over-representation of the ethnic group in a zone.

The *Index of Segregation* (IS) gives a measure of the differentiation of one social or ethnic group in relation to the total of other social or ethnic groups $S.I. = 1/2 \sum [x_i - y_i] 100$ where: x_i represents the percentage of the x social group in the i -th area; y_i represents the percentage of all the other social groups in the i -th area; and n is the number of areas considered. The values of IS range from 0 to 100, which respectively represent perfect distribution (social or ethnic mix) and maximum segregation of the social or ethnic groups analysed. $IS = 100$ indicates complete separation (i.e. no member of one of the two groups lives in an area which contains members of the other group); $IS = 0$ indicates complete similarity in the two groups (i.e. the same percentages of each group's members are found in every area).

The Index of Segregation is a special case of index of dissimilarity, as it compares the distribution of one ethnic group with that of the rest of the population. The index of dissimilarity is a percentage value measuring the unevenness of two distributions across a set of areas; it is used for identifying the degree of residential separation between two ethnic groups (Petsimeris 1998; Johnson, Forrest and Poulsen 2002).

Welfare Regimes and National Housing Systems in Europe

The complexity and diversity of segregation patterns in European multi-ethnic cities have gained growing attention since the mid-1990s when European comparative studies began to challenge the ‘over-attention to social polarisation and segregation as a result of economic restructuring and globalisation processes’ (Musterd and Ostendorf 1998, p. 1). These critiques of convergence theories grounded in the globalisation discourse led to ground-breaking approaches in comparative urban, housing and segregation studies. Critically, these approaches brought the role of the state back to centre stage in North American and European literature and, for the first time, welfare regimes were added to the traditional list of explanatory factors in segregation studies (Kemeny and Lowe 1998; Wessel 2000; Marcuse and van Kempen 2002). Welfare regimes were regarded as major drivers of differentiation in European cities, by preventing or reducing societal inequalities during the Fordist period and by filtering the divisive impact of globalisation (see discussion in Chapter 2).

Despite changes in the role of the state and devolution, the underlying argument remains valid: the difference in ethnic residential segregation patterns between American and European cities and among European cities is greatly influenced by the different welfare arrangements and redistributive mechanisms adopted at national, regional or municipal level (Musterd 2005; Arbaci 2007). More specifically, the distinct arrangements of the housing system, the degree of income

redistribution and the access to citizenship and decommodified services (education, health, pensions) affect the social stratification of cities, the levels of social and spatial inequalities and the relationship between residential segregation and class inequality (Domburg-de Rooij and Musterd 2002; Allen et al. 2004; Fujita 2012; Tammaru et al. 2016). Welfare regimes thus provide a critical comparative framework from which to view the roots of the diverse segregation patterns within macroscale redistributive mechanisms.

Within this focus on the state–market(–family) nexus, this chapter examines the relationship between welfare regimes and segregation by discussing the different types of housing systems in Western Europe in the mid-1990s. The work presented here draws on a previous study (Arbaci 2007). Given the methodological difficulties in comparing data across countries (variation of data scales and of information over time) and the different definitions of population categories (depending on the types of registration and forms of naturalisation and citizenship), the analysis was built upon comparative studies developed separately in the mid-1990s: Musterd, Ostendorf and Breebaart (1998) and Malheiros (2002) on ethnic segregation in Northern and Southern European cities; Balchin (1996) and Kemeny (1995) relating welfare regimes to housing tenure systems; and Barlow and Duncan (1994) relating welfare regimes to housing provision systems and land supply.

The first section compares patterns of ethnic residential segregation in more than 30 cities across 16 Western European countries, revealing an association with four ideal-typical welfare clusters (social-democratic, corporatist, liberal and familistic). The welfare clustering allows us to develop a divergence comparative framework that ‘seeks to explain the position of specific countries along the dimensions of decommodification, stratification and programme design which comprise the ideal-typical formulation of the concept’ of welfare (Allen 2004, p. 102).

The following sections explore the ways in which each welfare cluster differently affects social and spatial segregation among low-income and vulnerable groups, showing that the redistributive arrangements embedded in the housing system are important determinants. In each welfare/housing cluster, the combination of tenure policies (unitary and dualist systems) and modes of housing provision (promotion, production, land supply) reflects the different principles of stratification and decommodification that shape distinct mechanisms of socio-tenurial and spatial differentiation, thus of segregation. The analysis builds on the premise that in Europe, on ‘many occasions, class differences have taken over the role of ethnic differences, with almost identical segregation effects’ (Musterd and Ostendorf 1998, p. 14).

Finally, the spatial and social dimensions of segregation are disentangled in each ideal-typical welfare/housing cluster, providing a

conceptual framework in which to reinterpret the mid-1990s European panorama. This framework shows how housing systems affect the socio-spatial stratification of European cities differently and how the planning system, through forms of land decommodification (public ownership, control and negotiation of land supply), is critical in such processes of differentiation. Low levels of spatial segregation often indicate high levels of social inequality (familistic cluster) and vice versa (social-democratic cluster). However, as this and following chapters will show, this is not a paradoxical phenomenon.

The focus on housing systems does not reduce the importance of other factors driving segregation patterns but it highlights how segregation and inequalities are also the result of structural redistributive mechanisms. This overarching comparative framework is an analytical starting point for understanding patterns of ethnic residential segregation from a macroscale perspective and sets key contextual references for the empirical analyses later developed at city level from a mesoscale perspective.


Welfare Clusters and Segregation

After comparing a large spectrum of cities, van der Wusten and Musterd (1998) suggested that the welfare regimes affect levels of inequalities and segregation. They concluded that residualist welfare may drive high segregation levels (Chicago at one end of the spectrum), while universalist welfare may account for low levels of segregation (Hamburg, Stockholm and Amsterdam at the opposite end). Cities with welfare systems of intermediate quality lie in between. However, they stress that 'various aspects of the impact of the welfare state regimes on socio-economic inequality and segregation are less than obvious or are even obscure' (van der Wusten and Musterd 1998, pp. 241–242), offering open questions about the mechanisms that underpin these relationships.

Inspired by this line of enquiry, Figure 3.1 presents a synthetic panorama of ethnic spatial segregation levels across Western European cities in the mid-1990s, drawing on data from two comparative studies (Musterd, Ostendorf and Breebaart 1998; Malheiros 2002). In most European cities, the wealthiest groups are the most segregated, while the middle-income groups tend to follow dispersal patterns. Thus, differences in segregation levels among low-income and vulnerable groups best reflect the different impact of welfare regimes in the social-spatial hierarchy of the city, which represents wider societal principles of stratification.

The top and bottom part of Figure 3.1 shows, respectively, the *degree of spatial concentration* (Index of Segregation, IS, calculated at district

DEGREE OF SPATIAL CONCENTRATION - IS (1990–1995)



○ CARIBBEANS : Antilleans and Surinamese for Dutch cities; Black Caribbeans for UK cities
 ■ NORTH AFRICANS : Turks and Moroccans; Algerians for Paris; Moroccans for Milan, Madrid and Barcelona; Africans for Lisbon and Geneve; non-Westerns for Oslo; Indian Continent ethnic groups for UK cities.

Notes : IS calculated at district level.

RESIDENTIAL GEOGRAPHY

Major areas of ethnic concentration:

- a. many locations in the metropolitan area + highest concentration in the city centre (specific ethnic groups)
 - Brussels (North Africans)
 - London (Black Carribeans and Bangladeshis)
 - Manchester (Black Carribeans and subcontinental Indians)
- b. many locations in the metropolitan area + highest concentration outside the city centre
 - Amsterdam (Turks, Moroccans and Surinamese)
 - Stockholm (refugees and other immigrants)
- c. predominantly in the city centre - inner city areas
 - Frankfurt (several ethnic groups)
 - Dusseldorf (several ethnic groups)
- d. predominantly in the inner suburbs of the metropolitan area
 - Paris (North Africans in Grand Ensembles)
 - Milan, Madrid, Lisbon

Figure 3.1 Indices of segregation (IS) and major areas of concentration for selected ethnic groups in selected European cities, 1990–1995. *Source:* compiled by the author, based on data from Musterd, Ostendorf and Breebaart (1998) and Malheiros (2002).

level) and the *residential geography* of groups from the Caribbean, North Africa and Indian continent.¹ The scattered picture of the degrees of concentration invalidates some common assumptions of the media and anti-segregation policies.

First, there is no direct correlation between the proportion of the ethnic group (% of total population) and the level of spatial segregation (IS). For instance, ethnic presence is larger in Dutch and Norwegian cities than in British and Belgian cities but the IS are lower. This disproves the idea that an increasing number of immigrants leads to the formation of ghettos. It also corresponds with Prêteceille's studies of Paris (2012, p. 162) that 'invalidate the idea of an explosion of ethno-racial segregation' after the significant immigration growth following the 1980s.

Second, the level of spatial segregation is unrelated to the population size of the cities. Cities of about one million inhabitants (Frankfurt, Cologne, Milan, Amsterdam, Birmingham, Brussels or Barcelona) score different IS, as do cities with less than half a million population (Geneva, Vienna, Turin, Rotterdam, Oslo, Manchester), or cities and metropolitan areas with more than two million inhabitants (Paris, Madrid, Rome, Lisbon, London). This holds true even if we exclude the Southern European cities, where immigration flows are more recent and the proportion of undocumented migrants (which is not captured by the IS) is more substantial than in Northern European cities.

In contrast, the clustering of cities according to their welfare state regimes, as summarised in Table 3.1, points to a potential relationship between IS and welfare types. This relationship is further corroborated by the residential geography of the selected ethnic groups, summarised in the bottom part of Figure 3.1.

Western European countries, at least until the late 1990s, fall into four distinctive ideal-typical clusters² of welfare regime according to the *conception of society*, the *type of redistribution* and the level of de-commodification of public services: the *social-democratic* cluster (Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands, as well as the United Kingdom until the late 1970s); the *corporatist* cluster (Central Europe); the *familistic* cluster (Southern Europe) and the *liberal* cluster (United Kingdom and Ireland since the 1980s and Belgium with regard to the housing system).

Cities characterised by a liberal welfare regime, such as London, Manchester and Brussels, score the highest levels of segregation, particularly in the central areas (Figure 3.1). At the other extreme, cities belonging to a corporatist welfare regime, such as Paris, Düsseldorf and Frankfurt, score the lowest levels of segregation and the areas of ethnic over-representation are located in the inner city or inner suburbs. Cities with a familistic regime, such as Milan, Madrid and Lisbon,

Table 3.1 European welfare regimes and housing systems until the mid-1990s.

SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC - welfare cluster	CORPORATIST - welfare cluster	LIBERAL - welfare cluster	FAMILISTIC - welfare cluster
<p><i>Concept of society</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> relationships between the social partners in circumstances of relative labour scarcity; seeks to ensure that the social conditions of full employment support the well-being of society; <p><i>Redistribution and benefits</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> universalism and decommodification extended to all classes, equality of high standards welfare for all, no concept of minimum needs. <p style="text-align: center;">↓ ↓ <i>in housing:</i> TENURE-NEUTRAL SUBSIDY SYSTEM</p>	<p><i>Concept of society</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> groups with reciprocal rights and obligations, built on traditional family values and class differential; seeks to ensure the participation of all within the material, social and moral order of society; <p><i>Redistribution and benefits</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> familiarism and fragmentation in social insurance, preservation of status differentials by reinforcing the rights attached to classes and professions, state replaces the market as welfare provision (but recent obsession with free market and commodification). <p style="text-align: center;">↓ ↓ <i>in housing:</i> PARTIAL TENURE-NEUTRAL SUBSIDY SYSTEM</p>	<p><i>Concept of society</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> society composed of atomised individuals, seeks to ensure that each person attains a minimum material standard of well-being; <p><i>Redistribution and benefits</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> low level of universal transfers, residualism, limited benefits (safety net) for low income, working-class, state dependants, state encourage the market over other forms of organisation, obsession with free market and commodification. <p style="text-align: center;">↓ ↓ <i>in housing:</i> BIASED TENURE SUBSIDY SYSTEM</p>	<p><i>Concept of society</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> variant of corporatist, but weaker state provision, no history of full employment (minimum proletarianisation, family enterprises and self-employment, informal labour markets); <p><i>Redistribution and benefits</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> similar to corporatist as relies on family welfare, status differentiation and patrimony traditions, similar to liberal as stressing residual benefits, limited areas of decommodification, income polarisation counterbalanced by Christian social policy (family, patrimony) and informal access to employment and resources. <p style="text-align: center;">↓ <i>in housing:</i> BIASED TENURE SUBSIDY SYSTEM</p>
Archetypal: Sweden.	Archetypal: Germany.	Archetypal: United States (Canada, New Zealand, Australia).	Archetypal: Portugal, Greece.
Denmark, Finland, Norway, Netherlands (1960s transfer from corporatist)	Austria, Belgium, Italy, Switzerland (transfer to liberal), France (social-democ. / 1990s transfer to liberal)	United Kingdom (1979 transfer from social-democ.), Ireland, Spain (from familistic), Switzerland (from corporatist)	Spain (1990s transfer to liberal), Italy (hybrid with corporatist)

Housing system

- **unitary rental system^a** (except Fl, Nw): **housing tenure balance^c, predominance of social rental sector.**
- **State promotion** of various forms of rented and co-operative housing on **long-term** basis.

Sweden:

- social rental sector *leads* the rental market, (municipal housing companies compete with private rents and provide good quality housing on secure tenancy terms).

Netherlands:

- social rental sector *dominates* the rental market,
- very mature social rented sector (market rents determined by the cost structure).

Housing system

- **unitary rental system^a:**
 - **housing tenure balance^c, predominance of private rental sector.**
 - **State promotion** of private and social rented h. as **temporary** measure to remedy market imperfection.
 - Forms of housing self-production.

Germany/Switzerland:

- social rental sector *only influences* private rental markets by marginally dampening profit rents.

Belgium:

- housing system similar to liberal cluster, or rather, familistic cluster.

Housing system

- **dualist rental system^a:**
 - **housing tenure polarisation (imbalance)^c, predominance of owner occupation.**
 - State fosters home ownership and free market housing provision.
 - **State intervention** in housing is **limited** to a stigmatised provision for a residual population unable to adequately participate in markets.
 - **Non-profit** or **social sector** is protected from the profit sector by being **segregated from the private market and organised as residual, stigmatised.**

Housing system

- **dualist rental system^b** (including Fl, Nw): **housing tenure polarisation (imbalance)^c, predominance of owner occupation.**
- State fosters home ownership (as patrimonial concept) and allows housing self-production.
- **State intervention** in housing is **very limited** (stigmatised provision for a residual population unable to adequately participate in markets).
- **Non-profit** or **social sector** is protected from the profit sector by being **segregated from the private market and organised as residual, stigmatised.**
- Development of an **informal housing market** (private rental sector and owner-occupation).

^a Social and private renting are integrated into a single rental market.

^b State controls and residualises the social renting to protect private (profit) renting from competition.

^c Balanced/unbalanced distributional relationship between the (three) tenures.

Sources: compiled by the author, drawn from Barlow and Duncan (1994); Balchin (1996); Kemeny (1995); Mingione (1995); Allen (1998, 2000, 2004).

also score moderate levels of segregation. Cities within the social-democratic cluster are an intermediate case, with the highest ethnic concentrations outside the city centre, as in Amsterdam and Stockholm. Although in the mid-1990s the patterns of ethnic spatial segregation in Southern European cities were not as consolidated as in Northern European cities, the position of Southern European cities close to the corporatist welfare cluster is not so surprising. Familistic welfare regimes include a conservative variant of corporatist welfare regimes rooted in the Bismarck model.³

This view corroborates van der Wusten and Musterd's initial premise that welfare regimes affect the levels of spatial segregation of low-income ethnic groups. As the next section will show, among the many ways in which they can shape the patterns of segregation (income redistribution, citizenship, access to education, health, housing, etc.; see Schnell and Ostendorf 2002; Musterd 2005), housing systems and entrenched mechanisms of differentiation constitute one of the driving determinants, since they reflect and produce those principles of stratification embedded in the welfare regime (Schmidt 1989; Murie 1998; Allen 1998, 2004).

Linking Welfare Regimes and Housing Systems: Principles of Stratification and Mechanisms of Differentiation

Comparative research into European housing systems has demonstrated that each welfare regime cluster determines a distinctive housing system cluster, according to the conception of society and the redistributive mechanisms (Barlow and Duncan 1994; Kemeny 1995; Balchin 1996; Allen et al. 2004; Aalbers 2016a; Stephens 2017). A housing regime is made up of a tenure system and a provision system, and the two are closely related. In examining the relationship between housing and welfare regimes, this section explores both housing realms to identify the different principles of stratification and mechanisms of differentiation that may affect the social and spatial dimensions of segregation.

Conception of Society and Decommodification

Since 'the socio-political system in operation in [each] country provides the arena in which the relationship between the market and policy develop' (Balchin 1996, p. 12), the conception, constitution and vision of society influences the extent and the focus of the redistributive mechanisms delivered by the market-state(-family) nexus in each pillar of welfare. Thus it determines the extent of decommodification of the

education, health, labour, pension or housing system, and the section of society covered by universal transfers (in a decommodified system), or by residual benefits (in a commodified system).

The regime with the most comprehensively decommodified systems – the social-democratic welfare model – lies at one extreme (Table 3.1). Since it views society as a relationship of social partners, the state replaces the market and the family as welfare provider, universal transfers (tax and subsidy system) are high and extended to all classes and public services ensure high living standards.

Both corporatist and familistic societies, organised around reciprocal rights and obligations and built on traditional class differentials and family values, lie in the middle range. The state replaces the market in most welfare provisions but universal transfers are more fragmented than in the social-democratic regimes, benefiting particular classes and professions. However, in familistic regimes⁴ state intervention and universal transfers affecting housing and labour are limited and there is an over-reliance in the role of family as both welfare provider (not just in care services) and economic agent (Papadopoulos and Roumpakis 2013).

The liberal welfare regimes sit at the other extreme of the (de)commodification scale. These regard society as a series of atomised individuals, and the state encourages the market over other forms of organisation. The free-market ideology entails the commodification of public services. Benefits are residual and limited to the lower social echelons; the state only provides a safety net to ensure minimum standards.

Each model of society thus determines how the housing system allocates and distributes benefits in each housing tenure (owner-occupation, rental sector and social sector), within the housing market (supply-side or demand-side), and across the social groups. Thus it influences the degree of decommodification of the housing system. The correlation between welfare and housing is mutual:

institutional factors – the way in which market actors have been organized into or out of housing policy systems – accounted for the characteristics of national housing system. (...) [Schmidt (1989)] suggests two key dimensions for housing market differentiation. The first is the structure of the housing supply system. The nature of the building industry and the diversity of promotion are vital to understanding the varying nature of output between countries. Second, (...) ideological factors are crucial in understanding the long-term approach towards housing in any one country. This does not mean so much the politics of particular governments and their policy decisions, but rather a more general societal ideology which influences attitudes and expectations about welfare, states and markets. (Barlow and Duncan 1994, pp. 27–28)

Essentially, the combination of ideological and institutional factors organises each welfare/housing system around two realms – housing tenure and housing provision.

The *tenure system* relates to the level of universal transfers targeted at the owner-occupied, social and private rented sectors and is shaped by the societal ideology. For instance, since etatism is a fundamental part of corporatist regimes, state housing provision and housing benefits (allowances) for key workers are recurrent policies (their recurrence indicates in fact a path-dependency to the Bismarckian corporatist system). Specific forms of *housing provision* in terms of housing promotion and housing production constitute the supply system. The mechanisms of differentiation embedded in the tenure and production systems will be discussed next.

*Mechanisms of Socio-Tenurial Differentiation: Housing Tenures,
Unitary and Dualist Systems*

Typologies of welfare regimes and housing systems correlate with regard to housing tenure distribution (Kemeny 1995; Balchin 1996), as summarised in Table 3.1. The predominance of a particular housing tenure in each welfare cluster is strongly related to the type and level of universal transfers or residual benefits in the state–market–family provision. Universal or residual provision in housing depends on the collective conception of society and is produced and reproduced by its associated hierarchical social structure – based on social partners, class, family, professions or individuals. This is also reflected in the way social groups are distributed across housing tenures (here referred as socio-tenurial differentiation).

As shown in Figure 3.2, in both liberal and familistic welfare clusters owner-occupation is the predominant tenure, while the social rental sector is small and marginalised. This is because the state provision of housing is weak and welfare contribution is limited to residual interventions. In the liberal regime housing residualism is rooted in its ideological paradigms that regards housing as a commodity and individual responsibility, while in the familistic regime it is a legacy of the Catholic social policies that views (social) housing as a family rather than state responsibility (Allen et al. 2004).

In contrast, in the social-democratic welfare cluster the social rental sector is predominant and there is a more proportional balance of tenures, reflecting the concept of universalism and equal redistribution of high standards for all social groups and across all tenures. This is grounded on the ideological principles of social equity that consider housing as a right, thus a societal concern requiring state responsibility (Lowe 2011).





Figure 3.2 Housing tenures and gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, welfare clusters and Western European countries, 1994. *Sources:* compiled by the author based on data from Balchin (1996, p. 12).

The corporatist cluster lies between these two extremes. In this, the private rental sector is predominant and tenure composition is balanced – the result of the differential availability of universal transfers according to professions, classes and family values. State support is more widespread than in the liberal regime and less ‘ideologically symbolic’ than in the social-democratic regime. It plays ‘a temporary *social problem-solving* role (...) and it was never intended as any alternative or universalistic public sector. However, it has been expanded in times of social tension and housing shortage as in the post-war period up to 1970 and again after 1990’ (Barlow and Duncan 1994, p. 30).

There is another important difference. Familialism and fragmentation are characteristics of the corporatist and familistic welfare clusters, since both are rooted in the Bismarck model and aim to reinforce the rights attached to classes and professions, by maintaining status differentials. While the corporatist model relies more on the state and so fosters the expansion of the rental sectors, the familistic regime relies more on family (and voluntary agencies) to provide welfare and housing (Mingione 1995, p. 122; Andreotti et al. 2001; Naldini 2003), reproducing a *patrimonial* tradition in home and land ownership. This hegemonic idea of a homeownership society prevented the proletarianisation process that occurred in Northern European societies during the full employment Keynesian policies (Leal 2004a; Moreno 2006; Papadopoulos and Roumpakis 2013; as later examined in Chapter 5).

The structural differences in housing tenure distributions between the welfare regimes are more striking at city level (Figure 3.3). During the 1990s in Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Stockholm, Gothenburg and Copenhagen, more than 80% of the housing market was made up of rented housing, mainly social housing, typical of a social-democratic regime. In Munich, Vienna, Lille, Lyon, Marseille, Brussels and Antwerp, 60–80% of the market comprised rented housing but, as in other corporatist regimes, the private sector was dominant. In Birmingham, Manchester and Dublin, owner-occupation was the predominant tenure after the shift to a liberal regime from the early 1980s, with the extensive privatisation and reduction of the social rented stock. The significant share of social housing stock that remained in 1995 in the United Kingdom was a legacy of the pre-Thatcher social-democratic regime. In Southern European cities, the familistic regime fosters a housing market dominated by owner-occupation (with a negligible social rental sector); traditionally, Spanish cities had the highest levels of owner-occupation (70–80%).

Each welfare cluster provides distinctive forms of socio-tenurial differentiation that can be better understood using Kemeny’s (1995, p. 5) distinction between *dualist* and *unitary* rental systems. In the dualist rental system the social and private rental sectors are separated into two markets, as the state regulates and residualises the social rented sector (non-profit)



Notes: * private rented includes also social rented
 ** owner-occupied includes also social housing stock which is provided in form of subsidised homeownership

Figure 3.3 Housing tenures in selected Western European cities, 1990s. *Source:* compiled by the author, based on data from Ghékière (1992); Balchin (1996); Fonseca (1999, p. 203); Comune di Roma (2000); Urban Audit (2000).

to protect the unregulated private renting (profit) from competition. This is the case in liberal and familistic welfare states such as the United Kingdom, Ireland, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Italy and Belgium. Conversely, in the unitary rental system social and private are integrated into a single rental market, thus ‘increasing competition and overlap between profit and non-profit renting’ (Matznetter 2002, p. 266). This occurs in the social-democratic and corporatist welfare states, such as Sweden, the Netherlands, Germany, Switzerland and Austria, and evolves from their social market origins where the state encourages the social sector to compete directly with the private sector in order to develop a single rental market that keeps rents low and provides good quality of housing on secure contract tenancy terms (Kemeny, Kersloot and Thalmann 2005; Stephens 2017).

Within a unitary system, the state maintains fair competition between social and private markets by distributing benefits across all tenures, thus adopting a subsidy system that is meant to be tenure-neutral. In a tenure-neutral subsidy system, since the private rental market must compete with the social and/or non-profit rental market, it will need to be a recipient of equivalent subsidies to those allocated to the social sector, and, at the same time, flexible forms of rent control should be applied to both social and private rental markets (if the market shows signs of imperfection). Concurrently, owner-occupation should also receive subsidies, so that each tenure will be equally attractive to a significant proportion of households and conditions of fair competition are ensured between all tenures. To different extents in the Swedish, Dutch and German single rental markets, the social or non-profit rental sector tends to reduce rents in the private sector, thus increasing the affordability and accessibility of the rental market across all income groups. At the same time, it compensates the private market (rental and owner-occupation) through other benefits (allowances, vouchers, tax benefits). By keeping rents lower than mortgage costs, this system reduces demand for owner-occupation and moderates real-estate speculation, thus making homeownership more affordable (Balchin 1996, p. 15; Priemus 2001; Andersson et al. 2010). In contrast, within a dualist rental system the state supports a subsidy system that fosters owner-occupation (e.g. tax relief for mortgages) and residualises non-profit housing sectors; the social rented sector is minimised and separated from the private rental market so it does not compete on quality, affordability and accessibility (Pareja Eastaway and San Martin 2002; Leal 2004d; Lowe 2011).

As a result, unitary and dualist systems differ in the distribution of social echelons across the housing tenures, thus directly shaping different patterns of socio-tenurial segregation. In the unitary system, derived mainly from a social market strategy, the social or non-profit rental sector is accessible to all social groups and private rental markets

Table 3.2 Distribution of households in the social rented sector, by income groups, 1980s–1990s.

Countries	Low income ^a (1–3 income deciles)		Middle income ^a (4–7 income deciles)		High income ^a (8–10 income deciles)	
	1980s	1990s	1980s	1990s	1980s	1990s
UNITARY RENTAL SYSTEM						
Sweden	39.7	49.0	45.0	40.5	15.3	10.5
Netherlands	42.9	44.3	42.8	42.4	14.3	13.3
Germany	33.2	44.0	44.7	42.5	22.1	13.5
France	37.3	38.2	46.6	45.5	16.1	15.9
DUALIST RENTAL SYSTEM						
United Kingdom	59.1	61.8	31.9	33.5	9.0	4.7
Belgium	55.6	52.4	31.2	34.6	13.2	13.0

^a % of total households in the social rented sector.

Grey shadow to highlight the income groups most over-represented in the total of households.

Source: adapted from van der Heijden (2002, p. 334, table 2).

are kept affordable, enabling (re)distribution and mixing of the different income groups *within* each tenure. *Socio-tenurial mixing*, particularly in the social rented sector, is a distinctive feature of unitary rental systems (Table 3.2). Although socio-tenurial mixing is about the cohabitation of diverse groups in a residential area, rather than necessarily their social interaction, it is often intended as a means to increase equality of opportunities; by rescaling it at neighbourhood or even building level, it ensures that all groups have equal access to high-standard local facilities and welfare services. In contrast, the dualist system, by residualising the social or non-profit sector to vulnerable and low-income groups, produces a divisive socio-tenurial differentiation. As access to different housing tenures depends on income and the affordability, availability and quality of the housing stock, *socio-tenurial division* is greater than in unitary systems (van der Heijden 2002). In familistic clusters, the significant expansion of informal housing markets plays an important role in these divisive mechanisms, even though the informal segmentation of homeownership and rental markets is a response to the scarce, expensive formal market, long-term rent control and limited provision of social housing (Ferreira 1987a; Maloutas and Karadimitriou 2001; Padovani 2004).

According to these different mechanisms of social mixing or division across tenure, unitary systems (corporatist and social-democratic) lead to lower *levels of socio-tenurial segregation* than dualist systems (liberal and familistic). These are structural settings that we will return to when discussing the diverse degrees of socio-spatial segregation across European cities (see later Figure 3.6, rows).

*Mechanisms of Spatial Differentiation: Housing Provision
and Land Supply*

Barlow and Duncan (1994, pp. 31–32) were among the first to correlate welfare regimes and housing systems by looking at typologies of housing provision (production and promotion). More specifically, ‘different forms of *housing production* (regarding building firm size and profit regime), different forms of *housing promotion* and different forms of *land supply* and land-use planning (...) correspond with specific groupings of European welfare regime’ (Matznetter 2002, p. 265). This is a useful analytical framework within which to explore the distinctive mechanisms of spatial differentiation in each housing supply system, as shown in Figure 3.4.

One structural mechanism of spatial differentiation in the city is housing production – the size of firms, scale of production and profit regimes (Figure 3.4, top). Liberal regimes are organised around large house-building firms that rely more on speculative ‘development gains’ than on ‘building profits’.⁵ ‘For the social-democratic welfare regime, quite the opposite is true: still there are big builders, but they are kept separated from, and supervised by, non-profit developers and have to rely on building profits only, not least because land supply is under public control’ (Matznetter 2002, p. 265). Nonetheless, the large size of developers entails a *large scale* of production and of spatial differentiation in both clusters.

The corporatist welfare regime has, ‘a more fragmented building industry than in both former cases, but more speculative gains than in social-democratic regimes. The [familistic] welfare states of the Mediterranean (...) have even smaller builders than their corporatist counterparts, with even more speculative gains being made in the land development process’ (Matznetter 2002, p. 266). In both corporatist and familistic regimes, the preservation of the class-status differential accounts for the fragmentation and stratification of the construction firms: different construction firms provide for high-, middle- and low-income households that produce at a relatively medium and *small scale* (Leal 2004c).




Figure 3.4 Market–state mixes in housing provision: production and promotion forms in Western European countries in the 1980s (unscaled diagram). Sources: adapted from Barlow and Duncan (1994, p. 36).

Housing promotion and land supply add complementary mechanisms of differentiation (Figure 3.4, bottom). Since the liberal cluster is dominated by private-sector or market-led forms of promotion, it needs a speculative and commodified land supply because the profit regimes are generated by development gain. So private promotion largely depends on the conditions of the land market supply (cost, location, land use and profit gain from land-use change). At the other extreme, to different degrees in the social-democratic and corporatist clusters, private and speculative housing promotion is counterbalanced by various forms of non-profit housing provision. Since profit regimes are restricted to building profit, the quality of building construction and residential environment is higher than in profit regimes based on development gain. For instance, in social-democratic regimes development gains 'are not only seen as undeserved, but the measures used to remove them will have considerable benefits in reducing housing costs, [land costs] and increasing standards. (...) In the effort to keep welfare state costs manageable, states will widely intervene in the production process for housing' (Barlow and Duncan 1994, p. 31). Therefore, the social-democratic and corporatist clusters require a less speculative land market than the liberal clusters, using publicly owned land or land negotiated through a highly regulated planning system.

The type of land supply is central in this process. At least until the mid-1990s, in corporatist and social-democratic clusters, the public provision of land and redistributive approaches in planning provided a more affordable and accessible land supply that kept production costs low for both the state and the market and for household self-construction (e.g. among better-off members of the working class). This was essential to create affordable conditions for self-provision,⁶ co-operative housing and other forms of non-profit housing. In Northern Europe it was the basis for the *large-scale* post-War urban expansion that encouraged the suburbanisation of middle- and high-income households. In other words, a significant degree of decommodification in the land regime was necessary for the delivery of unitary systems, which were part of a wider programme of social mobility promoted in the Keynesian full employment policies of the Northern European welfare states.

Among most familistic welfare states of Southern Europe, a weak or absent planning system, the *patrimonial* land ownership tradition and the scarcity of affordable land led to alternative forms of land supply and a patchwork of informal and speculative housing provision (Salgueiro 1972, 2001; Ferreira 1987b; Maloutas and Karadimitriou 2001; Leal 2002). This encouraged an uneven, *small-scale* and fragmented urban sprawl, which drove the suburbanisation of low- and lower middle-income households to the peripheral

fringes. Catholic social policies, less developed industrial economies and family enterprises were responsible for the post-War urban sprawl in Southern European cities (Mingione 1995; Allen et al. 2004).

The four clusters exemplify how the interplay between (1) land supply arrangements (from public to market-led provision, largely determined by the planning regimes), and (2) the size of builders/developers' firms (small, large or mixed), directly influences the *scale of the production* of the residential built environment through large versus small plots of development, fragmented versus homogeneous expansions and by different degrees of mixed land use and tenure mixing. For instance, small-scale production in corporatist and familistic cities creates greater social and functional differentiation in the built environment than in the liberal and socio-democratic cities, with a larger provision of heterogeneous neighbourhoods in terms of scale, functions and tenures. The *levels of spatial segregation* across social groups thus vary among welfare clusters: they are higher in liberal and social-democratic welfares, more fragmented in familistic welfares and lower in corporatist welfares (see later Figure 3.6, columns).

How Mechanisms of Differentiation Inform the Social and Spatial Dimensions of Segregation: Land Supply, Tenure and Provision

At system level, land is the pivotal link between provision and tenure systems, whose interplay affects both the spatial and the social dimensions of segregation. The different types of profit regimes and sizes of firms associated with land supply and planning regimes influence the *spatial scale* of the residential built environment. The type of land supply is key to the housing promoted, so determines the composition of housing tenures and their geographic distribution, influencing the *socio-tenurial distribution* of the households within the urban context. Provision systems and unitary/dualist systems are mutually intertwined in the production of residential built environment through urban growth and urban renewal. Their combination is one of the structural urban conditions that shape the socio-spatial stratification of the city and patterns of segregation.

Figure 3.5 brings together the work of Balchin (1996), Kemeny (1995) and Barlow and Duncan (1994) and reviews both housing strains (provision on the left and tenure on the right) by using land supply as a common variable.⁷ This is an attempt to deconstruct the ways in which the tenure, provision and land supply embedded in each welfare




Figure 3.5 Housing provision, land supply and housing tenures: welfare clusters and Western European countries, 1985–1995. *Source:* compiled by the author, based on data from Barlow and Duncan (1994, p. 36) and Balchin (1996).




Figure 3.6 Housing tenures, provision forms (production and promotion) and degrees of socio-spatial segregation in four welfare clusters until the mid-1990s.

cluster/housing system affect the scale, socio-tenurial distribution and socio-spatial distribution of households (Figure 3.6). The social and spatial dimension of segregation will be addressed in turn. These findings will be used to reinterpret the picture of European ethnic urban segregation (Figure 3.7) compiled in the early 1990s according to the spatial concentration of the bottom social echelons.

Socio-Tenurial Dimension of Segregation

The four housing clusters operate differently across the spectrum, but the key divider is the structural difference between unitary and dualist systems. The right side of Figure 3.5 reveals a clear bifurcation between owner-occupation (with and without mortgage) and rental (social and private), which stands at the critical point between dualist and unitary systems, and corresponds to an increase in speculative land supply.

At one extreme are the liberal and familistic clusters (Figure 3.5, right side): the predominant speculative approach to land supply corresponds to a dualist housing system and a profit regime based on development gain (left side), where the maximisation of profits depends strongly on land and marginally on the quality or productivity of housing construction. Housing provision is thus tailored towards the most profitable part of the private market, predominantly homeownership and speculative private renting for middle- and high-income groups, and marginalises access for low-income groups, both native and foreign. This system channels the lowest-income groups into the residual part of the private rental stock (in poor-quality housing, as in the case of Turks and Moroccans in Brussels), or (when available) into the social rental sector (developed as a marginalised segment of the sector, as shown by Black Caribbeans and Bangladeshis in London or Manchester), or into the informal housing market and/or subletting (as in the case of Africans in Lisbon or Moroccans in Barcelona).

A speculative, commodified approach to land supply tends to generate a dualist housing system (a dominance of homeownership, and an unbalanced tenure composition). Vice-versa, a system that fosters primarily homeownership (thus reproduces a dualist housing system or shifts from a unitary to a dualist system) requires a speculative land supply, which constrains non-profit housing provision and makes the production of social housing more expensive. Because of its entrenched principles of social stratification, this system produces a divisive socio-tenurial differentiation. Social groups are divisively distributed across the housing tenures through the shifting and sorting of the market-state nexus, which results in an urban milieu with high levels of *social inequality* (Figure 3.6, rows).




Figure 3.7 Welfare and housing systems: reinterpreting patterns of ethnic spatial segregation in selected European cities and for selected immigrant groups, 1990–1995.

The intrinsic link between a speculative/commodified land supply, a dualist system and high social inequality is thus structural and systemic. This is a path-dependency of the familistic and liberal welfare regimes, where housing is conceived as a commodity (Lowe 2011). In the past two decades, with the devolution of welfare services and responsibilities to regional and local government without an equivalent fiscal devolution, several Northern European cities have begun to recommodify housing and shift towards a dualist system (van Kempen and Priemus 2002; Cole 2006; van Gent, Musterd and Ostendorf 2009; Andersson et al. 2010; Lévy-Vroelant 2014; Musterd 2014). Direct tenure policies and indirect regeneration programmes targeting concentrations of social housing have fostered homeownership, privatised public land, stopped social housing production and privatised social rental stock through transfer to tenants and non-profit associations (e.g. *Right to Buy* in the United Kingdom) or demolitions (e.g. differentiation programmes in the Netherlands, tenure mixing programmes in the United Kingdom). These forms of recommodification suggest a shift from unitary to dualist systems (path-change), which enhances tenure change and state-led gentrification in the central and inner city and creates a more divisive socio-tenurial differentiation (Davidson and Lees 2010; van Gent 2010, 2013; Hamnett 2010). With the transfer of the better-off tenants to homeownership (and resale of ex-social housing at market prices) and the gentrification-led displacement processes, the socio-tenurial segregation of the lowest-income groups in the residual segments has been accentuated, particularly in the shrinking and marginalised social rental sector (Table 3.2).

Ethnic groups have been particularly affected by the divisive mechanisms of socio-tenurial differentiation driven by the shift towards a dualist rental system. In London, the concentration of Black Caribbeans and Bangladeshis has increased in the residual and social rental stock (Watt 2009; Hamnett and Butler 2010), as with the Antilleans and Surinamese in Amsterdam. However, when ethnic groups have been dispersed in social housing in the peripheral areas of Amsterdam, the increased social inequality is not reflected in the indices of segregation (van Kempen and van Weesep 1998; Bolt, van Kempen and van Ham 2008). In the inner-city areas of several European cities, tenure change (from rent to owner-occupation) and regeneration programmes have driven processes of (state-led) gentrification and ethnic desegregation: with the expansion of middle-class homeownership markets, ethnic tenants were priced out or evicted (Simon 2002; Lees, Slater and Wylie 2007; van Gent, Musterd and Ostendorf 2009; Slater 2009; Arbaci and Tapada-Berteli 2012). The social reconfiguration of areas undergoing

gentrification represents a process of divisive socio-tenurial differentiation driven by the promotion of owner-occupation. Harvey's (2003) notion of 'accumulation by dispossession' best describes the vicious role that dualist housing systems can play in generating more socially divided societies (Glassman 2006).

The fostering of homeownership, while reshaping patterns of ethnic and socio-spatial segregation, has thus enhanced more divisive forms of socio-tenurial differentiation based on income, ethnicity, age and household structure that are characteristic of dualist housing systems. The impact of this ownership-driven process of differentiation differs across cities depending on the inherited housing system; it is more pronounced in dualist systems and moderate in unitary systems (van Kempen, Schutjens and van Weesep 2000, p. 528). As Van Gent (2013, p. 503) argues in relation to the Dutch cities, 'gentrification was made possible by a process of neoliberalisation within the housing system. However, as an institutional change is incremental and based on layering and conversion, many older institutional arrangements remain in place. These arrangements tend to slow gentrification and assuage social consequences'.

At the other end of the divide lie the unitary rental systems (Figure 3.5, right side). Social-democratic and corporatist clusters depend on three factors: (1) a large extent of public land ownership (direct land provision) and/or a highly regulated planning system (indirect land provision) correspond to a unitary system where (2) mixed forms of profit regimes (left side) enable (3) tenure-neutral policies to deliver a balanced tenure system and ensure a high social distribution within each tenure and across the city. The decommodified approach to land supply is a precondition for a significant socio-tenurial mix in the private and public rental sectors and socially and ethnically mixed neighbourhoods with reduced levels of social inequality among both native and foreign social groups (Figure 3.6, rows). Again, the link between a decommodified land supply, a unitary system and low social inequality is structural and systemic. Furthermore, as argued by Fainstein (2012, pp. 37–38) 'if equity and good planning are the principal objects of capturing increases in land value for the public, elimination of the market in land is a prerequisite. That this is done in nations that have active market economies indicates that land banking by the private sector can occur within otherwise capitalist economies, resulting in greater equity and broader right to the city'. This fundamental difference with dualist rental systems may explain why the lowest degrees of spatial segregation (IS; Figure 3.1) are recorded among North Africans especially in Frankfurt, Düsseldorf or Paris municipality (corporatist cluster), and more moderate levels are found in Oslo, The Hague and Amsterdam

(social-democratic cluster), compared with the high levels of segregation recorded in the liberal cluster.

Overall, socio-tenurial differentiation differs greatly between dualist and unitary rental systems; it is more socially divisive in the former and socially mixed in the latter. According to how the principles of stratification embedded in each housing system are produced, we thus expect higher degrees of *social inequality* (or divisive differentiation) in the liberal and familistic clusters and lower degrees in the corporatist and social-democratic clusters (Figure 3.6, rows). State provision in unitary systems tends to control and set better quality standards for non-profit and social rental stock and the urban public environment (collective areas, urban landscape, schools and other social infrastructures) – aspects that are marginalised in the state provision of dualist systems. As highlighted by Musterd, Ostendorf, and Breebaart (1998, p. 185), while comparing the neighbourhoods and housing stocks in which North African or Caribbean groups are settled, ‘the impression is that social and physical conditions are worse in cities such as Brussels, Paris, London, Manchester and better in Amsterdam, Stockholm, Frankfurt and Düsseldorf’.

Spatial Dimension of Segregation

So far, this analysis says little about the mechanisms embedded in the spatial dimension of segregation. The socio-tenurial distribution is strongly conditioned by the unitary or dualist housing system and influences the social dimension of segregation among diverse income groups. But it is also linked with the type of production of the residential built environment, the scale and geography of each tenure, according to the size of development firms (and sites) involved, and the type of redistributive approach embedded in the planning system (Figure 3.5, left side). These two aspects are entangled and have a bearing on the spatial dimension of segregation. In other words, the combined effects of the scale of production (size/type of the firms and land supply) and the socio-tenurial distribution (unitary or dualist system) have a big influence on the degree of socio-spatial segregation, as deconstructed in Figure 3.6.

Corporatist and liberal cities lie at the opposite extremes of the spectrum (Figure 3.6). Corporatist cities score the lowest levels of socio-spatial segregation because they are based on a unitary rental system, via mixed scales of production (small- and medium-sized developers) and mixed forms of land supply and profit regime. At the other extreme, cities in societies with liberal welfare regimes produce the highest levels of socio-spatial segregation because they are based on a dualist rental system,

developed through large-scale housing production and speculative access to land. Cities in the familistic and social-democratic clusters lie in the middle of this continuum. In familistic cities, fragmented and small-scale housing production (including self-production and informal land supply) accounts for a spatially unsegregated urban context but is also entrenched in a dualist rental system that leads to more social stratification than the corporatist model. Conversely, in social-democratic cities the socio-tenurial mix is driven by the unitary system. However, because the mix is produced through large-scale housing production, these cities show higher degrees of socio-spatial segregation than their corporatist counterpart, yet lower degrees than liberal cities.

The scale and geography of such socio-tenurial mixed occupancy differs between unitary systems. For example, in Amsterdam and the French and German cities the private and public rental sectors are both socially mixed. However, the rental sectors are larger in Amsterdam, leading to a more spatially homogeneous geography and higher levels of spatial segregation than in Frankfurt, Düsseldorf or Paris. This creates a significant degree of spatial segregation among Antilleans and Surinamese in Amsterdam (although lower than the Bangladeshis in UK cities – liberal cluster). Simultaneously, the large concentration of rental housing in the historic neighbourhoods accounts for the significant degree of segregation of North Africans (yet lower than that of the North Africans in Brussels – liberal cluster). In the Netherlands, renewal and housing differentiation programmes and the gentrification of historic centres reduced the stock of social housing and private rental housing from the mid-1990s. Ethnic patterns shifted as the geography of the rental sectors changed and sitting tenants in social housing were relocated in the peripheries (Musterd, Priemus and van Kempen 1999; Bolt, van Kempen and van Ham 2008; Musterd 2014). The point here is that the ‘geographical scale of each tenure’ is an important determinant in the spatial dimension of segregation, a key analytical element of comparison among cities and welfare regimes, and its changes over time.

The typological or architectonic features of the residential production are also important in understanding the socio-spatial hierarchy of cities, although this aspect is often disregarded in Anglo-American studies that focus predominantly on horizontal social differentiation (White 1984, 1998). Corporatist cities of Central Europe and familistic cities of Southern Europe have a long history of vertical social differentiation, or of permanent cohabitation between middle-class and working-class groups, given the reproduction of particular housing typologies, originally designed for this kind of cohabitation (Maloutas and Karadimitriou 2001, pp. 702–703). Examples are the Parisian Haussmann/Mansarde model exported to other continental capitals

since the 1900s, and the variants of the historical mercantile dwellings of port cities, as in Lisbon, Barcelona, Marseille, Genoa and Naples. In the Parisian model, the social division between the bourgeois lower floors and the servants' upper floor continued throughout the twenty-first century with the occupancy of the upper floor by manual workers, later substituted by other low-income households, students, older people and migrants. Gentrification processes eroded socially mixed cohabitation and the central and inner city areas of corporatist cities have become more socially homogeneous in terms of income echelons. 'A more recent type of vertical class cohabitation in some Southern European cities relates to gentrified upper floors of the old stock – especially when nice views and terraces are present [and lifts installed] – with the darker apartments of the lower floors relegated to working-class, immigrant or professionally marginal households' (Maloutas and Karadimitriou 2001, pp. 702–703). This is a typical feature of several Southern European cities and contributes strongly to the reduced levels of ethnic and socio-spatial segregation in the historic centre and peripheral belt (as explored in more detail in Chapter 8).

Overall, the structural conditions of housing provision – scale of production, land supply and profit regime – have a significant impact on the scale of the city's socio-tenorial hierarchy and, consequently, the patterns of ethnic and socio-spatial segregation. The mid-1990s European view of ethnic urban segregation, portrayed at the beginning of the analysis (Figure 3.1), can thus be partly reinterpreted in Figure 3.7, in the light of the findings drawn from the four welfare clusters (Figure 3.6). Housing systems are not the only explanation, but their embedded mechanisms of differentiation within the dimension of decommodification and stratification play an important role in the macroscale contextual structure of the city and, more generally, in the production of inequality and social division of space.

Conclusion

This chapter has explored one of the many ways in which welfare regimes influence patterns of segregation. Within a European comparative framework, the study of four archetypal welfare/housing systems has shown how (1) the composition and balance among housing tenures (unitary or dualist regime), and (2) the forms of housing production and promotion (land supply, construction industry, profit regimes) are crucial to the scale, nature and socio-spatial differentiation of the urban context and, consequently, the degree of ethnic and socio-spatial segregation of the most vulnerable ethnic groups. Both components of

the housing system depend on one another and on the type of welfare regime to which they belong.

Three emerging aspects are significant as they enrich the European debate on segregation and inequality. First, the *scale of housing production* is essential in explaining the diverse degrees of ethnic spatial segregation across European cities; it is not just about tenure systems. Second, the planning system directly affects segregation processes because the degree of *public ownership, control or negotiation of land supply* determines distinct mechanisms of socio-spatial differentiation and type of residential provision. Direct or indirect public ownership of land is crucial in providing a less socially divisive society, as shown in corporatist and social-democratic cases. Third, Southern European cases are indicative of patterns of (ethnic) residential dispersal that result from mechanisms of exclusion. In these cases, the *low levels of spatial segregation* recorded among the most vulnerable social and foreign groups are likely to be *associated with high levels of social inequality*, due to the divisive socio-tenurial differentiation driven by an unbalanced and dualist housing tenure system, dominated by owner-occupation and small or small-medium scale of production. The opposite can be said about the social-democratic cases.

This analysis reinforces the argument that spatial concentration and spatial dispersal are not automatically representative, respectively, of social exclusion and social integration. Spatial and social dimensions of segregation are not interchangeable, in contrast to what is assumed in dualist urban order (see the transatlantic debate in Chapter 2). In this respect, welfare arrangements are critically important to filter out macroscale processes. As Murie and Musterd (1996, p. 514) argued, 'patterns of social polarisation and division in cities affected by the same global economic pressures are also significantly affected by wider welfare patterns in the past and in the present'.

The emphasis on welfare regimes as an ideal-typical analytical tool has been instrumental in the formation of an overarching comparative framework and in showing how housing systems and land supply organise the socio-spatial hierarchy of the city differently. The focus reinforces the importance of principles of stratification and of system decommodification in the social and spatial division of urban societies. The nexus between the unitary rental system and land decommodification emerges as a precondition for less socially segregated cities, while the dualist system-land commodification nexus entails a more socially divided urban society. This adds to the European debate on the production of inequality.

A more in-depth focus on changes in the institutional and housing contexts is required to explore the connection between welfare and segregation. With the restructuring of welfare states and diversified

exposure to the financialisation of the state, some countries may now fall into a different cluster (Hemerijck 2013; Aalbers 2016a). Since 'housing policies and housing systems do change, often slowly, in small, gradual and incremental ways' (Malpass 2011, p. 305), it is sometimes difficult to distinguish whether the housing and regeneration programmes introduced since the 1990s have followed a path-dependence course (e.g. Spain, France, the United Kingdom and Belgium) or led to a path-change (e.g. Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands moving into a corporatist or liberal system; Doling 1997; Kemeny 2001; Hoekstra 2010). At the same time, more attention is required to the changing role of the state and its rescaling, since decentralisation has devolved some responsibilities to regional and local governments, producing diverse types of local welfare and housing systems and making redistribution more complex (McEwen and Moreno 2008). Thus, within the same country, municipal and regional governments may have diverged from the national system in the extent of decommodification of housing tenure policies and provision and fallen into a different archetypal model (Malpass 2011).

Nevertheless, this broad comparative framework remains valid as a conceptual tool. Its methodological contribution is not limited to the 1990s, nor to Western European national contexts. Since it associates segregation with a range of degrees of decommodification and forms of stratification, compared along a spectrum of redistributive archetypes (from universalism to residualism), it can accommodate different varieties of archetypes, timeframes and scales. The link between segregation and redistribution will, in fact, be further operationalised at a mesoscale to explore how local housing systems and their transformations have differently informed patterns of ethnic segregation in eight Southern European cities.

Notes

- 1 The focus has been narrowed towards Caribbean, North African and Indian continent groups because (i) they are one of the largest low-income ethnic groups present in the majority of the selected cities; (ii) they score the highest IS among ethnic groups within each city; (iii) they share similar bottom-end insertion in the labour market and (iv) their residential concentration, or spatial segregation, is often perceived as an indicator of deprivation and exclusion (Daley 1998; Friedrichs 1998; Giffinger 1998; Kemper 1998; Peach 1999).

The IS scores have been drawn from the comparative works of Musterd, Ostendorf and Breebaart (1998) and Malheiros (2002) since in both cases

- (i) the indices have been calculated at district level (aggregation of neighbourhoods or wards) to minimise distortions when segregation is measured using small geographic units or there is significant variation in average, and (ii) the authors have systematised the data in terms of statistical regularity and classification, scale and unit of analysis to address the technical limitations of cross-comparative analyses when employing databases from different European countries and cities. Particularly, issues regarding differences in the size of the metropolitan areas and in the average size of the internal administrative units have been considered in the interpretations of data. Although IS are unavailable for Stockholm, Musterd, Ostendorf and Breebaart (1998) and Murdie and Borgegård (1998) indicate a level of segregation of North Africans in Stockholm similar to, but lower than in, Amsterdam. For Paris, North Africans score similar IS in the metropolitan area and in Paris municipality (75 districts). For Oslo, North Africans are aggregated within non-Western ethnic groups. Attention should be paid to the residential geography when assessing IS. For instance, ethnic groups over-represented in outer or metropolitan suburbs might present lower IS than those in inner-city areas, given the more scattered and lower density distribution of the residential built environment.
- 2 Welfare clusters are often used as an ideal-typical analytical tool (Abrahamson 2002; Allen 2004). The definition and constitution of clusters are drawn from various authors (Barlow and Duncan 1994; Kemeny 1995; Balchin 1996; Ferrera 1996; Allen et al. 2004; among others) elaborating on Esping-Andersen's welfare typologies (1990, 1996).
 - 3 The Bismarck social model (1870s) developed the principle for social protection on the basis of existing mutual aid associations and set the foundations for welfare corporatist regimes, first in Germany and Austria and later adopted in most Central and Southern Europe countries (it also influenced the development of corporatist-based social security systems in Latin America). It introduced social insurance programs where the eligibility for benefits was earnings-related and based on compulsory contributions and occupational category. Thus, those categories considered privileged received higher occupational benefits (e.g. civil servants), and stability of the traditional family was protected by allowing non-working wives access to social insurance through the male bread-winner (Dieckhoener and Peichl 2009).

Both corporatist welfare regimes of Central Europe and familistic welfare regimes of Southern Europe ascribe to these Bismarckian components. The social insurance system – which covers the costs of health, education, social care and much of the income maintenance system (including pension and unemployment benefits) – is stratified along occupational and class lines, and family reliance, and it is managed by a system of independent funds. Southern European welfares are equally financed through social contributions but display levels of social expenses lower than for Central European welfares, except for pension, education and health systems (Allen et al. 2004; Ferrera 2007).

- 4 As Papadopoulos and Roumpakis (2013, pp. 207 and 204) argue, ‘in Southern European political economies it was not primarily the residual or rudimentary development of the welfare state that necessitated the reliance on the role of the family as a welfare provider, but crucially the specificities of this particular political economy that embedded in its logic the role that the traditional family played within these societies both as a welfare provider and as an economic agent. (...) Traditionally, in a familistic welfare capitalist regime, families were embedded into a segmented, unequal and exclusionary welfare system; a political system characterised by clientelism and patronage (usually based on thin alliances of social and occupational groups); a dual labour market with a large number of self-employed and informal workers; and a state-dependend national capitalist economy with key sectors controlled by oligopolies, the owners of which were well connected to domestic political elites’.
- 5 The main difference between development gains and building profits is that the latter regime does not allow developers to profit from the land development process (to prevent any forms of land speculation, for instance from land-use changes).
- 6 In corporatist regimes, self-provision ‘avoids enlarging the public sector and uses family-based networks to produce owner-occupied housing. In liberal regimes self-provided housing is usually ignored by the state. (...) The state policy will favour “the market” – that is the interests of large housebuilding firms and credit institutions. In [familistic] welfare states there is little tradition of direct state involvement in providing housing, and self-provision – predicated on extended family systems – fulfils any social role for housing. In the social-democratic regime, in contrast, rented and co-operative housing of various sorts is seen as an alternative sector open to all’ (Barlow and Duncan 1994, pp. 30–31).
- 7 On the left diagram of Figure 3.5, where production forms are plotted against land supply, the cross-link of housing provision variables shows a positive and mutual correlation between forms of land supply and profit regimes, indicating also a distinctive sequential position of the welfare clusters. For each welfare cluster the size of development firms are also shown. According to the position of each welfare cluster on the left diagram, the average tenure composition of four given tenure forms for each welfare cluster is identified on the right diagram, while each line joins the average for each given tenure form along land supply forms. On the right diagram, land supply can be then plotted against the linking up averages for the occurrence of each tenure within each welfare cluster. It reveals a bifurcation between owner-occupation forms (with and without mortgage) and renting forms (social and private), which stands at the critical point between dualist and unitary systems.

International Migration Turnaround

Established forms of international migration which have historically been very important (nineteenth-century settler migrations from Europe to the Americas, post-war guest-worker migration from the Mediterranean to northwest Europe, refugee migrations post-World Wars) have for too long now shaped our thinking about how migration is conceptualised and theorised. (...) New terms and metaphors are required to describe the new mobility types.

(King 2002, pp. 89–101)

Migration studies contributes greatly to the understanding of processes of ethnic insertion in cities but had a marginal influence on segregation studies. This chapter aims to extract key contributions of migration scholarship and identify migratory flows and waves that are relevant to the urban analysis undertaken in this book.

Migration has never been a linear process or concept. Since the 1970s, international migration patterns have changed and amplified the complexity of the phenomenon. Rapid global changes have accompanied new forms of international migration – at an unanticipated speed along traditional and new migratory routes – posing significant challenges for policy makers and researchers (Al-Ali and Koser 2001; Ribas-Mateos 2004; Vertovec 2007, p. 1024).

Three significant macroscale processes led to important social transformations in European societies: the fall of the Iron Curtain;

post-Fordist regimes of accumulation; and the restructuring of the European welfare regimes, which recommodified labour–capital relations and other societal services. Directly and indirectly, these transformations were linked to new forms of the international division of labour, more diverse migratory systems and more complex policy responses from receiving societies (Schierup, Hansen and Castles 2006; Bonifazi et al. 2008; Roberts and Wilson 2009).

At the same time, the profile of immigrants, their migratory projects and the nature of international migration flows was further diversified by the expansion of transnational and diaspora communities¹; new, circular forms of mobility (e.g. circular migration)² and of multi-step migration; ‘new motivations of migrants (above all the retreat from labour migrations linked to Fordist production systems), new space-time flexibilities and technologies, and the relatively new notion of migration as consumption and self-discovery’ (King 2002, p. 100).

In this context, terminology and the conceptual frameworks established during the industrial era became limited in understanding immigration (van Hear 2010; Castles 2010) and had ‘only limited application in the study of multi-group relations’ at the urban scale (Fong and Shibuya 2005, p. 286) and the formulation of policies that target deprived ethnic neighbourhoods (Veldboer, Kleinhans and Duyvendak 2002; Kazepov 2005; van Gent, Musterd and Ostendorf 2009). This prompted the development of new theories in migration studies.

This chapter starts by exploring the evolution of models and interpretative frameworks that reconceptualised immigration in the context of worldwide global changes and the (Southern) European ‘international turnaround’ (King, Fielding and Black 1997). Ground-breaking approaches emerged in the late 1990s and 2000s – the contextual, comparative perspectives that led to the metaphor of the trans-Mediterranean caravanserai and the Southern European model of immigration (Ribas-Mateos 2005). These challenged the convergence arguments embedded in the globalisation discourse, the post-Fordist model of immigration and the metaphor of Europe’s Rio Grande, which had dominated the academic and policy arena since the late 1980s. The conceptualisation of the international turnaround in Southern Europe, in particular, provided important contributions to these debates, anticipating the *social transformation perspective* developed in the late 2000s that considers migration as one element of social relations which cannot be analysed ‘in isolation, but as part of complex and varied processes of societal change’ (Castles 2010, p. 1568).

This is followed by a historical, taxonomic framework to identify migratory flows and waves across Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece from the mid-1960s until the economic recession of the late 2000s. Such divergence

and longitudinal comparative perspective is required to ‘understand the regularities and variations of a range of migration processes within a given historical socio-economic constellation’ (Castles 2010, p. 1582).

The analysis isolates divergences, changes and discontinuities that challenge the idea of a uniform migratory system in Southern Europe, replacing it with diverse and dynamic migratory sub-systems. These are interpreted from the viewpoint of worldwide and national, historical and geopolitical transformations, and contextualised within the various interpretative models. The diversification of the migratory flows and waves and the specificity of each country set key reference points for the empirical analyses on urban ethnic segregation developed in the following chapters.

Models, Frameworks and Theories in Migration Studies: Towards a Social Transformation Perspective

During the past three decades, the relationship between immigration and globalisation has been deconstructed in many ways, first by framing new migration models, then by developing contextual explanatory frameworks and more recently, by looking for new theories of migration.

Explaining a Changing World (Order)

By the end of the 1980s and early 1990s, the idea of a changing world order was central to defining new migration models able to reconceptualise international and regional migration systems (Kritz, Lim and Zlotnik 1992; Castles and Miller 1998; Salt 2001; see review in Bonifazi 2008). This was particularly important in Europe, where new in-migration basins (Southern Europe) and out-migration basins (Eastern Europe) were emerging, indicating the start of the so-called ‘international turnaround’ (King, Fielding and Black 1997). During the 1990s, the stark contrast between the immigration and emigration regions began to fade, as did the distinction between origin, transit, destination or return societies in defining the immigrants’ journeys (Ribas-Mateos 2004, 2005). The idea of a *global industry of immigration* and of a *post-Fordist migratory model* was crucial to this model-based approach rooted in migration economics, pointing to a worldwide convergence in labour migration patterns. Both ideas stemmed from a geopolitical and economic rationale that connected the liberalisation of trade and capital investment with changes in regimes of accumulation, and international division of labour. The convergence argument towards a new world order was widely challenged; however, this model-based approach remains influential

today in worldwide mappings of flows (see debate in Castles and Davidson 2000; King 2000; Ambrosini 2001; Bonifazi et al. 2008; Arango et al. 2009; Ambrosetti, Strangio and Wihtol de Wenden 2016).

Since the 1990s, a wealth of empirical studies have explored the novelty and complexity of the migratory phenomena further, through multiscale and multidisciplinary explanatory frameworks. 'More than ever, this multiplex nature of human migration and spatial mobility demands an interdisciplinary approach, enriched wherever possible by comparative studies' (King 2002, p. 89). Attention was placed on the diversity and divergence of cases in the old and new migratory regions (see review in Penninx, Berger and Kraal 2006). The quest for less generalised explanatory frameworks led to convergence patterns being contested. For instance, studies on Southern European cases showed the importance of contextuality, variability, multiscale and divergence in understanding local, regional and global migration processes (Baldwin-Edwards 1997, 2006; King 2000, 2002; Ribas-Mateos 2001; Baganha and Fonseca 2004).

Contextual, comparative studies required new models and explanatory frameworks to those developed around North American and Northern European post-War history (Pugliese 1995; King and Thomson 2008; see review in Ribas-Mateos 2004). As White noted (2002, p. 14), 'many of the stages of immigrants' arrival, settlement and community establishment that had occurred in Northern European countries between the 1940s and 1970s' would not be repeated within a 30-year time lag in Southern European or in Eastern European countries, since they 'present a very different set of social and economic structures from those existing further to the North'. Moreover, North American metaphors often imported to analyse processes and inform policies elsewhere were found to be inadequate and misleading (e.g. the Europe's Rio Grande of Rufin 1991). Similarly, claims of globalisation as the major driver of immigration were contested by studies on Southern Europe that showed 'regionalisation as being the primary issue along with networked migratory patterns' (Baldwin-Edwards 2004b, p. 9). Contextual perspectives and comparative divergence approaches became a fertile ground for developing more appropriate explanatory frameworks and new metaphors, which are now part of a wider transatlantic debate on migration theories (King 2002; van Hear 2010, pp. 1531–1533).

The quest for new models and frameworks was followed by the pursuit of 'new' grand theories in the late 1990s, particularly among Northern European and North American scholars involved in migration studies beyond these regions (see Brettell and Hollifield 2014; special issue of *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 2010, 36/10). Noteworthy was the seminal work of Massey et al. (1998, p. 281) that outlined 'what an integrated theory of international migration should

look like' based on four elements.³ *Worlds in Motion* aimed to set up the basis for a single theory appropriate for 'a brand new century within which immigration will play a central role' and that 'reflect[s] new social and economic realities [of] a post-industrial, post-Cold War world' (Massey et al. 1998, p. 3).

The Social Transformation Perspective within Migration Studies

By the end of the 2000s, the quest for a grand or single theory in migration studies was considered impossible or undesirable (de Haas 2008). The subject became a key issue in the international debate on the relationship between migration and social change. Opposing the single theory view, Castles (2010, p. 1565) argued for middle-order-level theories in order to

re-embed migration research in a more general understanding of contemporary society, and linking it to broader theories of social change across a range of social scientific disciplines. A conceptual framework for migration studies should take social transformation as its central category, in order to facilitate the understanding of the complexity, interconnectedness, variability, contextuality and multi-level mediations of migratory processes in the context of rapid global changes.

Two parallel notions underpinned this conceptual and methodological position. One viewed 'migration as a process which is an integral part of broader social transformations, but which also has its own internal dynamics and which shapes social transformation in its own right. (...) Social transformation as a key organising concept [is here] defined as a fundamental shift in the way society is organised that goes beyond continuous, incremental change' (van Hear 2010, pp. 1531–1533). Portes (2010) believed only marginal alterations of the social order were generated by migration processes, while Castles (2010, p. 1582) argued that migration shapes and is shaped by fundamental changes, thus we should 'link the analysis of migratory processes to broader social theory and through this to the analysis of societal change in general'. However, for both authors 'migration is linked in complex ways to class, gender, generation, ethnicity and other social cleavages, which are embodied in hierarchies of power and social status' (van Hear 2010, p. 1531). This view has been widely shared by urban studies scholars who have looked at such complexity, for instance, in the social stratification of the city (Allen et al. 2004; Kazepov 2005; Mingione 2009; Fujita 2012; Kandylis, Maloutas and Sayas 2012).

The second notion argued that migration studies have become an overly sectarian discipline; theoretical perspectives on migration 'have

evolved in isolation from one another' and fundamental divisions 'in their level of analysis as well as paradigmatic and thematic orientation' have constrained the development of interdisciplinary studies (de Haas 2008, p. 2). Furthermore, 'the lack of theoretical rootedness and largely descriptive nature of much empirical work has haunted the improvement of theories. As a result of the lack of a common theoretical thread, much empirical work – especially from outside migration economics – remains isolated, scattered, and theoretically underexplored' (de Haas 2008, p. 46). This view has reinforced the need to link migration theories to broader social science concepts, a call that resonates with the social transformation perspective (Brettell and Hollifield 2014; Amelina, Horvath and Meeus 2015). In this context, middle-order-level theories or 'theories of the middle range'⁴ are considered more appropriate to grasp the complexity and contextuality of the migratory processes, offering a methodology that balances out the over-reliance on economic perspectives in migration studies (Schiller 2005; Castles 2007). As stressed by King (2002, p. 89) 'new mobility strategies are deployed to achieve economic and, importantly, non-economic objectives', including, for example, what has been referred to as the 'transnationalisation of intimacy' by revealing the centrality 'of discourses and practices of "love" in' migratory processes (Mai and King 2009, p. 296). The methodological debate about single theory or middle-range theories in migration studies continues, but the social transformation perspective provides an invaluable framework that enables more direct bridges between migration and urban studies (Castles 2015).

The (Southern) European Migration Turnaround

One of the earliest signs of change in the global migratory system – the so-called 'international turnaround' (King, Fielding and Black 1997) – appeared in Europe in the early 1980s when Southern Europe shifted from being an emigration region to a new immigration basin. This change was radical not only in the novelty of the flow but also in the heterogeneous profile of immigrants, the complexity and diversity of migratory routes, and the speed and types of mobility. First identified in the Mediterranean regions, the new migratory phenomenon took longer to identify in the North-Western European regions because it was overshadowed by the legacy of post-War immigration patterns. In the meantime, Southern Europe became 'one of the most important areas of attraction in the continent' with about 10 million documented foreigners in 2007, exceeding the number in the reception basin of Northern Europe (Arango et al. 2009).

Theories to explain the international turnaround in Southern Europe developed incrementally. They began with global, model-based enquiries that related changes in immigration and regimes of accumulation, and later led to studies that paid greater attention to societal transformations at trans-Mediterranean and regional level. Most emerging models and interpretative frameworks challenged more traditional thinking in conceptualising migration.

Global Lenses and the Post-Fordist Model of Immigration

Historically, the beginning of the international migration turnaround in the 1970s coincided with the deindustrialisation process in Northern Europe and North America, which occurred alongside a progressive change in the Fordist regimes of accumulation and the restructuring of Keynesian welfare states. The Keynesian full-employment model of the Fordist period was slowly dismantled and values of universalism and decommodification weakened (the United Kingdom was the most obvious case, moving from a social-democratic to a liberal welfare regime, during the Thatcher government). Although universalist welfare, full employment and Fordist industrialisation were never fully developed in Southern Europe, the initial explanations about its migratory transformations embraced this overarching framework. Explanations moved from the 'diversion effects' (closing frontiers and tighter entry systems in the historical Western countries of immigration and the ease of Mediterranean geographical access) to the new role of Southern Europe within the international division of labour under a flexible regime of accumulation (King and Rybaczuk 1993; King 1995).

The focus on macroeconomic changes was central to the model-based enquiry of the 1990s (Baldwin-Edwards and Arango 1999; King 2000, 2001). The idea of a post-Fordist model of immigration emerged from a number of studies comparing mass migration flows across Europe and across historical periods; the analysis of the Southern European turnaround greatly contributed to this line of enquiry. As shown in Table 4.1, the characteristics of new flows in Southern Europe differ sharply from those of the post-War mass immigration in Northern Europe during the Fordist industrial period (Baldwin-Edwards 1997, 1999; Table 4.1, point b). However, despite significant contextual differences in immigration policies, citizenship arrangements and welfare services eligible to foreigners across Europe, the features of Southern European immigration coincided with those of the post-Fordist immigration model, as first suggested by Castles and Miller (1998, pp. 8–9) and later explored in detail by Ambrosini (2001; Table 4.1, points a and c). 'The globalisation of mass movement, the acceleration in volumes, the enhanced

differentiation whereby destinations are subject to arrivals of many different kinds of immigrants from diverse origins, the increasing feminisation of migration' (White 2002, p. 19) have marked the impact of post-Fordist regimes in Western countries since the 1980s and across developing countries thereafter. New forms of circular mobility, transnational communities and the watering down in the distinction between emigration and immigration areas have come into sight since the late 1990s, adding to the complex diversity of the new migratory system and challenging traditional thinking in policy making (Ribas-Mateos 2004, p. 1046; Vertovec 2007, 2010; Triandafyllidou 2013).

Thus in the 1990s, international division of labour was a key organising concept linking globalisation and immigration. One mainstream hypothesis revolved around the idea that the liberalisation of capital movement and trade would also increase the mobility of people (Sassen 1990). At the same time, 'the employment of immigrant labour in a strong underground economy and the expansion and relocation of enterprises in low-cost areas abroad' emerged as the key strategies to enhance competitiveness and survival in the global market, particularly among small and medium enterprises (Ribas-Mateos 2004, p. 1046).

The underpinning argument regarded *immigration as a global industry*, in which illegal or semi-legal status was of great importance (King and Konjhodzic 1996; Reyneri 1998, 2003; Baldwin-Edwards and Arango 1999). 'The linked processes of deindustrialisation, tertiarisation, deregulation of labour-capital relations and expansion of the informal economy' see immigrants as crucial to 'minimise labour costs in an increasingly competitive global market environment' (King 2001, p. 10); preferably, migrants with no access to labour protection and without (former) colonial entitlements that can be 'super-exploited' (Sivanandan 1988) in labour-intensive, seasonal or casual work. Informality and heterogeneity, initially regarded as a distinctive feature of Southern Europe, became a structural requisite of the global market and thus was welcomed by the progressively deregulated labour markets of North America and Northern Europe (Castles 2010, p. 1580). Pressure for the deregulation and recommodification of the labour system across European universalist welfare regimes was crucial in bonding globalisation and immigration.

During the 1990s, the globalisation and the post-Fordist arguments began to be challenged as the dominant interpretative concept in Southern Europe. Baldwin-Edwards (2004b, p. 10) argued that 'despite the grandiose claims of authors such as Sassen (2000) and Castles and Davidson (2000), identifying globalisation as an explanation of migration patterns, there has been little overall increase in global migration but rather, changed patterns impacting on certain regions (Tapinos 2000)'.

Table 4.1 Fordist and post-Fordist immigration models in Europe, 1950–2000.

Immigration models in Europe, 1950–2000		
	FORDIST period	POST-FORDIST period
<i>a. Castles and Miller (1998):</i>	<i>1950s–1980s</i>	<i>1980s onwards</i> – globalisation of mass movement – acceleration in volume – wide differentiation and heterogeneity in origin and destination of migration – increasing feminisation of migration
<i>b. Baldwin-Edwards (1999):</i>	<i>Northern Europe</i> (during Fordist period) – specific (few) nationalities – predominantly lower educational levels – general legality (except in France) – employment recruitment by state agency – little trafficking – incorporation into formal economy – bilateral treaty gives legal protection	<i>Southern Europe</i> (during post-Fordist period) – numerous diverse nationalities – diverse educational levels – general illegality (of entry, residence and/or work) – employment recruit. by private illegal ‘brokers’ – illegal trafficking by private agents – high absorption by the informal economy – bi/multi-lateral treaty for expulsion arrangements
<i>c. Ambrosini (2001):</i>	<i>Classical industrial society</i> – Southern Europe and ex-colonies – Central and Northern Europe – initially young men with low levels of education; women followed afterwards	<i>Post-Fordist society</i> – Eastern Europe and outside Europe – widened to include Southern Europe – young men including large numbers of educated members and women who migrate on their own
<i>region of origin</i>		
<i>arrival point</i>		
<i>migrants’ demographic characteristics</i>		
<i>areas of entry into the labour market</i>	– main activities of the development model: industries, construction and mining	– secondary niches, majority of jobs in small companies, low service sector and informal economy
<i>relationship with the economic system</i>	– explicit recruitment for workers; agreements between States for the supply of labour	– absence of explicit labour demand, but an ample formal and informal use of labour
<i>social citizenship</i>	– rights connected to regular work in unionised context	– problematic access to social rights; diffusion of irregular work and absence of explicit policies of recruitment

Sources: compiled by the author; drawn from Castles and Miller (1998), Baldwin-Edwards (1999, p. 2) and Ambrosini (2001, p. 77).

Also, the focus on push factors and convergence trends ignored other important context-driven mechanisms operating beyond the macroeconomic spheres. The relevance of a transformation from Fordist to post-Fordist regime was disputed on two grounds: first, Southern economies had never been anchored to a fully industrialised regime (with the exception of a few regions), having switched from agricultural to service societies (Allen 2004). Second, the so-called post-Fordist elements 'were already traditionally present in Southern European economies and labour markets, (...) so that for Southern Europe, post-Fordism involved a recovery of its pre-Fordist heritage' (King 2000, p. 14; see also Leontidou 1993). These calls for a more historical, contextual and geopolitical focus opened the way for complementary, interpretative frameworks and new metaphors.

*Trans-Mediterranean Lenses: From Europe's Rio Grande
to the Mediterranean Caravanseraï*

By the late 1990s, a body of work on new migratory systems moved beyond the post-Fordist analysis by focusing on regional systems from a historical and geopolitical perspective. Trans-Mediterranean interpretative frameworks came to the fore, particularly within the debate of the 'European fortress' (King, Lazaridis and Tsardanidis 2000).

Uneven economic development was a key determinant in this European debate. During the 1990s, the development gap and the demographic bias between the southern and northern Mediterranean regions, coupled with the difficulties in patrolling the sea borders, were regarded as the drivers of the systemic inflow to the new 'European Eldorado' (Montanari and Cortese 1995; Anderson and Bort 2001). The Mediterranean basin quickly became known as Europe's Rio Grande (Rufin 1991), analogous to the river-frontier between the United States and Mexico: a 'liquid frontier separating the rich North (Europe) from the poor South (North Africa, the 'Third World') and temptingly open to migrant crossing. (...) Short stretches of sea separate societies with very different levels of material wealth, opportunity and quality of life. (...) These short Mediterranean passages are [a] far from comfortable journey' (King 2001, pp. 8–10).

The metaphor of Europe's Rio Grande helped shed light on the wider global forces driving migration. Still today, 'the Mediterranean represents one of the most active friction-planes when considering North-South imbalances in globalised work, (...) which derives from global inequalities and instability' (Ribas-Mateos 2005, p. 6). However, the divisive nature of this concept led to discourses on the 'clash of civilisations' (cf. Huntington 1997). These were exploited by the media to depict

immigration as a threat stemming from overpopulated and underdeveloped countries, and by politicians to legitimise a harsher attitude towards immigration in the European fortress. They fed calls for tougher controls in Southern European countries since it was argued they were operating as a transit path to Northern European destinations. The concept was criticised in academia for underestimating the pull factors and the demand for migrant labour, and because 'it does contravene to a large extent both a deeper history of Mediterranean movement and identity and the experiences and aspirations of today's immigrants who want to be relatively free to "come and go" within "their" Mediterranean space. (...) [Also, it was] challenged by more liberal analysts who see both the necessity and the desirability of more freedom of movement' (King 2001, p. 9).

By 2000, in response to the divisive, restrictive and Euro-centric perceptions of the Rio Grande metaphor, an alternative trans-Mediterranean perspective emerged that viewed the Mediterranean as a place of exchange and circulation of people and ideas (Fabre and Ibert 2000; Albera, Blok and Bromberger 2001). Ribas-Mateos (2001, p. 24, 2005, p. 10) proposed a metaphor for the complexity of the new immigration system beyond the North–South divide and the global–local divide. It was called the *Mediterranean caravanserai* – an inn or 'common space' that receives, hosts and redistributes migrants travelling between countries with a wide range of skills, educational levels and origins. It emphasised the multiple migratory patterns covering short, long and staggered passages from beyond the Mediterranean but also traffic back and forth across the European, African and Asian continents. Some flows followed historical routes and commercial ties and operated on an interlinked regional scale; others followed colonial paths and diasporas' networks; yet others were new migratory routes, starting in the Asian and sub-African continents.

According to Ribas-Mateos (2001, p. 36), the caravanserai metaphor conceptualises an overarching Mediterranean migration system that stemmed from 'particular historical patterns of development and colonialism system (...) [and] avoid[s] the simple linear conceptualisation of international migration based on a one-way transfer of location from sending to receiving country'. The emphasis on the multiple natures of the Mediterranean passages (cross-regional mobility, geopolitical changes and transnational networks) allowed a more progressive approach to the framing of policy and the concept of citizenship.

The fluidity intrinsic to the new migratory system questioned simplistic notions about migrants, particularly when restricted to their legal status; it underlined the obsolescence of those principles upon which Northern European countries shaped their conceptions of citizenship,

based on the post-War notion of immigration (one-way movement from sending to receiving country) and the traditional definition of immigrants (either temporary guest-workers to return to their country of origin, or long-term workers to be integrated or assimilated in the 'host' society).

The metaphor of caravanserai highlighted the contrast between the heterogeneous migratory trends and the one-dimensional concept of citizenship leading to restrictive immigration controls imposed by several European governments, particularly those in Southern Europe (Al-Ali and Koser 2001; Solé 2004; Cohen 2008). Baldwin-Edwards (2004b, p. 9) empirically corroborated the relevance of the caravanserai metaphor and its policy implications by demonstrating that regionalisation and networked migratory patterns, rather than globalisation, were the primary route of immigration into Southern Europe, and by advancing 'the concept of an accommodating immigration policy'.

*Contextual Lenses: Societal Transformations
and the Southern European Model*

The trans-Mediterranean focus made a methodological contribution by extending theories on migration systems that emphasised the macro-economic 'push factors' to those emphasising the social transformations that shed light on 'pull factors'. In the latter, the key organising concept was contextual and shifted to the conditions and changes in the receiving countries that drove an internal demand for migrant labour. Here, immigrants were perceived as *gap fillers* for jobs left vacant by native workers as a result of societal changes. This view complemented the idea of immigration as a global industry.

A series of ground-breaking comparative studies that explored the multiple relationships between contextual preconditions, societal changes and immigration novelties also led to the conceptualisation of a Southern European model of immigration (King, Fielding and Black 1997; Arango et al. 2009; Ambrosetti, Strangio and Wihtol de Wenden 2016). This model drew on, and added to, concurrent studies establishing a Southern European model of capitalistic development, welfare regime and urban and societal development (Mingione 1995; Ferrera 1996; Andreotti et al. 2001; Allen et al. 2004).

Using the model developed in King et al. (1997, pp. 9–12) and Ribas-Mateos (2001), Figure 4.1 expands on the preconditions and social transformations generating demand for migrant labour that are specific to Southern Europe and do not apply to Northern Europe. After the 1950s, capitalist development in Southern Europe was organised around high and low productivity sectors; this led to a segmented labour market,




Figure 4.1 Conditions and preconditions of immigration in Southern European countries, 1950–2005. Sources: compiled by the author; bold box adapted from King, Fielding and Black (1997, p. 10).

while also supporting the expansion of small-scale and family-based (often informal) enterprises (Mingione 1995). Simultaneously, the familistic and residualist conception of welfare relied on women for the delivery of care services within the family. In other words, 'families should be responsible for the well-being of their members in a context of weak decommodification' (Ribas-Mateos 2005, p. 36).

Southern European societies underwent important transformations in the 1970s. The indigenous supply of cheap and flexible labour in the low-productivity sectors and care services gradually declined with the fall of rural depopulation and rural–urban migration, while urban societies were undergoing processes of modernisation, tertiarisation, professionalisation and social mobility. The enhanced level of education, the changing role of women in society and the notion of social and family prestige led to rising job aspirations and female employment and the rejection of manual work and family services.

The shift of indigenous workers to high-productivity sectors and changes in family roles reduced the supply of flexible, cheap and informal labour, sparking a growing demand for international migrant workers in the *low-productivity sectors* previously supplied by rural migrants (agriculture, fishing, shipping, construction sector, small and family-based enterprises, tourism, etc.) and in *family care* previously delivered by housewives (housekeeping, child and elderly care), including domestic services previously provided by domestic migrants (maids, concierge, cleaners).

International migrants not only filled the gaps in demand for internal labour (the pull factors driven by societal changes), but also helped reproduce the two structural traits of Southern European societies: the economic dependency on low-productivity sectors and labour market segmentation, and the nexus between welfare state and family in the care services. The latter pull factor accounted for a feminisation of migration, which became a structural part of the international division of labour as a result of demographic changes and changes in the role of the family in both sending and receiving countries (White 2002). As extensively examined by Ribas-Mateos (2001, p. 28)

in a privatised conception of social services, and thinking of the indigenous family's strategy for care, the double-earner household could be playing a reproductive role on the demand side, whilst immigrant women (who are also involved in transnational family strategies) could be seen as playing an important role on the supply side, in addition to their functions as household heads in development strategies. Accordingly, gendered family strategies and sexual division of labour can be seen as the grounds for an ethnically gendered conception of care as well as transnational division of female labour.

In Southern Europe, the Catholic Church, colonial kinships and trade routes operated as international recruitment agencies for female employment in domestic work, nursing and care services. The first Catholic female recruitment basin began in the Philippines (a former Spanish colony) during the 1970s, followed by recruitment in Latin American and African former colonies. This facilitated the reproduction of a familistic welfare system of care delivery as Southern European urban societies began the process of modernisation.

During these processes of societal transformation, path-dependencies in the labour structure and welfare care system were thus maintained and reproduced because internal rural–urban migration was substituted by international immigration (rooted in wider trans-Mediterranean and regional systems and in the new international division of labour). Lines of continuity throughout the global, regional and local scales of analysis have contributed to more comprehensive conceptualisations and new frameworks, by ‘re-embedding migration research in a more general understanding of contemporary society’ as later conveyed by Castles (2010).

Mapping Flows and Waves: A Divergence Perspective on Southern Europe

The idea of a Southern European model of immigration evolved and was consolidated throughout the 2000s as new Member States joined the European Union from the Mediterranean basin and Eastern Europe (King and Thomson 2008; Arango et al. 2009). However, despite similar conditions, mechanisms and outcomes across Portugal, Greece, Spain and Italy, the complex diversity in timing and geography of flows undermines the concept of a uniform migratory system. Understanding immigration flows requires a shift from interpretative models to taxonomic, comparative perspectives that take account of the diverse types of immigration across each country since the international turnaround.

This section develops a comparative and chronological identification of flows and waves in the four countries from 1965. Figures 4.2–4.5 offer a graphic picture of primary and secondary data on foreign population based on resident permits, continent and country of origin (most representative groups) and regularisation programmes (to incorporate part of the weight and trends of undocumented migrations, details of which are shown in Figure 4.6). As discontinuities of flows, or break points, often indicate the beginning and/or fading away of a migratory wave, these have been identified to isolate a series of immigration waves (at least three) and framed by the bold boxes (wave 1, 2 and 3).




Figure 4.2 Historic evolution of waves and flows of immigration, by selected foreign population (continent and country of origin) and regularisation programs: Spain, 1965–2010. Sources: compiled by the author based on data from Eurostat (1995); Mendoza (1997); INE Spain (1998, 2003, 2011); Arango (2000); Reyneri (2001); Cavounidis (2002); Ministerio del Interior (2003); OECD-SOPEMI (2003, 2011); Cangiano (2008); Cangiano and Strozza (2008); Arango et al. (2009). Notes: for comparative details on regularisation see Figure 4.6.




Figure 4.4 Historic evolution of waves and flows of immigration, by selected foreign population (continent and country of origin) and regularisation programs: Portugal, 1965–2009. *Sources:* compiled by the author based on data from Eurostat (1995); Malheiros (1996); Cordeiro (1997); Baganha, Marques and Fonseca (2000); Cavounidis (2002); Fonseca and Esteves (2002); INE Portugal (2002, 2011); OECD-SOPEMI (2003, 2011); Cangiano (2008); Cangiano and Strozza (2008); Arango et al. (2009). Notes: for comparative details on regularisation see Figure 4.6.




Figure 4.5 Historic evolution of waves and flows of immigration, by selected foreign population (continent and country of origin) and regularisation programmes: Greece, 1965–2001. *Sources*: compiled by the author based on data from Eurostat (1995); Iosifides (1997); Petronoti (1998); Fakiolas (2000); Reyneri (2001); Cavounidis (2002); OECD-SOPEMI (2003, 2011); Cangiano (2008); Cangiano and Strozza (2008); Arango et al. (2009). *Notes*: for comparative details on regularisation see Figure 4.6.



Figure 4.6 Regularisation programmes, Spain, Italy, Portugal and Greece, 1985–2007. Sources: compiled by the author based on data from Reyneri (2001); OECD-SOPEMI (2003, 2011); Levinson (2005); Cangiano and Strozza (2008); Arango et al. (2009).

This comprehensive mapping has been systematically compiled for each country, while mitigating significant data constraints⁵ (for issues on methods and data sources, see Cangiano 2008; Cangiano and Strozza 2008).

The analysis first compares the diverse types of flows within a geographical longitudinal outlook (until and after the mid-1990s), then identifies the waves of immigration using a historical outlook. By isolating ‘regularities and variations of a range of migration processes’ (Castles 2010, p. 1582), this taxonomic analysis aims to contextualise the diverse flows and waves within the various interpretative models.

The geographical longitudinal outlook (Figures 4.2–4.5, by countries and continents of origins) shows that the first signs of the international turnaround emerged in the late 1960s, developed progressively into the late 1990s and were then consolidated.

Since its onset, the international turnaround – between 1965 and the late 1990s – reveals divergent trends in immigration flows. In Spain and Italy there was a melting pot of similar migratory routes, while colonial links were predominant in Portugal and eastern links in Greece. But the consolidation period – from the late 1990s to the financial crisis of the late 2000s – points to a convergence of trends, which reinforced (in Greece) or diluted (in Portugal) the divergent patterns. From the historical outlook (Figures 4.2–4.5, wave boxes), two discontinuities emerge in the migratory patterns – at the end of the 1980s and at the end of the 1990s – that point to three distinctive waves of migration. The economic recession of the late 2000s and the aftermath of the Arab spring may lead to a third discontinuity, suggesting the beginning of a fourth wave.

Divergences of Flows from the Mid-1960s to the Late 1990s

Since the onset of the international turnaround, *Spain and Italy* have shared highly heterogeneous flows from all continents, with some variations regarding the country of origin (Figures 4.2 and 4.3). The flows had a similar variety of *migratory routes* linked to colonial legacies, the trans-Mediterranean caravanserai, the collapse of the Eastern bloc, transnational migrations, labour recruitment through the Catholic Church and trade unions (gender migration), foreign investments and retirement migration, among others (Table 4.2; see Cangiano and Strozza 2008; Ambrosetti, Strangio and Wihtol de Wenden 2016). Throughout this period, the Philippines was the principal source of female labour supply and Morocco the primary source country (although neither ever matched Albania in volume as the primary source to Greece). There are some dissimilarities: in Italy migratory

Table 4.2 Migratory routes compared: Spain and Italy, from the mid-1970s onwards.

Migratory routes	Spain	Italy
– Colonial legacies:	– Philippines, Latin America	– Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia
– Trans-Mediterranean links:	– Morocco, Algeria, Senegal	– Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Senegal
– Eastern European flows:	– Romania, Poland, former USSR	– Albania, Yugoslavia, Romania, Poland, former USSR
– Transnational migrations:	– China, Cape Verde	– China, Cape Verde
– Political refugees:	– Argentina, Chile, Uruguay	– Argentina, Chile, Brazil, Middle East
– Catholic Church:	– Philippines, Peru	– Philippines, Sri Lanka, Peru
– other shared flows:	– Bangladesh, Pakistan, India; Venezuela, Dominican Rep., Cuba; Germany, France, UK and USA	

routes were always diversified and had similar weights, while in Spain the early migratory routes came primarily from Northern Europe and North America, showing a predominant link to retirement immigration, military alliances and foreign investments (a trend also witnessed in Portugal and Greece). This Western source was later counterbalanced by flows from colonial routes (Latin America and the Philippines) and trans-Mediterranean caravanserais (North Africa).

All these factors – differentiated and heterogeneous origins and migratory routes, increased feminisation and greater volume and informality (see sequence of regularisations in Figure 4.6) – complement descriptions of the post-Fordist (Castles and Miller 1998; Ambrosini 2001) and the Southern European model of immigration (Arango et al. 2009). Spain and, especially, Italy were viewed as the original archetypes of the model (King and Thomson 2008) although Portugal and Greece partly diverged from the model because of their distinct migratory routes.

Unlike these archetypical cases, until the late 1990s, immigration flows into *Portugal* followed a single path based on *colonial legacies* and were a response to both labour (pull) and political (push) factors (Figure 4.4). The main flows came from the Portuguese speaking, mainly PALOP,⁶ countries and began in the late 1950s with labour recruitment from Cape Verde. Cape Verdeans and Portuguese female

workers filled a significant labour shortage after Portuguese male workers emigrated or were recruited for the Portuguese Colonial Wars in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea Bissau (1961–1974). After the fall of Salazar's dictatorship in 1974 and the democratisation period of 1975–1985, the PALOP migratory route was consolidated. The decolonisation process and the African civil wars led to a massive inflow of Portuguese *retornados* (literally translated as 'returnees') and immigrants from the former colonies of Mozambique, Angola, Cape Verde and Goa in the Indian continent. In this respect, Portugal's migratory history was similar to that of other Northern European countries, like France, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, which saw the post-colonial reflux of European settlers from former overseas territories claiming independence, or like Germany witnessing a massive post-War return of ethnic Germans from Slavic lands and Eastern Europe (see Peach 2002, pp. 22–24). From the late 1980s, new flows came from other PALOP countries (Guinea Bissau and São Tomé and Príncipe) and bordering countries (Senegal), driven by push-pull factors.

Moreover, the absence of immigrants from neighbouring Morocco and other North African countries suggests that the Mediterranean caravanserai is not a relevant interpretative framework for Portugal. Instead, the growing presence of transnational communities – such as Hindus and Ismailis (a Muslim Shia group who migrated to Mozambique from the Indian subcontinent and the Saudi peninsula), Cape Verdeans, and more recently, Chinese – linked Portugal with other 'migratory caravanserais' (Malheiros 1996, 2010; Mapril 2001; Al-Ali and Koser 2001; Fonseca et al. 2002b). Until the 2001–2002 regularisation process, the heterogeneity of migrant types stemmed primarily from their colonial links (Figure 4.6). Education, skill and income levels were low among immigrants from Cape Verde, Angola and Guinea Bissau but diverse among immigrants from Brazil, Goa and Mozambique. Mozambicans included groups with different origins and religions, such as Hindu, Muslim and Ismailis (Malheiros 1997, 2000a; Baganha, Marques and Fonseca 2000; Tiesler 2000; Fonseca and Malheiros 2005). The only similarity with other Southern European countries was the long-established presence of Western Europeans and North Americans.

Portugal is unique in Southern European cases for having a predominantly colonial, rather than a trans-Mediterranean migratory flow. Nevertheless, since 2000 there have been new sources of immigration from Asia (Bangladesh, Pakistan, China), Eastern Europe (Ukraine, Moldavia, Romania) and Latin America (Brazil). By the late 2000s, Brazilians and Ukrainians were in the majority, outnumbering those from the PALOP countries. The increased diversity of migratory types and routes suggests Portugal is moving closer towards the Spanish and

Italian models (Baganha and Fonseca 2004; Cangiano and Strozza 2008), although it still lacks trans-Mediterranean flows.

Greece is a third distinctive case as immigration flows came predominantly from a single migratory route stemming from the *Eastern links* with the Balkans, the former USSR and the South-Eastern European continent (Figure 4.5). Initially, the resumption of democracy in 1974 had led to the return of Ethnic Greeks from the United States and Europe, political refugees from Cyprus, Turkey and Iraq, and labour migration from Egypt and the Philippines. After the late 1980s, with the collapse of the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, a new regional migratory system opened up into Greece (particularly Ethnic Greeks, mainly Pontians from the former USSR, and Northern Epirotes from Albania) and reinforced the eastern links. By the late 1990s, two thirds of all documented immigrants came from the Balkans and Eastern Europe and half of all documented immigrants came from Albania. The dominance of a single source continent and a single source country distinguished Greece from other Southern and Northern European countries.

Other factors were also unique to Greece: the flows came from regions that were close by; most immigrants came from former Communist countries; the peak of the flows occurred in the 1990s (in Portugal and Italy it was the early 2000s and in Spain the late 2000s) with documented immigrants quickly reaching 10% of the total population (a proportion higher than in other Southern European countries but comparable to Northern European countries); and immigrants were concentrated in the capital region. 'These differences have important implications for future patterns of migration and (...) for articulation of labour markets and for patterns of settlement and integration that will further differentiate the immigration experience of Greece from that of other countries of Southern Europe' (Cavounidis 2002, pp. 45–46).

As in Portugal, the heterogeneity of immigrants in Greece was a result of its single eastern inflow; education, skills and income levels were particularly low among immigrants from Albania, while more diversified among Pontians, Ethnic Greeks and Eastern Europeans (e.g. from Poland; Petronoti 1998; Lazaridis and Psimmenos 2000). Another similarity was the long-established presence of Northern Europeans and North Americans. And as with other Southern European immigration patterns, the historic trans-Mediterranean flows (Egypt, Middle East, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kurdish and Cypriot refugees) and the Philippines channel were established during the 1970s and 1980s, but the new inflows from former Communist countries later predominated (Fakiolas 2000; Baldwin-Edwards 2004a, 2006). Despite a progressive diversification of source countries (Bangladesh, Pakistan, India, China, Peru,

Cuba, Nigeria, Ghana), the 2001 regularisation process consolidated the predominance of the eastern link (Figures 4.5 and 4.6), leading Greece to a divergence trajectory compared with the other Southern European countries.

Consolidation of Flows in the 2000s

The move towards international immigration was consolidated during the 2000s as it grew and became more diverse. A revolutionary change in immigration flows in Southern Europe began in the late 1990s: new migratory routes started to take shape across Portugal and Greece and intensified in Spain and Italy. Transformations also affected old migratory routes. The changes altered or amplified some of the patterns that distinguished each country's history of immigration in the previous three decades. Although the arrival of foreign groups led to a more complex panorama after the late 1990s (Figures 4.2–4.5), similar trends developed in all four countries, pointing to a convergence in the migratory sub-systems.

First, the *magnitude and diversity of flows increased sharply* across the four countries. The quota system had not stopped the rise in inflows and the 2001 census and the diversity of applicants to regularisation programmes showed a growing heterogeneity in migratory routes and sources of immigration (compare regularisation programmes in Figure 4.6). As argued by Arango and Finotelli (2009, pp. 27–28), the sequence of regularisation programmes during the 2000s confirmed that irregular migration remained 'a structural component of Southern European migration regimes (...) and reflects what Massey (1999) has called the "post-modern" paradox between global forces and restrictive policies rules'. Moreover, the earlier inferences by Southern European scholars about the high heterogeneity of immigrants' features and routes anticipated the concept of 'super-diversity' coined a decade later by Vertovec (2007, 2010) to describe new characteristics of immigration in Britain advocating for pluralism and more diversified understanding of identity categories.

Second, *there were growing inflows from the Asian continent and Eastern Europe*. While the number of North Americans decreased in absolute and relative terms, there was a growing number of (1) Bangladeshis, Pakistanis (coming from South–East Asia and the Middle East) and Sri Lankans, (2) Chinese through transnational routes direct to Southern Europe or via Russia and Northern Europe, and (3) Romanians, Ukrainians, Moldavians and Russians (among others from South-Eastern Europe). The specialised labour demand in agriculture, small-medium enterprises and the construction sector shifted the sex ratio imbalance towards male migration.

Third, *trends became more complex*; new convergences overlapped with old divergences. The regularisation programmes and the census reports show a radical shift in the composition of immigrants in Portugal (Figures 4.4 and 4.6), whose migratory routes and source countries became more diversified. Brazil and Ukraine replaced Cape Verde as the primary source country and the eastern links from Ukraine, Moldavia and Romania overtook flows from the PALOP countries, which remained stable in the 2000s (Baganha and Fonseca 2004). Thus the experience in Portugal began to converge towards that of Spain and Italy, where heterogeneous flows consolidated and intensified. Conversely, the increased eastern inflows further highlighted the divergent case of Greece (Cangiano and Strozza 2008).

Finally, *the nature of some of the old flows changed*. In the 1990s, most flows from Eastern Europe and Latin America came directly from urban areas, driven by the collapse of the Communist regimes, the Balkan war and the economic crisis in Latin America. But in the 2000s an increasing proportion of Eastern Europeans, Latin Americans and Africans were migrating from small-size cities and poor rural areas and reached Southern Europe after successive experiences of internal migration at home (Ribas-Mateos 2001, p. 31; Fonseca et al. 2002b; Fonseca 2008). This more recent *rural exodus* from Romania, Moldavia, Latvia and Ukraine, as well as Morocco, Tunisia, Senegal, Nigeria, Peru and Ecuador, among others, was not 'a product of the attraction of industrial employment (as happened with past European rural-urban migration) but the result of the rejection of rural poverty' (Ribas-Mateos 2001, p. 30). Multi-step passages and pre-emigration rural-urban experiences became a necessary strategy to accumulate educational, labour and trading skills to access international labour migration. Concurrently, with the enlargement of the European Union and the accession of new Member States in 2004 and 2007,⁷ *transit, circular and commuting migration* have been 'increasingly acquiring importance in Europe, putting traditional classifications of inflows and outflows under discussion' (Ruspini 2008, p. 184). Moroccans and Romanians, among others, have developed into *transnational communities* as multiple organisational ties and transnational practices have intensified (Vitiello 2007; Eve 2008). More generally, 'high levels of *spontaneity* (so that migration flows may be sudden and opportunistic), *mobility* (migrants are highly mobile within destination countries, or move on to another country) and *temporariness* (in terms of length of stay both in a particular country or in a particular job)' have become common traits of immigration in Southern Europe (King and Thomson 2008, p. 269).

Waves of Migration

Changes in trends and discontinuities in the evolution of migratory flows often indicate successive waves of immigration. A comparative, longitudinal analysis of five decades of international turnaround reveals structural shifts and transitory variations. Two major discontinuities of flows, or break points, can be identified at the end of 1980s and at the end of 1990s, framing three distinct immigration waves (Figures 4.2–4.5, wave boxes). The coincidence of these two breaking points across all four countries corresponds to significant historical events in the international and national geopolitical context.

The discontinuity at the end of the 1980s was characterised by two new migratory phenomena. The first is the significant inflows from Eastern European countries, anticipated by an earlier immigration from Poland into Italy, Greece and Spain. These coincided with the revolutionary period of Glasnost/Perestroika, followed by the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Communist regimes.

The second is a diversification of migratory routes from Africa, Latin America and the Far East. These routes were not related to the exodus of political refugees in the 1970s–1980s (driven by the rise of dictatorships in Latin America and African civil wars after the Portuguese decolonisation), nor to pre-existing colonial and commercial migratory ties. Their novelty also corresponded with the international geopolitical and economic restructuring after the end of the Cold War, which saw for instance the fall of dictatorial regimes in Latin America and Africa that were originally supported by the West to contain the spread of Communism.

The end of the 1990s was also marked by new migratory phenomena: the rapid growth of immigrants from all continents except North America and Western Europe; changes in the nature of flows; and the increasing visibility of immigrants from Southern Asia (Bangladesh, Pakistan, India), Eastern Europe (Romania, Ukraine and other countries of the former USSR) and Latin America, which arrived faster and in greater numbers than previous inflows from North Africa and the Philippines. These phenomena corresponded to two factors: increased poverty and unemployment across most continents (famine in Africa, economic crisis in Latin America and Asia); and the strengthening of the international role of the European Union (enlargement towards Eastern Europe, the Balkans and potentially Turkey; expansion of diplomatic and economic ties with Middle Eastern countries, former USSR countries and the Far East; introduction of the euro as international currency).

Simultaneously, the recommodification of the labour system, the weakening of the trade unions and the pressure on wages to compete in

international markets and maintain traditional labour-intensive settings in low productivity sectors fuelled the demand for cheap labour. These processes, which had shaped the Southern European fragmented labour systems since the 1980s, were further strengthened by neoliberal policies in all four countries during the late 1990s (Arango et al. 2009; Ambrosetti, Strangio and Wihtol de Wenden 2016).

These discontinuities point to *three distinctive waves of immigration*, as shown in the wave boxes in Figure 4.2. The *first wave* (until mid-1980s), based on the divisive equilibrium of the Cold War period, began at a different pace in each of the four countries and disappeared at the end of the 1980s. These flows were determined by *historical and geopolitical rather than economic circumstances*. The earlier migratory routes and regional inflows of Filipinos (in Italy, Spain and Greece), Cape Verdeans (in Portugal, Spain and Italy), Egyptians and Yugoslavians (in Italy and Greece) or Moroccans (in Spain and Italy) were the product of colonial links and commercial, political and religious links. Geopolitical push factors added to these pre-existing ties, facilitating the political exodus of the 1970s–1980s: the inflows of political refugees from Latin America (Argentina, Chile, Uruguay and Brazil) into Spain and Italy, and from Africa and the Middle East into Italy (Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia and Iran) and into Greece (Ethiopia, Eritrea, Iraq-Kurdish and Cyprus), as well as inflows from Angola, Mozambique and Guinea Bissau into Portugal in the aftermath of the decolonisation process. As a result, the socio-economic, educational and professional make-up of immigrants was heterogeneous, and subsequent processes of family reunification were expected to consolidate into ethnic communities.

A *second wave* (between mid-1980s and mid-1990s) followed the collapse of the Communist regimes and the three-tier division of the World. These flows were associated with *politico-economic driving factors*, particularly from countries and regions of the so-called Second and Third World that were border or battleground areas in the Cold War and governed by dictatorial regimes. The fall of the Iron Curtain led to political and economic restructuring in these countries which led to early inflows from Poland, then other Eastern European countries, Albania and the return of the Ethnic Greeks, followed by new inflows from Latin America, Africa and the Middle East. Many of these immigrants were poorly paid but well-educated professionals seeking stability and social mobility, who were able to enter the labour market at diverse levels.

A *third wave* (after the mid-1990s until the global economic recession) was related to the international repositioning of the European Union from the early 1990s. This wave was mainly *economically driven*, with a combination of push and pull factors ranging from a sharp rise in poverty and unemployment levels in the source countries (Romania,

Ukraine, North Africa, etc.) to the entrepreneurial strategies of transnational communities (Chinese,⁸ Pakistanis, Moroccans, etc.) that filled specific market niches in the receiving countries (Bauböck and Faist 2010). There was a greater uniformity among this wave of immigrants (low income levels and diversified skill and educational levels), compared with the more heterogeneous features of the immigrants from the first and second waves. The level of over-qualification for the jobs performed and exposure to precarious labour arrangements (temporary contracts and unemployment) was greater in the third than in the second wave.

The international economic recession (since 2008), combined with the geopolitical events in Ukraine (2014) and in North Africa and the Middle East after the Arab spring revolution (since 2011), may have an enormous impact on these migratory systems. We may expect another structural discontinuity in the flows in Southern Europe and the emergence of a distinct *fourth wave* (after late 2000s or early 2010s). It is too early to identify its significance, characteristics and consequences, although there are already signs of outflow of Latin Americans and Eastern Europeans from Southern Europe back to their country of origin or to other destinations in Europe, as well as emigration from Southern to Northern Europe, the Americas and Asia. However, divergent trends may emerge given the greater impact of the recession in Greece and Portugal, the renewed instability in the Middle East, the wars in Syria and Libya and the historical differences in regional migratory patterns from the Southern Mediterranean and the Eastern European rims.

Conclusion

As Castles (2010) argued for migration studies and van Kempen (2002, p. 46) for segregation studies, 'it is difficult, if not impossible, to explain patterns and processes (...) by one single theory'. The past 30 years of migration studies offered rich debates that advance new concepts, models and theories with which to understand the complexity of contemporary migratory phenomena. In particular, contextual divergence perspectives (e.g. the trans-Mediterranean caravanserai and debate on the Southern European model of immigration) greatly contributed to the conceptualisation of the international turnaround in (Southern) Europe, challenged convergence arguments within the globalisation discourse and the post-Fordist model of immigration and anticipated the theoretical contributions of the social transformation perspective (Castles 2010) and the concept of super-diversity (Vertovec 2007), later

conceptualised in the Anglo-Saxon migration studies and highly influential in rethinking immigration and policy responses. Furthermore, they developed useful analytical frameworks based on middle-range theories that can have greater applications in urban studies.

These lines of enquiry have been furthered here through a taxonomic historical analysis of the international turnaround in Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece over the past five decades. Divergences in the types of immigration flows and the three different waves of immigration identified suggest that in Southern Europe there is no uniform migratory system; rather, an overlap of three distinctive and dynamic sub-systems. Converging trends appeared only at certain times (e.g. the third wave), altering (Portugal) or amplifying (Greece) the divergences in regional patterns that distinguished each sub-system's history of immigration. Attention to contextual divergences in migratory flows is important not only in considering future migratory patterns and policy formulations (Cavounidis 2002), but also because they lead to diverse patterns in the settlement, geographic distribution and socio-economic insertion of immigrants into cities.

At the same time, these distinct sub-systems share similar pull-push factors and common features, as conceptualised in the trans-Mediterranean caravanserai and the Southern European model of immigration (King and Thomson 2008; Ambrosetti, Strangio and Wihtol de Wenden 2016). These similar features, factors and outcomes need to be understood within specific contextual differences. At the same time, 'new dimensions are arising (for example, the second generation), new social frameworks are built (for example, evolving social attitude) and new policies are enacted. (...) All this means that the Southern European model of immigration, as has been theorised in the late 1990s, needs updating' (Arango et al. 2009, p. 63).

Notes

- 1 'Although both terms refer to cross-border processes, *diaspora* has been often used to denote religious or national groups living outside an (imagined) homeland, whereas *transnationalism* is often used both more narrowly – to refer to migrants' durable ties across countries – and, more widely, to capture not only communities, but all sorts of social formations, such as transnationally active networks, groups and organisations. (...) Over the past decades, the concepts of diaspora and transnationalism have served as prominent research lenses through which to view the aftermath of international migration and the shifting of state borders across populations. (...) Diaspora and transnationalism pay more attention to agency and processes within global structures and thus are less prone to sweeping generalisations'

- (Faist 2010, p. 9; see debates and classifications in Vertovec 2004; Waldinger and Fitzgerald 2004; Cohen 2008; Bauböck and Faist 2010; Bruneau 2010).
- 2 'Circular migration refers to repeated migration experiences between an origin and destination involving more than one migration and return. Effectively, it involves migrants sharing work, family and other aspects of their lives between two or more locations. It is usually differentiated from *return migration*, which refers to a single emigration and return after an extended absence' (Hugo 2013, p. 2). Because labour, resources, information and social connections circle repeatedly and expand between locations with uneven levels of development, circular migration has been advocated by policy makers as a tool to reduce inequalities and foster development. Its 'proverbial "win-win-win" results (i.e. benefits for receiving countries through meeting labour market shortages, for sending countries through guaranteeing remittances for development, and for migrants themselves through offering employment and control over the use of their wages)' have been both praised and challenged (Vertovec 2008, p. 36; see also Geddes 2015).
 - 3 According to Massey et al. (1998, p. 281), an integrated theory on international migration should consider 'four basic elements: a treatment of the structural forces that promote emigration from developing countries; a characterisation of the structural forces that attract immigrants into developed countries; a consideration of the motivations, goals and aspirations of the people who respond to these structural forces by becoming international migrants; and a treatment of the social and economic structures that arise to connect areas of out- and in-migration. Any theoretical explanation that embraces just one of these elements will necessarily be incomplete and misleading'. As Castles (2015, p. 29) put it, 'they argue that world systems theory is best for explaining emigration from developing countries, while bits of world systems theory, segmented market theory, and neoclassical macroeconomics can be cobbled together to explain the forces attracting migration to developed destination countries – and so on for the rest of the four "basic elements"'.
 - 4 '*Middle-range theory* is principally used in sociology to guide empirical inquiry. It is intermediate to general theories of social systems which are too remote from particular classes of social behaviour, social organization, and social change to account for what is observed and to those detailed orderly descriptions of particulars that are not generalized at all' (Merton 1949, p. 39; see also Bernt and Colini 2013). Porter and Castles have advanced the discussion on middle-range theories versus single theory (or grand theory) in migration studies. As summarised by Castles (2010, p. 1566), 'Alejandro Portes has argued strongly against the idea of an all-embracing general theory for migration studies. Rather, researchers should focus on the complexity, contradictions and unintended consequences of social action (Portes 1997; Portes and DeWind 2004). This implies returning to Merton's concept of "theories of the middle-range": "special theories applicable to limited ranges of data – theories for example of class dynamics, of conflicting group pressures, of the flow of power and the exercise of interpersonal influence ..."


(Merton 1957, p. 9) (...) What middle-range theories could not – and should not – aspire to do is to provide rules for analysing all types of migration regardless of time or location’ (Castles 2010, p. 1566).

- 5 Information in Figures 4.2–4.5 needs to be read with caution due to the considerable number of undocumented immigrants and the inaccuracy and discrepancy of data sources between statistical institutions. In addition, before the mid-1980s some migrants were already naturalised, prior to or during their migratory path, due to their colonial affiliations or diaspora networks (e.g. immigrants from PALOP [Países Africanos de Língua Oficial Portuguesa – African Countries of Portuguese Official Language], Brazil and Goa holding a Portuguese passport; immigrants from the Philippines and some Latin America countries holding a Spanish or Italian passport; Ethnic Greek immigrants holding a Greek passport).
- 6 PALOP countries include Cape Verde, Angola, Mozambique, Guinea Bissau, São Tomé and Príncipe and Equatorial Guinea.
- 7 The Enlargement of the European Union included in 2004 Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech and Slovak Republics, Hungary, Slovenia, Malta and Cyprus, and in 2007 Romania and Bulgaria.
- 8 Chinese transnational communities are structured around ethnic entrepreneurship activities (and a wide network of chain migration) that recruit and exploit low-skilled labour forces from Chinese rural regions (mainly undocumented), and that resulted in a sharp rise in Chinese self-employed activities during the 2000s.

Societal and Urban Contexts in (Southern) Europe

By the mid-1990s the spatial distribution of ethnic groups in most Western European cities was apparently sharply divided, with Western immigrants over-represented in the most affluent areas and vulnerable non-Western immigrants in the poorest and most deprived. However, this ethnic geographic divide followed divergent patterns in Northern and Southern European cities. In Northern cities Western groups settled in the suburbs and non-Western groups in the inner city areas, while in Southern cities the picture was reversed with Western groups residing in the central areas and non-Western groups in the peripheral rings (Figure 5.1).¹ These divergent patterns of ethnic residential segregation corresponded to the geography of class segregation in the city, with the suburbanisation and counter-urbanisation of the wealthy in Northern cities and the peripheralisation of the underprivileged in Southern cities (Malheiros 2002). But which mechanisms drove these patterns?

Critically, macroscale structural mechanisms affecting the spatial and social division of the city seemed to drive ethnic segregation and the extent of inequality and marginalisation associated with these patterns, rather than circumstantial conditions and racial divisions. This point is central in European segregation literature that discussed the extent to which macroscale arrangements (welfare regimes, housing systems, local urban political agendas, etc.) inform the social stratification of urban society and affect the urban insertion of immigrant groups. The work of Musterd, Ostendorf and Breebaart (1998) was pioneer



LQs

Location Quotients



Figure 5.1 Geographic distribution (LQs) and degree of segregation (IS) of selected ethnic groups by country of origin in selected European cities, 1990–1996. Sources: compiled by the author; adapted from Malheiros (2002). Notes: (a) 1.00 = average spatial concentration; (b) % of total population.

regarding comparative analyses of Northern European cities in the late 1990s, but it was White’s ‘contextual structural model’ (1999) that first offered a multiscalar interpretative framework built upon a social theoretical model. Although it was only applied in the London case, this model has a tremendous potential for international comparative analyses since it conceptualises society at a highest level of abstraction,

SOUTHERN EUROPE


MILAN, 1996

Moroccans




MADRID Metrop. Area, 1996

Moroccans




LISBON Metrop. Area, 1991

Africans




W. Europeans + North Am.




Average pop. per unit: 65,840

W. Europeans + North Am.



Average pop. per unit: 101,700

W. Europeans + North Am.



Average pop. per unit: 16,600

<i>IS</i> – Index of Segregation	%(b)
W. Eu + N. Am	29.1
Egyptians	17.1
Filipinos	19.7
Moroccans	22.1

<i>IS</i>	%
W. Eu + N. Am	33.1
Latin Americans	20.2
Peruvians	22.1
Moroccans	27.3

<i>IS</i>	%
W. Eu + N. Am	31.7
Cape Verdians	43.3
Brazilians	30.7
Africans	34.8

LQs

Location Quotients




Figure 5.1 (Continued)

thus complementing the limitations of context-specific framings (see Chapter 2).

Contributions to these lines of enquiry concerning Southern Europe began later, inspired by the comparative work of Malheiros (2002) that pointed to a Southern European model of segregation. A series of innovative studies by Leal on Madrid and by Maloutas on Athens developed macroscale interpretations for single-city cases to explore the ‘contextual complexity of patterns, processes and mechanisms involved in the construction of segregation’ (Maloutas 2004a, p. 15). However, in order to fully understand how systemic mechanisms drive ethnic segregation in

Southern Europe, a comparative perspective is required. This work was first developed in Arbaci (2008) and provides the basis for this chapter.

This chapter examines a set of structural mechanisms underpinning patterns of ethnic residential segregation that are common to Southern European cities and (partly) distinctive from other European counterparts. It starts with a review of Malheiros's interpretative model (2002) that reframes it within the broader socio-urban context, by exposing additional, crucial patterns of ethnic residential segregation (divergences between port cities and continental cities; low-income ethnic groups settled in wealthy neighbourhoods; the 'belt effect' phenomenon and ethnic absence in particular working-class neighbourhoods; microsegregation and desegregation).

The discussion is then set within the wider societal context, by identifying key structural mechanisms of differentiation framed by the four dimensions of White's contextual structural model (1999). It shows the ways in which dominant social discourses, labour market segmentation, socio-urban processes that redefined the geography of social groups and inequality-driven housing regimes led to an 'urban diaspora' rather than ethnic ghettoisation or polarisation.

Finally, through an analysis of national and local urban political agendas, it examines some key systemic causes of the residential marginalisation of immigrants, complementing the focus on the role of the state-market(-family) nexus and systemic production of urban inequality. It explains why residential marginalisation is not a contingent consequence of housing supply/demand but a permanent structural condition, because it is systemic. In particular, it shows how the problem of housing affordability and marginalisation is a direct consequence of the hegemonic promotion and production of owner-occupation – a mainstay of the national and municipal agenda in Southern European societies.

The aim of this chapter is twofold. On the one hand, by making more explicit the link between national societal arrangements and local urban political agendas, it draws attention to distinctive Southern European patterns and key structural mechanisms (macroscale) that will be explored in the comparative analyses of eight cities (mesoscale). It will thus set additional key references for the following chapters. On the other, it resumes the narrative started in Chapter 3 on the paradoxical cases of Southern Europe (as part of the familistic welfare cluster), challenging the assumption that spatial concentration and spatial dispersal/desegregation automatically represent, respectively, social exclusion or upward social mobility. The issues and drivers of segregation are reconceptualised, showing how mechanisms of differentiation are key to understanding the nature of segregation.

Patterns of Segregation: A Southern European Model?

The idea that Northern and Southern European cities follow divergent patterns of immigrant settlement was first suggested by Malheiros (2002) when he compared European multi-ethnic cities in the 1990s. Within the analysis of this contrasting geography of patterns, Malheiros contributed greatly to new lines of enquiry by identifying a Southern European model of ethnic spatial segregation. His was a pioneering study because it complemented leading European comparative studies that had focused on Northern European cities (Chapter 2). He began much needed theoretical and comparative debates at a Southern European level.

Within the comparative context of the socio-urban development of European metropolises, Malheiros (2002, p. 108) identifies four distinctive features of ethnic spatial organisation in Southern European cities: (1) poorer housing conditions; (2) high informality levels in access to the real-estate market; (3) lower levels of spatial segregation associated with more complex patterns of residential distribution; and (4) a higher degree of peripheralisation (or suburbanisation).

The first two features also emerged in Northern European cities at the turn of the twenty-first century (Kesteloot and Meert 2000; Leerkes, Engbersen and van San 2007) because of the characteristics of the post-Fordist immigration flows (e.g. increasing illegal entry, single-gender migration, informal access via transnational networks; see Chapter 4) and the loss of affordable housing stock as a result of welfare restructuring, housing recommodification and devolution after the 1990s. However, the type and scale of the conditions differed significantly between Southern and Northern European cities (see Chapter 3).

The last two features – low spatial segregation and high peripheralisation – were distinctive phenomena of Southern European cities (compare in Figure 5.1). As we will see later, they were the result of a combination of socio-urban processes: a limited depopulation of central and pericentral areas despite the processes of tertiarisation and urban sprawl; the continuing presence of middle-income and affluent families in central areas; generally low levels of residential mobility (Maloutas 2004b); and the long-term effect of rent controls in Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece introduced in the late 1940s and abolished in the mid-1980s (Allen et al. 2004, pp. 156–186). These processes had led to the high peripheralisation of low- and lower middle-income groups because of the scarcity of accessible rented stock in the central and pericentral areas, which became more acute after the renewal programmes and gentrification processes of the early 1990s (Petsimeris 2005; Maloutas 2007, 2012b; Semi 2011; Arbaci and Tapada-Berteli 2012; Gastaldi 2012).

Overall, Malheiros (2002, p. 125) argues that the low degrees of ethnic concentration ‘seem to prolong the tradition of more reduced levels of spatial segregation’ among the local population, and that the high degree of ethnic peripheralisation mirrors the distribution of the low- and lower middle-income population in the peripheral areas. Nonetheless, it is important to stress that other Northern European cities in France, Germany and Austria display similarly moderate levels of class segregation, although lower levels of income inequality than in the Southern European cities (see Chapter 3; Prêteceille 2004; Tammaru et al. 2016).

Malheiros (2002, p. 125) points out that more complex residential configurations exist in Mediterranean cities and that ‘clear images of an urban space patterned according to ethnic and social lines are apparently less clear than in the cities of the North’, where ‘class differences have taken over the role of ethnic differences, with almost identical effect’ (Musterd and Ostendorf 1998, p. 14). He demonstrates how processes of urban fragmentation and gender division of labour among ethnic groups affect, respectively, the reduced presence of low-income immigrants in deprived central areas and the high presence of certain low-income groups in affluent areas. However, four important distinctions need to be considered.

First, fragmentation processes and socio-urban changes in Southern European central areas need to be contextualised within the broader processes of urban renewal and gentrification and, specifically, the time of arrival of the immigrants (White 1999). The time, pace and extent of these socio-urban changes has differed among the major cities, as we will see in the next chapters.

In Italy, particularly, ‘since the mid-1970s, public policies have strongly promoted the rehabilitation of the oldest part of the cities, including their historical centre’ (Allen et al. 2004, p. 28). As a result, scattered processes of gentrification began in the 1980s in Milan and Rome (Petsimeris 2005; Herzfeld 2009) and a decade later in Turin (Bocco 1998; Semi 2004). This limited the ability of less affluent immigrants to access housing in certain central areas after the first-wave immigrants of the mid-1980s had settled into scattered patterns of ethnic microsegregation.

In contrast, the presence of non-Western groups in the city centres of Barcelona, Genoa, Athens and, to a lesser extent, Lisbon remains significant because the rehabilitation of the central areas began later in the 1990s and early 2000s (Malheiros and Vala 2004; Arapoglou 2006; Bayona and López-Gay 2011; Malheiros, Carvalho and Mendes 2012; Gastaldi 2013). Concurrent processes of ethnic residential desegregation and microsegregation patterns began to emerge from the

mid-2000s. These processes and patterns developed faster in Barcelona's historic centre because of the renewal programmes of the Raval and Santa Caterina multi-ethnic neighbourhoods (Sargatal 2001; Tabakman 2001; Tapada-Berteli and Arbaci 2011; Blanco, Bonet and Walliser 2011), but remained limited in central Athens due to the distinctive socio-spatial structure of the housing stock and reduced investments in renewal programmes (Maloutas 2004b, pp. 202–203; Arapoglou 2006; Maloutas et al. 2012). These aspects and differences will be developed in more detail in Chapter 8.

Second, there are significant divergences in the socio-economic composition of the central and pericentral areas (Arbaci and Malheiros 2010). In the Southern European port cities of Lisbon, Barcelona, Genoa and Athens, the affluent groups are predominant in distinctive pericentral areas and/or along the coastline, rather than in the centre. This pattern contrasts greatly with the socio-spatial stratification of most Southern European continental cities, such as Milan, Rome and Turin, in which historically elite activities and affluent social groups are over-represented in the city centre. As we will explore in Chapter 6, ethnic urban distribution differs between port and continental cities. The contrast between Barcelona and Milan is not representative of all port and continental cities in Southern Europe. However, the example shown in Figure 6.13 is paradigmatic because it illustrates clear divergences in the distribution of native social groups between the two cities (see centre versus peripheral location between low- and high-income groups) and their reflections in the distribution of some ethnic groups (see the case of Moroccans and Western groups).

Third, low- and lower middle-income immigrants are under-represented in the traditional working-class neighbourhoods of the first peripheral ring of most Southern European cities. This pattern, which I term the 'belt effect', is distinctive to Southern Europe because there is no equivalent in Northern European cities (see Figure 7.4). This suggests other important mechanisms are at work beyond restructuring and gentrification. As discussed later in Chapter 7, there are three explanations. The first is the widespread post-War process of housing self-production (for single-family houses and co-operatives), which led to a high incidence of owner-occupation in peripheral working-class neighbourhoods. It was 'based, on the one hand, on high rates of saving and family support rather than institutional financing and, on the other, on suitably "elastic" forms of housing production and supply that (...) included popular access to land and owner-building' (Emmanuel 2014, pp. 170–171). Figure 5.2² illustrates the scale of this process, where owner-occupation (on the left) and single-family houses (on the right) are highly over-represented among low-income




Figure 5.2 Housing distribution across the social spectra (income quartile): owner occupation (c.f.) and owner-occupied single-family house (c.f.) in Southern European countries and compared to Northern Europe (EU-11), 1996. *Sources:* compiled by the author; data and calculations drawn from SCP (2000, p. 445, table 11.18). *Notes:* c.f. \cong 100 average distribution, c.f. $>$ 100 over-represented, and c.f. $<$ 100 under-represented; EU-11 includes Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxemburg, the Netherland, Sweden and the United Kingdom.

quartiles in Southern European countries, compared with the Northern European counterpart.³ The second explanation lies in the processes of upward social mobility *in situ* among long-term working-class residents and their descendants that made these peripheral working-class neighbourhoods impossible for new immigrants to settle in and to engage in processes of filtering up/down (Leal 2004b; Maloutas 2004b; see Chapter 8). The third explanation is the limited provision of social housing estates, given the Southern European dualist rental systems (see Chapter 3).

Finally, there are other distinctive contextual factors that have an indirect but significant effect on the spatial patterns of ethnic segregation: (1) the extension, geography and span of owner-occupation across the social spectrum (see Figure 5.2 on the left and centre; for Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece the concentration figures are around the average 100 for all quartiles, indicating a more equal distribution, as the smaller the distance between lowest and highest quartiles, the more equal the distribution of owner-occupation across social groups); (2) the low residential mobility among long-term residents in all social strata; (3) the role of the family in access to and provision of housing stock; and (4) the impact of metropolitan sprawl on the formation of larger, more socially homogeneous residential areas (Maloutas 2003; Allen et al. 2004; Pinto, Ferreira and Guerra 2016). All these factors make the ethnic and socio-spatial stratification of the Southern European city more complex and reveal that the patterns of ethnic insertion are not a simple function of their income, as later investigated in Chapters 8 and 9.

The study by Malheiros showed that the socio-spatial stratification of Southern European cities, associated with urban and housing dynamics, led to a distinctive Southern European model of ethnic spatial segregation, characterised by residential marginalisation combined with sub-urban scattered distribution.

But what are the distinctive macroscale mechanisms of differentiation that underpin these urban and housing dynamics and scattered forms of ethnic residential marginalisation? The focus on macroscale mechanisms (e.g. the role of state–market(–family) nexus in the organisation of welfare and housing systems, local urban political agendas and types of development, etc.) is paramount, as it sheds light on additional mechanisms and conditions that reflect forms of social and spatial inequalities that distinguish Southern European familistic welfare regimes (Maloutas and Fujita 2012; Tammaru et al. 2016). These analyses lead us to question whether current conditions of ethnic residential marginalisation are structural (embedded in wider societal and contextual arrangements) or just circumstantial. They call for the reconceptualisation of causes and problems.

Mechanisms of Differentiation: Urban Segregation in the Wider Societal Context

Chapter 3 has shown how European welfare regimes influence differently the residential segregation patterns of most vulnerable ethnic and social groups, according to how the redistributive arrangements are reflected in the housing system (tenure and supply side). Particularly in Southern Europe, these patterns have broadly led to the paradox of low degrees of spatial segregation associated with high levels of social inequality and residential marginalisation (Figures 3.6 and 3.7). Other, complementary, societal arrangements that influence the urban segregation of immigrants also warrant attention. From the analysis thus far it might be expected that some factors common to all four countries will facilitate immigrants' insertion, while others will inhibit it.

Here we continue this broad focus on macroscale contextual arrangements by exploring mechanisms of differentiation within the wider societal context organised along the combination of four dimensions: immigration flows; ideology of receiving society; state of economic conjuncture; and socio-spatial structures (see multi-level contextual structural model in Figure 2.4). This approach expands on White's meso-level model (1999), inspired by 'the work by Anthony Giddens and the late James Coleman [which] has been very influential in using a new focus on societal problems in general and in research on spatial segregation in particular' (van Kempen 2002, p. 46). Figure 5.3 offers a concise overview of the multi-level model adapted to the Southern European context. Attention is placed on non-Western foreign groups, as they are more vulnerable to conditions created by the receiving society and their insertion into the urban fabric is more controversial than that of the Westerners.

Immigration flows after the international turnaround of the 1980s led to ethnic insertion in the receiving societies (Figure 5.3, right side). Several positive factors aided this process. The first was the immigrants' characteristics: they were highly diverse in terms of education and skills; had urban origins; and many belonged to transnational communities organised around entrepreneurial activities and circular migration processes (see Chapter 4). These factors helped them access resources and create diversified insertion strategies (see the mixed embeddedness model of socio-economic integration in Kesteloot and Meert 2000).

The second factor was the systemic demand for cheap and flexible labour, predominantly in the labour-intensive, low-productivity sectors and in the family-care system (including nursing). As examined in Chapter 4, the Southern European familistic welfare regimes led to a segmented labour market, in which low- and high-productivity sectors




Figure 5.3 Residential patterns of ‘non-Western’ foreign groups in Southern European cities: an overview. Sources: compiled by the author.

coexisted, and delivery of care for children and the elderly was transferred to the family (King, Fielding and Black 1997; Arango et al. 2009). Both arrangements continued after the mid-1970s, despite the rapid transfer of native workers from low- to high-productivity sectors and a steady increase in female employment levels, which changed the role of women within the family (Ribas-Mateos 2004, 2005). Social transformations generated a systemic demand for immigrant workers to sustain a regime dependent on low-productivity sectors and the family-care system (Figure 4.1). The high demand for live-in maids and concierges (stronger in Italy and weaker in Portugal), created a unique residential niche for single-gender ethnic migration in affluent and middle-income urban areas (e.g. Sri Lankans in Rome; Filipinos in Turin, Milan, Athens, Barcelona, etc.). Similarly, the scattered geography of workplace accommodation in low-productivity sectors (e.g. construction, small and medium-sized enterprises [SMEs]) accounted for certain patterns of ethnic dispersal.

The third factor that facilitated immigrants' insertion was the role of the informal labour and housing markets as stepping stones to more stable conditions (Baldwin-Edwards and Arango 1999; Reyneri 2001, 2003). Finally, socially and functionally mixed areas facilitated forms of socio-economic inclusion, based on opportunities for market exchange, redistribution or reciprocity (Musterd, Murie and Kesteloot 2006), although mixed areas did not necessarily imply interaction and support (Chamboredon and Lemaire 1970; Maloutas and Karadimitriou 2001).

Overall, the combination of some of these factors leads to scattered spatial distribution and low ethnic residential concentration, due to the dispersed geography of the labour sectors (e.g. construction, domestic labour, care services and SMEs) and given the dispersal patterns of settlement, typical of ethnic groups with a medium level of education and skills, and urban origins (e.g. Eastern Europeans, Latin Americans, political refugees; see, for example, the middle column in Figure 6.13).

In contrast, one might expect transnational communities and ethnic groups with particular religious bonds to cluster and develop aggregative residential patterns irrespective of the socio-spatial structure of the receiving city (e.g. Bangladeshis, Hindus, Pakistanis, Chinese, Filipinos, Orthodox Jews; see debate in White 1999; Fonseca and Esteves 2002; Peach 2006, 2009). In addition, where there are significant levels of informal and non-conventional housing in central areas (hotels, subletting and residual rented housing), higher degrees of ethnic spatial concentration in overcrowded micro-areas can be expected (Fonseca 1999; Blangiardo 2001; Caponio 2006; Echazarra 2009; Malheiros and Fonseca 2011; Terrones 2011; Tosi 2011).

At the same time, the other macroscale contextual dimensions, referred in White's contextual structural model, greatly curtailed immigrants' access to territory in similar ways in all four countries (Figure 5.3, bottom and left side): dominant social discourses (ideology of receiving society); labour market segmentation (state of economic conjuncture); socio-urban processes influencing a 'recast of social groups in place' (Maloutas 2004b, p. 197); and housing regime (socio-spatial structures).

First, *dominant social discourses*, depicting the relationship between the receiving society and immigrants, fostered utilitarian, non-inclusive and repressive attitudes despite the universalistic concerns of the Christian and leftist traditions. Exclusionary principles are applied to different extents, for example, loosely in Portugal and tightly in Greece (Fonseca et al. 2002b; Fonseca 2003; Sciortino 2004; Arango et al. 2009; Kandyliis 2015). Their application depends on the perception of immigrants, type of immigration flow and the role played by the third sector (non-profit and religious organisations and trade unions). This non-inclusive attitude has an indirect but enormous influence on the ability of immigrants to access housing. Although immigrants are over-represented in informal and substandard accommodation scattered in peripheral urban areas, this is not necessarily by choice (this is explored in detail in Chapters 8 and 9).

Second, *labour market segmentation*, reinforced by the dualist labour market (formal/informal), leads to extremely vulnerable conditions for ethnic groups and reproduces the stratification of income along an ethnic dimension (Baldwin-Edwards and Arango 1999; Malheiros 1999; Domingo and Gil-Alonso 2007). This affects immigrants' capacity to secure rental contracts and pay rent, since they are constrained by scarce and temporary wage-based incomes. The self-perpetuating bond between the dualist labour market and the promotion and expansion of owner-occupation is a further restraint (explored later in this chapter).

Third, indirectly *socio-urban processes influencing a recast of social groups in place* create a barrier for non-Western residential insertion. These are associated with at least two dynamics.

Processes of gentrification and/or renewal of the central, pericentral and waterfront areas account for the inflow of affluent and young middle-income groups, and for housing tenure changes biased towards owner-occupation and the tertiary sector (hotels, aparthotels, leisure and tourism amenities, etc.). This dynamic frequently leads to the displacement of former low-income tenants (especially immigrants) to peripheral areas, and consequently, to the formation of more socially homogeneous areas (Petsimeris 2005; Blanco, Bonet and Walliser 2011; Gastaldi 2013). However, gentrification processes are often discontinuous and uneven

and may result in a partial replacement of the local population and the long-term coexistence of gentrifiers and vulnerable groups (e.g. Genoa and Lisbon central areas until the early 2010s; Mendes 2006; Gastaldi 2009; Malheiros, Carvalho and Mendes 2012). As explored in the following chapters, the extent and impact of this process on segregation varies between cities according to the timeline, urban morphology, social scope of renewal programmes, historical significance of the areas and the quality of the built environment and its social infrastructure.

Also, processes of upward social mobility *in situ* in some former working-class areas of the first peripheral belt prevent residents relocating to other urban areas (Maloutas 2004b for Athens; Leal 2004d for Madrid; Petsimeris 1998 for Milan, Turin and Genoa). While upgrading their socio-economic conditions, long-term working-class residents often ameliorate their residential conditions not by moving to a better-off neighbourhood but by improving their current home. The lack of spatial mobility and housing turnover means there are fewer opportunities for other low-income groups to move into these working-class neighbourhoods, and this inhibits processes of filtering up and down. This dynamic, largely linked to the relative immobility of long-term residents, and the structure of the family and the housing market, not only obstructs the residential access of immigrants in these areas, but also generates a 'broader impact on segregation tendencies in the wider city' (Maloutas 2004b, p. 197). In different ways, both processes reshape the tenure pattern and social composition of localities within the city and increase the differentiated social distribution across housing tenures (referred to as socio-tenurial differentiation), particularly along ethnic lines (see Chapters 7 and 9).

Fourth, the *housing regime* provides an unbalanced tenure distribution since it reproduces a dualist system and is heavily dominated by owner-occupation (Tosi and Cremaschi 2001; Pareja Eastaway and San Martin 2002; Guerra 2011). This results in an intractable and enduring problem of housing affordability for lower- and middle-class social strata (see Chapter 8). Moreover, since the first immigration wave in the early 1980s, escalating rents and the gradual erosion of the rental sector have exacerbated the problem of affordability and insecurity. The triggers were the rapid expansion of owner-occupation (Figure 8.1), fostered by the Southern European welfare and housing systems (Leal 2004a, 2011), the abolition of rent controls (Padovani 2004), the expanding credit system (Emmanuel 2004, 2014) and the privatisation of the social rental stock (except in Portugal, given the rehousing programme PER – *Programa Especial de Realojamento* – that fostered the expansion of the social housing stock in peripheral neighbourhoods of Lisbon and the metropolitan area; see Pato and Pereira 2013; Pinto and Guerra 2013).

Meanwhile, societal transformations (e.g. family and household structures, expansion of university education, etc.) and the volatility of the labour market have increased the need for private and social rented housing. This pressure has further limited immigrants' access to the scarce affordable rental stock, particularly in the central and pericentral areas. Even the residual rental market is not a solution for immigrants, given its scarcity and rent premiums (see details in Chapters 8 and 9). As 'owner-occupation is now the most common means of gaining access to a home' (Allen et al. 2004, p. 27), the possibilities for immigrants, even those on middle incomes, are severely hampered. Access to financial services is difficult for immigrants because of discriminatory policies or subject to predatory loan schemes that target specific foreign groups, such as Filipinos and Latin Americans in Barcelona and Madrid (see Chapter 9). In addition, most migratory projects require low housing expenditures to enable saving for other priorities (e.g. remittances, access to education and skills, entrepreneurial set-up, transnational and circular mobility, family reunification, etc.). 'It is clear that the long-standing solution to satisfy housing need by expanding owner-occupation is likely to be ineffective in meeting these new types of demand for rental housing' (Allen et al. 2004, p. 31).

These macroscale dimensions have led to dispersed patterns of ethnic settlement in the peripheries and metropolitan suburbs, a decreasing ethnic presence in central areas (desegregation processes) and growing forms of socio-tenorial differentiation. Despite significant differences among Southern European cities, the low spatial segregation among immigrants often hides marginalisation and social exclusion when associated with poor-quality housing, rent exploitation, precarious living conditions, overcrowding and poor access to social infrastructures. As investigated in Chapter 9, these patterns increased in scale and intensity after the late 1990s, reflecting a significant rise in residential inequalities. Inequality-driven mechanisms did not lead to ethnic ghettoisation or polarisation but to an 'urban diaspora', a metaphor coined in this book to encapsulate macroscale process of (forced) centrifugal expulsion from the central municipal area into the metropolitan rings. The 'urban diaspora' conceptualises this new geography of inequalities as a structural and systemic product of Southern European societies.

Mechanisms of Ethnic Residential Marginalisation: From Systemic Arrangements to Local Urban Political Agendas

These ethnic residential patterns, coupled with housing hardship and social marginalisation, have been mistakenly regarded as the 'contingent' consequence of supply and demand market dynamics,

characterised by the growing discrepancy between employment opportunities and scarce housing availability (see debate in Tosi 2001, 2004, 2011). In fact, the analysis so far has shown that they result from structurally embedded mechanisms, not from contingent situations. Three of the four dimensions discussed in the previous section point to structural societal arrangements of the welfare regime (dominant social discourses, labour market segmentation and housing regime), rather than to circumstantial conditions. In particular, housing affordability and marginalisation is a direct consequence of the promotion and production of owner-occupation at national and municipal level.

National Context

The fostering of owner-occupation is a *conditio sine qua non* for the reproduction of most pillars of familistic Southern European welfare systems. Owner-occupation is regarded as a political-economic instrument for ensuring political stability and widening the electoral base, boosting employment and economic growth, and offering security for pensioners and those outside the formal labour market. Historically, access to owner-occupation was advocated across all social groups by dictatorial and post-dictatorial authoritarian regimes to acquire political support (and electoral support thereafter) and mitigate those divisions that had led to civil wars in Spain and Greece, or could have furthered social instability in Italy. Overall, the promotion of homeownership is a response to economic rather than collective social welfare needs, since it is a structural component of the economic and labour regime.

For example, in terms of economic regimes, 'state expenditure directed towards housing serves other objectives than guaranteeing access to housing for those who have less purchasing capacity. The construction sector has been used as a counter-cyclical instrument of economic policy, compensating for the decrease in economic activity and consumption during periods of economic downturn' (Allen et al. 2004, p. 40). Housing policy expenditure is not directed towards reducing residential inequalities (e.g. public supply across tenures), but towards stimulating the housing market demand via tax relief and other forms of fiscal protections. It targets middle- and high-income households, transforming 'housing investment as an effective way to reduce their taxes. At the same time, there is little direct monetary aid for lower-income households seeking to buy or rent a home' (Allen et al. 2004, p. 40). Thus, the economic regimes produce regressive and counter-redistributive housing policies.

In terms of labour regimes, the dualistic labour market, in which insecure sector employment is significantly commodified, drives housing policies towards owner-occupation. Paradoxically, homeownership is

considered a form of security for those outside the formal labour market and a central form of investment within the black economy (Castles and Ferrera 1996). In the context of labour market segmentation and instability, income streams are unpredictable and uneven over time; self-provision of homeownership (formal and informal) thus emerges as a long-term solution that responds to the flexibility in the pattern of payments. Keynesian Northern Europe offers the opposite example, where 'the financing of social rented housing requires either that the majority of tenants are in guaranteed sector employment or that the state shows a high level of willingness to subsidise such housing' (Allen et al. 2004, p. 111).

The more commodified and segmented the labour system, the greater is the bias towards owner-occupation and a commodified housing system, and vice versa. During the post-War Keynesian period in Northern European countries, labour de-commodification and protection of full employment spurred the development of de-commodified housing systems biased towards rental markets integrated within a unitary rental system. The combination of public expenditure on housing (subsidies and/or direct public provision) and regulation of housing rental markets contributed to wealth redistribution. With the restructuring of welfare regimes in the 1990s, the progressive process of labour re-commodification entailed a parallel re-commodification of the housing systems. As a result, housing tenure policies fostered owner-occupation and narrowed progressively the scope of unitary rental systems (based on universalism), which in some extreme cases were shifted into dualist rental systems (based on residualism) with the deregulation of housing rental markets. Overall, the way in which the housing system relates to the economic and labour system means direct state provision of (social) housing is hardly relevant in Southern Europe and in other (neo-)liberal welfare states (Allen et al. 2004, p. 89).

Additionally, an ideological path-dependency legitimises these relationships. In Southern Europe, both Catholic and Orthodox social policies and the distinctive type of capitalist development, based largely on small entrepreneurs, promoted the 'partial' proletarianisation of society, or rather inhibited its full proletarianisation, a process fostered instead in Northern Europe during the Keynesian period (Mingione 1995). The widespread ideology of access to homeownership, through self-promotion and self-building, had been well established by the Christian democratic policies in operation since the nineteenth century. It was regarded as a means of spreading Christian family values rather than socialist or collectivist ideas associated with city workers (Kesteloot and Meert 2000, p. 54).

This process was largely implemented via ‘the function of the extended Southern family [in welfare delivery in general], in ensuring access to housing for its members and its role in protecting labour against commodification in a tertiarised economy’ (Allen et al. 2004, p. 89). Similarly, fiscal protection over homeownership and landownership was preferred over housing rent allowances and land redistribution, further justified by the Catholic notion of homeownership as family ‘patrimony’ which should perpetuate through generations (thus differing from the Northern European conception of ownership as a tradable good; see Chapter 1). The spatial expression of this process was a distinctive urban sprawl and the suburbanisation of low- and lower middle-income groups, developed by an aggregate spontaneous growth, often of small-scale production and self-production (Portugal, Greece and Italy), or by planned corporate developments (Spain and Northern Italy). Both cases have produced diverse forms of owner-occupation across the social spectra, particularly among working-class groups (Figure 5.2 on the left). One consequence has been the transformation of the working-class suburban belt into a distinctive ‘red belt of semi-proletarian owners’. Although low-income, the owners have lobbied for similar policies to those fostered by the middle- and high-income urban bourgeoisie, based on individual interests, increased protection of ownership and associated fiscal reductions. In a Southern way, collective social welfare interests have been defeated by owner-occupation.

Therefore owner-occupation is promoted not only by the state–market–family relationship (key social institutions of the welfare triangle) but in the wider social relations of segmented labour commodification, economic growth and Catholic and Orthodox social policies. Consequently, housing affordability in Southern Europe was never a circumstantial situation that could be addressed solely through a localised readjustment of housing market supply–demand mechanisms. It was the result of permanent conditions associated with macroscale structural and societal arrangements that dictated the terms of provision and production of housing, its distinctive tenure imbalance and its distinctive process of social division of space. These crucial structural mechanisms have hindered in particular the urban and residential inclusion of immigrants. As Tosi (2001, p. 4) states, ‘the weakness of general social [concerns in] housing policies, on different scales, has constituted the main reason for the housing problems of immigrants’.

Municipal Context

From the early 1990s, these macroscale structural arrangements were carried on at the governance level and in local urban programmes.

With devolution, in particular, local programmes became the primary means of delivering housing and economic policies and this developed further barriers to ethnic residential insertion.

EU accession in the 1980s brought significant political and economic pressures for the liberalisation of the Southern European housing market, which led to the abolition of rent control in the mid-1980s, and changes to policy and fiscal instruments, credit systems, housing production and the control of land (see Chapter 7). Most city restructuring programmes embraced the liberalisation of the housing market and promoted owner-occupation as an instrument of local economic policy and means of subsidising urban growth (Tosi and Cremaschi 2001; Blanco, Bonet and Walliser 2011; Maloutas et al. 2012; Mendes and Carmo 2016). Particularly in the city centres, the renewal programmes promoted the development of a middle-class homeownership market and real-estate investments. This was the preferred solution to revitalise decaying neighbourhoods, regain the economic centrality of the city centre and co-finance large-scale public interventions to stimulate the private market.

In most cases, these programmes penalised low-income and non-Western foreign groups, while benefiting mainly affluent native groups, land and property owners, foreign investors and financial institutions (Torner and Gutierrez 2001; Emmanuel 2002, 2004; Gastaldi 2012; Annunziata 2014). Even in cases that are regarded as successful examples of urban restructuring (e.g. Barcelona's centre and seaside), the result has been: (1) a rapid and profitable social and spatial reconfiguration of those areas attractive to a middle- and upper-income market (Arbaci and Tapada-Berteli 2012); and (2) a sharp decline of the affordable segment of the housing stock in all tenures (see Figures 8.6 and 8.7). As recently argued by Leal and Sorando (2013), most urban regeneration programmes in the central and pericentral areas of Barcelona and Madrid have been regressive and increased socio-spatial inequalities. Meanwhile, urban regeneration in peripheral neighbourhoods has maintained a redistributive role, because of its limited attraction for new middle-income households and real-estate investors.

Changes in the local urban political agendas contributed to widen socio-ethnic inequalities. On one hand, stronger planning control over new housing development restricted access to land for self-production and non-profit provision and made it more difficult for small developers to participate directly in the housing production process. As a result, the characteristic forms of affordable production developed during the period of post-War rural–urban migration, based on small developers, self-production, informal land acquisition and informal housing production, were inhibited. Furthermore, increasing land prices and the sale of public land curtailed the production of affordable housing

for low-income groups by the co-operative sectors and other non-profit bodies (see Figure 8.1). Overall, as we will see in the following chapters, planning tools such as planning gain, provision of municipally owned land and indirect land-cost subsidies have been extensively employed in Southern European urban political agendas to trigger property-led markets, but never as devices to provide a more equitable social division of space and affordable housing (Leal 2004d; Guerra 2011; Mugnano and Palvarini 2011; Bricocoli and Cucca 2016). Thus, planning tools played a regressive rather than a redistributive role. As (self-)production of affordable housing was no longer possible, access to capital through monetary resources, credit system or patrimonial inheritance became the sole means of getting on the property ladder, all of which were hard for immigrants to access. This limited the possibility for more stable ethnic residential insertion and widened the gap in access to housing among social groups, particularly between natives and non-Western groups (see detail in Chapter 9).

On the other hand, following the abolition of rent control in the 1980s and 1990s, the introduction of urban renewal programmes in central and pericentral areas increased socio-tenurial inequalities and played a regressive rather than a redistributive role. The renovation of the old housing stock led to a rapid contraction in the residual private rental sector, which had been the major source of accommodation for immigrants (in Barcelona, Genoa, Lisbon and partly Athens), and a flourishing upmarket housing supply, mainly for owner-occupation. The recommodification of the rental sector, combined with renewal programmes, steered social and tenure reconfiguration in selected areas by facilitating (forced) evictions and the shrinkage of rental stock, followed by gentrification and consequent processes of market-led displacement (e.g. Milan, Rome and Barcelona). These seem to be the main driving mechanisms behind processes of ethnic spatial desegregation in the central areas and increased peripheralisation of immigrants, which are mistakenly regarded as indicators of successful ethnic residential integration since their indices of segregation are reduced (Figures 9.14 and 9.15).

Indeed, given the severe contraction of the rental market, particularly the segment most accessible to medium- and low-income groups, forms of social and residential marginalisation have increased across the social spectrum, while they have grown exponentially along the ethnic dimension, including middle-income immigrants (Figure 9.1). During this process, ethnic housing hardship has not only escalated but also shifted from central areas to marginal metropolitan fringes. The gravity and scale of ethnic residential marginalisation is greater, but less visible. As a result, it seems reasonable to argue that for most Southern European municipalities there is a clear (yet not transparent) 'pursuing

[of] gentrification as a strategy of renewal, albeit one that is more likely to avoid social responsibilities than to deal with the structural causes of regional and city economic decline and poverty' (Atkinson 2003, p. 2346; see also Tabakman 2001; Briata, Bricocoli and Tedesco 2009; Sorando and Ardura 2016).

At one level, macroscale structural arrangements, informing housing systems in general or translated into current local urban political agendas, have been:

greatly hinder[ing] the integration of immigrants and their progress. From now on it is more difficult to follow 'housing careers', of the type followed by many immigrants in the past. (...) [Additionally], urban policies and local immigration policies risk seeing a further expansion of the space for direct control of the territory where immigrants are physically moved out of a given space. Already in many cities today evictions constitute the only visible public policy. (Tosi 2001, pp. 3 and 14)

At another level, the ways societal arrangements operate at local level should not be underestimated. For instance, clientelism and familialism, as well as low residential mobility among long-term residents, are still key mechanisms driving socio-spatial differentiation and residential exclusion of groups that are considered outsiders. The origins of housing hardship and marginalisation for immigrants in Southern Europe, and the enduring problem of affordable housing, need to be seriously reconsidered and addressed. Thorough considerations are crucial, not in the light of the orthodox market rationale (e.g. housing supply–demand), but in the wider context of those distinctive macroscale structural and societal mechanisms inherited from welfare arrangements, which are reproduced at urban governance level and in current housing and socio-urban dynamics.

Conclusion

This chapter has reviewed the distinctive features of immigrants' urban and residential insertion within wider societal and urban contexts. Main structural causes and effects of residential marginalisation have been reconceptualised and reinterpreted within Southern European contexts.

Paradoxically, critical features of urban ethnic insertion – low levels of spatial segregation, scattered peripheral settlements and processes of desegregation – conceal increased housing hardship and marginalisation among non-Western groups. These diffuse forms of residential marginalisation originate from structural mechanisms and wider processes of socio-residential differentiation rooted in the macroscale arrangements

of the welfare system, such as the ideology of the receiving society, the labour market segmentation and, above all, the dualist housing system and associated processes of social division of space.

Simultaneously, as welfare delivery has devolved to local levels, socio-ethnic inequalities have widened because of the regressive mechanisms embedded in local urban political agendas and their particular strategies of urban growth and renewal. Residential marginalisation has widened in scale and depth, but has also become less visible due to processes of ethnic desegregation and peripheralisation ('urban diaspora') resulting from a (forced) centrifugal expulsion from the renewed central area into the metropolitan rings. Thus ethnic housing marginalisation remains a permanent condition, though more scattered and less visible.

One root of the problem lies in policies and programmes fostering owner-occupation at national and municipal level, which produces an unequal social division of space and access to resources. So far, policy makers and academics have ignored this persistent source of inequality. But owner-occupation warrants further attention because of the magnitude of the ethnic marginalisation it creates, and because the case of Southern Europe exemplifies how a society organised around a homeownership-led system intrinsically affects patterns of segregation and structural inequalities. Traditionally, European segregation studies have confined the focus to the role of social housing and the unitary rental market since these were developed on Northern European contexts.

This analysis of macroscale mechanisms leads to three further points. First, although housing conditions in Southern European cities are critical for the settlement and inclusion of immigrants and an increasing proportion of local populations, the gravity and complexity of housing and segregation issues has been underestimated, deproblematized and scarcely investigated by academics and policy makers. This presents a specific challenge in these cities and in other societies where owner-occupation has been growing alongside neoliberal policies advocating for the decommodification and deregulation of the housing system. Compared with Northern Europe, the Southern European approach to housing produces a more reductive and less problematized view of segregation. As it reduces segregation and residential issues primarily to the alleged 'inefficiency' and 'rigidity' of the housing market (supply-demand) or to 'inevitable' global forces, it fails to account for contextual systemic mechanisms and state-market(-family) relations and the (lack of) redistributive role of local urban political agendas. This reductive approach to housing is embedded in the familistic welfare capitalism and stems from Christian social principles, which promote state intervention and universal transfers primarily to health and education (decommodified systems) but restrict them in terms of housing

(commodified system) since the housing system is not regarded as a redistributive pillar of the welfare regime. Although the prevention or reduction of inequality is addressed within wider social policies (e.g. in the health and education system), the issue is tangential when the housing system, housing policies and urban strategies are considered.

Second, the emphasis on a homeownership society and the introduction of emergency policies as the primary response to social and immigration issues are not alleviating but intensifying processes of socio-spatial differentiation and marginalisation. Even restricting the focus to housing or planning, the issue is about not simply social housing provision but broader socio-economic and political programmes that address the systemic roots of the housing affordability crisis. The problem cannot be alleviated by housing policies alone – there is also a need to rethink social welfare in tertiarised economies. This raises the question of whether and how a vision of a less unequal society can be reconsidered in a post-Fordist economy.

Finally, the fact that low levels of (ethnic) spatial segregation, desegregation, dispersal and suburbanisation do not always reflect processes of social upward mobility, but of social inequality and exclusion, redirects the attention to the causes (societal mechanisms) rather than the symptoms (spatial configuration).

In the academic arena, this warrants interpretative frameworks that focus more on contextual and tractable mechanisms of differentiation driving marginalisation, rather than unavoidable globally driven processes. Of crucial importance is the way in which each context differently relates to current neoliberal pressures for the (re)commodification of welfare services (e.g. privatisation of education, health, pension, transport), since commodified services amplify social differentiation and curtail the access of vulnerable and low-income groups to traditional modes of integration (e.g. education system).

The next chapters will provide a more in-depth focus on patterns, mechanisms and changes across eight Southern European cities.

Notes

- 1 A comparative analysis of the location quotients and segregation indices presented in Figure 5.1 needs to consider that the average size of the spatial units available in each city are different (e.g. average size unit in Madrid MA and Milan is larger than other cities), and that by reducing the size of the units, there is a possibility that indices might increase substantially. However, Malheiros (2002, p. 117) extensively deals with these statistical limitations when interpreting the results of the analysis, which nonetheless 'do not invalidate the trends that are identified. Moreover, the technical procedures

adopted to improve comparability (increasing the average size of the internal units of some metropolises through spatial aggregation procedures, direct calculation of segregation indices, choice of major foreign/ethnic groups as reference for calculation) provides a good picture of the dominant patterns'. These findings have also been confirmed in other segregation studies later developed (Fonseca et al. 2002a; Martinez and Leal 2008; Cucca 2012).

- 2 Figure 5.2 uses concentration figures (c.f.) to calculate the 'distribution' of owner-occupation (on the left) and owner-occupied single-family house (on the right) across four income quartiles, and to plot the 'distance' between the lower and higher quartile in both dimensions (in the centre). Overall, Figure 5.2 represents the degree of socio-tenurial differentiation within this tenure and typology of housing and it can be used as a proxy indicator of social (in)equality, since it employs statistical parameters that measure distribution and distance among social groups (relational positioning). The concentration figures have been calculated by SCP (2000, pp. 245–251) based on 1996 Eurostat data and used specifically to adjust for differences in composition of the housing stock between countries.

The distribution of the tenure can be average (c.f. \cong 100; buffer 90–110), over-represented (c.f. $>$ 100), or under-represented (c.f. $<$ 100) in each quartile. The more the c.f. across all four quartiles are concentrated (closer to 100), the more the tenure or typology is equally distributed across the income groups, and thus the distance between the top and bottom quartiles is small (see for instance on the left, the case of Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece where each quartile owns approximately 25% of the total stock of owner-occupation). An equal sharing among social groups indicates that socio-tenurial differentiation is minimal (c.f. closer to 100 and a small distance between first and fourth quartile), thus suggesting low levels of socio-residential inequality in this sector and/or that the sector is highly accessible or inclusive. Conversely, the more the c.f. are stretched across the spectrum, the more the tenure or typology is unevenly distributed among the social groups, and thus the bigger the distance between the top and bottom quartile (see the case of Northern Europe in the three parts of the figure). The unequal sharing and large distance indicates that socio-tenurial differentiation is significant, thus socio-residential inequality is possibly high and/or this sector plays a divisive role.

- 3 In Northern Europe, policy makers and housing scholars used to examine routinely the distribution of social groups within the rented sector, and particularly within the social rented sector when this was the dominant tenure. It helped to monitor the effectiveness of their unitary rental systems in increasing or maintaining social mixing within each rental sector, aiming to reduce broader social inequalities (Chapter 3). Equally, the distribution of social groups within owner-occupation is an important indicator of socio-tenurial differentiation in the analysis of countries where owner-occupation is, or is becoming, the dominant tenure (e.g. Spain, Greece, Italy, United Kingdom, Ireland). See discussion in Chapter 7.

A Mosaic of Ethnic Segregation Patterns

Southern European Cities in the 1990s

The book so far has approached segregation processes from macroscale comparative perspectives. Chapters 3 and 5 showed how national welfare regimes and associated housing systems shape mechanisms of differentiation and influence patterns of spatial segregation and social inequality. Since Southern European countries share analogous familistic welfare regimes, similarly low levels of ethnic residential segregation across Southern European cities would be expected. However, as discussed in Chapter 4, the diversity of migratory waves and the heterogeneity of the foreign groups encountered in the four countries suggest different ethnic settlement patterns among the cities.

We are moving now to mesoscale comparative perspectives to explore these patterns and divergences in more detail across the eight Southern European cities (Lisbon MA, Madrid MA, Rome MA, Athens MA, Barcelona, Milan, Turin and Genoa). This chapter first identifies and maps ethnic residential patterns in the eight cities by comparing levels of spatial concentration (Index of Segregation, IS) and geographic distribution (Location Quotients, LQs) of a large diversity of ethnic groups. In the second and third sections, patterns and divergences are interpreted in relation to the residential segregation of native groups (occupational categories, 1990s) and contextualised within the socio-spatial hierarchy of the cities at municipal and metropolitan level.

These comparative analyses reveal a complex and highly diversified mosaic that challenges those mainstream theories of the 1990s

that argue for an increase of ghettoisation and polarisation among ethnic and native groups (see debate in Chapter 2). But some distinctive traits emerge: a twofold typology between port cities (Lisbon, Barcelona, Genoa and Athens) and continental cities (Madrid, Rome, Milan and Turin) and remarkable geographical correspondences and mismatches between ethnic and social lines. Some patterns appear unique to Southern European cities, namely some forms of diffuse segregation, presence of low-income ethnic groups in wealthy neighbourhoods and absence of the most vulnerable ethnic groups in certain working-class neighbourhoods. To a great extent, these patterns are driven by processes of differentiation embedded in the socio-spatial stratification of the city, ethnic strategies of settlement, labour market segmentation and welfare care arrangements or ethnic affiliations linked to religious, entrepreneurial and transnational practices.

Some patterns, however, cannot be entirely explained by these processes and require further attention to the housing context and local urban political agendas as key mechanisms of differentiation. Moreover, the twofold contrasting geography of patterns encountered between port and continental cities, in particular, is expected to change incrementally in the following decades along with the intensification of urban renewal programmes and housing recommodification policies. These will be addressed in the following chapters.

Mapping Ethnic Segregation

Degrees of Concentration: A Twofold Typology of Port Cities and Continental Cities

When comparing the IS of a large variety of foreign groups across eight Southern European cities during the 1990s, the panorama appears complex and diverse (Figure 6.1).¹ However, a pattern of spatial concentration emerges in the distinction of two clusters of cities: continental cities (Madrid MA, Rome MA, Milan and Turin) and port cities (Lisbon MA, Barcelona, Genoa and Athens MA), with the former less ethnically segregated than the latter.

In continental cities, indices of spatial segregation (or spatial concentration) are significantly low, ranging from 18 to 35 IS even among those groups of African and Asian origins that often tend to cluster, such as Moroccans, Pakistanis, Chinese, Bangladeshis or Japanese. Moreover, Milan and Rome MA show the lowest levels of segregation among, respectively, the municipal and metropolitan cities.




Figure 6.1 Indices of segregation (IS) of selected foreign groups in selected Southern European cities, 1991–2002. *Sources:* compiled by the author based on data from Malheiros (2002) for Lisbon MA and Madrid MA, INE Portugal (1996) for Lisbon MA, INE Spain (1996) for Madrid and Barcelona and Petsimeris (1998) for Genoa; author calculation for Rome MA, Barcelona, Milan and Turin, data from Collicelli et al. (1998) for Rome MA, IDESCAT (1996) for Barcelona, Tosi and Lombardi (1999) for Milan and Comune di Torino (2003) for Turin. *Notes:* IS is calculated at district level.

Levels of spatial segregation across port cities are higher, 30–55 IS, with peaks among distinctive African and Asian groups in Barcelona (those from Pakistan, the Philippines and Morocco) and in Lisbon MA (those from Pakistan, China, India and Guinea-Bissau). However, the mechanisms that drive segregation may differ. For instance, in Lisbon MA, since migration flows from the Indian continent and the Far East are more recent, the high concentration of Asians is possibly associated with early-stage settlement mechanisms. Conversely, in Barcelona, the presence of Pakistanis, Chinese, Indians and Filipinos dates back to the 1970s, which suggests other reasons for high concentration levels. Similarly, during the 1990s, Asian and African groups were significantly concentrated in Genoa and Athens MA, according to early studies on the ethnic residential clusters in the central and western areas of both cities (Basile 1998; Iosifides and King 1998; Arapoglou 2006).

If we compare the data according to the continent of origin (Figure 6.1), the contrast – lower segregation indices in continental cities and higher indices in port cities – is even more remarkable, as it applies to most foreign groups. Moreover, the contrast seems consistent across municipal or metropolitan areas and irrespective of the size of the foreign group (per cent of total population) or its time of arrival (compare Figure 6.1 with waves of immigration in Figures 4.2–4.6).

Divergences in concentration levels between port and continental cities are more accentuated among Asians (Filipinos, Pakistanis or Chinese) and Africans, than Eastern Europeans or Latin Americans, who score low levels of concentration in all cities (below 35 IS), except in Lisbon MA where recent Eastern European migrants concentrate in temporary, often shared or overcrowded accommodations and in the residual part of the rental housing stock (Baganha and Fonseca 2004). For example, Filipinos and Moroccans are relatively dispersed in Milan, Turin, Rome MA and Madrid MA (25–30 IS), while particularly concentrated in the port cities of Barcelona (55–65 IS), Genoa and Athens (according to Basile 1998 and Petronoti 1998).

Overall, during the mid-1990s, the indices of spatial segregation show Southern European cities diverge along a twofold typology: ethnic settlements are more dispersed in continental cities and more concentrated in port cities. Why? Since segregation is a multidimensional process, we expect patterns and levels of segregation to result from a combination of factors. However, the recurrence of such a twofold divergence for each foreign group is so remarkable as to suggest differences in the macroscale conditions of port and continental cities so distinctive as to steer the level of ethnic concentration. A more comprehensive study of these differences will be made in later sections, which look at the

geographic distribution of the foreign groups and their relation to the socio-spatial structure of the cities. It will shed light on how socio-spatial and other forms of differentiation occur along social and ethnic lines.

Geographic Distribution: Patterns and Divergences

The geographic distribution of foreign groups in the 1990s has been mapped in a series of figures (Figures 6.2–6.7) that show a complex mosaic of ethnic spatial organisations and offer details for further examination. The figures demonstrate some of the characteristic patterns referred to in the macroscale analyses of Chapter 5. They point to three common patterns – diffuse peripheralisation, divergences within continents of origin and divergences within multi-ethnic areas – and a remarkable difference in the ethnic geographic distribution between central and outer-central areas as a source of divergence between port and continental cities.

Diffuse Peripheralisation

The large over-representation of Africans and Latin Americans, as well as Western groups, in the metropolitan areas of Lisbon, Madrid and Rome points to *patterns of scattered peripheral settlement*. These are also encountered in the peripheral satellite cities of Milan MA (Foot 2001; Blangiardo, Farina and Locatelli 2010) and of Barcelona MA (Domingo, Clapés and Prats 1995; Miret 2001; Bayona and Pujadas 2011). Athens MA is an exception, with a significant concentration of non-Western immigrants in the north-western and eastern districts of the municipality and a scattered metropolitan settlement of Ethnic Greeks and Poles in the western suburbs of Peristeri, Nikaia and Ilion.

Patterns of scattered peripheral settlement are emerging among long-settled and, surprisingly, new immigrants. Inclusive and exclusionary processes might account for such diverse forms of suburbanisation or peripheralisation, respectively. During the 1980s and 1990s, some long-settled non-Western groups followed the middle- and lower middle-class route of suburbanisation as a strategy of incorporation into the mainstream society, whereby suburbanisation was regarded as a symbol of social upward mobility and housing career. First-wave international migrants such as Argentinians and Chileans in Madrid MA; Goans, Hindus and Ishmaelis from Mozambique and wealthy Mozambicans in Lisbon MA (Malheiros 1996, 1997); or Ethnic Greeks and Poles in Athens MA best represent this form of ethnic suburbanisation. Conversely, the peripheralisation of Albanians in Athens and Rome MA, or of third-wave Moroccans in Madrid MA and Barcelona MA, often reflect processes of displacement from more central residential

BARCELONA – LQs, 1996. Total population: 1,508,805






Figure 6.2 Geographic distribution of selected foreign groups, by country of origin (LQs), in Barcelona, 1996. Sources: compiled by the author, including calculation; data from IDESCAT (1996). Notes: disaggregation of Location Quotients consistent with Malheiros's (2002) comparative analysis of six European cities presented in Chapter 5.


Latin America




Peru




Dominican Rep.




Argentina




Chile




Asia (excl. Japan)




Philippines




Pakistan




China



India



East Europe



Location Quotients, LQs





Figure 6.2 (Continued)

MILAN – LQs, 1996.Total population: 1,316,760


Total foreigners




Districts

- | | |
|------------------------------|---------------------------|
| 1 historic centre | 10 Monza-Padova |
| 2 CBD Greco-Zara | 11 Città Studi-Argonne |
| 3 Venezia-Buenos Aires | 12 Feltre-Ortica-Lambrate |
| 4 Vittoria-Romana-Molise | 13 Forlanini-Taliedo |
| 5 Ticinese-Genova | 14 Corvetto-Vigentina |
| 6 Magenta-Sempione | 15 Chiesa R.-Gratosoglio |
| 7 Bovisa-Dergano | 16 Barona-Ronchetto Nav. |
| 8 Affori-Bruzzano-Comasina | 17 Loreeggio-Inganni |
| 9 Niguarda-Ca Granda-Bicocca | 18 Baggio-Forze Armate |
| | 19 San Siro-Gallaratese |
| | 20 Certosa-Quarto Oggiaro |


country of origin




Non-Western c.




Western countries




Location Quotients, LQs




Africa (excl. Egypt)




Egypt



Morocco



Ethiopia



Senegal






Figure 6.3 Geographic distribution of selected foreign groups, by country of origin (LQs), in Milan, 1996. Sources: compiled by the author, including calculation; data from Tosi and Lombardi (1999) and Petsimeris (1998). Notes: disaggregation of Location Quotients consistent with Malheiros's (2002) comparative analysis of six European cities presented in Chapter 5.


Latin America



Peru




Brazil




Salvador




Argentina




Asia (excl. Japan)




Philippines




China




Sri Lanka



East Europe



F. Yugoslavia



Romania





Figure 6.3 (Continued)


LISBON Metropolitan area – LQs, 1996

Total population: 2,535,670
 Total foreigners: 53,249


W. Europe + N. Am.



Africa



country of origin



Location Quotients, LQs





Figure 6.4 Geographic distribution of selected foreign groups, by country of origin (LQs) in Lisbon MA and Madrid MA, 1996. *Sources:* compiled by the author based on data from Malheiros (2002).


MADRID Metropolitan area – LQs, 1996

Total population: 2,866,850
 Total foreigners: 54,470


W. Europe + N. Am.



Morocco



Latin America



Location Quotients, LQs




Figure 6.4 (Continued)

ROME Metropolitan area – LQs, 1996. Total population: 2,654,187






Figure 6.5 Geographic distribution of selected foreign groups, by country of origin (LQs) in Rome MA, 1996. *Sources:* compiled by the author, including calculation; data from Collicelli et al. (1998). *Notes:* disaggregation of Location Quotients consistent with Malheiros's (2002) comparative analysis of six European cities presented in Chapter 5.


Latin America




Peru




Brazil




Asia (excl. Japan)




Philippines




India




Sri Lanka




China




East Europe



Poland



ex-Yugoslavia



Location Quotients, LQs





Figure 6.5 (Continued)


TURIN – LQs, 2002

Total population: 896,918

Total foreigners



country of origin




Districts

- 1 Centro, Crocetta
- 2 Santa Rita, Mirafiori Nord
- 3 San Paolo, Cenisia, Pozzo Strada
- 4 San Donato, Parella
- 5 Borgo Vittoria, Madonna di Campagna, Le Vallette
- 6 Barriera Milano, Regio Parco, Rebaudogo
- 7 Valdocchio, Vanchiglia, Madonna del Pilone
- 8 San Salvario, Cavoretto
- 9 Lingotto, Nizza
- 10 Mirafiori Sud


GENOA – LQs, 1996

Total population: 917,400


Total foreigners




Non-Western c.




West Europe




United States




Location Quotients, LQs




Africa



Morocco



Egypt



Morocco






Figure 6.6 Geographic distribution of selected foreign groups, by country of origin (LQs) in Turin, 2002, and Genoa, 1996. *Sources:* compiled by the author, including calculation; data from Comune di Torino (2003) for Turin and Basile (1998) and Petsimeris (1998) for Genoa. Notes: disaggregation of Location Quotients consistent with Malheiros's (2002) comparative analysis of six European cities presented in Chapter 5.


Latin America




Peru




Brazil




Peru





Asia (excl. Japan)




China




Philippines



East Europe



Romania



Districts

20 x 20 km

- A Pre-Molo Maddalena
- B Sanpierrez, S. Teodoro
- C Oregina-Lagaccio, Castelletto, Portoria
- D Foce, S. Martino, S. Francesco d'Albaro
- E Sturla-Quarto, Valle Strurla, Nervi-Quinto-S. Ilario
- F Staglieno, Molassana, Struppa
- G Marassi, S. Fruituoso
- H Rivarolo, Bolzaneto, Pontedecimo
- J Sestri, Cornigliano
- K Voltri, Pra, Pegli

Figure 6.6 (Continued)

Foreign group by country of origin	Residential areas neighborhood level	N. of foreigners, official data	Attica, 1996 (a) other estimation
Albania (incl. ethnic-Greek)	scattered in Athens and Western suburbs of MA, Spata (Airport, East MA)	2,810 docum. (= 57% of total Alb.)	>> 100,000 without residence permit
Poland	Kypseli, Vathis sq., Attikis sq., Patsia, and Omonia; Western suburbs of MA	3,323 docum.	> 40,000 in Athens (docum. + undoc.)
Egypt	Metaxourgeio, Attikis sq., Akademia Platonos, Kypseli and Pagrati	4,834 docum	20,000 (docum. + undoc.)
Pakistan (b)	Meridi (Olympic Village), Omonia, Petralona, Kolonos; Western suburbs: Acharnes, Peristeri, Nikea	n.a.	20,000
Philippines	Kypseli and Patsia	5,254 docum	> 3,000 (doc+ und.) in Greater Athens
Bulgaria	Patsia and Pagrati	2,000 docum.	3,000 (doc.+ undoc.)
Russia (incl. ethnic-Greek)	Patsia and Kolonos; scattered Western suburbs of MA	3,500 docum	
Turkey (incl. refugees of Kurdish origin)	Exarchia	2,475 docum.	3,000 (doc.+ undoc.)
Iraq (incl. refugees of Kurdish origin)	Neos Kosmos	3,800 docum. (=94% of total Iraqis)	
Ethiopia	Ambelokipoi, Ilisia, Patsia and Pagrati	1,114 docum.	2,500 (doc.+ undoc.)
Eritrea	Ilisia, Ambelokipoi, Patsia and Pagrati	n.a.	300 in Athens
China (b)	Omonia and Pagrati	n.a.	2,000
Bangladesh	Patsia and Omonia	139 docum	2,000 undoc. 7,500 (b)
Nigeria	Omonia, Patsia and Attikis sq.	648 docum.	1,200 (doc.+ undoc.)
Ghana	Kypseli and Ambelokipoi	100 docum.	800 (doc.+ undoc.)
Sudan	Kypseli, Ambelokipoi and Patsia	486 docum.	550-600 (doc.+ undoc.)
Armenia	Neos Kosmos		500 (most undoc.)
Kenya	Patsia, Kypseli, Ambelokipoi, Goudi and Koukaki	115 docum.	300 (doc.+ undoc.)
Sierra Leone	Kypseli and Patsia (Amerikis sq.)		200 (mostly undoc.)
Palestine	Kypseli, Ambelokipoi and Ilisia	30 docum.	200 (undoc.)




Figure 6.7 Geographic distribution of selected foreign groups, by country of origin in the municipality of Athens, 1996–1998. *Sources:* compiled by the author; data Petronoti (1998, pp. 4–6) for table, Maloutas (2000, p. 50) for map; translation by P. Koutrolikou. Notes: (a) Official data from National Statistical Service of Greece (NSSG 1997) and National Center for Social Research (EKKE/PENED 1997); other estimations from immigrants’ associations and unions; (b) data from *To Vima* newspaper (7 March, 2004, pp. 60–61).

areas and discrimination from the formal rental market (Miret 2001; Lazaridis 2004; Weber 2004).

More commonly, peripheralisation or suburbanisation results from inter-municipal migration following family reunification (second-wave Africans and Latin Americans in Rome MA, Madrid MA and Turin, see Coin 2008), often constrained by the shortage of affordable permanent homes in the central and pericentral areas (Eastern Europeans and Latin Americans in Rome MA, Milan and Turin, see Somma 2008; and more recently in Barcelona MA, see Bayona and López-Gay 2011).

Housing accessibility rather than affordability makes Lisbon MA a particular case. Fifty years of rent control, abolished by the late 1980s, means available rented housing became scarce in the municipal area and was thus inaccessible for the three big migration flows after the fall of the dictatorship in Portugal in 1974 and the subsequent rise of civil wars in the former Portuguese African colonies. Rural migrants, first- and second-wave Cape Verdeans and Angolans and the less well-off Portuguese *retornados* (returning from the former colonies) had no choice but to settle outside the Lisbon municipality (Malheiros 1998; Fonseca 2003) and develop clandestine neighbourhoods and shanty areas in the first metropolitan ring (Salgueiro 1972, 2001). This peripheral distribution was reinforced by the rehousing of informal metropolitan settlements undertaken in the 1990s (PER rehousing programme - *Programa Especial de Realojamento*), which consolidated the diffuse metropolitan settlement among Cape Verdeans and Angolans (Pato and Pereira 2013).

Surprisingly, patterns of diffuse peripheralisation have also been identified among new immigrants. By the mid-1990s, the growing presence of undocumented and newly documented immigrants in the outer-central districts of Madrid MA (Ayuntamiento de Madrid 2003, pp. 4–5; 2007, pp. 10–14; Lora Tamayo 2003), the satellite cities of Barcelona MA (Domingo, Clapés and Prats 1995; Bayona and Pujadas 2011), Milan MA (Blangiardo 2001, pp. 144–145; Blangiardo, Farina and Locatelli 2010) and Turin (Comune di Torino 2003, p. 72) began a new phenomenon whereby metropolitan peripheral areas became the new city gates, a role previously played by the city centre. For instance in Spain, the southern and eastern suburbs of Carabancel, Usera, Puente de Valleca and Ciutat Lineal are the new gateways for Madrid, as Badalona, Santa Coloma de Gramanet, Cornellà, Esplugues and L’Ospitalet de Llobregat are for Barcelona.

As discussed later, a combination of dynamics accounts for this phenomenon, from ethnic kinship operating in clusters consolidated across the metropolitan areas (as in Lisbon MA), to the changing

geography of the residual rental stock. The latter, already scattered in the metropolitan area, has been shrinking and becoming more fragmented in the central districts, particularly since municipal-led renewal programmes and city branding programmes attracted private inward investments to expand owner-occupation markets, uplift the rental stock and facilitate the gentrification of deprived neighbourhoods (see renewal programmes such as PERI – *Plan Especial de Reforma Interior* – and EXPO 92 in Barcelona; URBAN and EXPO Colombo in Genoa; PRU – *Programa de Rehabilitação Urbana* – and EXPO 98 in Lisbon; *The Gate* programme in Turin; see, respectively, Cabral and Rato 2003; Briata 2010; Arbaci and Tapada-Berteli 2012; Gastaldi 2012).

This phenomenon was more pronounced among continental cities in the 1990s, but since the 2000s ethnic peripheralisation has become a common feature of most Southern European cities. As we will see in Chapter 9, the newly arrived Ukrainians and other Eastern European groups scattered in the most remote metropolitan outskirts of Lisbon MA are a paradigmatic example (Figure 9.9). Neither were Northern European cities immune to this phenomenon, although the academic focus on suburbs and ethnic metropolitanisation has only recently emerged, as studies on inner cities and ghettoisation have dominated the segregation literature for a long time (see debate in Bolt, van Kempen and van Ham 2008; Simpson and Finney 2009; Hochstenbach and Musterd 2017).

Divergences within Each Continent of Origin

Divergences in the geographic distribution of foreign groups belonging to the same continent of origin are often overlooked (White 1999). Already by the mid-1990s, segregation patterns differed among Asian groups and African groups, as well as among Western groups, both at metropolitan level (e.g. Rome MA, see Figure 6.5) and at municipal level (e.g. Barcelona, see Figure 6.2).

Income, occupational and educational levels and the time of arrival and type of immigration all influence the divergences in the distributional patterns within each continent of origin. For instance, among Latin Americans and Eastern Europeans, groups with a middle level of education (Argentineans, Brazilians, Poles and former Yugoslavians) tend to be more residentially dispersed and this pattern is now visible also in other Northern European cities (Bolt, Özüekren and Phillips 2012; Catney 2015, 2016).

Locations and concentration levels differ between long-settled and newly arrived immigrants, as for instance between former Yugoslavians and Romanians, or between Moroccans and more recent African migrants, as in Rome MA and Milan (Figures 6.5 and 6.23). In Italian

cities, even among the long-settled Africans, the location of middle-income entrepreneurial Egyptians contrasts with that of low-income employed Moroccans.

In most cities, Filipinos and Chinese follow divergent residential patterns, which reflect their different migration history and occupations. Filipinos began to migrate in the mid-1970s and were primarily linked to domestic and care services, while more recent Chinese migrants tend to engage in entrepreneurial activities. Divergent geographic distribution between Indians and Bangladeshis (Rome MA), Ethiopians/Somalis and Senegalese (Milan), Moroccans and Guineans (Barcelona) or Chinese in contrast to other Asians, arise from other important processes of differentiation associated with affiliation in terms of religion, kinships, transnational practices or entrepreneurial strategies.

Heterogeneous Multi-Ethnic Areas and Absence of Ghettos

Heterogeneous multi-ethnic areas are a common feature of Southern European cities, as shown by the overlap of areas of over-representation between several foreign groups at municipal and metropolitan level (Figures 6.2–6.7). The predominance of natives in all districts points to the *absence of ethnic ghettos*, even in districts with a significant ethnic presence, since neighbourhoods are predominantly socially heterogeneous and immigrants form fragmented micro-clusters (Granata 1998; Fonseca 1999; Sargatal 2001; Arapoglou 2006; Martinez and Leal 2008; Agustoni and Alietti 2009). The extraordinary increase and diversification of international inflows since 2000 has further expanded this pattern, particularly across the metropolitan areas. Although a comparison at a neighbourhood level would be more appropriate to deconstruct such ethnic micro-insertions, a generic distinction can be made between two types of multi-ethnic areas.

On the one hand, there are areas of *copresence between Western groups*, especially North Americans, and those *non-Western groups engaged in live-in domestic services and care services*, such as Filipinos, Peruvians, Salvadorians, Sri Lankans, Ethiopians or Cape Verdeans. During the 1990s, this was a significant feature in all cities except Lisbon MA and Barcelona.

The copresence occurred predominantly in the affluent historic centre and bourgeois pericentral districts of Rome (Dist. I and II), Milan (Dist. 1, 2, 3 and 6), Turin (Crocetta) and in the wealthy green hillsides and coastlines of most Southern European cities, as in the affluent neighbourhoods along Via Cassia Nuova and Flaminia in Rome MA (Dist. XX), in the Oeste Metropolitano in Madrid MA, in Cavoretto, Regio Parco and Madonna del Pilone in Turin, or the eastern districts, Portoria, Foce and San Fruttuoso in Genoa, and the Northern garden suburbs in Athens. Particularly in Spanish and Italian cities, the

presence of Filipinos and Peruvians in the bourgeois pericentral areas is also linked to religious or missionary institutions, which provide temporary accommodation or facilitate access to permanent homes after family reunification, as in the Eixample (Dist. 2) in Barcelona, Patisia and Kypseli in Athens, Ticinese-Genova (Dist. 5) in Milan, or District I and II in Rome.

On the other hand, there are areas of *significant copresence* among African, Asian and Latin American groups. These are notable in the *central districts of the port cities*, as in Ciutat Vella, Raval (Dist. 1) in Barcelona, the historic centre of Genoa between Pre' and Principe Station, close to Collina di Castello and Piazza San Giorgio, or the north-western central districts of Athens. Conversely, they are predominant in the *pericentral and peripheral areas of the continental cities*. Some examples are the neighbourhoods of Buenos Aires, Monza, Padova (Dist. 3 and 10) in Milan, or San Salvario, Borgo Dora and Porta Vittorio (Dist. 7, 8 and Dist. 4) in Turin, or Piazza Vittorio (Dist. XVII) and eastern districts (Dist. VIII, X, XII) in Rome, or the pericentral neighbourhoods of Latina-Lavapiés and Tetuán, and outer-central areas of Carabanchel, Ciudad Lineal, Puente de Vallecas, Usera and Villaverde in Madrid. Multi-ethnic neighbourhoods tend to develop near central rail stations, the traditional city gate, but their consolidation is now curtailed by renewal programmes and gentrification processes.

Central Versus Outer-Central Areas: A Source of Divergence Between Port and Continental Cities

The clustering of non-Westerners in the central areas of port cities but the pericentral and peripheral areas of continental cities is another example of the twofold typology previously observed in contrasting indices of segregation. This divergence is particularly remarkable between Barcelona and Milan, for Western and non-Western groups (Figures 6.2, 6.3 and Figure 6.13).

In Barcelona, Western countries are over-represented in the outer-central districts (Les Corts, Sarrià-Sant Gervasi – Dist. 4–5), as they expand north from the nineteenth-century bourgeois structure of the Eixample (*Plan Cerdà*), while non-Westerners are highly represented in the historic centre (Ciutat Vella and Raval – Dist. 1–3). Milan shows a direct contrast. Westerners are located in the central areas (historic centre and CBD – Dist. 1–2) and spread to the limit of the bourgeois areas, included in the Berruto Plan (*Piano Berruto* clockwise from Porta Venezia to Magenta – Dist. 3–6). Meanwhile non-Westerners are scattered, with a more significant presence outside the Piano Berruto (Granata 1998) and particularly in the eastern peripheral areas.

Among non-Western groups, this duality is illustrated by the distribution of Moroccans (and other Africans) whose significant presence in Barcelona's historic centre and absence in Milan's historic centre explains, respectively, their high or low indices of segregation. If we exclude the areas where immigrants are associated with live-in domestic employment (Dist. 4–5, partly Dist. 2 in Barcelona; Dist. 1–2 and partly Dist. 3–6 in Milan), the same pattern emerges for Filipinos, Peruvians, Sri Lankans, Salvadorians, Ethiopians and Poles.

Overall, analogous divergent distributions emerge, to different extents, in all groups. These might appear more nuanced in the case of Latin American and Eastern European groups, because of their scattered geographic distribution and their heterogeneous profile in terms of income, occupation, education and type of immigration waves.

This sharp contrast in the residential patterns of Westerners and non-Westerners between the central and outer-central areas of Barcelona and Milan can be traced across most port and continental cities, except Lisbon MA, which exhibits both types of distribution.

The geographic distribution of Asian and Western groups in Lisbon MA is similar to that of other port cities, with Indians and Pakistanis concentrated in the centre and Europeans and North Americans concentrated outside and on the coastline of Cascais and Estoril. But the distribution of Africans (mainly PALOP from African Portuguese-speaking countries) and Eastern Europeans, scattered respectively in the first and second metropolitan peripheral ring, follows a pattern found in the continental cities (Malheiros and Vala 2004).

Lisbon MA is an exceptional case given its specific migratory flows related to the rent control system in the municipality of Lisbon, the tightest and most extensive among Southern European cities (Padovani 2004). Thus, the socio-spatial and housing tenure composition of Lisbon municipality is unique when compared with the other metropolitan municipalities. As the first two migratory waves from African former colonies occurred during the period of rent control, PALOP were driven to settle outside Lisbon municipality in the first metropolitan ring. In the same period in the other Southern European port cities, the first waves of Africans were instead settling in the historic centre, operating as a city gate. The third migratory wave, after the abolition of rent control, has led to the peripheralisation of Eastern Europeans further afield, in the second metropolitan ring (Arbaci and Malheiros 2010).

Investigation of the complex mosaic of the mid-1990s highlights common spatial patterns and divergences among ethnic groups across most Southern European cities, and an important distinction between port and continental cities – with some exceptions in Lisbon

MA – in degrees of spatial segregation and ethnic geographic distribution. The mirrored Western/non-Western distributions between the centre/periphery partly explain why indices of segregation are lower in continental cities and higher in port cities. However, these findings do not reveal any more about the nature of the patterns, the degree or the processes of social marginalisation, but they suggest there are macroscale dissimilarities in the social and ethnic divisions of the cities at play. The following sections focus on differences in the socio-spatial structure of the cities, which further explain the twofold typology and highlight distinct processes of differentiation in ethnic residential segregation.

Socio-Spatial Distribution of the Native Population: A Contextual Legacy

To understand why immigrants live where they do it is necessary to consider the socio-spatial context and the mechanisms and systems governing urban and residential stratification of the diverse social groups (Musterd 2005; Maloutas and Fujita 2012). Given the complexity of these dynamics and the variety of factors involved, this requires extensive analysis. Southern European cities are particularly complex because of their fragmented and socially heterogeneous urban areas, the spread of owner-occupation across the social spectrum and the long-term repercussions of rent control in the socio-spatial structure of the municipal areas (Allen et al. 2004; Leal 2004a).

So it is remarkable, and unforeseen, that the analysis of the concentration and spatial distribution of immigrants in the mid-1990s shows such a sharp difference between port and continental cities. Indirectly, this suggests that certain structural characteristics and forms of socio-spatial differentiation, distinctive of these two types of cities, play a significant role in patterns of ethnic segregation.

However, this has to be understood in the context of profound changes in the housing and socio-spatial organisation of each city and in the type of immigration flows that have occurred in the past decades. These changes have taken place at different speeds and with different impacts across the eight cities.

The most appropriate starting point for establishing an in-depth analysis on the diverse socio-spatial contexts of the eight cities is to focus on the municipal scale first. Then the findings can be verified and extended with information from the metropolitan areas.

Figures 6.3–6.12 show a set of maps highlighting the geographic distribution of the diverse social groups at the beginning of the 1990s.

We will use these and the typological findings to: retrospectively clarify the immigrants' geographic distribution, particularly with regard to the longer-established immigrant groups; distinguish forms of socio-spatial differentiation between native and foreign groups; and set the context for the following chapters. These chapters identify the role played by housing and socio-spatial changes in the processes of ethnic and social differentiation.

Looking at the Municipal Scale: Barcelona, Genoa, Milan and Turin

Figure 6.8 compares the socio-spatial distribution of the population in Barcelona, Genoa, Milan and Turin, according to the employment categories at the beginning of the 1990s. In all four cities the degrees of concentration (IS) between high-, middle- and low-income groups are similar but there are significant differences in the geographic distribution of the groups at the top and bottom of the social ladder (LQs). Middle-income groups (administrators, white collar and self-employed) are the least segregated and scattered across most districts, although the self-employed are more concentrated in the pericentral areas developed for the commercial and service sector (Petsimeris 1998). In contrast, high- and low-income groups exhibit different degrees of concentration and geographic distribution, reinforcing the divergence between port and continental cities.

First, in all cities those groups at the top of the socio-economic spectrum (managers, professionals, business owners) are the most segregated although they differ by being over-represented in the central areas in the continental cities (Milan and Turin including the upmarket eastern hills) and in the outer-central districts in the port cities (north-western part of Barcelona and eastern part of Genoa).

Second, low-income groups show only an intermediate level of segregation, being over-represented in socially heterogeneous districts with a relevant presence of middle-income groups. But their pattern of residence is reversed, with greater presence in the central areas of port cities and in the outer-central districts of continental cities.

This contrast between port and continental cities is particularly striking between Barcelona and Milan, which lie at opposite ends in terms of geographic distribution and degrees of segregation for both high- and low-income groups. Low-income groups are slightly less segregated in Milan (15 IS) and are scattered across most peripheral districts (outside the Berruto Plan). In comparison, these groups are slightly more segregated in Barcelona (20 IS) and are over-represented in the historic centre (Cuitat Vella, Raval) and the Nou Barris district. This partly explains why the most vulnerable foreign groups, such as




Figure 6.8 Residential distribution of population, by occupational categories (LQs and IS), in Barcelona, Genoa, Milan and Turin, 1991. *Sources:* compiled by the author; Petsimeris (1998) for Genoa, Milan and Turin; author calculation for Barcelona, data from Ajuntament de Barcelona (1996) and disaggregation of Location Quotients consistent with Genoa, Milan and Turin.

Moroccans, present a lower degree of spatial segregation and a more diffuse geographic distribution in Milan than in Barcelona, and hints at more direct correspondence between the social and ethnic line of differentiation (compare Figure 6.8 with Figures 6.2 and 6.3).

Although this portrays the situation in 1991, port and continental cities have been historically developing and consolidating along two different socio-spatial structures, particularly throughout the twentieth century. There are three reasons for this.

First, the geographic distribution of traditional upper-class neighbourhoods, central in continental cities and outer-central in the port cities, has been consolidating over time as part of the strategy of status, class and patrimonial reproduction of the elites (see debate in Andreotti, Le Galès and Moreno-Fuentes 2015). This process greatly affected the geography of the other social groups. The role of upper-class locations in the organisation and socio-spatial division of cities is an important aspect, which has been first brought to light by Northern European scholars looking at Paris (Préteceille 2006, 2012), London (Hamnett 2003, 2009) or Copenhagen (Andersen 2004, 2012) and more recently argued also in the case of Athens (Kandyliis, Maloutas and Sayas 2012), Madrid and Milan (Dominguez, Leal and Goytre 2012; Andreotti, Le Galès and Moreno-Fuentes 2015).

Second, even during the period of industrialisation and rural–urban mass migration, elite activities and affluent groups remained in the prestigious historic centres of Milan and Turin (industrial continental cities). Working classes and low-income groups grew in the central areas of Barcelona and Genoa (industrial port cities), due to the large recruitment in harbour and mercantile activities, while new affluent areas developed outside the central districts. Southern European cities did not witness an extensive suburbanisation of high and middle classes (as occurred in Northern European cities during the Fordist era; Allen et al. 2004), which instead consolidated in the pericentral districts, as in the case of the Spanish *ensanche* (e.g. bourgeois neighbourhoods of Eixample Derecha in Barcelona or Salamanca in Madrid).

Third, Southern European cities have generally low levels of residential mobility or turnover rates (Table 6.1), partly linked to patrimonial property and attachment to the neighbourhood, so processes driving social-urban changes take a long time to develop, except when public interventions are forcibly implemented. Exceptions are, for instance, the renewal of central districts in Italian cities during the Fascist period for the development of monumental axes (inspired by Haussmann's planning tradition), which entailed large-scale demolitions and displacement of working classes, rehoused in new neighbourhoods in peripheral areas.

Table 6.1 Turnover rate in housing in selected cities and countries.

City, year ^a	T. Rate ^b , %	Country, 1981	T. Rate ^b , %
(1990s) Madrid	5	United States	17.5
(1990s) Barcelona	5	Great Britain	9.6
(1980s) Lisbon	4	Sweden	9.5
(2002) Athens	5	France	9.4
		Netherlands	7.7
		Belgium	7.3
		Ireland	6.1
		Spain	5.3

Sources: compiled by the author, data from Allen et al. (2004, table 2.16) and Maloutas (2004b, p. 198).

^aSources from Maloutas (2004b).

^bTurnover rate as proportion of previously constituted households moving in one year.

These processes and stratified configurations consolidated throughout the Fordist period and are reflected in the distinct organisation of port and continental cities observed in 1991. Petsimeris (1998, pp. 451–452) looked at whether four major processes – *embourgeoisement*, *gentrification*, *new middle-class suburbanisation* and *deproletarianisation* (decline of the working classes) – have been transforming four types of socio-residential areas that characterised Milan, Turin and Genoa, ‘in both the Fordist and post-Fordist eras’ (Petsimeris 1998, p. 463).

The process of *embourgeoisement* has increased the relative concentration of the upper classes in wealthy areas, thus reinforcing the Fordist social stratification of the city, while *gentrification* and *deproletarianisation* have brought about an increase in the middle classes and a decline of blue-collar workers in working-class areas. However, in the latter ‘the principal process is the replacement of blue-collar workers by clerical workers [both in the pericentral belt and outer city]. In this way, the proletariat of the Fordist era are being replaced by the “tertiary proletariat” of the post-Fordist era’ (Petsimeris 1998, p. 463).

Petsimeris stresses the expansion of the middle classes as an important element of the social hierarchy of Southern European cities. He also challenges the occurrence of ‘social polarisation as a process of absolute increase at the two extremes of the social hierarchy’ (Sassen 1991) and the formation of a dual city structure as a result of globalisation and welfare restructuring. As in Madrid (Leal 1994, 2004b), Athens (Maloutas 2007), Barcelona (Petsimeris 2010) and Northern European cities such as London (Hamnett and Cross 1998), Paris (Préteceille 2012), Oslo

(Wessel 2000) and Copenhagen (Andersen 2004), Southern European cities have not become more socially polarised, but social inequality has increased (Cucca 2010; Leal 2011; Kandylis, Maloutas and Sayas 2012; Pinto, Ferreira and Guerra 2016).

The historical continuity of the geographic distribution of middle- and low-income groups in the municipal areas and the increasing professionalisation of the urban societies as a result of intergenerational upward mobility (Leal 2004b; Arapoglou and Sayas 2009) challenge the hypothesis of a dual urban order.

The persistence of this socio-spatial hierarchy reinforces the patterns described in Milan, Turin, Genoa and Barcelona and, therefore, the validity of the twofold typology of port cities and continental cities.

However, as the following chapters will show, in the past decades deproletarianisation, professionalisation, embourgeoisement and gentrification have started to alter the socio-spatial structure of these cities to different extents and over different time periods. Some of these processes, which were slowly unfolding during the 1980s in the central and pericentral areas of Rome, Milan and later in Madrid and Turin (Petsimeris 2005; Briata, Bricocoli and Tedesco 2009; Herzfeld 2009; Dominguez, Leal and Goytre 2012), are only recently developing in the port cities, although to different extents and intensities in Barcelona, Genoa, Lisbon and Athens (Malheiros and Vala 2004; Maloutas et al. 2012; Semi 2015; Cucca and Ranci 2016).

Simultaneously, since the mid-1990s, in many of these cities there have been important changes in the forms of housing production and promotion (greater in Athens and lesser in Spanish cities), which have accelerated the decline of more traditional forms of affordable housing provision and processes of socio-spatial and socio-tenurial differentiation (see Chapters 7 and 8). Current patterns of ethnic residential segregation, and processes of desegregation, need to be understood in relation to these factors (Arbaci and Malheiros 2010).

*Zooming Out at the Metropolitan Scale: Rome, Madrid,
Lisbon and Athens*

Although the twofold typology emerges sharply across the four municipal cities, it is more difficult to develop a comparative mapping of the four metropolitan cities (LQs, IS or per cent of socio-occupational categories), given data constraints and differences in the size of the administrative units and in the disaggregation of the socio-occupational categories. Though primary sources have allowed a sketchy comparative mapping of Rome MA, Lisbon MA and Madrid MA (Figure 6.9), their socio-spatial organisations are far more complex and articulated.




Figure 6.9 Residential distribution of population, by occupational or industrial categories, in Lisbon MA (% , 2001), Madrid MA (% , 1996) and Rome MA (LQs, 1991). *Sources:* compiled by the author; Fonseca et al. (2002a) for Lisbon MA; Comunidad de Madrid (1997) for Madrid MA; author calculation for Rome MA, data from Comune di Roma (1996) and disaggregation of Location Quotients consistent with Barcelona, Genova, Milan and Turin in Figure 6.8.

Rome MA (LQ, 1991)




Figure 6.9 (Continued)

Secondary sources (from Figure 6.10 to Figure 6.12) have been used to provide a broader panorama of the residential distribution of the socio-occupational categories in each city.

At a metropolitan scale, Lisbon MA and Rome MA magnify the typological port/continental subdivision encountered, for instance, in Barcelona and Milan. This subdivision is less stark in Madrid MA and Athens MA as the social division of space develops along an axial (north–south for Madrid MA and west–east for Athens MA), rather than a centre–periphery divide. However, it is maintained at a municipal level, with a high incidence of wealthy groups in the central core of Madrid, the so-called ‘almond’ (*almendra*), and of lower middle- and low-income groups in the central areas of Athens.

Regarding the continental typology, Rome MA (Figure 6.9) displays some of the socio-residential patterns found in Milan, but on a bigger scale. The centre of the metropolitan areas (Mun. 1, 2, 3, 17) and the centre–north axis, show a high incidence of upper- and middle-income categories (from bank workers to public administration), while middle- and low-income groups are more diffusely distributed in the peripheral districts, with a significant over-representation of low-income groups in the south-eastern part of the metropolitan area (Comune di Roma 1996, 2004a). Since the 1980s, the traditionally socially mixed neighbourhoods of Rome have seen an increment of middle-income echelons. This is partly due to the gentrification of the popular neighbourhoods of Testaccio and Trastevere, and Pigneta-Preneestino (Annunziata 2011; Semi 2015), but also partly driven by endogenous processes associated with upward mobility of the offspring of low- and lower middle-income families who continue to reside in the same neighbourhood. This latter process of *intergenerational mobility in situ*, which can be traced in the western and eastern pericentral neighbourhoods of Rome, is also paradigmatic of other Southern European familistic societies (Leal 2004b; Maloutas 2004a).



Madrid MA (Figures 6.9 and 6.11) also has similarities with the other continental cities. The high incidence of upper- and middle-income groups in the municipality contrasts with the overwhelming peripheralisation of low-income groups (manufacturing, construction workers and working-class categories) in the metropolitan areas, particularly from the southern and south-eastern peripheral municipal rings outwards (Ayuntamiento de Madrid 2003; Leal 2004b). However, during the 1990s, middle-income groups have started growing in the central almond and in the northern and north-western metropolitan districts, both traditional areas of expansion of the urban bourgeoisie, as well as in some traditional working-class districts of the southern municipal peripheral ring (Ayuntamiento de Madrid 2003; Leal 2004b).

Lisbon Metropolitan Area

North-bank

Lisbon


South-bank



OCCUPATIONAL-RESIDENTIAL CATEGORIES (Census 1991)
zones of relatively high concentration of the following categories:

-  **high-income:** directors and managerial occ. (Cl. 8 - Alta Proprietária);
-  **upper middle-income:** professional occupations (Cl. 2 - Alta Vetusta);
-  **middle-income:** office workers / white collars, self-employed occ. (Cl. 6 - Média-Média + Cl. 9 - Famílias Recem-Constituídas);
-  **lower middle-income:** independent workers, employers in SME (Cl. 1 - Média-Baixa Urbana + Cl. 7 - Média-Baixa Sub-urbana);
-  **low-income:** lower technical and routine occupations / blue collars (Cl. 3 - Zonas Degradadas + Cl. 5 - Baixa Sub-urbana);
-  **farmers:** employers / workers in farm activities (Cl. 4 - Manchas Rurais);
-  **non-relevant:** empty or seasonal activities (Só vagos e/ou sazonal).

Figure 6.10 Residential distribution of population, by occupational and residential categories (%), in Lisbon MA, 1991. *Source:* compiled by the author; adapted from INE Portugal (1999, pp. 73 and 76), data Census 1991. Notes: disaggregation of occupational categories consistent in Lisbon MA, Madrid MA and Athens MA (Figures 6.10–6.12).



OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORIES, MADRID MA (1996)

zones of relatively high concentration of the following categories:

- high-income:** managerial occupations, directors and businessman, high-income self-employed occupations (≥ 2.0 Std Dev);
- upper middle-income:** professionals, educational and scientific occ. (1.0–2.0 Std Dev);
- middle-income:** office workers / white collars, employers in medium enterprises (SME), (0.0–1.0 Std Dev);
- lower middle-income:** independent workers, employers in small enterprises (SME), (1.0–0.0 Std Dev);
- low-income:** employed workers, lower technical and routine occupations (blue collars), (< -1.0 Std Dev.)

Figure 6.11 Residential distribution of population, by occupational categories (%), in Madrid MA, 1996. *Source:* compiled by the author; calculation by Sorando and data from Dominguez (unpublished – based on Census 1996). Notes: disaggregation of occupational categories consistent in Lisbon MA, Madrid MA and Athens MA (Figures 6.10–6.12).




Figure 6.12 Residential distribution of population, by occupational categories (%), in Athens MA, 1991. *Source:* compiled by the author; adapted from Maloutas (2000, p. 46), data: ESYE, Census 1991. Notes: disaggregation of occupational categories consistent in Lisbon MA, Madrid MA and Athens MA (Figures 6.10–6.12).

At different speeds and with different intensities, Madrid MA has been experiencing the four processes shown by Petsimeris (1998) in Milan and Turin in the 1990s: (1) the embourgeoisement of the northern and western central and pericentral areas; (2) the development of new middle-class suburbia in the north-western metropolitan districts; (3) the relentless processes of gentrification, from the centre outwards, including some peripheral working-class areas with upgraded services and infrastructures; and (4) the process of deproletarianisation and professionalisation (intergenerational upward mobility *in situ*) in some traditional working-class neighbourhoods of the southern and eastern peripheral metropolitan ring.

Similarly, Leal (2004b, p. 89) has pointed out that ‘the expansion of middle-class categories coincided with deep changes in the contents and size of the working class. Traditional working-class and mainly skilled, [but] also unskilled, industrial workers shrunk considerably. A new working class emerged, mostly occupied in services and having rather different social values. (...) The changes are important therefore not only because middle classes increased in number and the working class decreased, but also because there have been important internal changes in the social meaning of these broad categories’.

Equally important, at a metropolitan scale, the first three processes have reinforced a shift from a centre–periphery to a north–south axis divide, which developed during the 1960s after the 1946 metropolitan Vidagor Plan (Leal 2002). However, in the municipality of Madrid (Figure 6.11, right side), the centre–periphery divide between the more affluent central almond (Ensanche) and its surrounding peripheral working-class districts (Tetuan, Arganzuela, Delicias) remains. It will be interesting to see how the incremental processes of gentrification, deproletarianisation and growing immigrant presence will affect the municipality’s centre–periphery divide in the coming decades (Dominguez, Leal and Goytre 2012).

Regarding the port cities, Lisbon MA and Barcelona show similar patterns of socio-spatial distribution, but in Lisbon MA this is magnified at a metropolitan scale, with low-income groups in the riverside and central neighbourhoods of the municipal area and high-income groups in the outer-central hills and western seaside coast of the metropolitan area, along the Estoril railway line to Cascais (Figure 6.10). Within the Lisbon municipality, the socio-spatial context is more fragmented and heterogeneous than in Barcelona, as it reflects a greater vertical and horizontal socio-spatial stratification associated with the morphological structure of the city, the smaller scale of housing production and the greater effect of rent control in retaining middle- and low-income groups in the oldest neighbourhoods of the municipality (for in-depth analyses, see Fonseca 1999; Salgueiro 2001, 2002).

Finally, Athens MA (Figure 6.12) seems to offer a variant of the port city type as the west–east social divide is stronger than that of the centre–periphery. However, within the Athens municipality, the level of social heterogeneity and the presence of low-income groups is greater (Maloutas and Karadimitriou 2001, p. 705 and figure 1) than those exhibited in Figure 6.12, in which the incidence of middle- and high-income groups appears dominant and homogeneous. Since the 1960s, multi-storey apartment buildings in Athens' central areas have been redeveloped by a unique type of speculative housing production of multi-storey apartment buildings involving joint ventures of land-owners and (small) building contractors, called the *antiparohi* system, which has produced a dense and socially mixed built environment (Delladetsima 2006).

Its initial clientele were mainly the upper and upper-middle professional categories — either as participants in the process or simply as buyers — progressively encompassing larger strata of socially-mobile households moving from manual labour to tertiary employment, as well as the incoming population not belonging to the lower social strata. The last process, since the mid-1970s, has much more to do with the residential relocation of certain social categories than with the extremely reduced, by then, incoming population. (Maloutas and Karadimitriou 2001, p. 711)

The *antiparohi* system destroyed the historic features of the centre and the nineteenth-century pericentral neighbourhoods and generated a distinctive system of vertical socio-spatial differentiation with higher professionals inhabiting the upper floors, the unskilled and salaried echelons living in the lower floors and basement and clericals and petty entrepreneurs occupying the middle floors (Maloutas and Karadimitriou 2001, p. 706 and figures 2 and 3). This has been strengthened since the mid-1970s by the outflow of high- and middle-income occupational categories to the eastern suburbs, and the subsequent inflow of immigrants (Allen et al. 2004). Despite this unique type of urban development and housing production, Athens displays the general patterns found in the other port cities, as shown by the incidence of low-income groups in the socially heterogeneous central areas and by the different degrees of concentration among the social spectrum (higher among affluent groups, moderate among low-income groups and low among middle-income groups). The suburbanisation of the affluent groups on the eastern green hillsides (Kifissia, Psychiko-Filothei) and southern coastlines (Glyfada, Voula, Vouliagmeni) has many parallels with the wealthy outer-central districts in the Lisbon MA (Cascais, Estoril line, Restelo), Barcelona (Les Corts, Sarrià-Sant Gervasi) and Genoa (Portoria, Foce, San Fruttuoso).

Further in-depth comparative analysis of the municipal and metropolitan cities is needed to validate this argument. Nevertheless, it provides sufficient evidence to illustrate broad forms of socio-spatial stratification and their reproduction (path-dependencies), although the scale, pace and intensity varies among the eight cities.

It seems plausible to conclude that, to a large extent until the mid-1990s, Southern European cities display at least two distinctive socio-spatial hierarchies, clustered in the two typologies of port cities and continental cities. These differ in the socio-spatial distribution of the population (with upper and bottom echelons mirrored between the central and peripheral urban areas) and in the associated processes of differentiation.

Also, both types of cities share robust similarities in the patterns of concentration across the social spectrum (higher in the affluent, intermediate in the low-income and lower in the middle-income groups) and in the dispersed and growing incidence of middle-income groups. Both elements play a crucial role in the formation of socially heterogeneous areas and in the organisation of the socio-spatial hierarchy of the city.

Overall, these accounts challenge the adequacy of the polarisation thesis in interpreting the urban distribution of native and foreign groups, stressing instead the relevance of contextual legacies and particularly of the reproduction of the residential geography of upper classes. Particularly the twofold typological subdivision exemplifies the role played by the city's socio-spatial hierarchy and the specificity of the Southern European cities in the social and ethnic division of space.

Contrasting Ethnic and Social Residential Patterns

The comparative digression on the socio-spatial distribution of the native population across the eight cities provides a reference point to help contextualise the diversity of patterns of ethnic segregation in this section, and changes in the socio-spatial and housing contexts in the following chapters. By contrasting the residential patterns between foreign and native groups, according to income/occupation categories or education levels, this section aims to identify socio-ethnic correspondences and disparities to look for the underpinning processes of differentiation. It sets the background for the following chapters, in which we explore the mechanisms of social and ethnic differentiation embedded in the housing and urban processes and their changes over time.

*Socio-Ethnic Correspondences: The Role of the City's
Socio-Spatial Hierarchy*

By contrasting retrospectively the residential patterns of foreign groups (Figures 6.2–6.7) versus native groups (Figures 6.8–6.12), we can infer key preliminary findings that intersect the social and ethnic spectrum. First, in the central and outer-central areas, the split between port and continental cities overlaps with differences in the distribution of the diverse foreign groups (with some exceptions in Lisbon MA).

In continental cities, the lower concentration and greater geographic distribution of the most vulnerable foreign groups occurs because low-income native groups are scattered in the peripheral areas of the municipalities. Conversely, in the port cities, the greater the incidence of low-income native groups in the central areas, the higher the concentration levels are among the most vulnerable foreign groups. A simplified example is visualised in Figure 6.13, by employing the case of Barcelona and Milan given their comparable population size (about 1.5 million inhabitants) and similar heterogeneous migratory links dating back to the 1970s (see Chapter 4).


Moreover, those native and foreign groups that score the lowest degrees of segregation are characterised by middle levels of income, occupation or education. People in white-collar jobs and the self-employed are the most spatially scattered, along with long-established foreign groups without strong religious affiliations or transnational kinships, such as Argentineans and other Latin Americans, Polish and other Eastern Europeans and Egyptians. The distribution of these foreign groups is scattered across socially heterogeneous districts with a significant presence of native middle-income groups. Furthermore, this geographic correlation between the ethnic and the social lines is even stronger between the Westerners (above all North Americans and Japanese) and the higher-income groups.

This socio-ethnic correlation is strengthened by two important factors often disregarded in segregation studies: the substantial incidence of middle-income groups among natives and foreigners; and their distinctive patterns of residential distribution that are more dispersed than higher- or lower-income groups.

Socio-Ethnic Mismatches: Which Processes of Differentiation?

We have established a correlation between the social and ethnic patterns within the socio-spatial hierarchy of the city. However, a more detailed comparison between native and foreign groups that share

INCOME or EDUCATION



Notes: a. 100 = average spatial concentration
b. Index of Segregation

Barcelona: 1,580,800 (total population), 30,500 (total foreigners)
40,780 (average population per unit)

c. quartile, selected occupational categories:
low = blue-collar + service workers
middle = administrators
high = professionals + technicians

Milan: 1,316,800 (total population), 67,200 (total foreigners)
65,840 (average population per unit)

d. quartile, selected occupational categories:
low = working class
middle = white-collar workers
high = professionals + business owners

Location Quotients - LQs

groups - NATIVE	ETHNIC - groups
0.00–0.50	0.00–0.60
0.51–0.70	0.61–1.00
0.71–0.90	1.01–1.50
0.91–1.10 (a)	1.51–3.00
1.11–1.50	3.10–6.00
1.51–2.00	
> 2.00	

Figure 6.13 Examples of socio-ethnic urban correlation: comparing native and foreign groups' residential distribution (LQs and IS), according to income or educational levels, in a port and continental city, mid-1990s. *Source:* compiled by the author, including calculation and maps; data from Ajuntament de Barcelona (1996) and Petsimeris (1998) for selected occupational categories; IDESCAT (1996) and Tosi and Lombardi (1999) for foreign groups.

similar occupational or education levels suggests further forms of differentiation and distinctive processes, some unique to the Southern European contexts.

First, *natives and foreigners sharing similar income levels* do not share the same *geographic distribution and degrees of concentration* (compare Figures from 6.1 to 6.12). Some of these socio-ethnic mismatches indicate processes of differentiation associated, for instance, with practices of ethnic affiliation and live-in employment (Figure 6.14). Like transnational communities, such as Jews, Iranians and Lebanese (Cohen 2008), some foreign groups live in clusters, which stem from religious, cultural and entrepreneurship affiliations (Fonseca and Esteves 2002). The socio-spatial hierarchy of the city still plays a role in the initial settlement, but becomes more marginal as ethnic communities consolidate. Religious or entrepreneurship affiliations are endogenous forms of ethnic differentiation, which partly explains for instance the diverging geographic distributions between Indians and Pakistanis or Indians and Bangladeshis (Figure 6.14 left).

Live-in employment explains the large presence of low-income non-Western groups – Filipinos, Peruvians or Sri Lankans – in the more affluent areas of the city, or in neighbourhoods near middle-class areas (Figure 6.14 right). This phenomenon is particularly widespread in Italian cities, where international migrants have replaced internal rural migrants in live-in jobs servicing condominiums and in-home care. This socio-ethnic mismatch is structural in Southern European societies. Indirectly, it stems from the deficiency in welfare services for children and elderly, who are regarded as a family responsibility. As discussed in Chapter 4, in familistic welfares, home care is part of the gender division of family labour. Since the 1970s, and the professionalisation of women in Southern European societies, the responsibility for family care has been outsourced to female internal migrants, later to foreign migrants (initially from the Philippines and later from the Latin American and Indian continents). Thus the socio-ethnic mismatch, with low-income non-Westerners living in and near high-income areas, is the spatial reflection of a wider process of differentiation embedded in the familistic welfare regime.

Second, *the degrees of concentration are higher among all foreign groups than their native counterparts of similar income or educational levels* (Figure 6.15, section A). This discrepancy is more accentuated in the port cities, suggesting there are particular urban and housing mechanisms at play. As we will see in Chapter 7, the residual rental stock is more concentrated in the central areas of the port cities than in the continental ones. This might provide part of the explanation. The housing context (provision and production, type of tenure and its geographic distribution,





Figure 6.14 Examples of mechanisms of socio-ethnic differentiation: comparing native and foreign groups' residential distribution (LQs), mid-1990s. *Source:* compiled by the author based on data from Collicelli et al. (1998) and Comune di Torino (2003).

accessibility) is another important mechanism of differentiation, which accounts for additional social-ethnic mismatches.


Third, *in all cities, the low-income ethnic groups are not well represented in most traditional working-class neighbourhoods of the outer-central ring, or of the first peripheral ring located between municipal and metropolitan area* (Figure 6.15, section B). During the 1990s this socio-ethnic mismatch was particularly remarkable in the port cities, except Lisbon MA. There was a limited ethnic settlement in the working-class neighbourhoods of the peripheral districts of eastern Barcelona, especially Nou Barris, and in the western parts of Genoa and Athens MA. This pattern was repeated in the first peripheral ring of Rome MA (eastern part, from Mun. IV to Mun. X), Madrid MA (southern and south-eastern part), Milan (north-western and south-western ring) and Turin (south-west and north-west). The few exceptions are immigrants of the first migratory wave, in particular the Moroccans and Tunisians in southern Milan, eastern Rome MA and northern Turin, or the Cape Verdeans and Angolans in the first metropolitan ring of Lisbon metropolitan North-bank, and the Ethnic Greeks in eastern Athens MA. Overall, this phenomenon is a distinctive Southern European pattern, without an equivalent in Northern European cities.

This socio-ethnic division is remarkable as the working-class areas seem to operate as archipelagos, impermeable to the process of peripheral ethnic settlement (Figure 6.15, section C). Ethnic peripheralisation, as previously described, is occurring not only among long-term immigrants who are moving out from the municipal areas, particularly after family reunification, but also among newcomers and undocumented immigrants who first settle in the metropolitan areas. The absence of ethnic groups in these first-ring working-class areas is thus a unique and paradoxical case, which warrants further attention. As we will see in the next chapters, discrimination is an implausible all-encompassing explanation; rather, a distinctive combination of mechanisms of differentiation associated with socio-urban processes and changes, the transformation of the housing systems and distinct forms of social mobility and spatial inertia deter foreigners from living in specific parts of the city and types of housing, or drive the spatial dispersal of immigrants. Some lead to residential marginalisation and housing hardship without necessarily materialising in ethnically concentrated areas. These phenomena challenge the common assumption that ethnic desegregation and low levels of segregation reflect processes of upward social mobility or of integration; rather, in many Southern European cities these are often linked to processes of exclusion.

comparing the residential distribution of native and foreign groups:



B - low ethnic settlement in most peripheral working-class areas



C - process of ethnic peripheralisation into metropolitan areas




Figure 6.15 Examples of forms of socio-ethnic differentiation: comparing native and foreign groups' residential distribution (IS and LQs), mid-1990s. *Source:* compiled by the author based on data from Basile (1998), Petsimeris (1998) and Malheiros (2002).

Conclusion

By the mid-1990s, although immigration was a recent phenomenon, Southern European cities already displayed a complex panorama of ethnic segregation. The deconstruction of this mosaic has shown divergences but also some similarities in patterns offering a starting point from which to contextualise segregation patterns within processes of differentiation, and revealed the role of the socio-spatial structure of the city. Three findings are worth highlighting.

First, common features across these cities include diffuse peripheral settlements of ethnic groups across the metropolitan areas, heterogeneous multi-ethnic areas and absence of ghettoisation. These patterns were further consolidated with the significant immigration flows of the 2000s as discussed in following chapters. Importantly, differences in the geography and levels of concentration among foreign groups are consistent with differences in socio-economic and educational levels, the type and time of migration and religious, entrepreneurial or transnational affiliations.

Second, there is a distinctive typology in the geographic distribution and segregation levels between port and continental cities, with some exceptions in Lisbon MA. Ethnic segregation is higher in port cities and the location of Western and non-Western groups is mirrored between the centre and periphery. This does not mean foreigners in continental cities are more integrated, or less socially segregated, than in the port cities; rather, that differences in the geography in the socio-occupational categories produce different degrees of concentration.

However, the port/continental contrast is not important per se. It is in fact a spurious correlation since the presence or lack of port activities is not a determining factor and, as we will see in the following chapters, the contrasting geography is gradually diluting with the urban renewal programmes and gentrification of the central and peri-central areas.

This twofold typology unveils instead that there is a correlation between the social and ethnic lines that is organised around the socio-spatial hierarchy of the city, whereby the residential patterns of the upper classes and the socio-spatial morphology of the central areas are major determinants of the geography of the other social and ethnic groups. Divergences in the distribution and degree of ethnic segregation follow existing patterns of social division of space among native groups: where the diverse socio-occupational categories are differently distributed in the port and continental cities; where the wealthier echelons are the most segregated groups in the central areas of the continental cities and the outer-central areas of the port cities; and where the incidence of

middle-income groups among both natives and foreigners is significant and geographically scattered. The value of the port/continental contrast is to show how contextual differences and the social division of the city play an important role in the different patterns of ethnic residential segregation.

Third, some patterns identified in these Southern European cities seem unique to this region as they were not found in Northern Europe: the presence of low-income foreign groups in wealthy neighbourhoods and the absence of low-income foreign groups in some of the working-class neighbourhoods of the first peripheral ring. The first of these socio-ethnic mismatches is nested in the familistic welfare care regime. The second suggests that there are other factors deterring foreigners from settling in specific parts of the city.

But it is crucial to further understand how low levels of *spatial* segregation commonly seen in these cities – particularly in continental ones, and manifested through residential dispersal, peripheralisation among the long-settled and new immigrants and reduced ethnic presence in certain working-class neighbourhoods – relate to social differentiation. Indeed, these do not necessarily imply equally low levels of *social* inequality. A variety of inclusionary and exclusionary mechanisms seem to be in place. In particular, the housing system (the production, conditions and distribution of rented and owner-occupied homes) and socio-urban processes (gentrification, deproletarianisation or inter-generational upward social mobility) may operate as mechanisms of differentiation between social and ethnic lines, and promote marginalisation by diffusing spatial segregation. These processes will be explored in the following chapters.

Note

- 1 Data for 1996 with the exception of Lisbon MA (1991) and Turin (2002). IS are measured at district level and technical limitations are considered given the average size of the spatial units is uneven particularly between Madrid MA and Lisbon MA.

Mechanisms of Differentiation

The Role of Local Housing Systems up to the 1990s

Mechanisms of differentiation are multiple and contextually diverse, as are the forms in which social or ethnic segregation take place spatially. In Chapter 6, we looked at forms of differentiation associated with the social stratification of the cities, ethnic affiliations and the reproduction of family welfare care services to explain differences in segregation patterns among ethnic groups and between native and foreigner groups (see Figure 6.14). The analysis showed important correlations between native and foreigner groups, particularly in the geography and range of concentration and in relation to the socio-spatial hierarchy of the city (see Figure 6.13). Simultaneously, interesting forms of socio-ethnic mismatches emerged, in particular, the scarce ethnic presence in peripheral working-class neighbourhoods and the higher ethnic concentration in port cities than in continental cities, especially in the working-class central districts (see Figure 6.15).

These socio-ethnic correlations and mismatches suggest that specific housing mechanisms operating at city level are potential explanatory factors. Attention should be thus turned to the local housing systems and the different role their tenure and supply components played in the period considered. The eight Southern European cities share similar housing tenure systems organised within a familistic welfare regime, but their forms of housing production, extent of rent control and patterns of urban development differ significantly. Dissimilarities in the state–market–family nexus and in the significance of the formal and

informal (dual) housing markets framed different spatial organisation principles, whose legacies persist today. These contextual divergences are important in the understanding of the production of urban inequalities: what the nature of segregation patterns is; how similar social or ethnic divisions can create different spatial organisations across cities; and how similar forms of spatial segregation reflect different degrees of social division or marginalisation.

By looking at mechanisms of differentiation embedded in the local housing systems, the paradox of segregation encountered earlier in the welfare analysis can be further explored here at city level to reveal the ways in which the segregation–redistribution nexus plays out at metropolitan and municipal level. At the same time, significant divergences between cities challenge, yet again, the idea of a single unifying Southern European model of segregation, reinforcing the argument put forward in previous chapters.

To identify the housing mechanisms of differentiation underpinning patterns of segregation, this chapter develops a historical analysis of the geographic distribution of the native social groups across owner-occupied and rented sectors and the distinct ways in which these sectors have been developed across the cities and in municipal and metropolitan areas. The lack of data on the distribution of foreign groups across tenures prevents a systematic analysis, but the mechanisms of tenure differentiation among native groups provide a contextual framework in which to reflect on patterns of ethnic residential segregation. This offers insights on how successive waves of internal and international migration discovered in Chapter 4 have negotiated their residential insertion in the city in a changing housing and urban context.

The aim of this chapter is twofold. First, to combine and continue at city level lines of enquiry opened in previous chapters. Second, to isolate contextual references relevant to understand patterns of ethnic residential segregation after the mid-1990s, in terms of path-dependency or change, when international migration to these cities increased significantly. These themes will be explored in the next chapters.

Housing Tenure Perspectives to Understand Inequalities

A European Approach

As introduced in Chapter 2, most urban segregation studies that seek explanations from housing tenure arrangements come from Northern Europe. They pay particular attention to mechanisms of socio-spatial and socio-tenurial differentiation in housing tenure policies for unitary

rental systems and large-scale provision from the public and non-profit sector (Musterd, Ostendorf and Breebaart 1998; White 1999; Simon 2002; Musterd 2005; Bolt and van Kempen 2010). This perspective overcomes simplistic interpretations based on economic paradigms of housing market demand–supply and redirects attention to the role of the state–market nexus in the production of inequalities. These studies have provided valuable theoretical and conceptual frameworks in which to contextualise ethnic residential segregation in (Northern) European cities, and helped explain differences in segregation patterns and residential mobility between social and ethnic groups (Bonvalet, Carpenter and White 1995; Peach 1998b; Bolt, van Kempen and van Ham 2008; Zorlu and Latten 2009; Hamnett and Butler 2010).

Also, in Northern Europe there is a tradition of evidence-based policies and policy evaluation, which strengthens the nexus between research and policy formulation. Segregation is discussed in relation to mechanisms, processes and agents within the wider remit of deprivation and inequality. Census and local official statistics are also set to monitor the insertion of social echelons and ethnic minorities across tenures and to follow their residential trajectories, providing systematic data for research. This focus has become central to academic and policy debates that evaluate the effectiveness of housing or urban regeneration programmes in alleviating processes of marginalisation in ethnically concentrated areas, or in reducing urban inequalities between social and ethnic groups (van Gent, Musterd and Ostendorf 2009; Porter and Shaw 2009; van Ham et al. 2012). Often, desegregation policies and regeneration programmes are criticised for addressing the symptoms rather than the causes of deprivation (Cheshire 2009; Darcy 2010; Arbaci and Rae 2013).

It is important for Northern European scholars to discuss segregation in relation to housing tenure arrangements and mechanisms of socio-tenurial differentiation, for two correlated reasons. First, housing has been a fundamental pillar of the welfare regime (at least until the mid-1990s). The development of unitary rental systems, in combination with other decommodified welfare pillars such as labour, education and health, was designed to create less socially divided urban societies and reduce class inequalities. Current, area-based programmes advocating social or tenure mixing follow similar paradigms aimed at reducing socio-ethnic and socio-tenurial division in deprived neighbourhoods (e.g. *Contract de Ville* in France, housing differentiation programmes in the Netherlands). Second, in European cities ethnic segregation is correlated more with class inequalities than with ethno-racial differentiation (Musterd 2005; Fujita 2012). In European countries, to different extents, welfare policies have mitigated class inequalities, cutting the

distance between social echelons and between native and ethnic groups (or lessening the distances between white and ethnic minorities, as often referred to in Northern European literature). As already mentioned, this explains why European cities are less ethnically divided than North American ones, where segregation is more correlated to ethno-racial divisions (Chapter 2).

However, the European panorama is highly divergent, particularly with respect to housing systems (tenure policies and supply) and local urban political agendas. The overarching analysis discussed in Chapter 3 showed the ways that unitary and dualist rental systems shape and reflect different principles of socio-spatial stratification, according to the degree of decommodification and redistribution of the housing system (Figures 3.7 and 3.8). For instance, extensively decommodified housing systems, such as the social-democratic and corporatist ones, have fostered a more equal distribution of social echelons within the social and the private rental sector (both integrated in a single market and operating with a large stock – unitary rental systems). From the World War II until at least the 1990s, Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom (until the early 1980s) and France, Germany and Austria, promoted unitary rental systems to combine (1) high levels of socio-tenurial mixing (2) with better quality of housing (3) in secure tenancy terms and (4) more affordable housing markets. Unitary systems, by reducing the degree of social inequality and socio-tenurial differentiation, led to less socially divided urban societies than those organised through a dualist rental system with expanded owner-occupation like the Southern European systems and liberal systems such as in the United Kingdom after the 1980s.

The supply side also plays a crucial role in the social division of space. The ways in which these unitary or dualist systems are produced influence how the societies are spatially organised (see detail in Chapter 3, and Figure 3.6). Given these different housing supply systems, Western Europe offers four distinct cases: less socially divided societies can be less spatially divided, as in corporatist societies (*low* social inequality associated with *low* spatial segregation), or more spatially divided, as in the social-democratic societies (*low* social inequality associated with *significant* spatial segregation); at the same time, more socially divided societies can be less spatially divided, as in Southern Europe (*significant* social inequality associated with *low* spatial segregation), or more spatially divided, as in the liberal societies (*high* social inequality associated with *high* spatial segregation). Southern European and social-democratic societies are paradoxical cases, in which the level of spatial segregation is not an indication of similar levels of social inequality.

Adapting the Framework for Southern European Cities

The Northern European approach is valuable in exploring the role of the state, market and non-profit actors in the production of urban inequalities and in providing a conceptual umbrella for comparative accounts in segregation studies. However, differences in context and scale and the paucity of data require a reframing of this analytical framework for Southern European urban contexts.

Northern European cases focus primarily on the social and private rental sectors as dominant in unitary rental systems, based on large-scale public and non-profit provision. However, little can be extrapolated for the Southern European cases where social rented housing stock is residual in scope and scale (Lisbon, Milan, Turin and Genoa) or scarce (Madrid and Athens); and tenure policies and local urban political agendas mainly foster owner-occupation. Family and informal markets play another important role in the spatial and social reproduction of urban societies. How does segregation work in cities with a high proportion of owner-occupation and a rental system that is small, dualist and dual? How does segregation work in cities with smaller-scale housing production based on private provision and family provision? How does the state–market–family nexus operate and under which principles of social stratification and spatial organisation?

An analysis at city level requires a finer level of detail. The multiple, often overlapping ways that mechanisms of socio-tenurial and socio-spatial differentiation affect the scale and nature of segregation patterns stem from different scales of interventions, city-wide and local processes. Directly, these intersect national and local housing policy, urban development strategies (e.g. metropolitan suburbanisation and municipal rent control), and area-based interventions (regeneration and renewal programmes). Indirectly, the wider effects of socio-urban changes taking place in certain parts of the city create additional mechanisms of socio-tenurial differentiation. For instance, processes of gentrification or deproletarianisation have often entailed considerable tenure changes (from private rent to owner-occupation) while reducing (gentrification) or maintaining (deproletarianisation) the presence of low-income groups in the neighbourhood and adjacent areas. Low residential mobility and the role of family in the local housing market constrain filtering up and down processes often encountered in Northern European and North American cities. These interventions and processes differ among cities even within similar welfare regimes.

So, the analytical framework must consider broader mechanisms of socio-spatial and socio-tenurial differentiation embedded in the housing system and local urban political agendas in each city. There are

important differences in (1) housing tenure arrangements, in terms of social and geographic configuration of each tenure (owner-occupation, private rental sector and social rental sector), and (2) types of provision and production, accessibility and affordability. The social and geographic configuration of each tenure (level of social mix, homogeneity or marginalisation) combined with the characteristics of housing production/provision (scale, type and quality) are important contextual factors in the social division of space and reveal more about the nature and degree of ethnic residential segregation.

Finally, in Southern Europe, data on the distribution of socio-occupational groups and ethnic groups across tenures (socio-tenurial distribution by city level and/or district level) was not available in the census and local official statistics in the 1990s (and access remains limited, particularly in Italy), so secondary sources and historical accounts become the main source. This prevents a systematic comparative analysis, as in the Northern European cases. Instead, we have to review housing mechanisms before the mid-1990s by comparing the geography of housing tenures – private rental sector and owner-occupation – with the geographic distribution of native and foreign groups (compare Figure 7.2 with Figures 6.2–6.7, and Figures 6.8–6.12). The overall argument has been structured on this historical and geographical analysis in order to sketch an explanatory framework on how local housing systems operated as a mechanism of differentiation.

Mechanisms of Socio-Tenurial and Socio-Spatial Differentiation

Understanding Southern European Urban Contexts

Southern European cities share similar housing systems. But as Maloutas and Leal (2004, pp. 67–68) noted, they

do not rely on similar urban patterns, or on similar processes of housing production. The search for its common features should be focused on the relative absence of direct state intervention in solving the acute housing problem generated by rapid urbanisation and how this shaped the housing solutions that were implemented. These processes occurred in the context of welfare states that focused mainly on pensions but failed to intervene in other ways to support families and which, thus, allowed a bigger role for the family [and dual housing markets (formal and informal)] in social reproduction.

Paradoxically, a variety of types of production of affordable housing with or without minimal direct state provision emerged across the four

countries, while organised within similar tenure systems. From the post-War years to the 1990s when there was a severe housing shortage, urban societies and rapid urbanisation were structured around two main tenure policies: rent control and fostering owner-occupation. Both strategies avoided the expansion of social housing and other forms of large-scale direct state intervention (as provided by Northern European welfare regimes as part of the diverse social pacts), but their interplay was contradictory.

The solution for housing decommodification was indirect state intervention in the form of rent control restricted to the municipal areas and it was coupled with a commodified expansion of housing through owner-occupation, mainly in the metropolitan areas and led by the market, family and civil society. Municipal areas and metropolitan areas were thus organised under two distinct housing markets. The limitations of both policies in dealing with housing needs led to a combination of formal and informal housing markets, the latter playing an important role in affordability and accessibility but at the expense of quality of housing and the built environment and under insecure tenancies. Thus mechanisms of socio-tenurial differentiation embedded in the rental and owner-occupation market operated differently between municipal and metropolitan areas. Simultaneously, informal markets in these sectors have been a crucial part of these mechanisms. The next sections will look in more detail at municipal and metropolitan areas and at dual markets in the rental and owner-occupation sectors.

Both policies had to respond to the challenges posed to Southern European societies by the mass rural–urban migration, the beginning of international migration, an expanding middle class and growing female participation in the labour market during a period of partial proletarianisation and urban growth. Forty years of rent control had kept middle- and low-income families in the municipal areas and preserved a largely affordable rental stock. However, lack of incentives and profit for landlords led to disinvestment in the sector and its maintenance. In most municipalities, the rental market became inaccessible and saturated, leading to the expansion of residual rental markets and progressive housing decay, except in affluent districts. In the late 1970s, fair rent policies were introduced to consolidate the private rented supply, but the unexpected result was a further reduction in supply and the reinforcement of homeownership as a dominant tenure (for detailed analysis see Padovani 2004, pp. 169–174).

Rent control was applied differently in the eight cities. Its enforcement was long-lasting in Lisbon and Athens but inconsistent in large Spanish and Italian cities. After its abolition between the 1980s and 1990s, governments moved at different speeds to align controlled rents

with the market and liberalise the private rental market (Table 7.1). These divergent approaches account for the different size and affordability of the rental sectors across the cities and the relative importance of this sector in accommodating subsequent immigration flows.

The owner-occupied sector is also diverse. Homeownership was regarded as an engine for economic growth and a vehicle for patrimonial property across all social echelons. For the low social echelons and rural–urban migrants particularly, securing housing was the main family strategy to cope with the insecurity of an unorganised urban labour market (e.g. construction and personal services).

Homeownership in Southern European societies plays a different role than in Northern Europe, since it is considered the *sine qua non* condition for class and family reproduction (Ferrera 1996). During the Fordist period, waged work was the core element of social integration in Northern European cities. In Southern European cities, the core element was housing. In the North, urban development regimes and immigration were closely linked to industrialisation. Social reproduction was structured around the needs of industrial development, organised under Keynesian full employment strategies and the social welfare pact (education, training, health, housing, transport). Securing work was the prerequisite to integration since housing and other social amenities were guaranteed by the state and/or employers (Allen et al. 2004). Conversely, in the weakly industrialised South, urbanisation was not led by industrial development. War and the progressive disarticulation of the rural economies pushed (rural) migration towards cities, seeking jobs in the unorganised labour market with limited state provision of housing and social amenities. ‘Since amenities were not guaranteed by jobs, through wages and benefits, it was preferable to secure a house and then search for casual and, later, permanent jobs’ (Maloutas and Leal 2004, p. 60). Moreover, dictatorial regimes in particular considered homeownership instrumental to secure their political stability.

Until the 1990s, informal acquisition of land, housing self-production and development of clandestine neighbourhoods were the principal means of integration for rural–urban migrants and, in Lisbon, for immigrants from the former African colonies (Ferreira 1987b; Mingione 1995). As a result, urban sprawl accommodated two processes: the suburbanisation of middle- and high-income groups (though it never reached the scale and significance of counter-urbanisation processes in Northern European cities) and the peripheralisation of low-income groups, rural–urban migrants and informal settlements. The solutions to rapid urbanisation and housing needs led to different processes of housing production and urban patterns among the eight cities, even though they shared similar familistic welfare regimes and housing tenure systems.

Table 7.1 Chronology of rent control policies in Southern Europe: three phases between 1940 and 2000.

	First enactment	Second enactment	Abolition rent control → new rent law
Portugal	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – between two Wars – 1948 → early 1970s (only Lisbon & Porto) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – 1974 → 1985 (whole country) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – 1985 → 1990s slow convergence^a → 2004 enforcement of convergence → 2012 liberalisation
Spain	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – 1946 → 1964 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – convergence → 1985 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – 1985 (<i>Ley Boyer</i>) → rapid liberalisation
Italy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – 1950s → mid-1960s 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – on/off in the 1970s 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – 1978 → successive convergences & moderate rent → 2004 liberalisation
Greece	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – 1945–1950s → 1962 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – on/off in the 1970s 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – 1990 → progressive convergences → slow liberalisation

^a Convergence between moderate rent and market rent.

Sources: information drawn from Padovani (2004, pp. 157–180).

The scarce housing data for the 1990s only partly reflects this diversity. There are important differences in the composition and geography of housing tenures among these Southern European cities and between municipal and metropolitan areas (Figures 7.1 and 7.2). In the next section, this is the starting point from which to explore the variety of mechanisms of socio-tenorial differentiation between municipal and metropolitan areas. Then historical accounts of informal markets in the rental and owner-occupation sectors provide an explanatory framework for socio-ethnic mismatches. This analysis aims to isolate key factors relevant to understanding patterns of segregation in the 1990s (previously identified in Chapter 6) and highlights the magnitude of the changes that Southern European cities underwent after the liberalisation of housing markets (that will be explored in the next two chapters).

State–Market–Family Nexus: Socio-Tenorial Distribution in Municipal and Metropolitan Areas

There were differences in the tenure compositions across the municipal areas of the eight cities (Figure 3.3, Figures 7.1 and 7.2), at least until the mid-1990s. These have often been overlooked, although they reveal distinct housing histories. Particularly in 1991, the large rental stock in Lisbon municipality (more than 60%) and the predominance of owner-occupation in Madrid municipality (more than 70%) positioned the cities at two opposite ends of the spectrum. Historically, Madrid and other Spanish cities have always accounted for the highest rates of owner-occupation, greater than all other Southern and Northern European cities (Figure 3.3). Even in recent years, despite the similar and steady decrease in the rental stock of all Southern European cities,¹ Lisbon and Madrid municipalities remain at the opposite ends of the spectrum (Figures 7.2 and 7.3. According to the 2011 census, in Lisbon municipality the rental stock is 40% of the total stock, four times larger than in Madrid municipality). As discussed later, this is the legacy of two different tenure regimes and a distinctive state–market–family nexus set during the dictatorial regime.

By overlapping the geographic distribution of tenure (Figure 7.2) with the geographic distribution of socio-occupational categories (Figures 6.10 and 6.11), it is possible to see that the process of socio-tenorial differentiation varies in the two municipal areas. Both municipalities have accommodated a mix of low- and lower middle-income groups, in Lisbon by the large rental sector and in Madrid by owner-occupation. Since ethnic groups are prominent in the rental sector, mechanisms of socio-tenorial differentiation between native and foreign groups are more divisive in Madrid than in Lisbon. Therefore Lisbon's housing market has been more inclusive than that of Madrid.

The municipal areas of the other cities lie in between. Further reflections on this point will be explored in Chapter 9.

However, from the 1970s the long-term enforcement of rent control in Lisbon municipality reduced the availability of the private rented stock (by reaching a point of saturation), including the informal and marginal segment. The scarcity of accessible homes in the municipal areas diverted the flow of migrants from the former colonies (Mozambicans, Cape Verdeans, Angolans and Portuguese *retornados*) to the first peripheral ring and other metropolitan outskirts (Malheiros 1996; Arbaci and Malheiros 2010).

Paradoxically, the decommodification of the rental sector (through private rather than state provision) led to such market distortion that the housing market in Lisbon began to play an excluding role, just as owner-occupation did in Madrid. However, after the abolition of rent control in the mid-1980s, Lisbon municipality inherited a large rental stock and a significant residual segment, which became the new city gate for newcomers from Brazil, Eastern Europe or Asia (Malheiros, Carvalho and Mendes 2012). The scarce rental stock in Madrid encouraged, instead, the resettlement of immigrants into the metropolitan periphery (Dominguez, Leal and Goytre 2012).

The different role played by the rented and owner-occupied sectors in mixing low- and middle-income echelons in Lisbon and Madrid is the result of the different dictatorial regimes and their state–market–family nexus. The Salazarian state (called *Estado Novo*, 1932–1974) and the Francoist state (1936–1975) endorsed different visions of economic development and urban development, attaching different socio-political values to housing that favoured or controlled, particular social groups. Salazar’s ‘guided development’ was inward-orientated and anti-liberal (Williamson 1986, pp. 126–133; Corkhill 2002). It did not foster suburban expansion, and housing was confined to the social reproduction of the etatist establishment, favouring key public-sector and white-collar workers (Ferreira 1987b). In Lisbon, the residential mix of middle- and low-income groups was secured by the decommodification of the rental sector: mainly by private rent control and partly by the provision of state-owned socially rented neighbourhoods (e.g. *Bairros de casa económicas* in Encarnação, Arco do Cego, Alvalade, Maria de Deus, Alto de Ajuda, Alvalade and Restelo; Gros 1994; Silva 1994, pp. 87–185).

The etatist approach did not cater for rural–urban migrants employed outside the public sector, who had to rely on the private rental market or self-construction (e.g. *barracas*, clandestine neighbourhoods and homeownership co-operatives; Salgueiro 1972; Fleming and Magano 1992). Land development control was tight within the Lisbon




Figure 7.1 Population and housing tenures in selected Southern European cities, 1981–2001. Sources: compiled by the author; data from Urban Audit (1998), except: (a) Fonseca (1999, p. 203) and Fonseca et al. (2002a); (b) INE Spain (2003) for 2001; (c) Comune di Roma (2000, 2003).




Figure 7.1 (Continued)




Figure 7.2 (Continued)

municipality but weaker in the other municipalities of the metropolitan area. After the fall of the dictatorship, the pressure of mass migration from rural areas and former colonies speeded an unplanned metropolitan sprawl led by small landowners, informal markets and family strategies (Ferreira 1987a; Salgueiro 2001).

The state-market-family nexus was differently organised in Spain. Franco's corporatist ideology was more market-orientated and favoured those groups that helped to install the regime, such as large landowners

and the industrial/financial elite from the capital, Madrid. In support of urban development, a strong planning system and financial, fiscal and land subsidies for developers fostered large housing developments and owner-occupation (Leal 2004a). 'The land development regulations in Madrid favoured these large proprietors in the public decision-making processes about building and substantially reduced the autonomy of small landowners' (Maloutas and Leal 2004, p.66). The public provision of subsidised housing for key workers was designed for owner-occupation and not for social rent, and included the production of large-scale neighbourhoods by private corporations (e.g. *Viviendas protegidas*, in San Bla, Barrio del Pilar, Concepción; Moya González 1983; Sambricio 2003). Socially rented homes were scarce and residual, restricted to the rehousing of peripheral informal settlements (*chabolas*). 'The dictatorial Spanish regime depended more on the market to invest for profit, leaving less space for family strategies. Thus in Spain, family strategies were developed in a market-dominated context and revolved around accessing homeownership through the market' (Maloutas and Leal 2004, p.66).

Athens presents a third example of state-market-family nexus. Here the market was subordinated to a state-sponsored family initiative and helped accommodate a considerable amount of social mixing in the municipality. The military and parliamentary-clientelist Greek regime 'that was installed in the 1950s had weak legitimacy and became an ambivalent democracy after pressure from the United States. Housing was one of the areas where concessions could be made in a complex balancing act between economic tolerance and political control' (Maloutas and Leal 2004, p.66). In Athens, the enforcement of rent control was looser than in Lisbon, because small landowners and family strategies were involved in promoting housing and urban solutions. There was no direct state provision of socially rented homes as in Lisbon, or of subsidised homeownership as in Madrid.

It was the redevelopment of the central and pericentral neighbourhoods of Athens that led to vertical social mixing and access to affordable homeownership across the social spectrum. From the 1950s to the 1970s, under a regime of micro-capital and individual initiatives, small developers and landowners made use of a compensation contract, called *antiparohi*, to replace low-density houses with multi-storey buildings. In the *antiparohi* system, land in the central areas was exchanged for one apartment of the new multi-storey building,² while the sale of apartments in phases provided the capital to finance the construction (Papakis 2011, pp. 10–11). Based on saving and clientelism, this new production system became the dominant affordable route to owner-occupation, which was regarded as a shield from state housing

withdrawal, an unstable economy and an expensive credit bank system (Maloutas and Karadimitriou 2001; Delladetsima 2003, 2006).

Outside the municipal areas, owner-occupation is the dominant tenure in all three metropolitan areas (see Madrid, Lisbon and Athens in Figures 7.1 and 7.2). It spans natives' social spectrum, to different extents and levels of concentration, due to the diverse types of housing provision, access to land and *latifundia*, and size of developer firms (Mingione 1995). Under the Francoist land development control that consolidated the *latifundia* system, big landowners and corporate developers drove patterns of suburbanisation organised around larger, socially homogeneous areas. These constituted the axial division between the affluent and middle-class suburbs in the northern and western parts and the working-class and lower middle-income neighbourhoods in the southern part of metropolitan Madrid (Leal 1994), as previously shown in Chapter 6 (see Figure 6.11).

Conversely, land development regulation was weak in Lisbon MA and non-existent in Athens MA, so there was little planning control over the urban sprawl and the formal and informal land markets that emerged within the *microfundia* system. Metropolitan development was driven by family strategy and civil society. Small landowners and construction firms, co-operatives and families promoted small-scale homeownership developments across the social spectrum. Its fragmented aggregation brought about socially heterogeneous areas, but most areas developed through self-production and uncontrolled urbanisation suffered from poor housing quality and a lack of social and transport infrastructure (Salgueiro 2001; Maloutas 2004b). In Lisbon MA in particular, the mechanisms of socio-tenurial differentiation affecting Portuguese rural migrants (e.g. from Alentejo, Beiras) and immigrants from former colonies (e.g. Cape Verde since the 1950s, Angola and Mozambique since the mid-1970s) operated similarly; both sets of newcomers were excluded from the municipal rental sector since saturated after decades of rent control, but included in the metropolitan sprawl since engaging in similar housing self-production dynamics.

The contrasts between these cases highlight how: the state–market–family relationship affected the principles of spatial organisation; mechanisms of socio-tenurial and spatial differentiation were highly correlated with the vision, type and scale of housing provision/production, and access to land; these mechanisms played out through the spatial organisation of small or large developments to bring about socially heterogeneous or socially homogeneous areas, respectively.

As discussed in the next chapters, in the past two decades changes in the types and scale of production, planning control and access to land and the level of affordability of the housing markets altered these

processes of socio-tenurial differentiation and triggered new mechanisms of residential marginalisation.

Widening the focus to all cities, we can note additional differences, useful for interpreting patterns identified in Chapter 6. Socio-tenurial differentiation is more divisive in port than in continental cities, because the geographic distribution of tenures is more uneven (Figures 7.1 and 7.2). In Athens MA, Barcelona and partly in Genoa, the rental stock is unevenly distributed: it is more concentrated in the centre and areas linked to mercantile activities and scarce in the periphery of the municipality or in metropolitan areas. This uneven tenure distribution accounts for a higher concentration of lower occupational groups in the rented sector of the central districts and owner-occupied sector of the peripheral working-class areas, compared with continental cities. In the tenure structure of these areas, the bottom echelons are more differentiated. Also, the central districts are more socially homogeneous in the port cities than in the continental cities.

The higher concentration of rental stock in the central district of port cities has led to a higher concentration of foreign groups, compared with the continental counterparts (e.g. Moroccans in Barcelona and Milan, Figure 6.13). Simultaneously, the higher concentration of owner-occupation in the working-class neighbourhoods of the first peripheral ring may explain the absence or low presence of non-Western foreign groups and the socio-ethnic mismatch identified in the previous chapter (Figure 7.3; also compare Figures 6.8 and 6.12 with Figure 7.2).

Conversely, in Rome MA, Milan and Turin the rental and owner-occupation stock are more evenly distributed across the municipal districts and among municipal and metropolitan areas. Particularly in Milan and Turin, patterns of urbanisation and the spatial organisation of the city have been planned to support industrial development. Industrialisation promoted a larger distribution of the rental stock across the city, particularly in the peripheral districts, which also included public provision of social housing (*INA Casa*, 1950s–1980s) for blue-collar and key workers, mostly rural–urban migrants from Southern Italy (Tosi and Cremaschi 2001; Mugnano 2017).

Nevertheless, the state never engaged fully in the process of housing decommodification and expansion of the unitary rental system, as in the Northern European industrialised cities (Padovani 1996). In these Italian continental cities, most districts shared a large degree of tenure mixing, which led to a wider dispersal and mix of low- and middle-income groups. But there are important nuances to social mixing. While there were significant numbers of elitist activities and white-collar workers in the central and pericentral districts, the peripheral districts




Figure 7.3 Examples of socio-ethnic differentiation in working-class first peripheral belt: highest concentration of owner-occupation (%) and scattered distribution low-income ethnic groups (LQs).
Sources: compiled by the author; data from Ajuntament de Barcelona (1996) and IDESCAT (1996) for Barcelona; Petronoti (1998) and Maloutas (2000) for Athens.

were predominantly socially heterogeneous areas of lower middle- and low-income groups, alongside a few homogeneous affluent suburbs. This socio-tenurial mix offers an additional explanation of the pattern previously identified, of non-Western foreign groups being more widely dispersed in continental than in port cities.

*Dual Housing Markets: The Role of Informal Provision in
Socio-Ethnic Mismatches*

There are common housing patterns in all eight cities and these account for the socio-ethnic mismatches identified (Figure 6.15) and relate to the role played by the informal housing market in the social division of space. The mechanisms operate distinctively in the rented sector of municipal areas and the owner-occupied metropolitan areas.

First, the greater the incidence of low-income groups in areas with a large rental stock, the greater is the concentration of ethnic groups in these areas. In low- and middle-income neighbourhoods with a large concentration of privately rented stock, natives and non-Western groups are highly mixed (with the exception of the first waves of Mozambicans, Angolans and Cape Verdeans in Lisbon). The mechanisms of socio-tenurial differentiation operate along similar social and ethnic lines in the rental sector. However, ethnic groups are more residentially segregated than natives, particularly in the port cities where there is more residual rental stock and the informal rental market is concentrated in the central and waterfront districts.

Conversely, the greater the incidence of low-income groups (including rural–urban migrants) in owner-occupied areas, the lower and more scattered is the presence of ethnic groups in these areas. Owner-occupation has played an inclusive role for rural–urban migrants but a divisive one for immigrants (particularly of the second and third waves). Socio-tenurial differentiation in the owner-occupied sector is wider between the ethnic and social dimension than in the rented sector; however, it is the type of production system in use when migrants arrive that makes a difference, not simply mechanisms of discrimination or processes of filtering up and down. The absence or scarcity of non-Western migrants in the working-class neighbourhoods of the first peripheral ring relates to the high level of owner-occupation that before the 1990s was possible through self-production and informal access to affordable land. In this context, Lisbon MA is an exception, as both migrants from rural areas and immigrants from former African colonies that settled at the same time in the municipal fringes in the 1980s participated in a similar self-production system.

Important mechanisms of differentiation operated in the municipal and metropolitan areas until the early 1990s, and provided affordable housing niches. As we will explore later, the liberalisation of the housing market during the 1990s radically affected these informal processes and affordable niches, thus altering the mechanisms of socio-tenurial and spatial differentiation in place during the first two waves of immigration from the mid-1970s to the end of the 1990s.

Rental Sector in Municipal Areas: The Scale of Residual Rental Stock

By the early 1990s, in all eight cities the largest proportion of privately rented stock was kept in the municipal area (Figure 7.1) as a result of 40 years of rent control, although controls were enforced differently across the four countries. This provided an affordable rental market that accommodated a significant presence of middle- and low-income families and fostered vertical social mixing, resulting in low levels of spatial segregation. Simultaneously, the decommodification of the rental market led to disinvestment in the sector, the decay of the housing stock and the expansion of informal markets and the residual rental sector, often associated with precarious housing conditions and marginalisation (Padovani 2004). However, there are important differences between port and continental cities in the characteristics of the central district rental stock – such as social composition, quality of buildings, scale of the residual rental market and urban decay. These led to the development of two types of housing markets, which played different roles in differentiating the insertion of native and foreign groups.

Compared with the continental cities, Lisbon, Barcelona, Genoa and Athens (except the neighbourhoods redeveloped under the *antiparohi* system) retained a higher incidence of low- and lower middle-income tenants in the historic centre and in the areas neighbouring harbour activities. The dense urban fabric and narrow streets, the particular typologies of dwellings and the general disinvestment led to severe housing decay and an expansion of informal markets and residual segments that accommodated vulnerable, including non-Western, groups. Even after the housing market was liberalised, the scale of decay and informal market remained significant during the 1990s and 2000s and continued to accommodate successive flows of immigration that concentrated in those parts of the central neighbourhoods with high residual rental stock.

In the central districts of Milan, Rome, Madrid and, to a lesser extent, Turin, the retention of elitist activities, the larger presence of middle and upper occupational groups and the better architectural quality of the housing stock were crucial factors in retaining investment in the maintenance of buildings during rent controls. As housing decay and

the residual rental segments were more contained and geographically scattered, low-income households and non-Western migrants were less spatially concentrated than in the port cities.

Moreover, in Milan, Turin and Rome the liberalisation of the Italian housing market in the early 1980s drove renewal policies to rehabilitate the historic centre with incentives and subsidies to landlords and homeowners. The upgrading of the housing stock, coupled with enforced evictions, led to the progressive outflow of low-income tenants (natives and foreigners) from the central areas towards the peripheral districts and the potential expansion of an upmarket rental market for middle- and high-income households. Within these socio-economic and urban conditions, programmes of urban renewal, and processes of embourgeoisement and gentrification of the central and pericentral districts developed earlier in Italian continental cities than in the port cities (Petsimeris 2005; Semi 2015).

As discussed in Chapter 8, one of the first effects of these processes was the progressive change of tenure, as the residual rental stock was reduced and owner-occupation replaced the rented sector. In the 1990s, the process of social recasting and desegregation was already taking place in the historic centre of Italian continental cities, accompanied by a process of peripheralisation of low-income groups (Cucca 2010). The central districts began to lose the role of gateway for newcomer immigrants.

It was only in the mid- and late 1990s that the central neighbourhoods of port cities become the target for the economic restructuring of the city, and underwent a series of public renewal programmes and city marketing mega-events to attract private inward investments, new economic activities and the middle classes (Briata, Bricocoli and Tedesco 2009; Blanco, Bonet and Walliser 2011). However, the scale of decay and concentration of the residual stock was of such magnitude that the transformation of the historic centre and changes in the housing market took longer to materialise in port cities than in continental cities.

Rental values reflect the sharp differences between continental and port cities. Soon after the abolition of rent control, central district rents were highest in Milan, Rome and Madrid and lowest in Lisbon and Barcelona (see later Figures 8.3–8.9). However, in all cases the inheritance of the informal, residual and affordable rental stock still played an inclusive role for natives and immigrants in the residential insertion of the lower middle- and low-income groups. By the end of the 1990s the characteristics of the rental market in the central districts diverged substantially, becoming more upmarket, with a sharper decrease of residual rental stock in the continental cities (though, to a lesser extent in Turin), while more downmarket, affordable and residual in the port

cities (Bocco 1998; Semi 2004; Petsimeris 2005; Gastaldi 2009; Maloutas 2012b; Mendes 2014).

As processes of renewal and gentrification of the central and waterside areas have only started recently, Barcelona, Genoa and Athens retain a considerable concentration of more affordable and residual rental stock, which has led to longer cohabitation or social mixing between natives (from elderly to young professionals) and ethnic groups. In continental cities, these forms of tenure with a socio-ethnic copresence are more scattered and smaller in scale in the peripheral areas or in the remaining residual stock of some pericentral districts about to be gentrified (e.g. Lavapiés in Madrid; Piazza Vittorio in Rome; Corso Buenos Aires in Milan; Porta Palazzo and San Salvario in Turin).

*Low-Income Owner-Occupation in Metropolitan Areas:
Informal Production and the Belt Effect*

By the early 1990s, all metropolitan areas shared a similar pattern of socio-tenurial distribution, with a high proportion of owner-occupation across most metropolitan districts and the social spectrum. National statistics have already captured this span of owner-occupation across the social spectrum (Figure 5.2) but it is in the metropolitan areas that it materialised as a distinctive Southern European feature. More interestingly, the strongest incidences of owner-occupation occurred among low- and lower middle-income groups settled in the working-class peripheral belt, at the fringes of the municipal area and in the first ring of metropolitan areas. This belt was developed during post-War suburbanisation under particular forms of self-provision and informal access to land (later legalised), or subsidised production for owner-occupation. Low residential mobility and intergenerational residential reproduction consolidated these neighbourhoods and prevented processes of substitution and filtering up and down within the housing stock (Maloutas 2004b). In most cases, these areas acted as urban archipelagos, almost impermeable to new inflows.

As previously pointed out, there is also an important socio-ethnic mismatch in these working-class peripheral areas that does not have any precedent in Northern European cities. The western metropolitan areas of Athens MA (Figure 7.3), the eastern peripheral districts of Barcelona (Dist. 7–10) and the southern metropolitan areas of Madrid MA are remarkable examples. They show an extensive concentration of low-income and working-class groups in areas with more than 70% of owner-occupation and, at the same time, little or scattered settlement of non-Western groups (compare Figure 7.2, Figures 6.8–6.12 and Figures 6.2–6.7). The combination of a high rate of owner-occupation, low residential mobility and family




Figure 7.4 The 'belt effect': geographic distribution of Non-Western foreign groups in the first peripheral ring in Athens (% , 2005) and Lisbon (LQs, 2001). *Sources:* Arapoglou (2006, pp. 34–36) for Athens MA and Malheiros (unpublished, based on Census 2001) for Lisbon MA.




Figure 7.4 (Continued)

strategies has become a structural factor that limits the ethnic presence in these areas. As a consequence, it accounts for those forms of spatial and tenorial differentiation between native and foreign groups that otherwise occupy similar lower middle segments of the social spectrum and of the housing market.

This socio-ethnic mismatch occurring in areas of low-income owner-occupiers – because of the time lag between the rural–urban migration (1950–1980s) and international migration (1980s onwards) – is a paradigmatic example of how particular forms of housing production/provision and access to land have generated a distinctive Southern European process of ethnic and socio-tenorial differentiation. Until the late 1980s, particularly in Greece and Portugal, the weak land development control, informal land markets and self-production (ranging from low-income co-operatives to clandestine developments) provided affordable access to land and to owner-occupation and transformed better-off rural–urban migrants into homeowners. In Spain, the access to owner-occupation across the social echelons was mediated by market corporatist production and subsidised housing, as part of the

Francoist model of development. These mechanisms facilitated the housing careers of the working class and rural migrants and widened the social composition of this tenure.

However, these mechanisms ended after the new wave of international migration. By the end of the 1980s, following the liberalisation of the housing market and credit system, these forms of affordable housing production and access to land were vanishing. Credit and monetary resources began replacing saving and self-construction as the main access to housing, making it more difficult for international migrants (and other low-income groups outside the property ladder) to become owner-occupiers and pursue housing trajectories similar to those of earlier migrants. Owner-occupation lost the integrating role played during the post-War urbanisation process and became one of the key mechanisms of residential differentiation between native and foreign groups, and between those groups with and without access to credit.

Athens is a paradigmatic case of this socio-ethnic mismatch. Its geography best captures this mechanism of differentiation in a 'belt effect' in the shape of a doughnut, impermeable to ethnic settlements. For instance, the geographic distribution of the non-Western groups and other recent migrants from Central and Eastern Europe spreads across the territory, except within the doughnut of the first peripheral belt that includes working-class areas on the west and affluent suburbs on the east (Figure 7.4; see Arapoglou 2006). The 'belt effect' refers to the fact that the process of ethnic peripheralisation jumps this impermeable belt as ethnic settlements move out from the municipal area and into the second and third peripheral ring of the metropolitan areas. Advanced peripheralisation of immigrants is thus one of the consequences of a system based on large, concentrated areas of owner-occupation in a context of low residential mobility and a familistic welfare system.

In this context, Lisbon MA is the exception that confirms the pattern (Figure 7.4). Here the doughnut area represents a multi-ethnic belt resulting from the concomitant inflows of migrants from rural areas (Alentejo and Beiras) and from former African colonies (PALOP and Portuguese *retornados* from Cape Verde, and later Angola and Mozambique). Both internal and international migrants settled at the fringes of the municipal areas and participated in the metropolitan expansion through formal urbanisations, clandestine neighbourhoods and shanty areas (Fonseca 1999; Salgueiro 2001; Fonseca et al. 2002a; Malheiros and Vala 2004).

The 'belt effect' is not a paradoxical phenomenon but the spatial representation of particular Southern European mechanisms of differentiations embedded in the welfare and housing systems. Owner-occupation, low residential mobility and family strategies set the

context in which changes in migratory flows (from rural to international) interplay with changes in housing access (from self-production to monetary resources).

Conclusion

This chapter has presented an account of the mechanisms of differentiation embedded in the local housing systems. In order to circumvent the paucity of data on ethnic and socio-tenurial distribution, it developed a historical and geographic analysis. It showed a highly diversified panorama across the cities, between municipal and metropolitan areas and within each housing tenure, and how the specificities of local housing systems played a role in the socio-tenurial and spatial division in each case. Additionally, it reflected on how these mechanisms were differentiated along social and ethnic lines.

In Southern European cities, housing, rather than waged work, was the core element of social integration for migrants. Paradoxically, if compared with Keynesian Northern European cases, the main housing mechanisms of insertion for newcomer labour forces were not linked to public or third-sector provision. Family provision and the dual market played a fundamental role. Paradoxically too, socially heterogeneous neighbourhoods took shape or consolidated where the direct state provision of social or subsidised housing was residual or absent and where the commodified housing system dominated by owner-occupation did not bring about spatially divided cities. Its legacy is reflected today in low or moderate levels of residential segregation among natives and most foreign groups.

However, this spatial organisation is only apparently analogous among the eight cities and derives from different housing mechanisms. As Maloutas and Leal (2004, p. 67) explained,

the planned city produced either through the spatial organisation principles associated with industrial development, as in Northern Italy, or through the market and the political power of big land owners and developers, as in Madrid, coexists in Southern Europe with the unplanned, spontaneous city based on the loosely-regulated familistic-clientelistic urban development found in Athens [and, to a lesser extent in the metropolitan area of Lisbon].

Mechanisms of differentiation embedded in the local housing system (tenure policies and housing supply) relate to diverse principles of social

stratification. The state–market–family nexus operated differently within the anti-liberal Portuguese regime, the corporatist Spanish regime, the clientelist Greek regime and the industrial Northern Italian system. As a result, the mechanisms of socio-tenurial and socio-spatial differentiation varied according to the type and scale of housing production, patterns of urban development, weight of rent control, the significance of informal housing markets and land development control and in the (un)even geographical distribution of tenures.

Despite these differences and the residual state intervention, a variety of affordable housing ‘solutions’ emerged in all eight cities until the liberalisation of the housing market (1980s–1990s). These resulted in a span of owner-occupation across the social spectrum and in large niches of residual rental stock that provided the entry gate for newcomers. In most cases, family strategies, informal markets and access to housing through self-production were the key mechanisms that made the difference.

Within this complex picture, the socio-tenurial configuration of the housing stock (owner-occupation and private rental), its geographic distribution and forms of production provide an additional explanatory framework in which to contextualise patterns of segregation identified in the previous chapter, differences among cities and those correspondences and/or mismatches between native and foreign groups in terms of geography and degree of spatial concentration.

First, in most municipal areas, due to the partial decommodification of the housing market through rent control, the rental sector was large and affordable. This brought about social (and ethnic) mixing as well as a flourishing residual rental market. At a city scale, mechanisms of differentiation embedded in the rental sector were similarly inclusive along both social and ethnic lines. However, these were more limited in Madrid, given a municipal market largely dominated by owner-occupation (including subsidised housing provision) that pushed internal and international migrants towards peripheral and metropolitan areas. Paradoxically, in Lisbon, the city with the largest and most decommodified rental market, similar processes of peripheralisation occurred on a large scale after the mid-1970s. But in this case, several decades of rent control led to the saturation (or unavailability) of the rental market, which diverted the settlement of successive waves of migration from former African colonies (PALOP and Portuguese *retornados*) to outside the municipal area.

At the same time, the rental and owner-occupation sectors were more evenly distributed across municipal and metropolitan areas in Rome, Milan and Turin than in Lisbon, Barcelona, Athens and Genoa. Patterns of socio-tenurial differentiation were more mixed in the former cities,

accounting for a lower Index of Segregation in continental than in port cities. The geography of this socio-tenurial mixing offers an additional explanation of the dispersed distribution of non-Western foreign groups in the outer central areas of Rome, Milan and Turin, and the peripheralisation process encountered in Madrid.

Second, the informal housing market in the eight cities played an important role in the social and ethnic division of space; on a finer analysis, its geography, size, concentration and forms of production provide an additional explanation for the socio-ethnic mismatches and some paradoxes of segregation identified in previous chapters.

With regard to the rental sector, the scale and concentration of the residual stock was an important mechanism that consolidated ethnic presence in the central areas of port cities, accommodating or substituting successive waves of migration at least until the end of the 1990s. At the same time, patterns of ethnic concentration were particularly affected by structural and local changes in the rental sector, in terms of size, affordability and social composition. These occurred earlier in continental cities after the liberalisation of the housing market, when renewal programmes and processes of gentrification and deproletarianisation entailed a series of mechanisms of housing tenure change (from rental sector to owner-occupation, from residual to upmarket rental stock) that reduced further the concentration of non-Western groups in the central and pericentral areas.

The paucity of data does not allow us to identify mechanisms operating at local level, such as discrimination, mechanisms of vertical differentiation or neighbourhood differentiation between native and foreign groups. But the way the residual housing market interacts with residential marginalisation and social inclusion, entrapped mobility and opportunities for housing progression is complex. Ethnic residential marginalisation is no less severe in continental than in port cities because the (residual) rental sector is geographically more scattered and indices of spatial segregation are lower.

Conversely, the absence or scarce presence of non-Western migrants in the first peripheral ring relates to the high concentration of owner-occupation in working-class neighbourhoods, developed through self-production and informal access to land prior to the 1990s. A high concentration of owner-occupation, low residential mobility and family strategies have provided mechanisms of integration for rural-urban migrants, but these have now become structural factors that limit the ethnic presence in those areas. They create the apparently paradoxical phenomenon of the 'belt effect', which is furthering the process of ethnic peripheralisation to the second and third metropolitan ring: Athens MA is a paradigmatic example of advanced peripheralisation,

while Lisbon MA is the exception since natives and foreigners coexist in the municipal fringes, as both migrants from rural areas and immigrants from former colonies settled here before the 1990s and took part in the same production system. Immigrants from former colonies were thus not discriminated against in this process.

In this context, spatial and tenorial differentiation is wider between native and foreign groups, which otherwise occupy similar lower middle segments of the social spectrum and housing market. In this case, rather than mechanisms of discrimination or processes of filtering up and down, it is the type of production system and access to owner-occupation at the time of arrival of migrants that makes a difference (self-production during the rural–urban migration between 1950 and 1980, and monetary resources for international migration after the 1990s). As we will see in the next chapters, the shift from self-production to monetary access is one of the mechanisms that make it more difficult for immigrants to pursue housing careers similar to those experienced by rural–urban migrants and international migrants prior to the 1990s.

The historical and geographical contextualisation of the different local housing systems and mechanisms provides a background to understanding how changes in housing tenure and production, coupled with emerging socio-urban processes, affect patterns of segregation and bring about new mechanisms of differentiation and exclusion in more complex spatial arrangements. Chapter 8 will examine how processes of gentrification, embourgeoisement, deproletarianisation, low residential mobility, intergenerational mobility and changes in tenures and in patterns of metropolitan sprawl, among others, have strengthened or transformed the socio-spatial hierarchy of the city and mechanisms of ethnic insertion.

The housing milieux of the 1990s are also an important contextual reference to understand why residential marginalisation is greater for international than for rural–urban migrants. Despite processes of ethnic desegregation and dispersal, there are mechanisms of residential marginalisation structural to the Southern European systems, making it harder for immigrants to pursue more stable insertion in the urban society and possible upward residential mobility.

Notes

- 1 Athens municipality is an exception as the percentage of tenants has not decreased (34.1% in 1991, 35.6% in 2001 and 37.7% in 2011, according to the census data).
- 2 However, given the high land prices in the bourgeois suburbs, this exchange was not possible unless the new building comprised only three apartments.

Changing Urban Societies

New Mechanisms of Differentiation from the 1990s

Alea iacta est ('the die is cast', Suetonius 121 CE, para. 32).¹ The 1990s was a crucial decade of transition worldwide. In Southern Europe this was a time showing the first signs of a long period of profound societal and urban changes that followed the wider geopolitical and economic transformations of the early 1980s. This chapter focuses on the changes these urban societies experienced from the 1990s until the international financial crisis in the late 2000s. It examines how changes in housing and local urban political agendas have altered or consolidated some of the structures, processes, patterns and mechanisms of differentiation identified so far, and how these transformations interplay with patterns of ethnic residential segregation.

Attention needs to be paid to the ways in which the liberalisation of the housing market and the credit system – that triggered in Southern Europe the so-called 'monetary revolution' (Emmanuel 2004, 2014) – transformed the housing systems by bringing about new forms of production, provision and land supply, new processes of tenure change, and changes in affordability and means of access (Allen et al. 2004; García 2010). The liberalisation of the banking system and expansion of credit in Southern European countries drove changes in their economic systems that 'were much more radical than in other European countries joining the European Monetary Union'. By the late 1980s, Greece, Portugal and to a lesser extent Spain were 'by far the least developed member[s] of the Union both in income and consumption

levels as well as in market institutions and structures. (...) Statism ruled in both public and private sectors; inflation, public deficits and debts were high (Emmanuel 2004, p. 121). In this respect,

the 'expansion of credit and consumption, coupled with falling savings rates' and the increase 'in household wealth due to growing liquidity' witnessed throughout the 1990s, 'were a path breaking economic change (...) that was, furthermore, mainly monetary in nature. Given the extent of these 'modernization' changes in comparison to long sustained practices and structures that were clearly different from the European norm, we feel justified in using the somewhat excessive term 'revolution'.

[Yet], despite the misleading impression that the main cause of these changes has been the EU drive towards the European Monetary Union, with varying impacts in all member countries, the [Southern European] experience has been in essence a variation of quite similar trends and changes that swept throughout the advanced capitalist world during the 1990s'. (Emmanuel 2004, p. 122)

At the same time, the level of owner-occupation has expanded sharply in Southern European cities since the 1980s, profoundly exaggerating the housing tenure imbalance (except in Lisbon and Athens municipality), as shown in Figure 8.1 by the sharp bifurcation between the rental sector and owner-occupation in the municipal and metropolitan areas. The expansion of owner-occupation and the sharp contraction of the rental sector were followed by the disappearance of affordable housing provision and a progressive growth in nominal housing prices in both tenures, which created a housing affordability crisis in the mid-1990s as discussed later (Figures 8.3–8.8). These phenomena are closely linked and cannot be understood without reference to the structural changes in housing and land policy instruments that followed the liberalisation of the banking system and housing market.

With the huge rise in housing prices and reduction of real wages, housing affordability and hardship intensified, affecting not only the bottom echelons of the social spectrum but also the middle echelons (Figure 8.6), despite the process of professionalisation, intragenerational mobility and expansion of middle classes. At the same time, the provision of welfare services and housing was devolved from national to regional and local levels, but most financial control remained centralised. This prompted a shift from comprehensive, people-based policies to area-based renewal programmes in dealing with urban growth and inequalities and enhanced the initial tensions between the social and entrepreneurial roles of local governments. The combination of changing housing provision and a variety of socio-urban processes and

renewal programmes introduced additional mechanisms of socio-residential inequalities (Figure 8.2; Arapoglou and Maloutas 2011; Tosi 2011; Dominguez, Leal and Goytre 2012; Agustoni, Alietti, and Cucca 2015; Pinto, Ferreira and Guerra 2016). As the panorama became more complex, the relationship between social inequality and spatial segregation became even less linear and thus more difficult to interpret. The scale of residential marginalisation and housing hardship widened, but many of the spatial forms they assumed were dispersed, de-concentrated and peripheral, thus making social inequality less visible but not less problematic.

This chapter aims to investigate how these housing and socio-urban changes generated new structural mechanisms of differentiation and residential marginalisation and how they hindered immigrants in particular, amplified forms of socio-ethnic divisions and translated into new geographies of diffuse segregation (e.g. ethnic desegregation, microsegregation and peripheralisation). It begins with a broad panorama on the changing housing systems in order to isolate the genesis of these new structural mechanisms. Then it explores the effects of these housing changes across the eight cities at municipal and metropolitan level in relation to urban strategies of renewal and metropolitan growth, socio-urban processes (e.g. gentrification, intergenerational social mobility *in situ*, etc.) and socio-urban legacies (e.g. the working-class, owner-occupied belt, low residential mobility, patrimonial values, etc.). This is the wider context in which current patterns of ethnic residential segregation can be understood.

Changing Housing Systems: Path-Dependency and Systemic Shifts

Southern European welfare regimes have always fostered owner-occupation as a key political-economic instrument to boost employment and economic growth and ensure political stability (Allen et al. 2004). In the past two decades, the significant expansion of owner-occupation was not the result of radical shifts in the housing tenure system, as in corporatist and social-democratic welfare states moving away from unitary rental systems; rather it was the result of changes in the Southern European *modus operandi* as it adapted to liberalisation of the housing and credit system after the mid-1980s and the accession of Spain, Portugal and Greece to the European Union.

Housing policies quickly adapted to liberalisation: fiscal instruments, such as tax reductions for first-time buyers, fuelled demand for homeownership and helped increase mortgage consumption; land policies




Figure 8.1 Housing tenure changes (1981–2001) in selected Southern European cities and dynamics associated with the expansion of owner-occupation (Part 1). *Sources:* compiled by the author, including calculations; data from: Urban Audit (1998), except: (a) Fonseca (1999, p. 203) and Fonseca et al. (2002a); (b) INE Spain (2003).




Figure 8.2 Housing and socio-urban changes (1981–2001) in Southern European cities: new forms of socio-tenorial marginalisation (Part 2). *Sources:* compiled by the author. Notes: (a) for instance, intergenerational social mobility *in situ*, spatially entrapped social mobility.

were designed to stimulate the real-estate market; and financial instruments to support the production of affordable housing were weakened. Direct interventions by the state, the non-profit sector and the family were reduced in favour of the market. These policies reinforced the commodification of the housing system and land regime and contributed to the housing affordability crisis (Trilla 2001, 2004; Leal 2004d; Guerra 2011; Emmanuel 2014).

The process of liberalisation brought about three major shifts: first, the deregulation of the banking and mortgage systems introduced a *monetary revolution* (Emmanuel 2004); monetary resources and credit replaced self-production and saving to become the main means of access to housing and paved the way for real-estate speculation. Second, the restructuring of the planning system and land policy instruments in a market-led regime prompted *new forms of housing supply and commodified access to land*, resulting in the decline of self-production and direct family provision (Leal 2004c). Third, the abolition of rent control, with the progressive convergence of controlled rents towards market rents and the privatisation of social rented housing (with some exceptions in Lisbon and Turin), furthered the *commodification of the rental sector* (Padovani 2004).

These shifts combined to create a *mutually reinforcing effect*. Their interplay brought about a rapid expansion of owner-occupation and a reduction in the rental sector, fuelled land and housing prices and diluted previous forms of provision and production of affordable housing in both tenures. The shift from direct production to access to capital or monetary resources (liquidity, anticipated inheritance and credit) altered the ways in which families played a role in ensuring housing access to their members. Patrimony (in forms of inherited wealth, property transfer across generations and/or as mortgage guarantees) became more important than wage rates. As a result, new divisive mechanisms of socio-tenurial differentiation emerged that increased residential marginalisation and widened social inequalities. This mutually reinforcing effect ultimately spiralled into a housing affordability crisis that affected a large proportion of Southern European urban societies after the late 1990s.

Monetary Revolution and Changing Means of Access to Owner-Occupation

The liberalisation of the banking system and the reduction of the cost of borrowing created an ‘explosion’ of cheap credit for housing and consumption (Ball 2005, pp. 74–96, 113–125) that, ‘while still modest by European standards, constituted a major shift for [Southern European]

households, which traditionally rely on personal saving and family assistance' (Emmanuel 2004, p. 122). This process brought about a 'neoliberal "revolution" in monetary policies, institutions and practices' of consumption and production (Emmanuel 2004, p. 123). It changed the means of access to homeownership, increasing the importance of monetary resources, accumulation of capital and patrimony. The role of patrimony expanded: its traditional 'familistic' notion of long-lasting family asset, which is 'untradeable' (thus acting as a social institution in the reproduction of family and national political economy) broadened to include forms of anticipated, inherited capital that 'unlocks' liquidity for the offspring (through for instance (re)mortgaging and/or selling of part of the family stock). The combination of cheap credit and growing liquidity, stricter land regulation and tax reduction for first-time buyers eroded housing self-production, a traditional practice that had enabled low-income echelons to become homeowners and integrate into Southern European societies.

The monetary revolution did not benefit all social groups. The credit allocation and tax deductions were geared to people with higher incomes, thus it was regressive in terms of redistributive benefits. At the same time, 'the benefits from the diffusion of cheap credit [have been] offset by higher real estate market' and inflated housing prices (Emmanuel 2004, p. 132). The main gainers were land and property owners, affluent and upper-middle income groups, banks and insurance, and credit institutions (Delladetsima 2006; Memo 2009; García 2010). Ultimately, the less well-off groups had fewer opportunities to access the property ladder or improve their housing trajectory, while the affluent groups enjoyed wide advantages. The example of Athens MA is paradigmatic (Table 8.1).

The opportunities offered by the much-expected revolution in monetary conditions have evidently been completely [cancelled out] by the explosion in real estate prices and, in parts of the market, the increase of rents with the result that housing conditions have stopped improving, compared to past trends, while in many [dimensions] of the housing system of Athens there has been an increase in the overall social inequalities. (Emmanuel 2004, p. 139)

In all cities, during the early 2000s the cost of housing increased exponentially in relation to the cost of living and to real wage rises, while offsetting the benefits of the socio-economic ascent among younger generations brought about by the process of professionalisation and intergenerational upward mobility experienced since the 1980s (Câmara Municipal de Lisboa 2004b, pp. 174–175; Arapoglou and Sayas 2009;

Table 8.1 Socio-tenurial distribution and changes, Attika (1994–1999, %).

A. Tenure share by major socio-economic strata, Attika 1994 and 1999

<i>Income deciles:</i>	1994			1999			94–99 variation		
	Owner-occ.	Renters	Free of rent	Owner-occ.	Renters	Free of rent	Owner-occ.	Renters	Free of rent
Higher 1–2	71.6%	26.6%	1.9%	72.1%	23.5%	4.4%	+0.7%	-11.7%	+131.6%
Middle 3–7	70.4%	27.5%	2.1%	69.8%	24.7%	5.4%	-0.9%	-10.2%	+157.1%
Lower 8–10	61.1%	35.6%	3.3%	54.8%	38.8%	6.4%	-10.3%	+9.0%	+93.9%
ATTIKA TOTAL	67.8%	29.7%	2.4%	65.8%	28.7%	5.5%	-2.9%	-3.4%	+129.2%

B. Share of loan recipients by major socio-economic strata, Attika 1994 and 1999

<i>Income deciles:</i>	1994				1999				94–99 variation	
	Owner-occ.		<i>of which:</i>		Owner-occ.		<i>of which:</i>		Owner-occ.	<i>of which:</i>
	(absolute)	(%)	Outright	With mortgage	(absolute)	(%)	Outright	With mortgage		
Higher 1–2	385	21.1%	88.1%	11.9%	408	21.9%	83.3%	16.7%	+6.0%	+47.8%
Middle 3–7	947	51.9%	90.4%	9.6%	988	53.1%	86.5%	13.5%	+4.3%	+46.2%
Lower 8–10	493	27.0%	91.9%	8.1%	463	25.0%	91.8%	8.2%	-6.1%	-5.0%
ATTIKA TOTAL	1825	100%	90.3%	9.7%	1859	100%	87.1%	12.9%	+1.9%	+42.9%

1999

<i>Income deciles:</i>	homebuyers of LAST 10 YEARS				homebuyers of LAST 5 YEARS			
	% of total owners		<i>of which:</i>		% of total owners		<i>of which:</i>	
			Outright	With mortgage			Outright	With mortgage
Higher 1–2	121	29.7%	67.8%	32.2%	53	13.0%	52.9%	47.1%
Middle 3–7	257	26.0%	72.4%	27.6%	126	12.7%	64.3%	35.7%
Lower 8–10	97	21.0%	83.5%	16.5%	41	8.8%	73.2%	26.8%
ATTIKA TOTAL	475	25.6%	73.5%	26.5%	220	11.8%	63.2%	36.8%

Sources: adapted from Emmanuel (2004, pp. 134–136, tables 3 and 4).

Dominguez, Leal and Goytre 2012). Housing affordability also became an issue for middle-income households; the problem affected such a wide segment of Southern European societies that it came to be regarded as a 'housing crisis' (Pareja Eastaway and San Martin 2002; Tosi 2004). The (lack of) affordability derived from two interlinked processes: the expansion of owner-occupation in a credit-based and speculative market, and the shrinking of the rental sector that led to a rise in rents mainly due to scarcity. Municipal areas suffered the fastest price growth in both tenures, particularly in the traditional working-class neighbourhoods of the first municipal ring (Figures 8.3–8.5). These conditions diverted the housing options of middle- and low-income households to outside the municipal fringes and furthered the process of peripheralisation in the metropolitan areas.

The problem of affordability was endemic to the system and became one of the major sources of socio-residential inequalities. Inequality arose from a paradoxical phenomenon based on limited accumulated capital and price increases in a credit-based homeownership market: differences among social groups in terms of patrimony became more crucial than wage differences in the access to housing. Households required substantial assets – such as savings, liquid capital, family patrimony or anticipated family inheritance – to cover part of the cost of a new house or provide a deposit and a guarantee against the loan. For instance, two households with similar wages might have different access to the housing market depending, for example, on whether they could access beforehand the family patrimony (e.g. anticipated family inheritance), which was more likely for middle-class than for working-class offspring. As argued by Leal (2004b, pp. 101–102),

differences in patrimony become more important when measuring economic inequalities in Southern Europe, because of the dominance of homeownership, which increases differences between tenants and homeowners and also between owners of houses that are paid for and owners that still pay mortgages. This situation implies a handicap generally falling on younger households [and immigrants]. (...)

Since inequalities in patrimony have increased, the social distribution of patrimony may be regarded as even more important than the distribution of income, especially in a risk society where the insecurity in the labour market is increasing.

As a result of this shift from housing self-production and saving to monetary resources, patrimonial dependency and borrowing, new structural mechanisms of socio-tenorial differentiation and residential marginalisation emerged. Residential inequalities widened across the




Figure 8.3 Owner-occupation and rental sector: geographic distribution (%), nominal housing price (€/m²) and annual growth rate (%) in Madrid MA (1999–2001) and Barcelona (1997–2001). *Sources:* compiled by the author, including calculation and maps; data from: (a) Comunidad de Madrid (2001, 2003) for owner-occupation, Leal (2004b) for rental sector; (b) Ajuntament de Barcelona (2002).




Figure 8.4 Owner-occupation and rental sector: geographic distribution (%), nominal housing price (€ / m²) and annual growth rate (%) in Rome MA (2000-2003) and Milan (2000-2003). *Sources:* compiled by the author, including calculation and maps; data from: (a) Comune di Roma (2000, 2003) for owner-occupation; (b) FIAIP (2001, 2002, 2004).




Figure 8.5 Owner-occupation and rental sector: geographic distribution (%), nominal housing price (€ / m²) and annual growth rate (%), Turin (2000–2003), Genoa (2000–2003) and Lisbon (1996–1999). Sources: compiled by the author, including calculation and maps; data from: (a) FIAIP (2001, 2002, 2004); (b) Câmara Municipal de Lisboa (2004a) for housing tenures; (c) Vilaça (1997) and Confidencial Imobiliário (2000).

social spectrum, particularly between working-class and middle-class offspring, natives and foreigners, and further among foreign groups.

For example, foreign groups that relied solely on wages, including middle-income households from Latin America or Eastern Europe, were at a disadvantage compared to those that relied on credit support from transnational communities and ethnic kinships, such as Chinese, Ismaeli, Hindu, Jewish, Middle Eastern and Islamic communities (which were forbidden by *sharia* law to take out mortgages). The migratory project also made a difference; many non-Western immigrants, particularly single-gender migrants from Latin America, Eastern Europe or the Philippines, accumulated savings for remittance and investments in their country of origin, rather than in the host country (Fonseca et al. 2002b; Baganha and Fonseca 2004; Zontini 2010; Triandafyllidou 2013). These factors add to a more complex mapping of ethnic and socio-spatial segregation.

Land Recommodification and Changes in Housing Supply

Concurrently, devolution, land recommodification and changes in the supply systems introduced new structural mechanisms of socio-spatial division. The liberalisation of the housing market and credit systems was facilitated by, and required, the changing of the land policy instruments and restructuring of the planning system to the benefit of developers, landlords and financial investors.

The combination of new land policy instruments and recommodification of land restricted the amount of public land available for affordable housing and made it more difficult for the public sector to have control over, or influence, land prices. Simultaneously, planning systems gained greater control over the territory and curtailed informal access to land and informal construction, traditional forms of affordable provision.

Land policies curbed planning gains, for instance, by reducing the proportion of land that developers had to give local government for urbanisation or subsidised housing (as in Spain and Italy). The amount of public land available for affordable housing was reduced sharply because of limited planning gains and the sale of public bank land by local and national governments. This 'is a common practice related to the high debt they suffered by the growing demand of local public services and the increasing investment in public works', which became a local obligation after devolution (Leal 2004d, pp. 6–10; Bolocan Goldstein and Bonfantini 2007; Kaika and Ruggiero 2016). Public lands, expropriated or bought in previous decades, were also sold during the privatisation of public companies (e.g. telephone, rail, electricity companies)

to finance investments. Similarly, saving banks and investment banks carried out

finance speculations by investing in new land developments. This strategy meant that housing reached higher prices than offices and hotels. The changing use that occurred in some of the largest European cities by transforming industries, offices or hotels into apartments in the city centre is also becoming a normal practice in Madrid and Barcelona. As a result of these circumstances land to build social [and affordable] housing progressively shrunk, [and] it was only possible in some small places owned by local or regional government. (Leal 2004d, p. 9)

‘The lack of reference of cheap land influenced the average growth of land prices’, which increased significantly because of real-estate and financial speculation (Leal 2004d, p. 10). High land costs made compulsory purchases untenable for the state and reduced the opportunities to expand a public land bank to subsidise public housing or support non-profit provision such as housing co-operatives. Small developers and households found it difficult to acquire land and enter the housing production system, as the high cost of land cancelled out the low cost of borrowing. Moreover, informal practices to access cheap land disappeared with the increase of local planning control. As a result, mechanisms that were key to promoting and producing affordable housing, which were based on cheap or public land, vanished with the liberalisation process and consequent land recommodification.

Land recommodification had macroscale implications. It curtailed the supply of affordable housing, thus adding to the mutually reinforcing effect that spiralled into a housing affordability crisis. It also consolidated particular features of the Southern European housing supply system, such as a profit-based regime based on development gain and speculative land supply, and little or no state intervention. More importantly, it altered the production system, which gradually shifted from small to large development companies and dramatically reduced public and non-profit provision by families, co-operatives and public housing enterprises. Each of these two effects sustained the other. Changes in the land regimes – combined with the new credit systems, the emergence of a competitive and profit-led land market open to international investment and the scarcity of serviced land – reduced the opportunities for small developers to access land for housing production.

In Portugal, Greece and Italy, though at different speeds and intensity, the construction industry was reconfigured, shifting from traditional small and/or medium-size developers to larger and international enterprises, with the consequent alteration of forms of housing production/provision (see Corkhill 2002 for Portugal; Delladetsima 2003,

2006 for Greece). Traditional practices of exchange between small land-owners and developers for the production of multi-storey buildings – such as the *antiparohi* system in Greece and, to a different extent, the *patos bravos* developments in Portugal and the *Corea* model in Italy² – gradually disappeared (Foot 2001, p. 44; Maloutas and Karadimitriou 2001; Salgueiro 2001, 2002).

Self-production declined and housing co-operatives became geared to middle-income and professional groups, which could afford the higher cost of land (Fleming and Magano 1992; Santos 1999; INSCOOP 2000). In Spain, this process consolidated the legacy of the corporatist and latifundist system supported by the Francoist regime by expanding the construction industry, which was based on large developers, and shifting the production of subsidised housing for owner-occupation (VPO programme – *Viviendas de Protección Oficial*) to middle-income households to offset increasing land cost.

Overall, changes in the supply system eroded previous practices of affordable production/provision that were crucial for the social integration of lower middle- and low-income groups, as well as rural–urban migrants. These practices could not be reproduced in a housing regime based on speculative land and property markets. This had enormous implications for recent international migration in terms of social integration and access to housing. Simultaneously, the larger scale of housing production brought about bigger and more socially homogeneous residential developments, aimed at middle-income or affluent households (Maloutas 2003, pp. 174–175; Mugnano and Palvarini 2011; Orueta 2012; Pinto, Ferreira and Guerra 2016). These were the spatial consequences of the new mechanisms of socio-residential differentiation resulting from the monetary revolution and fiscal and credit changes.

Rental Sector: Recommodification and Shrinking

The full recommodification of the rental sector brought about major changes in the mechanisms of socio-tenurial differentiation. The liberalisation of rental markets and the credit system and tax relief for first-time buyers had huge downside effects on the rental sector. Increasing scarcity and thus unaffordability (Figure 8.6) led to new forms of residential marginalisation and division between foreigners and natives. Three concurrent processes contributed to this: (1) the abolition of rent control and (2) processes of urban renewal and/or gentrification, both of which nurtured processes of tenure change with a significant reduction of the affordable and residual rental sector in the municipal area and (3) the privatisation of social rental stock, which further marginalised and residualised the sector.




Figure 8.6 Housing rent outlay (% of annual income), by geographic location (a) and by housing typologies (b), in Rome, Milan, Turin, Genoa and Barcelona, 2003. *Sources:* compiled by the author, including calculation and translation; data from Sunia (2003a) and Ajuntament de Barcelona (2004) for A – geographic location; B – housing typology adapted from Sunia (2003a), based on average rent.

Recommodification of the rental sector began with the abolition of rent control and the lessening of tenants' protection. This process resulted in a sharp decrease in the private rental stock, which became scarce and unaffordable by the mid-late 1990s. With a limited supply of affordable housing, the privatisation of social rented housing and the shrinking of the residual and informal segments, recommodification added to the crisis of housing affordability.

In the 1980s, after the abolition of rent control, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece introduced different measures to stimulate confidence and investment in the rental sector and increase the private supply of the stock: previously controlled rents were progressively raised to match market rents, new laws reduced the terms and length of new secure tenancies and enforced the eviction of insolvent tenants and financial incentives were offered to help rehabilitate properties (Padovani 2004).

Paradoxically, these measures did not have the desired effect and triggered a process of tenure change instead (rented housing converted into owner-occupation). Most small landlords, after decades of protection, did not have enough confidence in the sector or capital to cope with the scale of decay, so sold to sitting tenants and, later, to real-estate companies. After the 1990s, tenure change accelerated as a result of credit and fiscal incentives, renewal programmes and the development of speculative homeownership markets, spurred by the processes of gentrification and embourgeoisement. The private rental stock, including its residual segment, was sharply reduced and rent prices increased spectacularly as part of the sector moved upmarket.

The social rental sector was similarly affected. During the 1990s, national housing policies and the control of social housing stock were devolved to regional and local governments. Most local governments privatised their social rental stock by selling to the sitting tenants at low or moderate prices (showing some similarities with the Right to Buy policies developed in the United Kingdom). The provision of social rented housing was cut or eliminated, particularly as a result of the land issues discussed earlier. This increased the stigmatisation and marginalisation of the remaining social rental stock, following a path-dependency of familistic welfare systems that relegated social rented housing to a residual role within a dualist rented system to protect market profits (Tosi and Cremaschi 2001; Trilla 2001, 2004; Urbani 2010). However, Lisbon and other municipalities of the metropolitan areas were an exceptional case; these followed a divergent trajectory during the 1990s by expanding the small public stock through a rehousing programme (PER – *Programa Especial de Realojamento*) for the massive eradication of shanty areas introduced in the 1990s and delaying substantially the privatisation of the existing social rental stock given the scale of the decay

of the housing stock and a less speculative risk-averse credit system (Cachado 2013; Pinto and Guerra 2013).

In this context, a paradoxical relationship emerged between housing needs and behaviour. Despite the increasing need for affordable rent, both the demand for housing and the policy response was geared to owner-occupation. Escalating rents and the low cost of borrowing appeared to make buying more financially viable than renting. This, and the limited tenant protection with short-term lettings, reinforced the Southern European idea of security and patrimonial investment attached to property, which had traditionally been associated with the insecure labour market and pension system. It created an artificial demand for owner-occupation, which simultaneously fuelled house price inflation. Given the limited affordable alternatives provided by the market or by local governments, credit-based homeownership became the sole solution for policy makers and households (García 2010; Tosi 2011; Trilla 2011; Emmanuel 2014; Kandyliis 2015).

Final Reflections

Overall, these three major shifts and their mutually reinforcing effects had a huge impact but did not radically transform Southern European housing systems; the tools and scale of interventions changed but the vision, objectives and the residual redistributive regime did not. Fostering owner-occupation remained the main objective, strengthening the unbalanced tenure system; the wider welfare arrangements adapted to a market-led context with new fiscal, financial and land instruments that further directed interventions away from the state, families and the non-profit sector. The lack of political will and structural means – to control and manage the rise of housing prices/debts in relation to the cost of living and to seek systemic arrangements other than owner-occupation – created an unsustainable housing system in both economic and social terms. The social and structural implications were more severe than those faced in previous decades. The housing affordability crisis, which affected not just the most vulnerable social groups but a wide section of the social spectrum, was structural and chronic, because systemic.

The Southern European political arena has barely questioned the long-term social consequences of the fostering of owner-occupation and of tenure imbalance. The political debates and policies aimed at expanding the rental sector and its affordable segment are minor; unlike in Northern Europe (Kemeny 2001; Priemus 2001; Kemeny, Kersloot and Thalmann 2005), there is no concept of tenure balance and unitary rental system as a means of controlling housing price growth,

supporting the territorial mobility of the labour force, nourishing the young household life-cycle or accommodating much-needed cheap labour (Allen et al. 2004, p. 173). Ultimately, this is not an economic but a political matter.

Growing Homeowning Cities: New Mechanisms of Differentiation, Residential Marginalisation and Diffuse Segregation

In all eight cities, the structural transformations of the housing systems that adapted to, and supported, the liberalisation of the housing market and banking system drove an exponential expansion of owner-occupation. This translated at local level into two distinctive dynamics: new housing production predominantly in the metropolitan areas, and tenure change mainly in the core municipality (Figure 8.1).

This part offers a dual focus on metropolitan and municipal areas to examine how the monetary revolution and the recommodification of the rental sector and land supply produced new mechanisms of socio-tenurial differentiation. These housing changes, combined with socio-urban changes and strategies of urban growth and renewal, introduced new forms of socio-residential marginalisation, affecting immigrants in particular (Figure 8.2). Paradoxically, the increasing residential marginalisation often introduced diffuse segregation, because it was associated with patterns of ethnic microsegregation, desegregation and outflow from the core municipal areas, while furthering processes of ethnic metropolitan peripheralisation.

Implications of New Housing Production in the Metropolitan Areas

In the metropolitan areas, owner-occupation increased exponentially as a result of new housing production feeding the recent metropolitan sprawl, as shown in Figure 8.1 by the parallel increase in the number of dwellings and the proportion of owner-occupation in all metropolitan areas (Salvati and Morelli 2014; for Athens MA see Leontidou, Afouxenidis and Kourliouros 2003). Additionally, in several metropolitan areas, second homes were converted into primary homes because of the fiscal benefits for primary homes and the absorption of traditional vacation areas into the sprawl (Sayas 2006).

As previously explored, this housing growth depended on new types of production/provision – particularly in Portugal, Greece and, to a different extent, Italy – developed under profit-led conditions, with bigger development firms and international financial investments,

more extensive development sites and a more controlled but speculative access to land. In Spain, these modes of production rooted in the Francoist regime further expanded the scale of developments and speculative corporate investments. The enormous developments in the north-western and north-eastern rings of Madrid MA are paradigmatic cases. More importantly, the combination of these modes of production led to at least two parallel processes.

The first was the erosion of those forms of affordable production and access to owner-occupation available prior to the liberalisation of the markets, which were accountable for socially heterogeneous suburban expansions organised around small- and medium-sized development firms, self-production, internalised production costs and, above all, affordable and/or informal access to land. This resulted in a severe cut in housing production for lower middle- and low-income groups and curbing of public and non-profit provision. Only a few cases of low-income housing co-operatives continued to operate in the late 1990s because they were developing on land banks purchased or publicly donated in previous decades, as in the eastern and north-eastern districts of Lisbon or in the north-eastern suburbs of Athens MA (e.g. Thrakomakedones).³ These are a circumstantial legacy of previous modes of collective production and must be distinguished from more recent forms of landowners' co-operatives, aimed not at housing production but at land capitalisation, whereby land is resold when prices rise. Such speculative practices among co-operatives are widespread in the Attika region.

The second process was that a new form of housing production was dedicated to the development of middle-class suburban areas and the expansion of wealthier suburbs with affluent 'citadels' around business parks. For instance, during the 1990s, Lisbon MA witnessed a spectacular incidence of new, high-income developments in the affluent municipality of Cascais; similar cases can be found in Madrid MA (Comunidad de Madrid 2000) around the expansion of the western ring (Las Rozas, Torreloaños, Tres Cantos, etc.) and the northern ring (Cobeña, Algete, Valdeolmos-Alalpardo, etc.), in the eastern suburbs of Milan MA (Segrate-Milano Due),⁴ or northern suburbs in Rome MA and in the affluent suburbs of Athens MA, such as the wealthy green hillsides of Kifissia, Psychiko-Filothoi in the east and the southern coastlines of Glyfada, Voula, Vouliagmeni.⁵

These large-scale, middle-class developments drove the growing demand for owner-occupation, in part responding to demographic changes related to the life-cycle of young middle-income families, single households and processes of professionalisation. The demand was in part fuelled by tax benefits, the low cost of borrowing and though

apparently contradictory, unaffordable rental markets in the municipal districts (Figure 8.6).

During the 1990s, this new housing production reinforced previous patterns of socio-spatial segregation as it developed along the middle- and high-income suburban axes, for instance, in the north-west axis of Barcelona and Lisbon MA, the eastern part of Genoa and Athens MA, the northern-western rings of Madrid MA (Sanchinarro), the north-western and southern axis of Rome MA and the south-eastern axis of Turin. The process was consistent throughout the 2000s with the metropolitan sprawl of the port cities and Madrid. As a result, it diverted the process of ethnic peripheralisation and consolidated ethnic clusters outside these axes (Leontidou, Afouxenidis and Kourliouros 2003; Delladetsima 2006; Martinez and Leal 2008; Pujadas et al. 2011; Marques and Ferreira 2016).

After the end of the 1990s, important processes in and around working-class peripheral areas introduced additional mechanisms of socio-spatial and socio-tenurial differentiation. Middle- or high-income owner-occupied archipelagos were also developed at the fringes of peripheral working-class neighbourhoods, which were traditionally heterogeneous areas in social and tenure terms. This first occurred around those peripheral neighbourhoods with improved social, environmental and physical infrastructures and faster connections to the centre.⁶

Many of these working-class peripheral areas were also affected by internal social dynamics. One such dynamic was linked to exogenous processes of gentrification, as in the case of Oeiras in Lisbon MA, the south-western neighbourhoods of Rome MA, the eastern peripheral ring of Madrid and along the Madrid–Toledo axis (Comunidad de Madrid 2003; Comune di Roma 2004a; Malheiros and Vala 2004). Another dynamic was the pressure from the increasing demand of young lower middle- and low-income families priced out of the property and rental markets of the core municipal districts, particularly in continental cities and in Barcelona (Figure 8.3 and Figures 8.6–8.9). Yet another was associated with endogenous processes of upward social mobility that did not entail spatial mobility, such as *spatially entrapped social mobility* of long-term residents (Maloutas 2004b) or *intergenerational social mobility in situ* (Leal 2004b).

The latter phenomena are distinctive to Southern Europe and linked to the family nexus and low housing turnover. *Intergenerational social mobility in situ* refers to the offspring of working-class families, better off in terms of education and income, who search for new houses close to the parents but in residential areas with better environmental conditions and more modern housing typologies. In this case, spatial proximity reflects the strategic role played by families in accessing housing and

child care or other non-monetary services (Allen et al. 2004). This process is associated with family residential reproduction that drives a large demand for new middle-class developments near former working-class areas. Paradigmatic cases can be found in the southern and eastern ring of Madrid MA, the north-eastern axis of Rome MA or the northern part of Milan.

Overall, both processes associated with the metropolitan expansion of owner-occupation – erosion of affordable production and development of new middle-income archipelagos – brought about more homogeneous suburban developments, in terms of social and tenure characteristics. According to the socio-urban characteristics of their surrounding areas, their impact was diverse, either reinforcing or altering those patterns of socio-spatial segregation previously *in situ*, and filtering the ethnic presence in these areas.

In terms of ethnic segregation, the new suburban developments created additional territorial barriers to the insertion of immigrants, on one hand, because they were tailored for middle-class homeowners, on the other, because they increased the value of the adjacent former working-class areas, which further reduced the availability of affordable housing for low-income groups and immigrants. In several cities the fastest rate of price growth occurred in the working-class neighbourhoods of the first peripheral ring (Figures 8.3–8.5). This was a direct effect of adjacent developments and/or the indirect housing pressure from processes previously described relating to internal and external mobility, which prevented processes of filtering up/down linked to disinvestment, thus reducing affordable opportunities for immigrants.

Additional mechanisms of diversification might explain a more significant ethnic presence in some peripheral neighbourhoods or suburbs, yet not in adjacent ones. For instance in Madrid, the ethnic presence in the first peripheral ring increased primarily in Tetuán, Puente de Vallecas, Usera and San Cristóbal because of the distinctive characteristics of the built environment that did not attract middle-income owners (e.g. fragmented and poor urban fabric, residual housing stock, shortage of local infrastructures and services, ageing population, etc.; Comunidad de Madrid 2000, 2003; Martínez and Leal 2008). However, this differentiated ethnic distribution also depended on ethnic kinships, which consolidated ethnic clusters in peripheral neighbourhoods and operated to sort and shift newcomer immigrants. For instance, in Lisbon MA the long-established Cape Verdean kinship in Oeiras and Amadora attracted newcomers from Angola and Cape Verde, but not those from Guinea-Bissau (because they were mainly Muslim) or from Ukraine (because they avoided African communities), who settled in other peripheral neighbourhoods; in other cities, similar

mutually divisive distributions can be found between North Africans and Sub-Saharanans or Indians and Bangladeshis.

From a macroscale perspective, it is important to stress that the recent metropolitan sprawl, led by new homogeneous residential developments (in social and tenure terms), reflects two structural aspects of the local housing systems that create strong barriers to ethnic residential insertion. First, it represents a systemic rupture with previous Southern European modes of housing production and patterns of low- and middle-income suburbanisation, which accounted for the heterogeneous mosaics of socially and tenure-mixed areas that enabled the settlement of internal migrants. Those dynamics are now disappearing. Second, it translates locally the new mechanisms of socio-tenurial differentiation associated with the monetary revolution and the changes in housing and land regimes that restricted owner-occupation to the middle-high social spectrum and reduced the availability of affordable rental markets.

Both aspects are extremely relevant when considering the impact of the current metropolitan sprawl on ethnic insertion and the scale of residential exclusion. Forms of residential exclusion are enhanced by the fact that in Southern European cities, former working-class peripheral areas are characterised by low residential mobility and a high incidence of owner-occupation, which slows the pace of filtering up and down processes that often enable the settlement of migrants and other lower middle- and low-income groups. Overall, areas with an overwhelming concentration of owner-occupation – including new suburban developments and former working-class suburbs – are thus becoming an impermeable territorial barrier for a large proportion of native low earners and immigrants, which is greater than in previous decades. This has resulted in the further peripheralisation of ethnic groups into the second and third metropolitan rings and in the particular Southern European phenomenon of the ‘belt effect’ explained in Chapter 7.

In summary, housing accessibility, socio-urban dynamics and ethnic kinships are as crucial as affordability in understanding the recent process of ethnic metropolitan peripheralisation. A sectoral focus on the housing market value reveals only one part of the story; the geography and scale of owner-occupation (and reduced size of the rental stock), the low residential mobility and the diverse socio-urban changes taking place in the municipal districts and metropolitan suburbs have played a crucial role in reshaping patterns of ethnic and socio-spatial segregation. Such patterns are more complex and stratified and are not a simple product of processes of filtering up and down. Neither do they depend solely on housing prices.

Implications of Housing Tenure Change in the Core Municipal Areas

Across the eight cities, the growth of owner-occupation in the municipal areas reflects a remarkable process of tenure change in the existing stock, since the total number of dwellings has remained stable or has decreased since the 1980s (Figure 8.1). This transformation of the rental stock into owner-occupation is a direct consequence of at least two important processes occurring at varying pace and intensity in all Southern European cities: the abolition of rent control and municipal programmes of renewal. The latter – often referred to as rehabilitation or requalification programmes, and only recently as regeneration programmes – uses spatial reordering as a means to address deprivation and social inequalities.

Controlled rents were abolished in 1978 in Italian cities, in 1985 in Madrid, Barcelona and Lisbon and in 1990 in Athens. A succession of laws enforced and regulated the convergence of moderate/controlled rents towards market rents and the weakening of tenants' rights. Both measures – implemented speedily in Spain and Italy but slowly in Portugal (Salgueiro 2002; Costa 2011) – aimed to stimulate private rent supply in a market-led regime and maintain social mixed neighbourhoods. However, the distrust in the sector after decades of protection and the lack of capital from small landlords to deal with the scale of building decay resulted in the sale of rented properties to a new owner-occupation market and the shrinking of the rental stock.

Tenure changes had already begun by the late 1980s as low-income tenants were replaced by middle- and high-income homeowners. In the initial stage many landlords sold occupied properties to their sitting tenants, many of them middle-class families, who benefited from the controlled low rent that 'enabled them to save money to become owner-occupiers. [Other landlords] emptied their buildings of tenants, refurbished or rebuilt them, or sold to small promoters' (Padovani 2004, pp. 173 and 169). During the 1990s, when the low cost of borrowing and tax relief increased the demand for owner-occupation and the middle classes expanded during the professionalisation process, this socio-tenurial change was accelerated: real-estate companies acquired and refurbished unoccupied and occupied rented properties to supply the new middle-class homeownership market. Later, companies capitalised on the scarcity of the rental stock and the high rents by developing an upmarket rental sector (Padovani 2004, pp. 167–174). As a result, the process of tenure change has transformed the social composition of both tenures in the central and pericentral neighbourhoods, which became attractive areas for investment by middle-class and affluent groups benefiting from renewal programmes and service-based

and tourism-based activities. These changes were often accompanied by population displacement, triggered processes of gentrification and enhanced processes of embourgeoisement (Sorando and Ardura 2016).

However, the scale and pace of the phenomenon varied considerably among the cities. The key differences were the speed of rent convergence enforced by the municipal governments (faster in Madrid, Barcelona, Milan and Rome) and the extent of the state's financial support and regulation for moderate rents (only in Italy and Portugal; Figures 8.7 and 8.8); partly the degree of protection for historic and popular patrimony (higher in Italy and lower in Spain and Greece); mostly the size and investment capacity of the development firms and real-estate companies (larger in Madrid and Barcelona and smaller in Lisbon and Genoa); and above all, the timeframe and scale of the programmes of urban renewal for the rehabilitation of central and waterfront areas (Gastaldi 2003, 2009; Petsimeris 2005; Maloutas 2012b).

In many Southern European cities, public interventions aiming to rehabilitate the historic centres played a significant role in transforming the social and tenurial structure of the city. The first cities to introduce renewal programmes were Milan, Rome and Turin in the 1980s. The Urban Renewal Plan (PRU – *Piani di Recupero Urbano*), which provided State funds for the rehabilitation of private and public buildings, triggered earlier processes of embourgeoisement in the affluent central areas and attracted international inward investments in the property market, as in *zona Centro* and *Magenta* in Milan and *zona Centro* and *Parioli* in Rome. After the early 1990s, processes of gentrification sprawled into the more popular neighbourhoods of the central and peri-central areas, as in *Brera* and *Porta Ticinese* in Milan and *Trevi*, *Campo Marzio* and *Capitelli* in Rome. This process took longer in Turin, where the recovery from the deindustrialisation process and the development of the service economy was slower, delaying the embourgeoisement of the *Quadrilatero Romano* and later gentrification of *San Salvario* (Semi 2004, 2015).

Later, during the 1990s, major programmes of urban renewal aimed at the social and economic transformation of the central areas were implemented also in Madrid and Barcelona (*ARI – Área de Rehabilitación Integrada*, *PERI – Plan Especial de Reforma Interior*) and built up in Turin (*CdQ – Contratti di Quartiere*, *PRUSST – Programmi di Riqualificazione Urbana e Sviluppo Sostenibile del Territorio*). After the 1990s, these programmes played a more significant role in the port cities of Genoa (*URBAN* programme) and Lisbon (*PRU – Programa de Reabilitação Urbana*), while they were marginal or absent in the centre of Athens. Most of these programmes focused on deprived working-class areas as part of wider local and regional growth strategies, some with the




Figure 8.7 Average housing rents compared: variation in monthly rents (€ / p.m.) and in housing rent outlay (% of average income), in Milan, Rome MA, Turin, Genoa and Barcelona, 1998–2004. Sources: compiled by the author, including calculations; data from Sunia (2003a, 2003b, 2004a, 2004b), ARES-2000 (2000, 2003) and Ajuntament de Barcelona (2004). Notes: (a) moderate rent (e.g. Italy, *Patti in Deroga* in 1998 and *Canone Agevolato* in 2002); (b) considering an average income in 1998 = € 1300.00 monthly net (€ 15 600.00 annual net).

AVERAGE MONTHLY RENTS, 1999
 € / m² (semi-central areas)

	1999				
	moderate rent (a)	open market rent	market rent – immigrants	premium paid by immigrants over moderate rent	surplus paid by immigrants over open market rent
Rome	5.16	7.23	8.78	+ 70	+ 21
Milan	3.34	5.37	7.77	+103	+26
Turin	4.00	5.94	7.13	+ 78	+20
Genoa	4.26	6.46	7.64	+ 79	+18

HOUSING RENT OUTLAY, 1998–2004
 % of average income (b)

	1998					2002			2004		
	moderate rent (a)	open market rent	market rent – immigrants	premium paid by immigrants over moderate rent	premium paid by immigrants over open market rent	open market rent	market rent – immigrants	premium immigrants over open market rent	open market rent	market rent – immigrants	premium immigrants over open market rent
Rome	36	44	53	+16	+ 9	55	67	+22	97	118	+21
Milan	25	48	60	+21	+12	61	77	+16	100	126	+26
Turin	39	34	41	+16	+ 7	41	49	+ 8	55	66	+11
Genoa	29	38	46	+17	+ 8	44	52	+ 8	60	71	+11

Figure 8.8 Immigrant households and average housing rents: monthly rents (1999, € / p.m.) and housing rent outlay (1998–2004, % of average income), in Milan, Rome MA, Turin and Genoa, 1998–2004. Sources: compiled by the author, including calculations; data from Sunia (2003a, 2003b, 2004a, 2004b), ARES-2000 (2000, 2003) and Ajuntament de Barcelona (2004). Notes: (a) moderate rent (e.g. Italy, *Patti in Deroga* in 1998 and *Canone Agevolato* in 2002); (b) considering an average income in 1998 = € 1300.00 monthly net (€ 15 600.00 annual net).

support of European Structural Funds (e.g. URBAN programme), while others were linked to international events, such as the Olympic games (Barcelona 1992; Athens 2004; Turin Winter Games 2006), Expo (Lisbon 1998; Milan 2015), Expo Colombo and European Capital of Culture (Genoa 1992 and 2004) and Universal Forum of Cultures (Barcelona 2004). More recently, public interventions focused on neighbourhoods with a large ethnic presence (e.g. Barcelona, Neighbourhood Law – *Llei de Barris* – since 2004 and Neighbourhood Plan – *Pla de Barris* – since 2016; Turin, The Gate project, 2012), waterfront districts and neighbourhoods in the peripheral rings (e.g. in Italy, PRIU – *Programma di Riqualificazione Urbana*, CdQ – *Contratti di Quartiere*, PRUSST – *Programmi di Riqualificazione Urbana e Sviluppo Sostenibile del Territorio* and PIT – *Programmi Integrati Territoriali*).

In several cases, renewal programmes have acted as an important catalyst for housing and social changes in the areas of interventions and in neighbouring areas (see, for Spain, Leal and Sorando 2013; Janoschka, Sequera and Salinas 2014; for Italy, Briata, Bricocoli, and Tedesco 2009; Annunziata 2014; Semi 2015; for Athens, Delladetsima 2003, 2006; Arapoglou 2006; Maloutas 2016; for Lisbon, Cabral and Rato 2003; Mendes 2006, 2009, 2014; Rodrigues 2010). As we will see in Chapter 9, Barcelona offers one of the most paradigmatic cases of state-led gentrification and (ethnic) desegregation, as a result of the several renewal programmes that constituted the so-called Barcelona Model (PERI – *Plan Especial de Reforma Interior*, Olympic Village, @22 programme; see critiques in Capel 2007; Blanco, Bonet and Walliser 2011; Degen and García 2012; Janoschka, Sequera, and Salinas 2014). Through public-private partnership schemes, the rehabilitation of the built environment and public spaces, the improvement or introduction of transport, social and cultural infrastructures (e.g. museums and universities) and city marketing the conditions were created to attract inward investments and real-estate interests, and new economic activities linked to culture, services and tourism. Particularly in central working-class areas, renewal programmes triggered a faster process of tenure change and displacement of the vulnerable population and non-Western foreigners from the rental sector, both formal and residual, providing the ground for an attractive property market for young professionals, middle-class households and Western foreigners. This resulted, directly or indirectly, in a gradual process of residential and commercial gentrification, property market speculation and rises in rent values leading to the de-concentration and microsegregation of working-class groups and immigrants (Arbaci and Tapada-Berteli 2012).

However, it is important to stress that renewal programmes and gentrification processes are ‘highly dependent on contextual causality’

(Maloutas 2012b, p. 34) and have not been a driving factor of radical transformation or analogous processes of social change in all eight cities. For instance, in Athens, 'there is also no evidence of significant gentrification-like social change in its central neighbourhoods. Socio-spatial change in Athens is still dominated (since the mid-1970s) by the gradual and segregating relocation of upper- and upper-middle strata to the suburbs (Maloutas, Emmanuel and Pantelidou-Malouta 2006) and, at the same time, by the desegregating effect of vertical social differentiation around the city centre (Leontidou 1993; Maloutas and Karadimitriou 2001) rather than by gentrification' (Maloutas 2012b, p. 38).

In Lisbon, socio-residential changes in the 1990s were initially related to the process of embourgeoisement and tertiarisation of the pericentral bourgeois areas (Avenidas Novas, Saldanha, Restelo). A conjuncture of factors curtailed private investment in, and revaluation of, the central working-class neighbourhoods: the scale of decay was too great for the small development firms; the rental sector underwent recommodification but rent was slowly converged; as a result, small-scale renewal programmes secured inhabitants' right to stay and ethnic enclaves were consolidated. The gentrification of the central areas was thus a slower, more recent phenomenon, starting in the Bairro Alto as part of the growing fragmentation of the social structure, characteristic of the post-modern city (Salgueiro 2001, p. 225; Mendes 2006), and later in the Rato with the embourgeoisement of Príncipe Real and the multi-ethnic neighbourhood of Mouraria (Malheiros, Carvalho, and Mendes 2012; Mendes 2012). The process of socio-tenurial substitution never matched the scale and pace of Barcelona; renewal programmes were less intense and deregulation of the housing market and 'speculative processes of valuation/devaluation of the land use' of the central areas occurred much later (Mendes 2009, p. 12; Rodrigues 2010). However, the recent change in the rent Law (introduced in 2012 under the Troika's pressure to deregulate the rental market and tenants' protection), coupled with the explosion of tourism and the Golden Visa,⁷ is paving the way to international real-estate investment for tourist accommodation and related services. These changes are bringing about a new wave of gentrification and touristification of central and waterfront neighbourhoods (Santos, Cais do Sodre, Santa Caterina, Alfama, Intendente), characterised by a faster pace and more aggressive speculative nature unforeseen in Lisbon before the mid-2010s.

Similarly, in Genoa the transformation of the social and tenurial structure in the central working-class areas followed later than in Barcelona; during the 2000s a fragmented process of gentrification coexisted with consolidated ethnic clusters (Gastaldi 2003, 2013; Scarpa 2016). Several renewal programmes played an important role in socially reshaping the

centre but their effect was smaller than in Barcelona. The opening of the city centre to the tourist port and the introduction of a university complex and cultural activities aimed to rejuvenate the neglected historic centre and attract a new middle-class market of homeowners. It eventually stimulated private inward investment and speculative processes (Gastaldi 2009, 2012). However, these were slow to take off because of the city's economic stagnation; the growing number of older, rather than young professional people; and the density of the listed built environment, which restricted demolitions, unlike in the case of Barcelona (Petsimeris 2010; Semi 2015).

Although the pace of socio-tenurial changes differed among cities, there were two common denominators. First, the abolition of rent control and renewal programmes facilitated processes of embourgeoisement, gentrification, deproletarianisation and other forms of expansion by middle-income homeowners, often associated with forced evictions and the displacement of low-income and other vulnerable tenants (e.g. non-Western foreign groups). These processes often followed a centrifugal path, spreading outwards from central or pericentral districts into peripheral working-class neighbourhoods.

Second, the liberalisation of the market and renewal programmes drove speculative property market dynamics in all municipal cities, with huge consequences for affordability: due to tenure change the rental stock, particularly its affordable segment, shrank considerably from the mid-1980s. It became scarce, unaffordable and upmarket. The lack of alternative affordable rental markets drove more demand for owner-occupation, supported by a cheap credit regime and a speculative market, so nominal prices and housing outlay rose significantly in both tenures (Figures 8.3–8.9). Rent and nominal price increases in one area created a domino effect in the next. The result was that rents escalated not just in the upgraded districts but in the whole municipal area, thus outpricing lower middle- and low-income tenants – both natives and foreigners – from most municipal districts. Figures 8.6 and 8.7 show how rent affordability affects a large proportion of middle-income households and areas traditionally characterised by low rent and a large concentration of residual rental stock, such as the peripheral neighbourhoods of the continental cities and the central and waterfront districts of the port cities.

None of the local or regional governments introduced policies or programmes in the eight cities to counterbalance the social downside effects of these processes linked to the deregulation of the housing market and facilitated by renewal programmes. The exception was Bologna, where the municipal government provided rent subsidies and secure 25-year tenancies to retain low- and middle-income tenants in the historic centre, controlled rent rises and fostered the rehabilitation of




Figure 8.9 Average monthly rent (€/ p.m.) by geographic location in selected Italian cities, 2004. Sources: compiled by the author; adapted from Sunia (2003b, 2004b).

the built environment (Hoque 2000). However, more socially inclusive and counteractive policies are currently expected in Barcelona and Madrid since advocated by the municipal governments elected in 2015 as the cornerstone of their urban agenda.

Residential marginalisation increased among a wider section of society. This made non-Western immigrants more vulnerable; they had to deal with soaring rent premium (Figure 8.8) in a rental sector made even scarcer by discriminatory practices (ARES-2000 2000; Sunia 2004a, 2004b; ANCI 2010; Orueta 2012). Immigrants were also overcharged within the residual or marginal housing stock, where native or ethnic groups exploited them through high rents. Chinese landlords, for instance, acquired several properties in deprived neighbourhoods in Rome (Esquilino), Milan (from Paolo Sarpi to Buenos Aires), Genoa (centre), Madrid (Lavapiés) and Lisbon (Martim Moniz/Mouraria; see Mapril 2001, 2002). Despite their lack of investment in the much-needed refurbishment of their properties, they let apartments and rooms to immigrants at high rents, thus expanding (an expensive) residual and informal market (Sunia 2003a).

In terms of mechanisms of socio-tenorial differentiation, the abolition of rent control, renewal programmes and gentrification had an enormous impact on the recapitalisation and social recasting of both the rental and the owner-occupation sectors. However, there is one important macroscale difference between continental and port cities. In the continental cities, these transformations reinforced the socio-spatial structures of the city, accounting for *processes of social homogenisation* in the central and pericentral districts. After the late 1980s, the embourgeoisement and gentrification of the central neighbourhoods of Brera,

Magenta and Porta Romana in Milan, Trevi, Campo Marzio, Capitelli in Rome and Quadrilatero Romano in Turin consolidated the traditional presence of middle-income and affluent residents in the historic centres. Those processes are now expanding to the pericentral neighbourhoods of Porta Ticinese and Isola-Garibaldi in Milan, Trastevere and Testaccio in Rome and San Salvario in Turin (Semi 2015).

Conversely, in the port cities, the housing and social changes in the central and waterside areas radically altered the inherited social hierarchy of the city, traditionally organised around a poorer inner city and wealthier outer city. The inflows of middle-income owner-occupiers and the development of economic activities atypical of these central neighbourhoods (often related to culture and tourism) fragmented the socio-tenorial homogeneity of these traditionally working-class neighbourhoods and changed the structural role and social profile of the historical centre. In Barcelona, Ciutat Vella and Raval underwent an extraordinary social change, as did to some extent Bairro Alto, Rato, Santa Catarina and Graça in Lisbon, Santa Misericordia in Genoa, and Metaxourgio, Keramikos and Gazi in Athens (Alexandri 2015). This process of social fragmentation resulted in the mixing and cohabitation of a diversity of groups in terms of income, age and ethnicity, which coexisted with processes of ethnic desegregation, microsegregation, outflow or expulsion of immigrants from central areas towards metropolitan peripheral areas. However, the extent and duration of this social and ethnic mixing will depend on the pace of gentrification, touristification, international real-estate investments and the recapitalisation of the neighbourhood's property value, among other contextual characteristics.

Under current conditions, the historic centre of Barcelona seems likely to be more extensively gentrified than was the 1960s modernist redevelopment of central Athens (Maloutas 2007; Maloutas et al. 2012). In contrast, in Lisbon and Genoa, the urban morphology and typology of dwellings (dense nineteenth-century buildings without lifts or facing narrow alleys) are a physical constraint on the full gentrification of central and waterside areas, unless demolition of blocks or multiple buildings is allowed. While this middle-income expansion, embourgeoisement and gentrification of the central and pericentral areas narrowed the distinction previously identified between port and continental cities (in the geographic distribution of social groups, particularly of the upper classes), it also generated new differences among port cities.

The domination of owner-occupation led to an additional macro-scale effect. As the housing tenure system became more unbalanced, it furthered mechanisms of socio-tenorial differentiation between natives and foreigners in general and mechanisms of segmentation in the rental sector in particular, where there was an increasing concentration of non-Western groups. Forms of residential marginalisation and social

segregation increased but these often translated into processes that reduced their spatial concentration such as microsegregation, desegregation, dispersal, outflow and peripheralisation. These mechanisms have reinforced the systemic (re)production of housing hardship, which is thus not a temporary condition and whose forms of marginalisation are spatially diffused. Paradoxically, decreasing levels of spatial segregation often represent processes of exclusion and advance marginality.

First, with the increase in forms of cohabitation, severe overcrowding and precarious accommodation, the scale of housing hardship was often hidden in the shrinking size and dispersed geography of the rental stock. Its contraction and fragmentation led to forms of microsegregation and diffusion, for instance at the bottom floors of the dwellings, such as in the centre of Genoa and Athens, or in the large flats of the bourgeois peripheral neighbourhoods, like the *Ensanche* in Barcelona and Madrid.

Second, the gradual displacement of low- and lower middle- income tenants from central areas accompanied processes of ethnic desegregation and resettlement towards peripheral neighbourhoods in the metropolitan areas or into smaller cities as in Italy (Blangiardo 2001, 2010; Miret 2001; Comune di Torino 2003; Weber 2004). Processes of ethnic desegregation took place in the gentrifying neighbourhoods of Ciutat Vella (Barcelona), Lavapiés (Madrid), San Salvario and partly Porta Palazzo (Turin), Esquilino (Rome) and Buenos Aires (Milan). Processes of ethnic peripheralisation were also associated with the difficulties for reunified families to secure an independent and permanent settlement in the municipal areas (Tosi 2001, 2004; Comune di Torino 2003, 2004; Comune di Roma 2004b).

Finally, the scarcity and unaffordability of the rental stock increased the entrapment in precarious conditions of those groups that could not rely on the financial resources of family or kinship to access owner-occupation or that pursued migratory projects other than owner-occupation.

Overall, the progressive alteration of the socio-spatial structure of the core municipal area and the gradual reshaping of patterns of ethnic and socio-spatial segregation are interlinked with these forms of residential marginalisation and housing hardship. It is important to stress that under current circumstances, the outflow from municipal districts and the metropolitan peripheralisation of low- and middle-income groups is not driven by choice but is part of a process of centrifugal expulsion from the municipal housing market. This process has underpinned a sort of 'urban diaspora', as discussed in more detail in Chapter 9. Progressively, central areas have been losing the role of city gate and successive rings of the metropolitan area have turned into the new gateways for immigrants. The repercussions of high housing costs and the migratory project are critical, yet their territorial translation is increasingly more complex and requires a finer analysis of the mechanisms and processes involved.

Conclusion

In all eight cities the middle and upper classes in the central and pericentral districts and the suburban residential archipelagos expanded after the 1990s, but the pace and extent of this process differed between cities. At the same time, new mechanisms of socio-tenurial differentiation, driven by current housing systems and local urban political agendas and enhanced by socio-urban processes, triggered new forms of residential marginalisation. In both metropolitan and municipal areas, these new mechanisms of differentiation resulted from (1) the erosion of affordable forms of production and access to owner-occupation, and (2) the robust reduction of the rental sector, particularly the residual and affordable segment. The first factor was linked to new housing production (modes and scale), increasing land prices and the dependency on monetary resources (vs. self-production); the second followed tenure change due to the abolition of rent control and the processes of renewal, municipal rehabilitation plans and gentrification.

As these dynamics translated *locally* the liberalisation of the housing market and credit system and created the conditions for a speculative property market, they triggered a sharp increase in property and rent prices across the whole municipal and metropolitan area and further widened the unbalanced tenure systems. New forms of marginalisation and housing hardship emerged, particularly for immigrants. These were strengthened by the diverse socio-urban processes associated with these dynamics (e.g. embourgeoisement, gentrification, deproletarianisation, spatially entrapped social mobility and intergenerational upward social mobility). Overall, the impact of these mechanisms was gradual, yet so considerable that it radically altered some distinctive Southern European housing arrangements and reshaped the socio-spatial structure of the cities.

Residential marginalisation and housing hardship affects a significant segment of the middle- and low-income social spectrum, particularly those unable to get a foot on the property ladder, who cannot rely on family and kinship monetary resources or who pursue alternative agendas to owner-occupation. Under these circumstances, immigrants are particularly hindered. Some of these forms of marginalisation translate spatially into desegregation processes, outflow and metropolitan peripheralisation following the exclusion of the less better-off segments from municipal district markets. Others are geographically hidden because they are diffused in the new socio-spatial structure of the core municipal areas, trapped in overcrowded, precarious and sub-standard accommodation within an unaffordable municipal rental market or in parental or kinship accommodation.

Thus new processes of microsegregation are emerging. De facto, this reflects locally the biased redistributive arrangements of the current

housing and local urban political agendas (e.g. renewal strategies), which have encouraged speculative practices. However, the peripheral and dispersed geographic distribution of these forms of residential marginalisation and processes of desegregation and microsegregation disguise the actual scale and meaning of exclusion.

There have been three structural outcomes. First, housing affordability has re-emerged as a structural and long-lasting problem. The housing affordability crisis is the structural result of policies and local programmes and is rooted in the housing system and local urban political agendas (see also Chapter 5). It is not a temporary phenomenon driven by housing market dynamics but the result of the reproduction of unbalanced housing tenure arrangements, enhanced by programmes of urban renewal and metropolitan growth and current socio-urban processes. The implications are enormous as a lack of affordable rent restricts household life-cycle, labour mobility and saving strategies for future housing careers, and so on. For those that rely on the rental sector as the only possible form of accommodation, as (supposedly) do most immigrants, the repercussions are severe and far-reaching.

Second, the relationship between spatial segregation and social inequality becomes increasingly difficult to interpret. Processes of marginalisation and housing hardship increased but their spatial and geographic translation was manifold and often dispersed, while their actual scale was hidden or underestimated. The diversity of socio-urban processes and the inheritance of a socially heterogeneous urban fabric added to this complexity. According to the extent and geography of the middle-income urban expansion, the socio-spatial hierarchy of the city was either strengthened (continental cities) or transformed (port cities); those distinctive differences between port and continental cities were narrowing, while new differences among port cities were emerging. Often, both the social homogenisation and the fragmentation of central areas were associated with mechanisms of residential exclusion, leading to processes of desegregation and microsegregation. There are paradigmatic cases where the decrease in the degree of spatial concentration per se is not a spatial representation of processes of integration but of social exclusion. Processes and mechanisms of differentiation tell us more about the nature of segregation than spatial indicators.

Third, the rental sector increasingly acts as an additional mechanism of residential differentiation between native and ethnic groups with similar income levels. Until the mid-1990s the mode of access to owner-occupation was a key driving mechanism of socio-ethnic residential differentiation; afterwards the rental sector also began to play a divisive role between natives and immigrants, creating new forms of differentiation in terms of geography/location, housing quality, security

of tenure, housing hardship and opportunities for housing careers. In all eight cities, after the liberalisation of the housing market the rental sector became scarce and unaffordable, upmarket and socially reconfigured. These dramatic changes in scale, geography, costs and social connotation led to new mechanisms of socio-residential marginalisation. They also watered down those distinctive aspects of the Southern European rental sector that had previously allowed forms of socio-ethnic residential correspondence, particularly in districts with an extensive concentration of affordable rental stock, including its residual segments.

Thus, current patterns of ethnic residential segregation cannot be understood in isolation from past and current mechanisms of socio-ethnic differentiation, particularly those driven by housing systems and urban agendas and enhanced by socio-urban processes. Chapter 9 offers analytical insights from paradigmatic examples across the eight cities that explore further the impact of current mechanisms of differentiation on ethnic residential insertion.

Notes

- 1 *Alea iacta est* is a Latin phrase used/translated in many languages (e.g. 'le jeu son fait' in French) to indicate that there is no turning back after an irrevocable decision, or that events have passed a point of no return. It is attributed by Suetonius to Julius Cesar when he crossed the Rubicon river with his legion in defiance of the Senate, thus starting a civil war (49 BCE).
- 2 *Patos bravos* means literally 'wild ducks' and it is a colloquial expression that refers to a distinctive model of multi-storey development of inferior quality in terms of material, design and planning standards. Provided by developers of dubious professionalism and speculative practices (the so-called wild ducks), this type of development targeted middle- and lower middle-income homeownership markets and expanded between the 1960s and 1980s taking advantages of the returned migration from the former colonies. Similar speculative models also developed in Italy. 'One example is the *Corea* model (the name derives from the Korea War) developed at the edge of the Milanese metropolitan area in the building boom years of the 1950s and 1960s. This low-rise illegal, self-promoted housing was soon absorbed into the urban fabric as Milan expanded, and some of it has a relatively high status' (Allen et al. 2004, p. 176). In both cases informal practices to access land for development were quite common.
- 3 Thrakomakedones was a co-operative development set up to purchase land, benefitting from co-operative status, and then dissolved as soon as the land was distributed among the members at the beginning of the development process.

-
- 4 Segrate-Milano Due was a new model of wealthy suburban neighbourhoods (including offices, sports and educational facilities and pedestrian routes) created in the late 1970s by Edilnord, a company associated with the Fininvest group of Berlusconi. Although it targeted upper middle-class families with children, the model was marketed as a successful new town, which became a reference for the development of new suburban, large-scale gated communities in the 1980s and 1990s in Northern Italy. Basiglio-Milano Tre was later developed in the southern part of Milan MA.
- 5 Kifissia, Psychiko-Filothei and Glyfada, Voula, Vouliagmeni are old nuclei of upper middle-class suburbs. New large-scale residential areas were developed at the edges of these old nuclei by an aggregation of individual initiatives rather than by large-scale landowners or large-scale development companies. According to Maloutas, this was not due to the higher rents in the centre, but to the filtering down in previous decades of a new generation of middle-class households who would potentially settle there.
- 6 For instance, in:
- Athens MA: north-eastern suburbs – Mesogeia (Messoghia) – close to the new highway linking the new airport of Spata; or northern suburbs around the Olympic village (Coccosis and Kyratsoulis 2002; Delladetsima 2003).
 - Lisbon MA: South-bank expansion adjacent the new bridge – Alcochete, Montijo; eastern suburbs around the Tagus Park – Oeiras and in direction of Sintra; or eastern developments around the Expo 1998 – Oriente (Cabral and Rato 2003).
 - Barcelona: eastern developments adjacent the Olympic village – Sant Martí.
 - Milan: north-western and north-eastern suburbs linked to the new rail and metro connections – e.g. Rho Fiera.
 - Madrid MA: eastern part and first southern metropolitan ring (Comunidad de Madrid 2000, 2003).
- 7 The Golden Visa (or ARI – *Autorização de Residência para Investimento* – Residence Permit for Investment Activity) was introduced in Portugal in 2012 and is a fast track for foreign investors from non-EU countries to obtain a fully valid residency permit, which allows the investor and his family members to enter and/or live in Portugal, travel freely within Schengen-based European countries and apply for Portuguese citizenship after six years. The majority of the applications have been from China.
- Acquisition of property above €500,000 – or above €350,000 for properties more than 30 years old or located in areas of urban renovation – also qualify for the Golden Visa programmes. Intended to boost the Portuguese housing market in recession since the financial crisis, it has created the conditions for a new speculative market that targets historical areas and deprived working-class neighbourhoods in central locations. A Golden Visa programme was also introduced in Spain (€500,000 as a minimum spend on a property), Cyprus (€300,000) and Greece (€250,000).

The Urban Diaspora

The Paradox of (De)Segregation

How have the structural transformations of the Southern European housing systems and urban renewal strategies affected patterns of ethnic segregation during periods of rising immigration? How can patterns of ethnic residential segregation be interpreted within the changing socio-spatial division of the city? This chapter continues the analysis developed in Chapter 8 by focusing on how the socio-residential conditions and spatial segregation patterns of the diverse ethnic groups have changed since the mid-1990s. The paucity of diachronic data on foreign groups and housing across all eight cities makes it impossible to develop an accurate comparative longitudinal analysis; however, there is sufficient diachronic disaggregated data from Milan, Madrid, Barcelona and Lisbon to offer a starting point from which to examine key changes in patterns and processes.

The social and spatial dimensions of these changes are disentangled and analysed in turn. The chapter first explores how and to what extent residential marginalisation and socio-tenurial differentiation have intensified across the ethnic groups and widened the divide between natives and immigrants. Housing hardship grew, residual segments of the rental sector and owner-occupation markets became more ethnicised and the expansion of homeownership among immigrants disguised new mechanisms of marginalisation.

However, it then becomes clear that such intensification of social inequality does not imply an increase in spatial segregation. By examining

changes in the patterns of ethnic segregation, the second part of the chapter shows how the increase in socio-residential inequality was associated with spatial desegregation, peripheral dispersal and diffuse segregation, continuing the story set in previous chapters. In particular, the analysis reveals how the geographic distribution of successive waves of immigrants followed centrifugal paths and how these new patterns of segregation stemmed from structural mechanisms of differentiation driven by the housing systems and urban renewal regimes. Thus while social inequality has increased for most non-Western groups in the cities examined, spatial segregation has decreased. The metaphor of the 'urban diaspora' is advanced here to capture this phenomenon – a systemic and macroscale exclusionary process that forces the centrifugal expulsion and dispersal – and signal the role of the state in driving this geography of urban inequalities.

We see once again the paradox at the heart of this book that challenges the hypothesis that spatial segregation is an indicator of social inequality. The two dimensions do not necessarily equate and their relationship is far from linear. Although these examples might not be representative of other cities, they are emblematic cases of the magnitude and geography of ethnic residential exclusion in Southern Europe.

Widening Ethnic Residential Marginalisation and Socio-Tenurial Differentiation

In the last chapter we suggested that the monetary revolution, the recommodification of land and the rental sector and the fostering of owner-occupation combined to increase the residential marginalisation of immigrants and widen the socio-tenurial divide between natives and non-Westerners. As we will see in this chapter, evidence from Milan, Barcelona, Madrid MA and Lisbon MA confirms this assumption and reveals the scale and geography of the exclusionary processes driven by macroscale housing mechanisms and local renewal programmes. The growth of residential inequalities varies among ethnic groups; differences in the migratory project, length of stay, ethnic affiliation and housing behaviour all affect the housing trajectories and degree of marginalisation. Diachronic data from the four cities captures such diversity and points to forms of residential marginalisation that are structural, because systemic. Some forms remain visible, while others are concealed within highly segmented property and rental markets. Despite this, there are signs of improvement in the housing conditions of some ethnic groups.

Milan and Its Region

The most systematic record of worsening housing conditions for immigrants comes from Lombardy and its capital, Milan. During the 1990s, the number of non-Western groups in all forms of precarious accommodation (except workplace) and in shared, often overcrowded, rentals increased sharply (Figure 9.1). Nonetheless, shared and precarious accommodation formed part of migrants' strategies for saving and remittance, especially for single-gender migratory projects (e.g. Somalian and Filipino women; Chell 1997; Ribas-Mateos 2005). Figure 9.2 shows that for female immigrants, housing quality was unrelated to income, and those earning the most were living in shanties and workplaces. However, the conventional assumption that higher incomes lead to improved housing circumstances is partly validated in the case of male immigrants.




Figure 9.1 Housing insertion of non-Western groups, by year of arrival, in Lombardy (and Milan), 1989–2001: according to housing tenures (owner-occupation and rental sector) and types of accommodation (independent and precarious). Sources: compiled by author, data from Tosi (2002, pp. 131–133).




Figure 9.2 Immigrants' housing insertion in Lombardy in 2003, by gender: immigrants' average monthly income in each type of accommodation. *Sources:* compiled by author, data from Menonna (2005, pp. 4–5).

In 2001 a significant number of all non-Westerners (about 40% in Lombardy and 55% in Milan) suffered housing hardship and overcrowding, showing these conditions affected even those immigrants with a stable job and an income and pointing at a constrained housing rental market (Figure 9.1; see also ARES-2000 2003; Tosi 2004; ANCI 2010). Local and/or macroscale housing mechanisms increased housing costs, as previously indicated by the sharp rise in immigrants' rents (Figures 8.6–8.8). After 2001 the residential condition of long-established immigrant groups improved slightly then began to deteriorate from 2008. This fluctuation highlights the residential vulnerability of non-Westerners in a commodified housing system during an international crisis (Menonna 2010; Cucca 2012).

The incidence of housing hardship was greater in Milan than in the Lombardy region. In 2009, ethnic residential marginalisation in Milan remained acute: about 42% of immigrants lived in precarious accommodation compared with 30% in Lombardy (Menonna 2010), the rate of homelessness among immigrants was triple that of Lombardy (Tosi 2010) and most independent accommodation was found in the residual segment of the private rented market and social housing (Agustoni, Alietti and Cucca 2012, 2015). As pointed out by Pozzo (2009b, 2010), the residential trajectory of immigrants was particularly polarised. During the past two decades, the level of independent accommodation and owner-occupation grew slowly and levels of spatial concentration remained moderate, but housing hardship and entrapment in severe conditions of social deprivation persisted (Borlini 2009; Cucca 2012). In terms of housing quality and affordability, the gap between Italians and non-Western groups widened after the 'monetary revolution' and renewal programmes in the central and pericentral areas, despite signs that long-established immigrants had established housing careers (Mugnano and Palvarini 2011).

Figure 9.3 shows ethnic residential trajectories between 1990 and 2003 according to the continent of origin. The incidence of precarious accommodation and rent sharing remains significant and there is also a general pattern of improved conditions. However, diverging trajectories are indicated. Owner-occupation among Latin Americans and Asians may occur primarily among some long-established groups, because of their greater disposable income and eligibility for credit (Argentinians) or their investment project linked to entrepreneurial activities (Chinese). Other long-established groups may remain in live-in employment or rent sharing to remit savings and invest in property in their country of origin (Filipinos or Peruvians). The recent arrival of Eastern Europeans may explain their low levels of independent accommodation, which contrasts with the progress of long-established

Poles and former Yugoslavians. In the case of North Africans, the steady increase in independent rented accommodation (the highest among long-established groups) might indicate the role played by ethnic and family kinships in accommodating successive flows of co-nationals and families. Progression in renting is particularly important for ethnic groups that follow *sharia* law (Moroccans), while Coptic Catholic Egyptians pursue owner-occupation.

Moreover, the increase in owner-occupation is not always a sign of residential progression. In Milan, 'in most cases the dwellings purchased by migrants are in market segments that are not desirable for Italian buyers. [They] are generally smaller, more peripheral and in worse condition than those chosen by Italians (Scenari Immobiliari 2005). (...) High prices and poor quality of affordable housing led to a growing number of migrants buying a home in other provinces (especially Novara, Piacenza and Bergamo)', further afield from Milan metropolitan area (Mugnano and Palvarini 2011, p. 16). This trend, clearly traceable throughout the 2000s, has intensified since the financial crisis. According to Mugnano (2017, p. 80 – data from Scenari Immobiliari 2016), already in 2006 more than 60% of dwellings purchased by immigrants were located across the peripheral neighbourhoods of Milan (26.6%) and its metropolitan area (38.6%). These areas combined have reached almost 90% of foreigner acquisitions every year since 2012 (with 36.7 and 50.1%, respectively, in 2015), spreading particularly towards the edges of the metropolis. The magnitude of this market segmentation has also been captured in the census of 2011 with the metropolitan area of Milan recording 8% of all foreigners living in Italy (and another 8.5% in the metropolitan area of Rome).

Overall, Milan is an emblematic case of the persistence of ethnic residential marginalisation and the slow progress of ethnic residential careers. Socio-ethnic housing differentiation widened over the past two decades (with a difference of 56 points between Italians and non-Westerns in 2001) as the housing market was liberalised and central and pericentral areas became subject to renewal, embourgeoisement and gentrification (Ponzo 2009a; Bricocoli and Cucca 2016). Prospects of residential careers among ethnic groups have become limited and funnelled into the peripheral and residual segments of Milan's housing market, or beyond the metropolitan area.

Barcelona and Madrid

Ethnic residential trajectories are apparently better in Barcelona (Figure 9.4) and Madrid MA (Figure 9.5), where in 2001 the incidence of owner-occupation across non-Western groups was higher than in Milan, particularly for long-established groups (Moroccans, Filipinos,

HOUSING TENURE and TYPE OF ACCOMM. (%)		INDEPENDENT ACCOMM. owner-occ. and rent				PRECARIOUS ACCOMMODATION						
		OWNER-OCCUPATION	TOTAL RENT of which: - alone or with relatives - sharing with other imm.			TOTAL INDEPENDENT	GUEST	RECEPTION CENTRE	ILLEGAL ACCOM.	HOTEL and WORKPLACE	OTHERS	TOTAL PRECARIOUS
CONTINENT & COUNTRY of origin (by nationality) map = LQs, 1996		foreign residents										
AFRICA North	1990	2.4	43.6	-	-	46.0	7.2	27.1	7.0	-	1.5	42.8
	1996	0.6	67.9	-	-	68.5	6.2	8.4	9.0	-	9.5	30.5
	2001	3.9	75.5	41.8	33.7	79.4	9.7	5.2	2.2	1.0	2.5	20.6
	2003	3.7	77.4	48.2	29.2	81.1	8.3	4.6	2.8	3.2	0.0	18.9
AFRICA other	1990	7.0	55.4	-	-	62.4	4.5	12.2	4.2	12.2		33.1
	1996	2.2	66.3	-	-	68.8	8.4	12.1	0.8	8.6		29.9
	2001	8.5	50.9	16.9	34.0	59.4	16.7	11.8	0.5	9.9	1.7	40.6
	2003	13.9	48.6	24.3	24.3	62.5	4.3	15.7	0.9	14.7	1.7	37.3
LATIN AMERICA	1990	1.1	66.6	-	-	67.7	9.3	3.5	2.5	16.9		32.2
	1996	1.6	84.0	-	-	85.6	6.0	2.0	-	6.4		14.4
	2001	7.4	52.4	31.8	20.6	59.8	23.2	1.7	0.0	13.8	1.5	40.2
	2003	11.4	63.7	38.8	24.9	75.1	14.0	1.3	0.0	8.3	1.3	24.9
ASIA	1990											
	1996											
	2001	9.6	57.9	37.3	20.6	67.5	7.4	3.6	0.3	17.3	3.7	32.3
	2003	11.1	62.5	44.6	17.9	73.6	6.2	3.8	0.0	15.7	0.8	26.5
EAST EU.	1990	0.0	17.9	-	-	17.9	23.0	30.0	8.8	20.2		82.0
	1996	0.0	40.8	-	-	40.8	8.6	13.6	23.1	9.5		54.8
	2001	5.0	54.2	30.8	23.4	59.2	5.7	4.6	9.6	7.1	16.2	40.8
	2003	4.4	57.6	27.6	30.0	62.0	2.5	5.6	6.9	18.2	27.9	38.2
Tot. non-Western	2001	7.4	58.7	33.2	25.5	66.1	12.3	5.0	1.6	11.2	3.8	33.9
	2003	9.0	63.4	39.4	24.0	72.4	7.5	5.0	1.7	12.0	1.5	27.7
Total population**	2001	63.7	33.6	-	-	97.3	** estimated					2.7

Figure 9.3 Immigrants' housing insertion: Milan, by housing tenures (%) and types of accommodation (%), 1990–2003. *Sources:* compiled by the author; data for 1990 and 1996 from Tosi (2002, p. 131, table 6), Tosi and Lombardi (1999, p. 26, table 4); data for 2001 and 2003 from ISMU (2003, 2005); data for LQs, 1996 maps from Tosi and Lombardi (1999).

Pakistanis and Peruvians) and groups engaged in entrepreneurial activities (Chinese, Pakistanis). The second wave of Latin American migrants (Ecuadorians, Colombians) also score better than their counterparts in Milan, although they also have the highest levels of overcrowding and substandard conditions in Catalonia and the Madrid region (which coincides with the metropolitan area).

HOUSING TENURE and TYPE OF ACCOMM. (%)		INDEPENDENT ACCOMM. owner-occ. and rent				PRECARIOUS ACCOMMODATION						
		OWNER-OCCUPATION	TOTAL RENT of which: - alone or with relatives - sharing with other imm.			TOTAL INDEPENDENT	GUEST	RECEPTION CENTRE	ILLEGAL ACCOM.	HOTEL and WORKPLACE	OTHERS	TOTAL PRECARIOUS
CONTINENT & COUNTRY of origin (by nationality)		foreign residents										
map = LQs, 1996												
Egypt	1991											
	8,200 1996	0.0	86.6	58.4	28.2	86.6	1.9	1.9	3.8	5.7	0.1	13.3
	15,700 2003											
Morocco	1991	3.0	55.0	-	-	58.0	8.0	29.0	4.0	1.0		42.0
	3,600 1996	1.2	60.1	36.9	23.2	61.3	8.3	12.5	13.1	4.4	0.4	38.7
	6,000 2003											
Senegal	1991	0.0	91.0	-	-	91.0	6.0	-	3.0	-		9.0
	600 1996	1.8	89.3	-	-	91.1	4.5	1.7	-	2.7		8.9
	2,000 2003											
Philip.	1991	10.2	60.3	-	-	70.5	8.5	-	-	21.0		29.5
	7,600 1996	0.0	90.8	71.3	19.5	90.8	1.0	0.0	0.0	7.2	0.0	8.2
	21,200 2003											
China	1991	1.8	58.9	-	-	60.7	26.9	-	0.8	10.2		37.9
	3,900 1996	6.2	66.5	46.6	19.9	72.7	8.9	0.0	0.0	13.0	5.4	27.3
	11,000 2003											

Figure 9.3 (Continued)

However, several studies have stressed the severity of ethnic residential marginalisation that followed the growing inflow of immigrants after the late 1990s (Bayona 2007, 2008; Bayona and López-Gay 2011; Orueta 2012). It persisted in the consolidated multi-ethnic areas of the historic centre and pericentral areas of both cities and in the first peripheral ring of Madrid, where the residual segment of the rental market gradually saturated during the 2000s. As the affordable rental sector became scarce, severe overcrowding grew among Pakistanis, Chinese, Filipinos, Ecuadorians and Colombians in the residual segments of both the rental and the property market (Martinez and Leal 2008; Terrones 2013). Simultaneously, ethnic residential marginalisation grew in the new multi-ethnic areas. In Barcelona it emerged in the peripheral neighbourhoods of Nou Barris, Ciutat Meridiana and Besos, and in the first metropolitan ring (Martori and Apparicio 2011; Valdivia and Almirall 2011; Miret and Serra del Pozo 2013). In Madrid MA it occurred further afield in the second metropolitan ring, particularly in the southern, working-class belt of homeowners from Usera

HOUSING TENURE and HOUSING QUALITY (%)		HOUSING TENURE owner-occ. and rent						HOUSING QUALITY of which: PRECARIOUS ACC. (a)				
		OWNER-OCCUPATION of which: - paid - mortgage (or loan)			TOTAL RENT	FREE of RENT	OTHERS	VERY DEGRADED	TOTAL OVERCROW. (b)	High overcrow. (c)	Moderate overcrow. (d)	
CONTINENT & COUNTRY of origin (by nationality) map = LQs, 1996	2001 residents											
AFRICA	9,619	20.6	9.6	77.1	70.4	0.9	1.4	22.9	43.0	3.2	24.5	
Morocco	6,846	20.5	9.3	11.2	77.1	0.9	1.5	23.9	44.7	3.4	25.6	
LATIN AMERICA	46,486	19.0	9.1	9.9	78.2	1.3	1.4	17.8	34.8	3.6	22.2	
Ecuador	14,144	13.7	8.1	5.6	83.6	1.4	1.3	20.5	56.2	8.3	40.0	
Colombia	7,700	15.9	8.2	7.7	80.7	1.9	1.6	16.6	36.1	2.9	22.0	
Peru	7,550	24.1	8.3	15.8	73.7	0.9	1.2	-	-	-	-	
ASIA	12,639	28.1	12.3	15.8	69.5	1.1	1.3	28.8	38.3	4.8	25.6	
Pakistan	3,602	23.7	11.2	12.5	74.9	0.5	1.0	44.1	51.2	11.4	42.4	
Philippines	3,450	27.1	8.7	18.4	70.6	1.1	1.2	43.3	31.5	2.9	25.6	
China	2,390	32.1	13.8	18.4	65.0	0.5	2.3	17.8	43.6	3.0	21.2	
EASTERN EUROPE (+ other Europe)	4,924	23.5	13.6	9.9	74.3	0.8	1.4	-	-	-	-	
Romania	898	17.7	10.8	6.9	81.5	0.6	0.2	13.5	28.4	2.3	16.7	
EU 15	14,891	38.3	21.6	16.7	58.4	1.4	2.0	-	-	0.4	4.5	
NORTH AMERICA	2,346	30.2	15.2	15.0	67.5	1.4	0.9	-	-	-	-	
Total non-Western	73,675	21.1	10.0	11.1	76.3	1.2	1.4	18.8	-	2.8	20.0	
Total Western	17,340	37.2	20.7	16.5	59.6	1.4	1.8	-	-	-	-	
TOTAL (homes)	804,614	72.0	51.1	20.9	24.7	1.2	2.0	9.3	-	-	-	

Figure 9.4 Immigrants' housing insertion in Barcelona, by continent and country of origin (nationality): housing tenures (%) and housing quality (%), precarious acc. in Catalonia), 2001. *Sources:* compiled by the author; calculations from INE Spain (2003) for Census 2001; data on precarious accommodation from Bayona (2008, table 1); data for LQs, 1996 maps from IDESCAT (1996). *Notes:* (a) Values for Catalonia Region (Bayona 2008); (b) home with >6 person; (c) <6m²/person; (d) between 6 and 10m²/person.

HOUSING TENURE and HOUSING QUALITY (%) CONTINENT & COUNTRY of origin (by nationality) 2001 residents		HOUSING TENURE owner-occ. and rent					HOUSING QUALITY of which: PRECARIOUS ACCOM.				
		OWNER-OCCUPATION of which: - paid - mortgage (or loan)	TOTAL RENT	FREE of RENT	OTHERS	I.R.E. (a) - INDEX of RESIDENTIAL EXCLUSION	TOTAL OVERCROW. (b)	High overcrow. (c)	Moderate overcrow. (d)		
AFRICA	52,815	26.1	9.2	17.0	70.4	1.6	1.8	-	-	-	-
Morocco	38,256	25.5	8.6	16.9	70.8	1.8	2.0	28.3	20.0	3.3	16.7
LATIN AMERICA	200,341	22.3	9.4	12.8	75.2	1.3	1.2	-	-	-	-
Ecuador	85,569	16.4	8.3	8.1	81.5	1.1	1.0	28.1	36.1	9.2	26.9
Colombia	49,985	17.3	7.7	9.6	80.6	1.0	1.1	20.8	20.7	2.9	17.8
Peru	19,165	36.9	10.2	26.7	59.7	1.8	1.6	20.1	14.8	1.0	13.9
ASIA	18,929	38.8	17.0	21.9	57.9	1.3	2.0	-	-	-	-
China	7,568	36.7	14.2	22.5	60.6	0.8	1.8	-	-	-	-
EASTERN EUROPE (+ other Europe)	48,964	22.7	8.8	13.8	74.4	1.2	1.7	-	-	-	-
Romania	21,623	17.2	7.1	10.1	79.4	1.5	1.9	19.9	17.2	2.6	14.6
Poland	10,001	27.6	6.4	21.2	70.7	0.8	1.0	-	-	-	-
EU 15	33,591	55.8	26.1	29.7	40.6	1.6	2.0	-	-	-	-
NORTH AMERICA	7,623	49.0	25.9	23.1	47.0	2.1	1.9	-	-	-	-
Total non-Western	321,049	23.9	9.7	14.2	73.3	1.3	1.5	25.4	26.0	5.4	20.7
Total Western	41,454	54.6	26.0	28.5	41.8	1.7	2.0	-	-	-	-
Spanish	5,057,288	84.7	62.0	22.7	12.5	1.6	1.2	8.3	1.4	0.1	1.2

Figure 9.5 Immigrants' housing insertion in Madrid Metropolitan Area, by continent and country of origin (nationality): housing tenures (%) and housing quality (% , precarious acc.), 2001. *Sources:* compiled by the author; data from Martinez (2007, figure 12), Martinez and Leal (2008, table 2) and calculations from INE Spain (2003) for Census 2001. *Notes:* (a) I.R.E. refers to adequacy and habitability (indicators: overcrowding, residential density, facilities and conditions of the building (Martinez 2007); (b) home with >6 person; (c) <6m²/person; (d) between 6 and 10m²/person.

to Villaverde (Dominguez, Leal and Goytre 2012, p. 232). ‘Most Latin American, Asian or Central-Eastern European immigrants’ moving to the metropolitan rings bought and rented ‘in low quality dwellings developed during the 1950s and 1960s’ (Bayona and Gil-Alonso 2012, p. 325). These were in the residual segments of the property market shunned by the Spanish, like the large state-subsidised estates for working-class homeowners (*poligonos de viviendas*) as well as Barcelona’s dense multi-storey buildings that suffer from aluminosilicate, a cement pathology that affects the structure of the building.

As Orueta (2012, p. 66) argues regarding the Spanish cities, the residential marginalisation of the 1990s developed into enclaves of exclusion during the 2000s as a result of residualist social policies, urban renewal regimes and the absence of social housing provision. This was part of a wider process of social fragmentation rather than ethnic ghettoisation or polarisation.

As in Milan, the increasing residential marginalisation in highly segmented markets combined with processes of ethnic peripheralisation, suburbanisation and diffuse segregation. Indeed, the distinctive tenorial structure of the market and the hegemony of property-led policies made Madrid the most extreme case of socio-ethnic and tenorial differentiation among Southern European cities. Tenure distances between natives and non-Westerners were high in 2001 (84.7 and 23.9% homeowners, respectively, or 12.5 and 73.3% renters, Figure 9.5). This socio-ethnic distance of 61 points is even more striking considering the wide incidence of owner-occupation among natives (62% in 2001), reflecting the key role of family support and inherited patrimony in this process of differentiation (Leal and Dominguez 2009).

The case of Barcelona shows that the remarkable growth of homeownership among migrants during the 2000s was associated with an important mechanism of residential marginalisation, unique to Spain: the financialisation of poor immigrants. In the last three years of the housing boom (2004–2007), in Spain ‘one million migrants (out of six million) became homeowners’, a phenomenon that helped to prolong the housing bubble (Palomera 2014, p. 219). Two studies of the rise of Filipino and Latin American homeowners in Raval and Ciutat Meridiana (Terrones 2011, 2013; Palomera 2014) reveal that this apparently local phenomenon was actually the result of three macroscale factors: (1) the large demand for housing by immigrants and (2) a significant stock of overvalued residual properties that were unwanted by the Spanish provided a distinct supply–demand context that (3) was exploited by real-estate agents and banks through predatory lending specialising in the financialisation of poor migrants.

As both studies describe in detail, real-estate agents and banks developed an aggressive strategy to sell properties to immigrants in the densest part of Raval and in the *polígonos de vivienda* of Ciutat Meridiana.

Ciutat Meridiana illustrates the extent of these schemes: between 2000 and 2007 the number of migrants, mainly of Latin American origin, rose from 2 to almost 40% of the total population. Similarly, 35% of Filipinos in Barcelona lived in Raval by 2009, with a significant concentration in the northern part around Carrer Paloma, now considered the heart of the Filipino cluster. Estate agents and financial institutions drove these processes of ethnic concentration and the filtering up of 'many second-generation migrants from rural Spain [who sold their apartment inherited from their parents and] moved to suburban locations often considered more attractive. (...) The processes implied an increase in housing prices in Ciutat Meridiana, proportional to other central and gentrifying areas of the city' (Palomera 2014, p. 227).

These schemes flourished as the large demand for housing by immigrants was channelled into homeownership, as a 'forced alternative' to a saturated, expensive and discriminatory rental market (Terrones 2013, p. 15). Real-estate agents focused on Filipinos and Latin Americans, employing agents and 'professional guarantors' trusted by the community and often including mortgages for buying properties in the country of origin. The neoliberal concept of homeownership as a secure investment and source of stability, social mobility and status married easily with the Catholic culture of owner-occupation embedded in both groups.

Banks and estate agents created a wide range of facilities to finance immigrants who generally lacked income, savings and relatives with a property to act as guarantors. As Terrones (2013, p. 18) puts it, 'financial institutions developed strategies to force to the maximum the indebtedness capacity of buyers' by providing 100% credits even to the non-creditworthy; accepting unrealistic guarantees with large numbers of people on the title deeds; using outlawed practices such as the 'crossed guarantee' and 'concepts like "round mortgage" or "hire-purchase" that cover the real risk of the operation (...) and the consequences of not being able to pay the mortgage'. These lending schemes were not based on economic solvency but on the expectation that buyers would sublet rooms to help pay monthly instalments. They promoted an informal subletting market, coupled with severe overcrowding and worsening housing conditions. 'Ultimately, banks absorb the majority of the resources that informally circulate through these networks, at the expense of impoverishing most of their members' (Palomera 2014, p. 230).

As in the United States, this was made possible by the deregulation and securitisation of mortgages but was further aggravated by the Spanish mortgage law that ‘unlike US legislation, does not free homeowners from their debt once they are foreclosed’, thus leaving them homeless but still owing a large part of the credit to the bank for the rest of their life; between 2008 and 2012 there were more than 300 foreclosures in Ciutat Meridiana and 350,000 in Spain (Palomera 2014, p. 231). Overall, the expansion of owner-occupation through the financialisation of poor households led to over-indebtedness, overcrowding and severe risks of social exclusion.

Barcelona provides ‘just an extreme example of what has been a common behaviour throughout the country’ (Terrones 2013, p. 17). Similar cases can be found in Madrid MA across the *polígonos de viviendas* of the southern ring (Martínez and Leal 2008; Domínguez, Leal and Goytre 2012). San Cristóbal de los Ángeles in Villaverde district is one example: by the end of the housing boom in 2007, this *polígono de viviendas* became the neighbourhood with the highest ethnic concentration (45% of total population) as the Spanish population, mostly former migrants from rural areas, were filtered out. The growing incidence of Latin American, Romanian and Moroccan homebuyers coupled with informal subletting was possibly linked to predatory financialisation of poor migrants, as in Ciutat Meridiana neighbourhood in Barcelona. Although there are no studies about these financial schemes in Madrid, they could be widespread since owner-occupation – which represents 85–90% of the total housing stock – dominates Madrid’s housing market, leaving a negligible proportion of the stock to the formal rental market.

The Spanish cases offer some important insights on the macro-scale mechanisms producing urban inequality. The real-estate agents and financial institutions had an important influence on patterns of segregation. Also, the growth of migrant homebuyers led to severe overcrowding and informal (sub)letting markets, with risks of social exclusion linked to permanent over-indebtedness. This is not a sign of housing career but of entrapment in an overvalued, segmented market.

These forms of residential marginalisation are more severe than those experienced by previous migrants and working-class groups who accessed owner-occupation through self-production and state-subsidised production. They demonstrate the perverse effects of Spain’s deregulated monetary-based housing system, where the financialisation of poor households substituted housing policies for the expansion of the rental system and production of affordable housing.

Lisbon

Lisbon MA provides a very different picture. In 1991 and 2001, the conditions for ethnic residential progression were more favourable than in Milan, Barcelona and Madrid MA, and socio-tenurial differentiation was more moderate. As shown in Figure 9.6, the incidence of owner-occupation was high across the diverse ethnic groups (from 20 to 56% in 2001), particularly among the first-wave immigrants from the former colonies of Cape Verde, Angola and Mozambique (about 45% in 1991 and 55% in 2001). In 1991 there was little tenurial differentiation between the Portuguese and the non-Western groups (55.5 and 50.1% homeowners, or 44.5 and 49.9% renters), although this widened in the following decades. In 2001 there was a difference of 16 points; Portuguese and non-Westerns were 70.6 and 54.2% homeowners, or 29.4 and 45.8% renters. The reason for this was not a greater access to credit, as in Spain, but that the larger, more affordable rental sector and larger self-production system allowed migrants to save. The contrast with Barcelona and Madrid MA is striking.

The moderate socio-ethnic tenurial differentiation in Lisbon MA can be attributed primarily to two factors (described in detail in Chapters 7 and 8). First, the earlier migratory flows from the former colonies took place in the second half of the 1960s and during the mid-1970s decolonisation process, at the same time as Portuguese internal migration. As rent controls had curtailed the large supply of rental homes in Lisbon municipality, both migrant groups became part of the process of suburbanisation organised around different forms of affordable self-production for homeownership, including shanties and clandestine neighbourhoods.

Second, a large proportion of rental stock, particularly the residual and affordable segment, and the informal rental market played a big role in keeping housing costs to a minimum and allowing savings for future housing careers. Unlike other Southern European cities, after the abolition of rent control and liberalisation of the housing market, Lisbon MA inherited a large rental stock, which maintained its size and affordability because rent convergence and evictions were not widely enforced and the pace of housing renewal programmes and tenure change was slow.

However, as in the other cities, ethnic residential marginalisation and housing hardship persisted (Silva 1999; Fonseca 2003, 2008; Guerra 2011). In 1991, the housing conditions of immigrants were generally worse than those of the Portuguese. A quarter of migrants from Portuguese-speaking African countries (PALOP) lived in shanties and about two-thirds lived in overcrowded homes, particularly in the

first peripheral ring (Oeiras, Amadora and Loures; see Fonseca 1999; Malheiros 2000b).

By 2001, long-established PALOP groups registered some patterns of improvement, but their difference in relation to the Portuguese population widened (Figure 9.6). Although more Cape Verdeans, Angolans and Mozambicans became homeowners and progressed into traditional types of housing, precarious conditions persisted. After the mid-1990s, the National Institute of Housing funded the PER rehousing programme (*Programa Especial de Realojamento*), designed to rehouse more than 50,000 families living in shanties in the Lisbon MA. The PALOP citizens benefited most from this and moved from precarious accommodation to social housing. Despite this, the absolute number of PALOP citizens living in shanties increased by 22% from 1991 to 2001, suggesting that shanties were much more ethnicised than in the previous decade (Arbaci and Malheiros 2010). In addition, the PER-families programme, which offered subsidies to buy affordable apartments in the market, mainly favoured Portuguese families whose earnings and creditworthiness were greater than those of PALOP families. On a small scale, the PER programme reinforced the mechanisms of socio-ethnic tenurial differentiation already in place (Pato and Pereira 2013; Pinto and Guerra 2013).

Socio-ethnic differentiation and residential exclusion increased, particularly among the second and third wave of immigrants from Asia, Eastern Europe and Brazil. Between 1991 and 2001 housing conditions, in terms of overcrowding, subletting and sharing with other migrants, deteriorated further. This blight expanded from the central deprived areas to the metropolitan ring and to shanty settlements (Baganha and Fonseca 2004; Malheiros and Vala 2004; Malheiros and Fonseca 2011). Simultaneously, it became more difficult for these immigrant groups to access homeownership, mortgages and affordable rents, in contrast with the positive residential trajectories of Portuguese and Western groups (Figure 9.6).

These patterns of change indicate that the new monetary access to housing (versus self-production) differentiated and widened the gap between natives and non-Westerns, though not as much as in Milan, Barcelona or Madrid. Additionally, the loss of affordable stock (also linked to the demolition of substandard dwellings) had a detrimental impact on migrants' saving strategies and led to housing-market exploitation and increasing ethnicisation of the residual segment of the rental market, as noted in other Southern European cities (Arbaci and Malheiros 2010). The multiple forms of residential marginalisation and housing hardship recorded for long-established groups (e.g. Cape Verdeans) suggest the assumption that a high proportion of owner-occupation reflects a successful housing career must be reviewed. 'The ethnic structure and the precariousness of housing conditions constitute a structural factor of the spatial organisation of the city and the metropolitan area' (Fonseca et al. 2008, p. 27), since in Portugal the

HOUSING TENURE and HOUSING QUALITY (%)			HOUSING STOCK BY TENURE owner-occ. and rent						HOUSING QUALITY of which: PRECARIOUS			
			OWNER-OCC. of which: - paid - mortgage (or loan)			TOTAL RENT of which: - affordable rent (a) - social rent (and moderate)			NON-CLASSIC DWELLINGS	OVERCROW. (b)	VERY DEGRADED	SHARED with > 1 family
CONTINENT & COUNTRY of origin (by nationality)	foreign residents											
AFRICA - PALOP	25,601	1991	44.3	17.4	26.9	55.7	20.4	-	24.0	67.9	-	8.6
	80,427	2001	53.9	34.9	19.0	46.1	12.5	11.0	9.3	64.2	2.6	8.9
Cape Verde	13,943	1991	46.7	14.2	32.6	53.3	23.6	-	29.5	67.6	-	5.7
	28,702	2001	51.9	29.4	22.5	48.1	21.0	18.2	14.1	60.5	2.4	5.8
Angola	5,025	1991	44.3	21.3	23.0	55.7	19.4	-	11.6	66.7	-	9.2
	27,706	2001	55.2	38.3	16.9	44.8	6.4	5.0	4.3	65.8	2.0	9.2
Mozambique	2,093	1991	47.6	30.1	17.5	52.4	13.7	-	5.4	60.7	-	7.0
	2,758	2001	58.5	37.4	21.1	41.5	11.3	9.6	2.6	47.1	0.9	5.4
AFRICA Other	1,666	1991	44.0	19.4	24.7	56.0	12.8	-	21.5	56.7	-	11.8
	1,850	2001	41.4	23.5	17.8	58.6	4.6	3.5	2.0	52.5	2.6	24.3
LATIN AMERICA	717	1991	52.0	19.8	32.2	48.0	12.4	-	0.6	30.9	-	5.6
	1,110	2001	56.0	32.3	23.7	44.0	3.8	0.9	0.7	29.3	1.1	5.5
Brazil	4,400	1991	40.5	19.5	21.0	59.5	11.7	-	0.4	30.1	-	8.0
	16,817	2001	28.3	17.3	11.0	71.7	3.1	1.7	1.3	51.6	1.3	23.0
ASIA (excl. India, China, Pak.)	445	1991	41.1	11.5	29.6	58.9	13.8	-	0.5	17.2	-	5.9
	974	2001	40.4	16.0	24.3	59.6	5.9	3.5	0.3	38.8	3.0	23.5
INDIA, CHINA and PAKISTAN	861	1991	59.6	29.2	30.3	40.4	8.7	-	2.2	50.6	-	8.3
	3,225	2001	34.7	16.3	18.3	65.3	5.4	3.3	1.3	65.7	2.3	31.7
India	376	1991	62.1	34.1	27.9	37.9	9.1	-	3.7	48.2	-	8.5
	1,350	2001	39.0	16.3	22.8	61.0	9.2	6.2	1.7	70.8	2.8	28.2
China	190	1991	47.3	4.8	42.6	52.7	11.2	-	0.0	45.7	-	19.1
	1,122	2001	38.0	20.4	17.6	62.0	2.4	0.9	0.2	50.7	0.9	22.3
Pakistan	295	1991	64.7	39.5	25.2	35.3	6.6	-	1.7	56.6	-	1.0
	753	2001	22.0	10.3	11.7	78.0	3.3	1.8	2.0	79.2	3.7	51.9
EAST EUROPE	227	1991	32.2	14.9	17.3	67.8	11.5	-	4.1	27.9	-	8.8
	7,348	2001	20.4	8.8	11.6	79.6	5.0	1.8	4.7	64.9	2.5	41.4
Ukraine	3,097	2001	17.3	5.0	12.3	82.7	5.0	1.8	6.4	69.8	2.7	50.2
	50	1991	20.8	6.3	14.6	79.2	10.4	-	0.0	52.1	-	4.2
Russia	731	2001	32.4	18.7	13.7	67.6	3.5	4.1	3.6	51.7	2.2	33.5
EU 15	10,095	1991	51.1	16.1	35.0	48.9	19.8	-	1.0	16.2	-	4.0
	12,335	2001	54.7	22.8	31.8	45.3	7.9	1.1	0.7	14.6	0.9	5.8
NORTH AMERICA	1,302	1991	50.0	15.1	35.0	50.0	9.6	-	0.2	14.3	-	4.2
	1,242	2001	61.6	22.1	39.4	38.4	5.4	0.8	0.6	12.0	0.2	4.6
Double nationality	12,809	1991	60.4	29.5	30.9	39.6	21.7	-	3.4	32.0	-	3.1
	39,948	2001	71.1	38.7	32.4	28.9	8.7	4.6	2.7	31.9	0.9	3.7
Portuguese	2,481,800	1991	55.5	27.1	28.4	44.5	32.6	-	1.9	32.2	-	2.4
	2,516,812	2001	70.6	36.8	33.8	29.4	18.1	4.2	1.1	23.2	1.2	1.8
Total population	2,540,276	1991	55.4	26.9	28.5	44.6	32.3	-	2.1	32.4	-	2.5
	2,682,687	2001	69.6	36.5	33.1	30.4	17.6	4.4	1.4	24.7	1.3	2.3

Figure 9.6 Immigrants' housing insertion in Lisbon Metropolitan Area, by continent and country of origin (nationality): housing tenures (%) and housing quality (%), 1991–2001. *Sources:* data and calculation by Malheiros (unpublished – based on Census 1991 and 2001). *Notes:* (a) monthly rent <€60 in 1991; €100 in 2001; (b) overcrowding = relationship established by INE between composition of household (age, sex, parenthood) and no. of rooms in dwelling. If no. considered necessary for family typology is below reference standards, house/flat is considered overcrowded.

'state's actions and inactions have great bearing in the production and in the reproduction of poverty and marginality' (Pereira 2007, p. 409).

These four city cases show the extent to which the new mechanisms of differentiation discussed in Chapter 8 have worsened housing conditions for immigrants since the 1990s. Despite the nuanced panorama, differences between natives and non-Westerners in terms of access to tenures and housing quality have intensified and more migrants are concentrated in the residual segment of both the rental and the property market. Owner-occupation has grown among some non-Western groups; however, this is not necessarily a sign of residential career but of entrapment in marginalised conditions. In several cases, residential marginalisation developed into enclaves of exclusion. Thus residential inequality remains a structural product of Southern European housing systems and local urban political agendas, even though it varies in scale. The socio-ethnic residential divide is greater in Madrid MA and more moderate in Lisbon MA because of the differences in the tenurial structure of each city and in the extent of the property-led regimes. The hegemony of the owner-occupation market in Madrid MA, contrasted with the larger, more affordable rental sector in Lisbon MA, positions the two cities at opposite ends of this spectrum.

Diffusing Ethnic Segregation: An Indicator of Exclusion

What is the spatial dimension of these processes of residential exclusion? The number of non-Western migrants increased significantly after the late 1990s, and ethnic residential marginalisation and socio-ethnic tenurial differentiation intensified. Therefore we might expect a similar increase in spatial segregation. It is possible to imagine the formation of ghettos in the more extreme cases of exclusion where housing segmentation became ethnicised.

However, most Southern European cases analysed here point in the opposite direction. Surprisingly, the indices of spatial segregation have been decreasing since the late 1990s for all non-Western groups. The rise in residential marginalisation and exclusion did not lead to ghettos. Also, the signs of spatial desegregation did not solely reflect processes of integration or upward social mobility. Instead, residential marginalisation was diffused across the metropolitan territory, while becoming microsegregated in the central municipal areas.

With the analysis of Lisbon MA, Madrid and Barcelona, we will explain this phenomenon through the metaphor of the 'urban diaspora'. The metaphor aims to picture a macroscale process of 'forced' centrifugal expulsion and 'dispersal' of non-Western groups into the

metropolitan rings from the central municipal area. Driven by the structural mechanisms of differentiation embedded in the housing systems and urban political agendas, this process also limits the possibility for migrants to 'return' to the core municipality. The term diaspora, while it encompasses the ethno-racial dimension and the image of involuntary mobility, also stresses that this is a macro, exclusionary and dispersal process; it is irreversible and multi-faceted; it does not solely affect the most vulnerable and poorest groups, but a wide segment of the population that encompasses class divisions (Mavroudi 2007; Bauböck and Faist 2010). It thus avoids that association with poverty evoked by the metaphors of the ghetto or neighbourhood effects. The three cities illustrate the scale and geography of this diffuse segregation and how it grew out of processes of exclusion. Studies of other Southern European cities refer to similar patterns of moderate segregation and peripheralisation, making Lisbon, Madrid and Barcelona paradigmatic cases (Martinez and Leal 2008; Bayona, Gil-Alonso and Pujadas 2011; Malheiros and Fonseca 2011; Dominguez, Leal and Goytre 2012).

Lisbon's Urban Diaspora

Lisbon MA is an illuminating case, thanks to the plentiful diachronic data for each ethnic group. Figures 9.7 and 9.8 show an inverse correlation between the spatial and social dimension of segregation between 1991 and 2001. This is visible in the relationship between changes in the Index of Segregation (IS, which indicates spatial concentration at parish level, the smallest administrative unit) and changes in residential overcrowding (% in a logarithmic scale). Their correlation for each group is further explored in relation to demographic growth and share of owner-occupation (Figure 9.8). An index of deprivation would have better represented the social dimension of segregation but, as it is unavailable in Southern Europe, residential overcrowding has been chosen instead as a proxy of housing hardship and potential socio-residential exclusion.

Between 1991 and 2001, spatial concentration decreased among all non-Western groups (except Angolans), a trend that suggests macro-scale housing and socio-urban mechanisms at play (Figure 9.7). But for recent migrant groups (Brazilians, Eastern Europeans, Chinese, Indians and Pakistanis) this extraordinary desegregation process goes hand in hand with a further deterioration in levels of overcrowding. For well-established PALOP immigrants the decrease in segregation levels contrasts with continued overcrowding. This inverse relationship between desegregation and housing hardship is better visualised in Figure 9.8 with references to tenure change: it progressively intensifies from first-wave (PALOPs) to second-wave (Brazilians) and escalates for third-wave




Figure 9.7 Housing insertion of selected foreign groups in Lisbon MA, 1991–2001: level of spatial concentration (IS), residential overcrowding (%) and their changes. Sources: compiled by the author; logarithmic scale calculated by the author, data from Malheiros (unpublished – based on Census 1991 and 2001). Notes: (a) residential overcrowding as % of total residential units of each foreign group; (b) IS (0–100) as Index of Segregation calculated at ward level (by parish units, *Freguesia*).




Figure 9.8 Housing insertion of selected foreign groups in Lisbon MA, 1991–2001: contrasting changes in spatial concentration (IS), residential overcrowding (%) and owner-occupation (%). Sources: compiled by the author; data from Malheiros (unpublished – based on Census 1991 and 2001). Notes: (a) each vector of direction represents the 1991–2001 change in Index of Segregation (IS, ward level by parish units, *Freguesia*) plotted against residential overcrowding (%), on logarithmic scale – see previous figure).

immigrants (Eastern Europeans and Asians); patterns are nuanced within the same continent of origin, particularly among PALOPs, where migration from São Tomé, Guinea-Bissau and Equatorial Guinea is more recent than from Cape Verde, Mozambique and Angola. Desegregation signals a housing career only for Portuguese, Western groups and Mozambicans. Traditional theorists might interpret these declining segregation indices as positive, but the spatial changes actually reflect processes of social exclusion, given the increase or persistence of housing hardship in most cases.

The geography of this process of desegregation associated with hardship is of particular interest. Its intensification across waves follows a centrifugal process of peripheralisation outside the Lisbon municipality. The extent of dispersal and diffuse segregation into the metropolitan areas seems to be linked to the time of arrival of the group (Figure 9.9 – LQs, 2001). First-wave migrants from PALOP settled in the first peripheral ring around the municipality of Lisbon, which was inaccessible because of rent control; second-wave migrants (Brazilians) settled in a scattered form, mainly across the metropolitan rings, despite the liberalisation of the rental market in Lisbon; and third-wave migrants (Eastern Europeans) concentrated further afield in the third ring (Baganha and Fonseca 2004; Fonseca and Pereira 2016). Lisbon remained impermeable to the first wave, while second- and third-wave immigrants remained under-represented despite their significant growth and the liberalisation of the vast rental market. Conversely, Western Europeans intensified their presence in Lisbon in the gentrifying central areas, the bourgeois pericentral districts and the wealthy suburbs. This points to an emerging centre–periphery social division of space, which echoes the centrifugal distribution of successive migration waves.

The reduced variations in the levels of spatial segregation among PALOP groups (Figures 9.7 and 9.8) reflected a consolidation of their earlier patterns of settlement in the first ring of the North- and South-bank of Lisbon MA (compare Figure 9.9 with Figure 6.4 – LQs, 1996). Simultaneously during the 1990s the Mozambicans, then Cape Verdeans and Guineans, were dispersed and the Angolans and São Toméans clustered in these areas. For many the process was linked to a growing access to a residual property market and to the PER programme, which encouraged the rehousing from shanty neighbourhoods into public housing estates (Malheiros and Vala 2004). As a result, the earlier peripheralisation of PALOPs excluded from Lisbon’s controlled rental sector was consolidated around the first ring through three immigration waves and reinforced by public programmes and housing career routes (Pato and Pereira 2013).

Conversely, the desegregation of Brazilians and Eastern Europeans mirrored the process of metropolitanisation in the second and

third ring (Figure 9.9), and was associated with increasingly precarious housing conditions and poorer quality infrastructures (Guerra 2011; Malheiros and Fonseca 2011). In 2001, Eastern Europeans were particularly under-represented in the PALOP areas of settlement, which shows that while ethnic kinships and affiliations played an important role in the residential insertion of newcomer co-nationals from PALOP countries, they became mechanisms of ethnic division of space for non-Portuguese-speaking groups. Both the municipality of Lisbon and the first peripheral ring operated as a barrier to settlement for second- and third-wave migrants, mainly because of the macroscale housing and socio-urban mechanisms analysed in Chapter 8 (expansion of owner-occupation and middle-income housing markets, tenure change, spatially entrapped social mobility, etc.) and the 'belt effect' described in Chapter 7.

Lisbon MA offers some considerations on how the process of ethnic segregation may have operated in Southern Europe in the 1990s and 2000s. First, diffuse segregation and peripheralisation rather than ghettoisation became the main processes of ethnic settlement. Desegregation was in fact a process common to all non-Western groups, despite the significant differences in immigrants' residential histories and residential marginalisation. Second, desegregation was greater among groups with the worst level of housing hardship. It is thus misleading to equate low/decreasing levels of spatial concentration with social or residential integration. Rather, this link between desegregation and hardship indicates a process of ethnic marginalisation by spatial dispersion (Arbaci 2008).

More importantly, this process is centrifugal. For non-Westerners, the more recent the migration flow, the greater the desegregation/hardship process and the further the peripheralisation, making the metropolitan rings the new city gates. This contrasts with the centrality of Westerners in the core municipal areas. Macroscale mechanisms enforce a ring-succession of PALOPs, Brazilians and Eastern Europeans into the metropolitan areas, producing an enforced exodus of non-Western immigrants. Rising house prices, the scarce supply of affordable rented homes, gentrification and embourgeoisement make it difficult for the low- and lower middle-income groups to remain in or return to the core municipal areas (Mendes 2013).

Although these constraining processes are less acute in Lisbon than in Madrid, Barcelona or Milan, the centrifugal path of expulsion and the centre-periphery division of space and impossibility of return indicate the growth of an 'urban diaspora'. This ring-succession of immigration waves led to wider mechanisms of differentiation driven by macroscale changes in housing and socio-urban processes that followed the liberalisation of housing and credit markets and by the introduction of urban renewal policies (Chapter 8).





Figure 9.9 Geographic distribution of PALOP, Brazilians, Eastern Europeans and EU citizens (LQs), in Lisbon Metropolitan Area, 2001. *Sources:* compiled by the author, adapted from Arbaci and Malheiros (2010, figures 2 and 3). *Notes:* Location Quotients (LQs) calculated at ward level (by parish units, *Freguesia*).



Brazil | 16,817

*10.1% of total foreigners
0.6% of total population*

Eastern Europe | 7,348

*4.4% of total foreigners
0.3% of total population*




Figure 9.9 (Continued)

Urban Diaspora as a Southern European Phenomenon?

The lack of diachronic and disaggregated data makes it difficult to test the occurrence of an 'urban diaspora' across Southern European cities with systematic quantitative comparative analyses. Nonetheless, the wealth of studies on major cities, such as Madrid, Barcelona, Milan, Rome, Turin and Athens, offer some insights in support of this line of enquiry revealing processes and centre-periphery divisions analogous to those found in Lisbon MA.

As in Lisbon MA, the trends towards centrifugal dispersal in the metropolitan areas, diffuse segregation and desegregation in core municipal areas are also present in Italian and Spanish cities (Zajczyk et al. 2005; Alguacil 2006; Magatti 2007; Cesareo and Bichi 2010; Fernández 2010; Leal and Alguacil 2012; Orueta 2012), and in Athens (Arapoglou and Sayas 2009; Maloutas et al. 2012). Can we talk of an 'urban diaspora' in all major Southern European cities?

On one hand, dispersal results from a complex interplay of dynamics and the contextual diversity of the cities makes generalisations difficult. Dispersal can be associated with both inclusive and exclusionary processes. The inclusionary processes could be attributed to suburbanisation linked to housing career, labour mobility or upward social mobility; or to immigration dynamics related to family reunification or kinship mechanisms. The exclusionary processes stem from divisive local mechanisms linked to market- or policy-driven expulsion from areas undergoing tenure changes and gentrification, or from the city as a whole because it is unaffordable and the rental stock is scarce. The mechanisms can be driven by socio-urban processes, such as the intensification of wealthy enclaves and embourgeoisement, the expansion of middle classes in and around the core municipality or a spatially entrapped social mobility among working classes preventing filtering up/down processes.

On the other hand, similar macroscale drivers create a convergent process of marginalisation by dispersal: for instance, the divisive mechanisms of differentiation embedded in Southern European welfare regimes and the changes in the housing systems and socio-urban processes that followed the liberalisation of the housing market (see Chapters 3 and 8). There is indeed a process of centrifugal exclusion common to all major Southern European cities, which is reflected in two patterns of ethnic mobility in and out of the municipal cores. In central and pericentral districts the outflow of immigrants from the traditional multi-ethnic neighbourhoods has speeded up and the inflow of newcomers has slowed. This phenomenon is particularly evident in multi-ethnic districts undergoing renewal programmes and gentrification, as in San Salvario in Turin (Figure 9.10), Ciutat Vella in Barcelona, Trastevere in Rome or Isola-Garibaldi in Milan. As the municipal cores




Figure 9.10 Immigrants' residential growth (%), in Turin, 2001–2002. Sources: compiled by the author; adapted from Comune di Torino (2003, p. 72), data provided at ward level.

become impermeable to non-Westerners, the traditional city gates for newcomers have progressively moved to the peripheral rings. Official city reports often acknowledge these intense patterns of ethnic mobility, not as indicators of exclusionary processes but of 'natural' phases of invasion-succession, or 'inevitable' results of housing market dynamics or signs of ethnic integration. Official discourses tend to echo the North American examples.

However, academics have been more critical. The relationship between ethnic peripheralisation and marginalisation has been at the centre of

several studies in Milan (Zajczyk et al. 2005; Agustoni and Alietti 2009, 2011; Ponzio 2009b, 2010; Cucca 2010, 2012; Mugnano 2017), Madrid (Martinez and Leal 2008; Leal and Alguacil 2012), Barcelona (Bayona and Pujadas 2011, 2014; Vono and Bayona 2011; Bayona and Gil-Alonso 2012) and Athens (Arapoglou 2006, 2012; Maloutas et al. 2012). Many have focused on how exclusionary housing mechanisms and local urban political agendas have driven a process of centrifugal expulsion from the core municipality. In the 1990s, Bocco (1998) made this argument for Turin by linking municipal renewal programmes with gentrification processes and the ethnic desegregation of multi-ethnic neighbourhoods in San Salvario and Porta Nuova (Figure 9.10; for more recent discussions see Petsimeris 2005; Semi 2015). Ground-breaking studies of Madrid MA and Athens MA contribute further to this line of enquiry by contextualising the processes of diffuse segregation in relation to the wider socio-spatial hierarchy of the city and its recent change (Dominguez, Leal and Goytre 2012; Kandyliis 2015).

These studies describe divisive phenomena, which could be understood within the metaphor of ‘urban diaspora’ conceptualised in this chapter. However, inter- and intra-municipal mobility of immigrants has not been widely studied in Southern European cities because of the lack of disaggregated data, so it is difficult to test this metaphor with a quantitative comparative analysis. So far, only Madrid and Barcelona offer some quantitative insights that mirror those of Lisbon.

Martinez and Leal (2008) and Dominguez, Leal and Goytre (2012) show how, as in Lisbon MA, macroscale housing dynamics have triggered a systematic population outflow from the Madrid municipality into the first metropolitan ring since the 1990s and progressively into the second ring during the 2000s. Figure 9.11 depicts this trend. As a result, the earlier enclaves of Moroccans congregated further afield while the newer enclaves of Ecuadorians expanded in the metropolitan rings along the north–south divisive axis of Madrid MA, as shown in Figure 9.13. Similarly, forms of housing career took place in ethnic enclaves while forms of ethnic-residential marginalisation were dispersed across the peripheral areas. This phenomenon is more evident in Madrid MA and Barcelona MA, because the financialisation of the poor was so extensive in Spain as to steer ethnic groups towards the owner-occupied working-class areas shunned by the Spanish (*poligonos de viviendas*). In other Southern European cities these peripheral owner-occupied areas would have been more impermeable to processes of filtering up/down (see the ‘belt effect’ phenomenon in Chapter 7).

In Madrid MA and Barcelona MA, as in Lisbon MA, metropolitanisation was linked to a fall in levels of spatial concentration among all non-Western groups, which continued during the 2000s (Figure 9.12, Indices




Figure 9.11 Residential mobility from Madrid municipality to the Metropolitan Areas (%), 2000–2005. Sources: Martinez and Leal (2008, graph 1), data from Padrón Municipal de Habitantes. Note: Padron is the official annual register of population (age, sex and nationality) made by local authorities in Spain.




Figure 9.12 Indices of Segregation (IS) in Madrid MA, by continent and country of origin, 1996–2009. Sources: compiled by the author; data for 2001 and 2009 from Dominguez, Leal and Goytre (2012, table 10.6); data for 1996, 2001 and 2005 from Martinez and Leal (2008, table 4); data provided at ward level (*sección censal*) from Census (2001) and Padrón Municipal de Habitantes (1996, 2005, 2009). Note: Padron is the official annual register of population (age, sex and nationality) made by local authorities in Spain.




Figure 9.13 Geographic distribution of foreigners from Morocco and Ecuador, in Madrid municipality and Metropolitan Area, Location Quotients (LQs), 2005. *Sources:* Martínez (2007, maps 9 and 10); data provided at ward level (*sección censal*) from Padrón Municipal de Habitantes (2005).




Figure 9.13 (Continued)

of Segregation). The inverse desegregation/hardship correlation was recorded among both long-established immigrants (Moroccans and Peruvians) and second- and third-wave immigrants (Latin Americans and Eastern Europeans), with significant incidences among the largest foreign groups (Ecuadorians, Romanians and Colombians). Overall, as Dominguez, Leal and Goytre (2012, p. 218) argue, ‘social changes, in terms of socio-economic cleavages and ethnic differences, within

a framework of liberal urban policies and a welfare state typical of Southern European cities involving the absence of social housing, are leading to an increase in social inequalities without necessarily increasing segregation’.

Barcelona MA offers similar evidence in support of the ‘urban diaspora’ argument. Studies on inter- and intra-municipal mobility of immigrants tracked processes analogous to Madrid MA and Lisbon MA and established an explicit link between centrifugal migration from the central areas and a steady decrease in levels of ethnic segregation since the mid-1990s. Noteworthy is the work of Nel-lo and Donat (2014, see graph 3 and table 6), Martori and Apparicio (2011, see table 5), Bayona and López-Gay (2011, see figures 10 and 13) and Bayona and Gil-Alonso (2012, see table 4) among others.

In addition, the case of Barcelona exemplifies how this complex phenomenon is a process of expulsion from the central multi-ethnic district reinforced by renewal programmes and local urban political agendas, the so-called ‘Barcelona Model’ (Casellas 2006; Capel 2007; Blanco, Bonet and Walliser 2011; Degen and García 2012; Rius and Sánchez-Belando 2015). The city became too upmarket for the low- and lower middle-income echelons, particularly with the renewal of the deprived neighbourhoods of the historic centre (Dist. 1 – Ciutat Vella), the waterfront and pericentral industrial districts (Dist. 10 – San Marti, Poble Nou and the so-called @22). The wealth of studies and available data reveal a strong link between municipal renewal programmes, stated gentrification and the speculative housing market as the source of ethnic desegregation and peripheralisation of low-income groups (Sargatal 2001; Tabakman 2001; Torner and Gutierrez 2001; Petsimeris 2010; Orueta 2012; Leal and Sorando 2013).


Since the late 1990s, two contrasting trends have affected Barcelona municipality: the enormous rise in the number of immigrants (from 2% of the total population in 1996 to almost 20% in 2009, with a 25% average annual growth during the 2000s) occurred as the rental stock shrank, particularly during the housing boom (from 27% of the total stock 1991 to 21% in 2001, followed by a 7% annual decrease during the 2000s). In such a constrained housing market, ethnic spatial mobility intensified beyond that of natives (Bayona and López-Gay 2011) and the level of spatial concentration steadily decreased in all non-Western groups (Figure 9.14).

The most remarkable example of ethnic desegregation occurred in the multi-ethnic neighbourhoods of the historic centre (Dist. 1 – Ciutat Vella), which for decades was the largest and cheapest source of rental stock in the city (Figure 9.15, see 1991 tenure distribution and 1997 average rent prices in Dist. 1 – Ciutat Vella). As shown in Chapter 8, Ciutat Vella underwent several renewal programmes (PERI – *Plan Especial de*

Reforma Interior), with surgical demolitions (*esponjamiento*) in the Casc Antic and the Raval and the expansion of cultural and tourism activities. Tenure progressively changed from rental to owner-occupation and property values grew rapidly, helped by speculative real-estate activities, until the areas were colonised by residential and commercial gentrification (Subirats and Rius 2006; Arbaci and Tapada-Berteli 2012). The socio-economic and housing transformation was radical and fast: as shown in Figure 9.15, by 2003 Ciutat Vella became the most expensive district of the city, recording rents even higher than in the wealthy districts of Les Corts and Sarrià-Sant Gervasi. The rapid growth of property values reverberated beyond the city centre into the peripheral working-class districts in the east, which were also undergoing renewal programmes (Poble Nou and @22, Diagonal Mar, Forum and Sant Andreu); a large proportion of non-Western and low-income groups flew from the central area, replaced by Western and middle-income groups (Tapada-Berteli and Arbaci 2011). Indices of spatial segregation have declined in all non-Western groups, and the conditions that had accommodated immigrants in low-income neighbourhoods for decades disappeared. The wider socio-spatial hierarchy of the city began to alter, as the centre changed its role, image and social and ethnic composition.

The speed of this state-led transformation was remarkable, particularly in a city characterised by low residential mobility and a district with a considerable proportion of elderly and low-income households. The historical centre progressively lost its role as the city gateway but also became a source of the centrifugal process of expulsion. Changes in Location Quotients (Figure 9.14) reflect the flow of non-Western migrants in the adjacent working-class neighbourhoods in the west (Dist. 3 – Sants-Montjuïc) and in the peripheral ones in the east (Dist. 8–10 – Sant Martí, Sant Andreu and Nou Barris), while they remained scattered in the pericentral middle-class districts (Dist. 2 and 6 – Eixample and Gràcia) and in the north-western affluent ones (Dist. 4 and 5 – Les Corts, Sarrià-Sant Gervasi). A new geography of ethnic segregation was emerging.


In 2009, Bayona and López-Gay (2011, figures 4 and 10) recorded an intensification of these new patterns of ethnic segregation at census unit level and an even greater ethnic outflow from Barcelona into the metropolitan area. The ethnic metropolitanisation occurred beyond the first peripheral ring of working-class homeownership neighbourhoods (indicating a 'belt effect' phenomenon) except in Ciutat Meridiana, to where ethnic homebuyers were channelled (Palomera 2014). The process of desegregation and dispersal was more visible among Moroccans, Chinese, Latin Americans and Eastern Europeans but statistically more intense among Pakistani and Filipinos, who nonetheless consolidated





BARCELONA – LQs – 1996, 2002, 2005



LATIN AMERICA



AFRICA



Location Quotients, LQs




Figure 9.14 Location Quotients (LQs) of selected foreign groups, in Barcelona, 1996, 2002 and 2005. Sources: compiled by the author, including calculations; data provided at district level from IDESCAT (1996) and Ajuntament de Barcelona (2002, 2005).




Figure 9.15 Comparing housing and ethnic residential insertion in Barcelona, 1991–2005: housing tenures, changes in housing prices and geographic distribution of immigrants. *Sources:* compiled by the author, including calculations; data provided at district level from IDESCAT (1996) and Ajuntament de Barcelona (2002, 2005).

ETHNIC RESIDENTIAL DISTRIBUTION

1996–2005

'96	'05	AGR	
30,500	231,000	+ 25.23	tot. immigrants




Figure 9.15 (Continued)

in micro-areas of the historical centre because of homeownership and informal subletting strategies mentioned previously (Terrones 2013).

Different scales of analysis of Lisbon MA, Madrid MA and Barcelona MA demonstrate that suburbanisation, desegregation and diffuse segregation are not indicators of inclusion but are structural mechanisms of exclusion. The case of Barcelona is emblematic in illustrating how these three patterns are interlinked and follow processes of socio-residential expulsion from the core municipality triggered by housing and socio-urban transformations and municipal renewal strategies. As explored in Chapter 8, since the intensity of urban strategies and the pace of gentrification and socio-urban changes differ across Southern European cities, we might expect this phenomenon to be less developed in other port cities, but quite advanced in continental cities.

Multiple scenarios can be anticipated which, although diverse, share some common facets. The ethnic reconfiguration of central and pericentral areas and the centrifugal processes of ethnic metropolitanisation are two key dynamics that, with the legacies of past ethnic and socio-spatial structure of the city, will define the complex geography of Southern European multi-ethnic cities. The increase in ethnic residential marginalisation seems a permanent process, whatever its geographic configuration, because it is driven by structural mechanisms deeply rooted in the familistic housing system and adapting to the neoliberal market–state nexus at both national and municipal level.

Conclusion

In Milan, Barcelona, Madrid and Lisbon social residential inequality has risen among most non-Western groups while indices of spatial segregation have declined since the 1990s. Also, in other Southern European cities processes of ethnic desegregation, metropolitan peripheralisation and diffuse segregation accompanied growing housing marginalisation, often advancing into extreme cases of exclusion.

The apparent paradox between spatial segregation and social inequality is intrinsic to Southern European welfare regimes (Chapter 3) but it has increased significantly during the past two decades. This is due to the ways in which national and local governments have adapted to neoliberal agendas since the liberalisation of the housing and credit system (Chapter 8), in particular with the monetary revolution, further commodification of housing and land regimes and policy-led strategies of renewal and gentrification.

Moreover, these mechanisms have widened the socio-tenurial differentiation between natives and non-Westerners in terms of access

to tenures and housing quality. This divide is highest in Madrid MA and lowest in Lisbon MA because of the opposing tenurial structures in the cities. Despite nuanced differences among cities, immigrants have been left with two constrained choices: housing segmentation or advanced forms of peripheralisation. The saturation and shrinking of the rental sector, renewal programmes and the broader crisis of housing affordability have channelled immigrants into the residual segment of both the rental and the property market or progressively expelled them from the central areas into the metropolitan rings. In many cases, the growth of owner-occupation among non-Western groups has been enforced; it is not necessarily an indication of residential upward mobility but of entrapment in marginalised conditions and over-indebtedness.

The magnitude of this rising residential inequality is not always visible because of the way in which ethnic residential marginalisation takes place, via desegregation and dispersal in peripheral areas. The metropolitan dimension is becoming an essential part of patterns of ethnic settlement that can, in turn, reinforce socio-residential marginalisation when peripheral settlement entails reduced access to public services and infrastructures and poorer housing quality.

This centrifugal geography of ethnic groups, first encountered in Lisbon then traced in Madrid and Barcelona, can be understood as an ‘urban diaspora’, a macroscale process of (forced) expulsion from the central municipal area into the metropolitan rings. Any possibility of returning to the core municipality seems limited, as the underpinning structural mechanisms consolidated a divide between the centre and periphery.

The metaphor of the ‘urban diaspora’ conceptualises this new geography of inequalities as a structural and systemic product of a neoliberal state–market nexus filtered through Southern European welfare regimes, joining a burgeoning literature that calls for alternative metaphors to the paradigms of ghetto, polarisation and neighbourhood effects. These paradigms are now considered inadequate to interpret patterns and mechanisms of division in European cities, yet remain widely employed to legitimise de-concentration and mixing programmes, which in fact may intensify the actual processes of social exclusion and urban inequality (Ireland 2004; Darcy 2010; Maloutas 2012a; see Chapters 1 and 2).

Towards a Systemic Understanding of (Ethnic) Residential Segregation

This book began with a paradox first encountered in Southern European cities: why is (ethnic) residential segregation decreasing in many cities where social inequality is increasing? It is by now clear that this is not a paradox. Intrinsically, this is a faulty question; the social and spatial dimensions of segregation are not interchangeable, and the relationship between spatial concentration and social inequality or marginalisation is not linear but complex and takes a variety of forms. Spatial concentration per se is not *the* problem. Yet these dimensions are frequently entangled in theory and policy, mixing up symptoms and causes. The term segregation – and how it has been conceptualised and interpreted in the dominant scholarship – contributes to this ambiguity despite efforts to clarify it (see Chapters 1 and 2).

Here I sought to pursue a different line of enquiry: how to disentangle ethnic spatial segregation from social marginalisation, and which mechanisms, contextual conditions, processes and changes drive each of these dimensions and forms of socio-ethnic differentiation? At the heart of this enquiry is an understanding of segregation as a systemic contextual process embedded in the wider society, its principles of stratification and the role of the state–market(–family) nexus in the organisation of welfare arrangements, housing, planning and land systems. How are societies organised and how do their modes of organisation differentiate ethnic groups in spatial *and* social terms?

In this comparative journey across Western Europe, in particular across Southern European cities, I have shown that segregation is fundamentally about redistribution. The redistributive arrangements of welfare regimes and their pillars – their programmes of de-commodification, in particular those embedded in the housing system and local urban political agendas that influence the socio-spatial structure of the city – play a fundamental role in shaping patterns of ethnic residential segregation and socio-ethnic divisions. These multiple, systemic mechanisms are interconnected and operate across several scales, from (supra-)national to municipal levels. ‘While social processes may become manifest *in* a certain residential stock *in* a neighbourhood, as rising levels of social segregation or as local spatial concentrations of poverty, that does not necessarily imply that they are also caused *by* or being problems *of* the housing stock or *of* the neighbourhood composition’ (Musterd 2002, p. 140). But ethnic patterns reminded us that segregation is also about how migration waves and types of migratory flows/projects intersect, and interact with, these systemic urban processes and broader social transformations.

In this sense, it was instrumental to bring together – for the first time to such an extent – literature from urban, housing, welfare, immigration and segregation studies across different languages and contexts. This opened more diverse, but complementary, lines of enquiry that helped to form a more comprehensive understanding of a multiplicity of mechanisms of differentiation. Particularly crucial also was the perspective from planning for developing a more in-depth appreciation of the role of land and urban development systems, so central in the production (and more importantly, prevention) of urban inequality.

All in all, I hope to have expanded the pioneering work of European scholars by bringing to the fore distinct features found in a region that previously had little bearing in theory (re)formulation and international debates. This journey concludes by returning to the key findings and arguments developed throughout the book and reflecting on their wider implications.

Redistribution, Distinctiveness ... and Housing Systems

It was made evident throughout the book that there is not a single European model in terms of patterns of ethnic segregation, with Western European cities presenting diverse degrees and patterns of both ethnic and socio-spatial segregation. Among other reasons, this is because of the type of welfare regime adopted in different countries (Chapter 3). The four welfare regimes in the region, each with distinct principles

of stratification and different degrees of system decommodification, influenced the way in which housing and land supply systems differently organised the social and spatial division of the respective urban societies. To put it simply, the more decommodified the pillars of welfare, the less socially unequal the cities examined.

This is a lesson that Scandinavian social-democratic and Central European corporatist welfare states teach us regarding housing. Contrary to the persistent claims that recommodification of the housing system, particularly the expansion of homeownership, benefits society, and the clear policy shift in that direction (Harloe 1995), a critical (pre) condition for reducing and preventing inequality in those countries was the combination of a unitary rental system and land decommodification.

How this translated into spatial patterns, however, was more complex. Relationships between welfare regimes (and their degree of decommodification) and level of ethnic spatial segregation were not straightforward. The type of housing production system and the land system, often overlooked in segregation studies, emerged as key mechanisms of spatial differentiation (Chapters 3, 7 and 8). For instance, in Scandinavia it is the combination of large-scale, non-profit production and publicly owned land that explains high degrees of spatial segregation in these highly egalitarian societies.

Each welfare cluster is distinctive but not homogeneous. In fact, the familistic welfare cluster that encompasses the eight Southern European cities analysed did not translate into a Southern European model of segregation, nor did these seem to be converging in that direction. Instead the panorama found in the 1990s was highly diverse, with significant divergences in the level of concentration and geographic distribution of ethnic groups between and within cities. Divergences in patterns and processes were also visible within ethnic groups, even within the same continent of origin (Chapters 6 and 9). This evidence clearly challenges what seems to be an appetite for overgeneralisation within the field, calling instead for fine-grained, contextual and comparative approaches that can explore these differences and multiple realities.

How can we make sense of this complex mosaic of patterns in Southern Europe? Two factors were found to be of major importance. Despite being part of the same welfare cluster, each country had distinct relationships between state, market, family and civil society. This, in turn, differently informed the urban development of the cities, the production of housing and the dominant tenures – thus socio-spatial divisions (Chapter 7). This was visible in the contrasting cases of Lisbon MA (stronger state and larger rental sector), Madrid MA (stronger market and dominance of owner-occupation) and Athens MA (stronger civil society and *antiparohi* homeownership production).

Equally important was the nature of migration. The four countries, and their large cities in particular, experienced distinct types and waves of immigration (e.g. shaped by the colonial legacy dominant in Portugal, the Balkan and Eastern links in Greece). These, in connection with the socio-spatial structure of each city at the time of arrival, also influenced the levels and geography of insertion of ethnic groups (Chapter 4). Identifying three waves of migration across 50 years was crucial to detect both centrifugal paths of residential expulsion from central areas and peripheralisation of following waves of immigrants (Chapter 9). Migration waves have been mostly overlooked in segregation and should be further considered in our understanding of how migration flows intersect with other dimensions shaping socio-spatial patterns.

Yet, despite the diversity of patterns, the eight cities share structural traits that distinguish Southern Europe from other areas of Western Europe.

Low levels of ethnic spatial concentration vis-à-vis high levels of social marginalisation appeared consistently across all cities and scales of analysis (Chapters 3, 5 and 6). Within this general pattern, levels of ethnic spatial concentration were lower in continental cities (Madrid, Milan, Rome, Turin) than in port cities (Lisbon, Barcelona, Genoa, Athens). During the 1990s, this twofold typology was consistent for all ethnic groups.

As a form of categorisation, this typology per se is a means not an end; its value lies in revealing how the distinctive socio-spatial structure of port and continental cities (i.e. the geographic distribution of the natives, the geography of tenures and the axis of urban development) helped organise the geography and level of ethnic concentration. The contrast between Barcelona and Milan (Chapter 6, Figure 6.13) and the parallelism between Athens MA and Barcelona (Chapter 7, Figure 7.3) are paradigmatic.

These findings reinforce, over a large number of cases, the point made by Southern European scholars that there are strong associations between the residential geographies of native and foreign groups (Malheiros 1998, 2002; Martinez and Leal 2008; Arapoglou and Sayas 2009; Kandyliis, Maloutas and Sayas 2012), and that the upper classes' geography determines the urban distribution of the other groups (Dominguez, Leal and Goytre 2012). The latter is not a relational process that is distinctive of Southern European cities, or specific to a historical period, as a similar argument was first demonstrated two decades ago in the case of Paris (Préteceille 1995) and more recently in Vienna (Hatz, Kohlbacher and Reeger 2016). Here, this is taken further in understanding patterns of ethnic residential segregation, by

triangulating ethnic groups and socio-occupational categories of native groups with tenures and housing production, thus revealing the relative position of foreigners in spatial and residential terms and the degree of socio-ethnic residential differentiation. It follows that, if in the coming decades the concentration of the upper groups will dramatically increase in traditionally wealthy neighbourhoods and consolidate in other central districts of the city (e.g. linked to processes of embourgeoisement, super-gentrification and aggressive real-estate speculation and financialisation), then we should also expect an increase in ethnic residential segregation and more complex forms of socio-ethnic divisions.

But some important socio-ethnic mismatches were also found, distinctive of this region: what I called the ‘belt effect’, consisting of the low presence of ethnic groups in working-class areas in the first peripheral ring of most metropolitan areas; and the presence of low-income ethnic groups in or nearby wealthy areas. Not yet detected in other Northern European or North American cities, yet, these patterns were not exceptions, but the result of structural mechanisms of differentiation typical of familistic regimes.

The first mismatch – the ‘belt effect’ – is related to self-production of housing, high levels of working-class homeownership and upward social mobility *in situ*. This combination challenges the orthodox assumption that social mobility entails spatial mobility, and that immigrants’ settlements automatically follow filtering out/in processes (see debate in Maloutas 2012b, p. 37). The second mismatch is associated with the key role of immigrant workers in the delivery of care services in familistic welfare systems; traditionally care services relied on women but, with the changing role of women in society, the reproduction of this system became dependent on rural–urban migrants, and then on international immigrants following the profound transformations of the 1970s (Ribas-Mateos 2005; Da Roit, Ferrer and Moreno-Fuentes 2016; see Chapter 4).

This shows how, in Southern Europe, the weight of the family dimension in the provision of welfare services (from care to housing and labour) is fundamental to understanding some urban processes, in particular the ‘belt effect’, intergenerational mobility *in situ* and homeownership as a patrimonial strategy to reproduce family and society. This dimension is often overlooked in Northern European literature that focuses mainly on the state–market nexus and filtering up/down.

Finally, a structural characteristic of Southern Europe is the housing affordability crisis, which is systemic and chronic due to the residualist nature of the Italian, Spanish, Portuguese and Greek housing systems. But some distinctive mechanisms, such as self-production and informal land markets, provided in the past alternative forms of affordable

housing production for low-income groups (Chapter 7) that compensated for the lack of state intervention and sidestepped the speculative nature of the market.

A New Geography of Inequalities?

From the mid-1990s, key systemic transformations and socio-urban changes – with an increase in migration flows (third wave) – complexified this picture, and the relationship between segregation and inequalities became increasingly difficult to interpret. In most Southern European cities, the coexistence of low levels of spatial segregation with high levels of social inequality was amplified by an increase of ethnic desegregation, dispersal and metropolitanisation, and a significant growth of ethnic residential marginalisation and housing hardship. Overall, the social distance between foreigners and natives widened (Chapter 9). The distinction between port and continental cities has been fading away at the same time as radical transformations of the central areas of some port cities (such as Barcelona) have profoundly altered the socio-spatial hierarchy of the city. These and other urban transformations were not inevitable but the result of several systemic changes linked to the liberalisation of housing systems and land recommodification, the monetary revolution and local urban political agendas adopting area-based renewal programmes and gentrification as growth strategies (Chapter 8).

But it became apparent throughout the period examined that inequalities were not (necessarily) manifested through ghettoisation but through dispersal and peripheralisation. In fact, desegregation processes have accompanied – and were linked to – increased residential marginalisation. Critically, the narrow focus on areas of concentration of ethnic or disadvantaged groups needs to be widened in order to recognise that inequality and marginalisation can *also* be disguised in dispersal patterns. Just because marginalisation is diffused and less visible, it is no less problematic.

By bringing to the fore this fundamental aspect, I propose the metaphor of ‘urban diaspora’ to capture this emergent macroscale process of (forced) expulsion from the central municipal area into the metropolitan rings, and to conceptualise this new geography of inequalities. The term is meant to evoke the multiple facets of a diasporic process (Mavroudi 2007; Bauböck and Faist 2010), yet contextualised in an urban context: the geographic dispersal of a group, which is forced, centrifugal and seems difficult to reverse (recalling the impossible return to the original neighbourhood unless through heavy state intervention); the associated process of marginalisation; and finally the ethno-racial dimension. Importantly, the term diaspora does not refer

specifically, or solely, to the poor but encompasses all classes and their relational positioning in society. I hope that the ‘urban diaspora’ offers a symbolically charged and appealing image able to replace the myth of the ghetto, in response to the call launched by Musterd, Ostendorf and Breebaart in 1998 for new metaphors to describe ethnic segregation in Europe.

The metropolitan dimension of segregation has long been noticed by Southern European researchers (Chapter 9). But this was seldom linked to macroscale processes of exclusion or considered a reflection of urban marginalities. Only recently have some Northern European scholars begun to recognise similar phenomena. In the Dutch case, this was referred to as ‘suburbanisation of the poor’ and linked to state-led gentrification (Hochstenbach and Musterd 2017). In London, Hamnett (2009, 2010) saw it as a result of cuts in housing benefits, a step further in the recommodification of the UK housing system by the then Coalition Government. Other British researchers seem to have been caught by surprise by the latest Census and explained lowering segregation indices by an increasing super-diversification of immigrants and flows and a changing British society, but overlooked the exclusionary component of these desegregation processes, and the role of the state (Catney 2015, 2016; Manley et al. 2016).

It is important to note that systemic changes that became visible from the mid-1990s occurred at different speeds and took distinct forms across the cities examined (Semi 2015; Sorando and Ardura 2016). A paradigmatic example is the contrast between the rapid transformations of the socio-spatial structure of Barcelona since the 1990s and the much slower changes that occurred in Lisbon, where the deregulation of the rental system and the renewal of the historical centre occurred much later (Chapters 8 and 9; Petsimeris 2005, 2010). In fact, some substantial legislative changes happened as late as 2012, and their impact became more visible in the following years (Mendes and Carmo 2016).

The redistributive nature of mechanisms of differentiation can also change. This is the case of owner-occupation: with the liberalisation of the housing and credit system, it shifted from a socially inclusive into a highly divisive mechanism. One of the main characteristics of Southern European societies was the equal distribution of outright owner-occupation across all social strata (Emmanuel 2014; including some immigrants from the first and second wave, see Chapter 5, Figure 5.2). This was possible due to widespread practices of self-construction and informal access to land, which compensated for the residual state intervention in societies where housing was considered a family responsibility and the notion of owner-occupation was based on (family) patrimony, rather than being an exchangeable good.

After the monetary revolution of the 1990s, credit and capital became the dominant means to access owner-occupation. As a result, three main processes turned owner-occupation into a mechanism widening inequalities. First, credit-based housing consumption (and recommodification of land supply) substituted self-production and fuelled real-estate speculation aggravating the housing affordability crisis (Chapters 7 and 8). Second, access to credit and capital is unequal thus making it more difficult and risky for immigrants and low-income groups to access owner-occupation compared with previous generations. Third, increasingly, patrimony and parental wealth rather than wages defined people's capacity to access housing and pass on wealth – and associated inequalities – to the following generation. From the 2000s, escalating housing prices and stagnating wages exacerbated the role of patrimony in producing residential inequality and shaping more complex patterns of urban segregation.

While in the 1990s the class stratification of the city was a major determinant of patterns of ethnic residential segregation, these relationships have become much less clear. It seems that with the increasing dominance of patrimony-based access to housing, class and 'housing class' (to echo Weberian scholars; Rex 1971) are becoming more important in explaining these patterns (Chapter 8). However, in parallel, the rise of homeownership among poor migrants is not necessarily a sign of upward mobility but serves as a mask for marginalisation and entrapment (Chapter 9).

Housing as the Deus ex Machina

A key argument that unfolds throughout the book is that housing is the main mechanism of differentiation. Its various components – including not just market dynamics but also tenure and housing production systems – structure the nature of the patterns found and, more importantly, are the main driver of increasing marginalisation, inequality and widening division between native and foreign groups. By progressively losing its redistributive value, housing has become a residualist machine that has generated accumulation for some and impoverishment for many, exacerbating socio-economic distances between social groups in terms of affordability, accessibility and quality and security of tenure.

In Southern European familistic regimes, the liberalisation of the housing systems mainly reinforced their nature because residualism was already a structural characteristic of the system. But in other Western European countries that have progressively recommodified their housing systems, residualism has increasingly become a novel trait (Chapters 2, 3 and 7). In some cases, such as that of the United

Kingdom, the recommodification of housing represented a radical path-change from universalist arrangements (Hemerijck 2013). It is not a coincidence that housing affordability has become one of the major issues facing European cities since the late 1990s (Chapters 7 and 8).

Housing is also a key driver underpinning divisive socio-urban processes such as embourgeoisement and gentrification, enabling or curtailing them. An emblematic example is the impact of the speed and type of rent deregulation across the cities examined, which paved the way for tenure changes and area-based renewal programmes with subsequent social and spatial 'recasting' (Chapters 5 and 8). All in all, we cannot understand the structure of the city, segregation processes and legacies without understanding how housing operates at national and local levels. Ultimately, this study hopes to have enriched our understanding of the role of housing *within* society (Allen et al. 2004).

This also bears a methodological reflection. It was important to move away from the orthodox focus on housing market dynamics or on social housing, typical of segregation studies in North America and Northern Europe, and widen the focus to the housing system. Critically, this included not only the tenure system dimension (a legacy of Northern European housing studies) but also the supply system and land system, both requiring an attentive look into the planning system. All these components, in particular the pioneering focus on land and planning, were fundamental in developing a more detailed understanding of the distinctiveness of urban development processes and revealed how these produce inequalities.

As with any research, this study has a number of limitations. Important dimensions linked to redistributive mechanisms of welfare regimes that inform segregation and inequalities, such as education, were not considered and might offer fruitful lines of enquiry. Two other aspects potentially relevant to further understand mechanisms of differentiation were also outside the scope of this book. A detailed focus on the neighbourhood scale could complement the meso and macro investigations carried out here. A focus on ethnic and family practices could also explore reciprocity and tensions between and within kinships, and practices linked to religious, cultural or entrepreneurial affiliations, that could enhance the redistributive foci (Kesteloot and Meert 2000).

Finally, while the book attempts to engage with a scholarship that might have been treated as peripheral in relation to Anglophone scientific production, there is much to be done in that regard. There is no interaction here with the rich scholarship from Latin America on socio-spatial segregation and wider society (Sabatini 2003; Roberts and Wilson 2009; Di Virgilio and Perelman 2014), or from South African and other (post)colonial urban scholars on the role of the state and

urban planning in driving racial segregation as a form of social control and stratification of society (Njoh 2008; Colombijn and Barwegen 2009). Although this literature has had little influence on the North American and European debates, which are the focus of this book, it is paramount to establish a dialogue with this body of knowledge and further develop a systemic understanding of segregation which can learn from other urban contexts – an endeavour that should encompass comparative analyses across these distinct regions.

Looking Ahead: Emerging Processes and Challenges

Immigration acts as an analyser of new territorial processes. (Tosi 2001, p. 1)

This book explores the mechanisms that underpin the production of inequality and social division of space up to the late 2000s. Then came the period in which an international financial crisis unfolded with far-reaching consequences at several levels. Arguably, the extent and nature of the impacts are too complex to fully understand at this point. However, the key argument of this book remains, and will remain, valid: (ethnic) residential segregation is a complex systemic process, which is multidimensional and context-dependent, and intrinsically related to redistributive arrangements. Some emerging transformations, mostly preceding this major event, may critically affect these arrangements, and how segregation and inequality should be examined and understood in current and future contexts. The lenses on the past that this book provides can also be used to interpret present and emerging challenges. I argue that three processes are of particular importance.

First, multiple levels of governance are (increasingly) involved in framing and delivering key mechanisms of redistribution and reshaping how welfare regimes operate (Kazepov 2008, 2010). On one hand, the process of devolution taking place across Europe, to different extents and in different forms, has transferred key responsibilities from national to regional and/or municipal levels. Key distributive mechanisms have thus become more varied across regions/cities depending on local welfare policies, in addition to national welfare regimes (Andreotti and Mingione 2013; Carmon and Fainstein 2013). This may have positive and negative impacts. Some cities and regions have put in place more inclusive or redistributive policies than national states (e.g. divergence between the Scottish and the UK governments regarding planning policy agendas [Tomaney and Colomb 2013], or between the Catalan and Spanish governments on immigrant integration policies [Gebhardt 2016a, 2016b]; or the emergence of Spanish new municipalism

[Subirats 2016] to counteract national programmes of austerity and privatisation). But unless accompanied by equivalent fiscal devolution, these increased responsibilities may put local governments under intense pressure without sufficient financial capacity for direct intervention, thus making them more vulnerable and dependent on real-estate interests (Lupton and Tunstall 2008; Andreotti, Mingione and Polizzi 2012).

On the other hand, supra-national governance has had a major impact, steering redistributive arrangements away from universalism towards residualism. The European Union is a good example: despite having no responsibilities for housing policy, its regulatory competition policy has effectively promoted ‘a stealth housing policy’ to foster debt-driven homeownership (Doling 2006, p. 335) and curb Member States’ ability to develop unitary rental systems (Elsinga, Haffner and van der Heijden 2008). More recently, the Troika austerity programmes in some Southern European countries have forced privatisation of services and deregulation of rents (e.g. Greece, Portugal; see David 2018).

These processes are not new and vary greatly between different countries and cities. Nevertheless, it seems increasingly important that interpretative frameworks on segregation incorporate a transcalar perspective that is able to further examine the degree of redistribution along the universalism/residualism spectrum, not only in nation-states but also across smaller and larger governance levels.

Second, the process of financialisation seems to be unfolding faster across key dimensions relevant for segregation, in particular the housing system and the local urban political agendas (Zwiers et al. 2016). Financialisation, considered as an ‘increasing dominance of financial actors, markets, practices, measurements and narratives, at various scales’ (Aalbers 2016b, p. 3), can be traced back at least to the 1980s as entangled in the post-Fordist radical shift (Harvey 2003). There is a contentious debate regarding the significance of these transformations (Forrest 2015): are these signs of ‘new’ worldwide, radical societal transformations? Is this a new regime of accumulation or simply a latest phase of post-Fordism ones?

Regardless of this debate, financialisation entails yet another transformation regarding *how* society values housing. With the welfare restructuring of the 1980s–1990s, housing ceased to be a ‘right’ (although in certain places it never was) to become an ‘individual commodity’ (Chapter 2); now it is being transformed into a ‘financial commodity’ (Lowe 2011). The financialisation process became bound to housing and real estate when ‘mortgage markets were transformed from being a “facilitating market” for homeowners in need of credit to one increasingly facilitating global investment’ (Aalbers 2008, p. 148).

Segregation studies need to engage with this debate because financialisation is now paramount in understanding the role of the state in the production of inequality. Hence, in addition to the two-dimensional focus on the tenure and supply system, it is necessary to incorporate the financial system, and how these systems relate to each other, to understand the current welfare–segregation nexus. The financial system is gaining a central role as a mechanism of differentiation.

The impact of this process on segregation and marginalisation was emerging in the analysis of Barcelona, which exposed dominant practices of financialisation of the poor and how these have affected the segregation patterns of Latin Americans and Filipinos (Chapter 9). Other researchers have shown how financialisation and large amounts of capital invested in real estate led to the growth of residential concentration among wealthy echelons that, in turn, increased the segregation indices of lower-income groups (Préteceille 2006; Dominguez, Leal and Goytre 2012; Maloutas 2012a). Importantly, financialisation is not confined to homeownership but has already permeated other tenures, as the case of Berlin’s rental housing and that of Lombardy’s social housing demonstrate (Fields and Uffer 2016; Belotti and Arbaci 2017).

The impact of financialisation is also visible in relation to urban development (Haila 1988; Weber 2010; Kaika and Ruggiero 2016). As argued by Pinson and Journel (2016, p. 139), ‘with the financialization of the economy, urban assets and built environments have become increasingly central and even crucial in the current forms of capitalist accumulation’. The unprecedented pace and scale of urban renewal in some Southern European cities, such as Lisbon since the early 2010s, illustrates the ability of large capital investments to transform built environment into liquid assets. This has been facilitated, and in some cases craftily promoted, by legislative changes affecting the housing system (e.g. Portuguese new urban rental Law introduced in 2012 to deregulate the rental sector, ease eviction and limit secure tenancy) coupled with fiscal-led immigration programmes to attract foreign urban consumption (e.g. Golden Visas; Non-Habitual Resident Tax Regime; see Mendes 2018, pp. 41–42).

Notably, these processes may accelerate urban changes and magnify divisive mechanisms of gentrification, embourgeoisement and touristification (Cocola-Gant 2016). Especially in the aftermath of the financial crisis, touristification has been gaining prominence as a distinctive process of urban development and as a growth strategy to stimulate urban consumption and large-scale inward investment. The effects of tourism-induced urban change on ethnic segregation patterns and socio-ethnic differentiation are still under research, but its magnitude is already reflected in the scale of ‘protest and resistance’ it is generating

in several cities (Colomb and Novy 2016). This will certainly prompt new chapters in segregation studies.

Lastly, new mass migration flows are emerging with characteristics that appear to be different from the third wave and are associated with a variety of processes including the refugee waves in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, and those of the Syrian War. Should these be considered a fourth wave? Will we return to a European Fortress and a halt to the Mediterranean caravanserai? What does this entail for the insertion of old and new migrants? Regardless of the direction in which these processes evolve, segregation studies need to incorporate the advancements of immigration studies and consider the likely increase of immigrants' heterogeneity regarding backgrounds but also motivations, conditions, lifestyle, educational and income levels.

Some of these features were already identified in the Southern European migratory system in the 1990s (such as heterogeneity, temporariness, informality) and have later emerged in Northern Europe. Super-diversity has become an all-encompassing notion used across disciplines to capture these realities (Nathan 2011; Syrett and Sepulveda 2011; Jivraj and Simpson 2015), particularly in urban studies with the development of the concept of hyper-diversity (Joppke 2004; Wetherell 2007; Tasan-Kok et al. 2013). A social transformation perspective, that opened a soul-searching debate in migration studies in the early 2010s, is even more valuable today to comprehend the impact of new and more diverse migration flows in cities.

It's the State, Stupid

The socio-spatial patterns critically analysed in this book point, ultimately, in one important direction: social and spatial divisions in urban societies are not inevitable or organic phenomena, and the state – in its various levels and forms – is a key actor in shaping and mediating these processes. Segregation and inequalities are driven by redistributive mechanisms embedded in policies and regimes at multiple scales.

It is by now clear that across most of Western Europe there has been a tendency to limit the extent, scale and scope of these mechanisms of redistribution since the mid-1980s. As we have seen, this has widened inequalities and adversely affected migrants' life-chances. In Southern Europe, the emergence of acute residential marginality and wider divisions between natives and foreigners is entangled with the ways in which neoliberal agendas for privatisation and deregulation have been filtered through familistic welfare regimes, reinforcing their residualist nature.

But the pace, shape and impacts of these transformations varied significantly across national, regional and urban contexts. Neoliberalisation is not a ubiquitous and uniform process, and it is best described as ‘inherently fuzzy, diverse, contingent, ever-mutating and path-dependent *processes* of regulatory change that have been inspired by neoliberal ideas’ (Pinson and Journal 2016, p. 137; see also Brenner, Peck and Theodore 2010). Moreover, these processes are strongly mediated at different levels as ‘institutional change is incremental and based on layering and conversion’ with ‘many older institutional arrangements remain[ing] in place’, thus maintaining a highly redistributive and filtering role (Van Gent 2013, p. 503). Also, the financialisation process is ultimately mediated by local institutions and policies that can facilitate or hinder the penetration of financial actors and flows at several levels; the state has an active role in exposing (or protecting) households and institutions to financialisation.

In comparative terms, Europe remains a region where the redistributive orientation of its various welfare regimes persists, perhaps stronger than elsewhere. And its value continues to have significant endorsement. Processes of state-led privatisation and deregulation have generated continuous and growing opposition, and are at the heart of fierce political and social battles within different parts and tiers of the state and civil society. Regulation of housing, in particular, is (re)emerging as a fundamental social struggle in the context of acute housing affordability crisis and regeneration-led displacement (e.g. PAH – *Plataforma de Afectados por la Hipoteca* – Platform for Mortgage Victims, a grassroots organisation to stop evictions and campaign for housing rights in Spain; social movements in European cities, see Mayer, Thörn and Thörn 2016; Wills 2016). The quest for the ‘right of citizens and government to regulate’ is back (Raco 2016, pp. 11–12) and will hopefully prompt a renewed attention in policy arenas and future research.

This book sits beside those who believe that to build a more egalitarian and fair society, there needs to be a shift away from neoliberal and deregulatory agendas back to more robust social equity principles, universalist provision of welfare and broader regulation of key markets, in particular housing and land. This requires rethinking *how* universalist principles can be delivered today, in a different economic regime and political context than the period examined here. This constitutes an enormous challenge; but, while the role of the state may be changing, it remains ever more important.

Social and spatial inequalities are complex systemic processes that cannot, should not, be addressed via a single policy or sector. There are no simple solutions for complex problems. While this book does not set out to provide a solution, it calls for an articulated ‘combination between an area-based and a comprehensive policy approach

(decommodification of key services targeting people rather than areas), where the former is effective in engaging people and the latter in widening access to and knowledge of public services' (Arbaci and Rae 2013, p. 476; see also Tunstall and Lupton 2010; Marcińczak et al. 2016).

But a critical step is a change in the discourse on spatial segregation. To reverse negative and misleading perceptions, it is essential to recognise that there are also advantages in the spatial concentration of ethnic groups (thus avoiding stigmatising such concentrations as ghettos that generate and reproduce social problems). Some of the challenges facing contemporary societies require an even more careful use of terms in light of the rise of anti-immigration and populist narratives.

The scholarly community that supported a paradigm shift in segregation studies – towards the inclusion of the welfare state and socio-economic inequality in the analyses – plays an even more valuable role today. Originally it emerged as a movement challenging convergence theories embedded in the globalisation discourse(s), social polarisation theory and the dual city order. But *contextual* and *divergence comparative perspectives* continue to offer a critical framework for scholars to respond and react to the dominant neoliberal narratives and practices that shifted the theoretical premises for policies away from social equity principles, the cornerstone upon which the many different Europe(s) have been imagined. The quest for new metaphors continues...

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